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Cuba, 1961-1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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Cuba, 1961-1962

226. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, May 31, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Secret. Although the memorandum does not have a standard to-from heading, it was apparently prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency in response to a request from the Cuba Study Group for additional information relating to the Bay of Pigs operation.

SUBJECT

What briefing, if any, was given the Brigade or the Brigade's staff on going guerrilla

REFERENCE

Paragraph F. of Memorandum Dated 22 May 1961/1/

/1/Not further identified.

The following is a summation of actions involving preparation and instruction for contingency employment of the 2506 Brigade in the event elements of the Brigade or the unit in total suffered defeat and were forced to operate as guerrillas.

1. All officers and the original cadre (some 375 personnel) which formed the 2506 Brigade received extensive instruction (in excess of 13 weeks) in guerrilla warfare organization, tactics and techniques. It was with considerable difficulty and only after strenuous instruction on conventional operations that the officers of the Brigade were weaned from their marked inclination to guerrilla operations. Many of the unit leaders had in fact operated as guerrillas either with Castro forces in the fight against Batista or in the later operations against Castro after he had seized power.
2. During the evening staff and operations classes conducted during the Brigade training cycle extending from November 1960 through March 1961, several discussions were held on the subject of a conventional force defeated in the field and forced to continue resistance as a guerrilla element. Circumstances and ways of means of organizing and operating in various parts of Cuba were discussed in detail. These discussions did not cover the Zapata area specifically for security reasons, but covered the other feasible areas to include the Escambrays, Pinar del Rio and the Oriente. These discussions were not covered with any specific direction towards the Brigade operation in these locales, but were in the nature of contingency operations planning, i.e., "in the event we suffered defeat and it was physically possible, we would attempt to break contact and retire to a redoubt area

where we would initiate guerrilla activities." The stated mission of the Brigade for which it was organized and trained was to land by sea and air and fight a conventional conflict as an organized military force. At no time did the Brigade once organized receive training to fight as a guerrilla force. To have attempted to conduct such training would have detracted from the purpose for which the Brigade was organized and would have been detrimental to morale. An indigenous force of the size of the Brigade cannot be organized and trained in the time allocated to concurrently accomplish both missions (conventional military role and guerrilla force role) satisfactorily.

4. [sic] During the pre-staging briefings of commanders and key staff officers at the training base in Guatemala (period 25 March to 7 April 1961) the operation plan (less locale and target date) were briefed to the Brigade Commander, Deputy Commander and S-3. Contingency provision in the event of the defeat of the Brigade involving fragmentation of the unit and attempts to initiate guerrilla operations were discussed. It was mutually agreed that these contingency plans would be discussed only down to the level of battalion commanders prior to the landing to avoid defeatist talk and apprehension concerning success of the operation. These discussions covered both the aspects of an element or elements of the Brigade becoming cut off from the main body and attempting to break contact with the enemy, and assume guerrilla posture, as well as the possibility of the Brigade as a whole being cut off from the sea as it advanced inland and the possibility of its assuming a defense in a redoubt area or fragmenting for guerrilla operations. It was mutually agreed that no specific plans for this eventuality could be pre-planned insofar as ground actions were concerned due both to the security provisions prohibiting early briefing of any Cuban personnel as to the specific locale of the landing and the circumstances surrounding the combat action which might lead to an element or the whole of the Brigade to assume such a contingency plan. However, the following general provisions governing such operation were mutually agreed to:

- a. Resupply to the Brigade would be primarily by air with secondary reliance on clandestine maritime craft. Drop procedures would be provided for in the Operation Plan.
- b. Communications would be directed to the base control outside the target area by the five RS-1's and seven TPL radios in operation with the Brigade. (Not in the command commo trailer.)
- c. Tactical integrity would be preserved wherever possible and the operational size of guerrilla units would be dictated by the specific local conditions prevalent in the operation area.
- d. Command lines would be preserved with the Brigade Commander or his designated representative, preferably a senior unit commander exercising operational control of specific operational areas.
- e. Local recruits and volunteers would be accepted but the Brigade would maintain the 2506 personnel in command and key positions in all formations.
- f. Local law and customs would be observed, provisions or resources commandeered would be paid for or receipts given.
- g. Terrorist operations affecting personnel other than GOC governmental or military personnel would be avoided.

5. At Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, subsequent to briefing on the target area, these contingency provisions were further discussed with the same individuals (Brigade Commander, Deputy Commander and S-3) with further specifics addressed to the terrain of the Zapata area. The following points were covered:

- a. Red Beach Task Force (2nd Bn, 5th Bn and Co. A of 1st Airborne Bn) would hold Red Beach area in the event Blue Beach was forced to withdraw to the north. Blue Beach Force would withdraw to the north along the coast road. Upon junction with Red Beach Task Force at the head of the bay, the Brigade would withdraw to the south and west into the greater Zapata area, breaking contact with the enemy and assuming guerrilla operational

status or preparing for evacuation in increments as feasible. Alternate courses of action (evacuation or guerrilla status) were to be implemented as dictated by the circumstances.

b. In the event Red Beach was cut off by the enemy from contact with Blue Beach, the same course of action was to be followed by the Red Beach Force. If, however, the coast road to the Blue Beach area was open and the Blue Beach Force holding, the Red Beach Force was to retire to the south to effect junction with Blue Beach.

c. Blue Beach Force, if cut off from Red Beach and capable of breaking out, was to move as appropriate to either or both the following areas bordering Blue Beach and attempt to evade pursuit and initiate guerrilla operations.

(1) The area bounded on the north by El Jiqui and the Jaguey Grande Red Beach road to the northeastern edge of the swamp and thence south to the Covadonga/San Blas road and the road southwest to Playa Giron.

(2) The area to the east and north of Blue Beach bounded by the Playa Giron, San Blas, Covadonga road on the west thence southeast along the edge of the swamp to the western edge of Cienfuegos Bay.

d. It was mutually agreed that this plan might not be feasible if either major force (Red or Blue) were closely pressed by the enemy. Evacuation by sea was deemed undesirable by the three officers concerned who stated that they must fight and win or go down in defeat without recourse to evacuation and that they would not consider or discuss evacuation.

6. The Brigade Commander prior to embarkation stated that he had discussed the details of this contingency plan with the commanders he considered appropriate. He stated that he considered this plan to be particularly suitable for the small airborne contingents dropping on DZ's 4 and 5 at Jocuma and San Miguel de Pita respectively. This contingency was further discussed with the Airborne Battalion Commander De Valle on the night of 17 April prior to takeoff.

7. In summation it must be stated that little interest or enthusiasm was displayed by the Brigade personnel concerned for any aspect of the plan that involved retreat and defeat, to include this contingency for guerrilla operations plan. It was generally recognized and openly stated by the key officers that any military force involved in an airborne/amphibious landing and subsequent field operations against an enemy defending his homeland would have an extremely difficult time assuming a guerrilla role in any substantive force subsequent to defeat in the field. The defeat itself implied that the enemy in close combat had surrounded or ruptured and destroyed the Brigade as a military force, thus allowing only a fraction of its combat effectives to escape to assume a role as escapees and evaders with a limited potential for later guerrilla operations.

227. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) to Secretary of Defense McNamara

CM-224-61

Washington, June 8, 1961.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that McNamara's office received the memorandum on June 9.

SUBJECT

Cuba

In response to your request, the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, in consultation with the Central Intelligence Agency, has prepared an estimate of usable guerrilla areas, the political-police control mechanism, key pro-Castro sub-leaders, and possible guerrilla centers in Cuba, enclosed herewith.

L.L. Lemnitzer/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.

Enclosure

CUBA

1. Preamble. It is impossible to estimate the amount of really hard-core pro-Castro residual which would remain in Cuba after the overthrow of Castro. Many factors would contribute to increase or decrease the guerrilla potential facing any successor government. Some of these factors are:

- a. Degree of acceptability of new government to Cuban population.
- b. Policy of new government with regard to good agrarian reforms instituted by Castro.
- c. Extent of vindictiveness practiced by new governmental bureaucracy against Castroites.
- d. Efficiency with which campaign to overthrow Castro was executed and degree of success quickly attained. Almost all factual information on Cuba is old. New information is very fragmentary and mostly laced with gossip, rumor, and propaganda. Current sources are not considered trained intelligence observers and their information is not subject to check or confirmation, hence is of little value. Any estimate on Cuba at this time must necessarily be based on background rather than current information.

2. Pro-Castro Areas of Cuba

- a. Geographically. Pro-Castro sentiment exists throughout the island. The degree to which a particular area or province should be regarded as pro-Castro or anti-Castro cannot be determined with any precision. Localities which, on the surface, appear mostly pro-Castro might react violently anti-Castro if the political-police control apparatus were removed or if US forces were in the area. We have no reliable evidence upon which to base a precise judgment that certain geographic areas are more or less pro-Castro than others but Havana province and parts of Oriente province are probably the most pro-Castro localities.
- b. Sociologically. Within the Cuban society, Castro's principal support comes from the peasant or campesino group and the underprivileged. Identification of these groups with the Castro regime has given them a sense of importance in the Cuban scene far beyond that which they formerly enjoyed. Continued identification with Castro promises them a far better life than they heretofore had any reason to expect. Many of these people have become so tied to the Castro regime by their own acts that their lives would be forfeit under any successor government. Hence, it is probable that many of them would at least attempt to flee to the hills and continue to fight if Castro was able to gain sanctuary in the mountains. Important Castro strength also exists in the ranks of urban labor and among the students although in both groups considerable anti-Castro sentiment is evident. The Havana Dock Workers Union and the Electrical Trades Union have both exhibited displeasure over working conditions and pay scales under Castro. The students are angry over the loss of autonomy of their institutions of learning, long a Latin American tradition, and there have been some anti-Castro manifestations as a result. However, offsetting factors include the infusion of many rural students by Castro who would otherwise have been unable to attend.
- c. Governmental. The large governmental bureaucracy which extends into every province, city, town, village, and hamlet on the island can be regarded as staunchly pro-Castro, although defections do occur from time to time.

All governmental officials including the rural police owe their jobs to loyalty to and support of Castro. However, it is probable that, faced with the overthrow of Castro's government, many of these people would immediately switch sides.

3. Areas Favorable for Guerrilla Activity. (See Appendix "A")/2/ Traditionally, the mountainous areas of Cuba have been used for guerrilla activity, and these areas still provide the most favorable areas from which to conduct this type of activity. Suitable areas exist in Pinar del Rio province (Sierra de los Organos and Sierra del Rosario), Las Villas province (Sierra de Trinidad, also known as Sierra de Escambray), and Oriente province (Sierra Maestra, Sierra del Cristal, and Cuchillas de Toar). Historically, the Peninsula de Zapata has also harbored guerrilla bands, but because of the difficulties of egress, especially in the rainy season, has not seen extensive use.

/2/Appendix A, not printed, is a map of Cuba with the areas cited in the text highlighted.

4. Political-Police Control Mechanism

a. Provincial Organization. The political-police mechanism in Cuba is based on the provincial organization and all provinces follow the same pattern. Each province has a rural police regiment whose headquarters is located in the provincial capital city. Subordinate to the police regiment are a reserve company and several police squadrons each of approximately 165 officers and men, varying in numbers according to the size of the province and the number of important urban localities in the province. Squadron headquarters are located in the principal towns in the province. Squadrons, in turn, establish police posts (usually 8-10 men each) in the smaller towns and villages, and patrol outlying areas and beaches. Communication is via both police and commercial facilities, including radio communication with patrol vehicles. Under Castro, a system of "block informants" has been established which keeps the police informed of anti-Castro or counter-revolutionary activities. Local part-time militia units are based on the local police post or squadron headquarters where their arms are normally stored and where orders are received.

b. National Organization. Rural police regiments are controlled from Havana by the Ministry of Armed Forces. The total strength of the Rural Police (a part of the Army) is 9,600. Within Havana itself, police power is exercised by the National Police, a force of about 9,000 whose current subordination is unknown. The National Police have not heretofore been a part of the Cuban Armed Forces.

5. Key Pro-Castro Sub-Leaders. In view of the paucity of credible information currently coming out of Cuba, any listing of key sub-leaders would necessarily be based on past, rather than current, performance. Further, given Castro's penchant for rapidly disposing of "friends" who do not fully agree with him, it may rapidly be outdated. However, the list of personalities at Appendix "B"/3/ represents some of the key second and third line leaders as nearly as can be determined at this time. Additional names are filed by the intelligence community and are watched as information becomes available. However, it can be assumed that all governmental and military leaders including local mayors, governors, cabinet ministers and sub-ministers could be considered in the key sub-leader category.

/3/Not printed.

6. Possible Guerrilla Centers. As indicated in paragraph 3 supra, certain areas of Cuba lend themselves favorably to guerrilla activity. However, the exact location of guerrilla centers could only be determined after they develop, with one notable exception. In January 1961, a report from a trained observer in Cuba indicated that arms and ammunition were being placed in an abandoned mine in the Sierra Maestra in Oriente province. Since that time, additional reports have indicated that a military camp was under construction at the same place, the remnants of the only parachute-trained unit in the Cuban Army are reported stationed there, and the same area has been used to train Latin American youths invited to Cuba for revolutionary training. Significantly, this area was Fidel Castro's base before his successful seizure of power from Batista, and knowing the difficulties he experienced in obtaining arms and ammunition during his stay on the Pico Turquino in the Sierra Maestra, it is a logical place

for his stockpiling weapons against the possibility of his overthrow. This location is known as Minas del Frio. It must be noted, however, that there is no evidence of recent date to confirm this analysis.

7. If the Cuban populace failed to support the overthrow of Castro and chose to support pro-Castro guerrilla bands, the following general areas could become guerrilla centers and might possibly support guerrilla populations as noted:

Province: Pinar del Rio

Area: Sierra de los Organos

Supportable Guerrilla Population: 100

Province: Pinar del Rio

Area: Sierra del Rosario

Supportable Guerrilla Population: 100

Province: Las Villas

Area: Sierra de Trinidad

Supportable Guerrilla Population: 2,000

Province: Oriente

Area: Sierra Maestra

Supportable Guerrilla Population: 5,000

Province: Oriente

Area: Sierra del Cristal

Supportable Guerrilla Population: 300

Province: Oriente

Area: Cuchillas de Toar

Supportable Guerrilla Population: 200

Guerrillas in these areas would exist by foraging on the local population for food, clothing, and medical supplies.

228. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy

Washington, June 8, 1961.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Cuba 1961 121-353. Confidential. Drafted by Mountain.

SUBJECT

Service of Cuban Volunteers in U.S. Armed Forces

In response to your instruction at the NSC meeting of 5 May 1961,/1/ the Department of Defense has prepared the attached program/2/ to enable Cuban volunteers to serve in the U.S. armed forces.

/1/See Document 204.

/2/Not printed.

There is at present no census of the Cuban exile population in the United States which accurately reflects the number of males between the military ages of 17 to 26. However, from figures supplied by the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center in Miami, out of a total of 25,000 of all ages registered at the center, 17,350 are adults of whom approximately 75% fall within the 35-50 age group. On this basis it appears likely that no more than 3,500 are of military age. If this figure represents the upper limit, the number who would be interested in volunteering for service with the U.S. armed forces will probably be considerably smaller. In the absence of a census, the plan has assumed that the number of volunteers will be not more than 2,000 and may be as few as 800.

There are some legal barriers to the enlistment of aliens in the U.S. armed forces. These barriers, however, do not prevent their voluntary induction if they are between the ages of 18-26. It is therefore planned to make use of the existing mechanisms of the U.S. Selective Service System to provide special quotas for induction into the three services of Cuban volunteers in this age group as they become identified and available. An exception in the law allows the enlistment of aliens up to age 31 in the regular Navy and up to age 28 in the regular Marine Corps. The plan makes use of this provision as well.

Special measures for security screening have been stipulated.

The Department of Health, Education and Welfare has agreed to provide and fund any needed English language training prior to actual induction of volunteers. The purpose of this arrangement is to avoid the necessity for assembling Cuban personnel in one place for training under military auspices. With their English language training completed before entry into the armed services, Cubans can be processed and trained as individuals along with U.S. personnel. In addition, this arrangement assures the military services of trainable people from the start, and will tend to cut down attrition rates after induction.

Although the Cuban volunteers will join the armed forces as individuals and will be trained as such along with U.S. personnel, the military services will be given informal instructions to make provisions for readily identifying and locating each of these volunteers should it ever become necessary.

The services will be required to give these volunteers the most advanced individual training possible. However, assignment to training or duty requiring access to classified information will be held to a minimum.

No increase in manpower ceilings is proposed. Once language training has been funded by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, additional costs to the military services for the processing of these volunteers can be handled within present budgets./3/

/3/On July 10 McNamara sent a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force indicating that the President had concurred in the program for the induction of Cuban volunteers into the U.S. armed forces, outlined in this memorandum. McNamara instructed that the program be implemented by each of the services as quickly as possible. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Cuba 1961 121-353)

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original.

229. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, June 13, 1961.

//Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Secret; Hold Closely. Prepared by Admiral Burke.

SUBJECT

Meeting with the President and the Taylor Group at 1700, 13 June 1961

PRESENT

The President

General Taylor

The Attorney General

Admiral Burke

Mr. Allen Dulles

1. General Taylor outlined what we had found in the Cuban matter. He went over the recommendations/1/ at great length. The President was quite interested in the recommendations on the cold war organization. That is, the Strategic Resources Board, suggested in the first recommendation. General Taylor told him all the advantages of the thing. That they needed such a board, that this would coordinate the activities of State, Defense and Intelligence and other agencies. He gave all the benefits of it. The President was quite taken with it.

/1/See Document 234.

2. After General Taylor got through I said that this thing might not work as well as it would seem on the surface. There was great danger in this because if the Man became an assistant President, it would be very difficult to operate with State and Defense. In addition to that if the staff grew, and I thought that it would grow because of the habits of staffs in Washington, then the staff would surely impinge upon the duties of State and Defense and they would quite rightfully become concerned about this new agency taking over their duties. Furthermore, that there was such a thing as passive resistance and that if for any reason people in State or Defense thought that this new agency was taking over, there would be conflict and differences of opinion and the activities would not be well done. In addition to that, if this man started to give military advice there would be difficulties between him and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. This, the President listened to but I think he discounted the difficulties a great deal. In any case, he discussed the advantages at great length but did not discuss the disadvantages except to state that the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State should both be briefed very carefully before the idea was suddenly sprung on them. This was to get them acclimated to the idea.

Comment: I still think that the idea has a slight chance of working. It was quite evident that Taylor is to be given the job because during the conversation, the President said that he wanted to speak with Taylor for about half an

hour sometime tomorrow, Wednesday.

4. They went over the other recommendations, with which the President agreed.

5. It was decided that there would be two meetings, one on Thursday or Friday morning, which would brief the Cuban affair./2/ Present at this meeting would be the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Dulles, Mr. Bissell, other leading people from CIA, Mr. McGeorge Bundy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There would be a second meeting on Monday or Tuesday, which would go over the recommendations with approximately the same group./3/ Before this meeting, however, General Taylor and the rest of us would have to get together with Mr. McNamara and Mr. Rusk.

/2/No record of this meeting has been found.

/3/A record of this meeting, which took place on June 19, is in the Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials.

6. I pointed out to General Taylor that I thought Mr. McNamara, and perhaps others, were going down to a tactical exercise in Camp LeJeune on Friday. This didn't seem to have much effect but Taylor said that he would look into it.

7. I also mentioned that I was to go to the hospital and they asked if that could be postponed and I said of course it could, so I may have to postpone my trip to the hospital.

8. It was decided that there would be no report and that the President would make some sort of release that he had received recommendations and was studying them and expected to put some of them into effect.

9. There was considerable discussion as to what might have happened had they had air superiority. It was pointed out that there was a difference of opinion between General Taylor and Bobby Kennedy and Mr. Dulles and myself on that. The President read that.

10. The President seemed to be in pain, but seemed to be satisfied with the report in general. This meeting lasted for about an hour so there was considerable discussion on some of the details, most of which were not too important. I did bring out that General Somoza/4/ had talked with me and that General Somoza wanted to conduct another revolution, which I thought was a good thing but the President said, "here we go again."

/4/The reference is to the President of Nicaragua.

Arleigh Burke/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

230. Letter From the Chairman of the Cuba Study Group (Taylor) to President Kennedy

Washington, June 13, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Secret.

Dear Mr. President: By your letter of April 22, 1961,/1/ you charged me in association with Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Admiral Arleigh Burke and Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles to study our governmental practices and programs in the areas of military and paramilitary, guerrilla and anti-guerrilla activity which fell short of outright war with a view to strengthening our work in this area. You directed special attention to the lessons which can be learned from the recent events in Cuba.

/1/See the source note, Document 169.

On May 16, our Cuban Study Group submitted to you an interim oral report of our conclusions as of that date./2/ We are now prepared to make our final report to you orally,/3/ supported by the following memoranda:

/2/See Documents 218 and 219.

/3/See Document 229.

Memorandum No. 1 "Narrative of the Anti-Castro Operation Zapata"

Memorandum No. 2 "Immediate Causes of Failure of the Operation Zapata"

Memorandum No. 3 "Conclusions of the Cuban Study Group"

Memorandum No. 4 "Recommendations of the Cuban Study Group"/4/

/4/These four memoranda are printed as Documents 231-234.

In your letter of April 22, you invited me to submit an individual report subject to the review and comment of my associates. As we have found no difficulty in reaching a unanimous view on all essential points under consideration, we are submitting this view as a jointly agreed study.

In closing, may I express our view of the great importance of a prompt implementation of our first recommendation to establish a Strategic Resources Group supported by a Cold War Indications Center which will allow our government readily to focus its resources on the objectives which you set in the so-called Cold War. We feel that we are losing today on many fronts and that the trend can be reversed only by a whole-hearted union of effort by all Executive departments and agencies of the Government under your guidance.

Sincerely yours,

Maxwell D. Taylor

231. Memorandum No. 1 From the Cuba Study Group to President Kennedy

Washington, June 13, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Secret; Eyes Only; Ultrasensitive.

NARRATIVE OF THE ANTI-CASTRO

CUBAN OPERATION ZAPATA

I. Development of the Concept and Plan

1. Although the Cuban situation had been the subject of serious study in the Special Group,/1/ Central Intelligence Agency and other Government agencies since 1958, this study takes as its point of departure the basic policy paper, "A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime," approved by the President on 17 March 1960. (See Annex 1)/2/ This document, developed by the Central Intelligence Agency and indorsed by the Special Group, provided a program divided into four parts to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime

by covert means:

/1/The Special Group, sometimes called the 5412 Committee, consists of a Deputy Under Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Director, Central Intelligence and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and meets weekly to consider covert operations conducted by the CIA under the authority of NSC 5412/2. [Footnote in the source text.]

/2/The annexes cited in this memorandum were attached but are not printed. Some of the documents included in the annexes are printed, as noted in footnotes below. The March 17, 1960, policy paper cited here is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1958-1960, vol. VI, pp. 850-851.

- a. The creation of a responsible and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime located outside of Cuba.
- b. The development of means for mass communication to the Cuban people as a part of a powerful propaganda offensive.
- c. The creation and development of a covert intelligence and action organization within Cuba which would be responsive to the orders and directions of the exile opposition.
- d. The development of a paramilitary force outside of Cuba for future guerrilla action.

2. Since the primary purpose of this study is to examine the paramilitary actions growing out of this program and its successive modifications, the paragraph referring to the paramilitary aspects of the plan is quoted in its entirety;

"d. Preparations have already been made for the development of an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba, together with mechanisms for the necessary logistics support of covert military operations on the island. Initially a cadre of leaders will be recruited after careful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors. In a second phase a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of the United States so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited there both before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of resistance. The creation of this capability will require a minimum of six months and probably closer to eight. In the meanwhile, a limited air capability for resupply and for infiltration and exfiltration already exists under CIA control and can be rather easily expanded if and when the situation requires. Within two months it is hoped to parallel this with a small air supply capability under deep cover as a commercial operation in another country."

3. It is apparent from the above excerpt that at the time of approval of this document the concept of paramilitary action was limited to the recruitment of a cadre of leaders and the training of a number of paramilitary cadres for subsequent use as guerrillas in Cuba.

4. The CIA began at once to implement the decisions contained in the policy paper on 17 March 1960. A target of 300 men was set for the recruitment of guerrillas to be trained covertly outside the United States. Radio SWAN was installed on Swan Island and ready for broadcasting on 17 May 1960. (See Annex 2) Steps were taken to develop the FRD (Frente Revolucionario Democrático) as the Cuban front organization composed of a broad spectrum of Cuban political elements other than Communists and Batistianos. (See Annex 3) On August 18th, a progress report was given to the President and the Cabinet, at which time a budget of some \$13 million was approved, as well as the use of Department of Defense personnel and equipment. However, it was specified at this time that no United States military personnel were to be used in a combat status.

5. Sometime in the summer of 1960 the paramilitary concept for the operation began to change. It appears that leaders in the CIA Task Force set up in January 1960 to direct the project were the first to entertain the thought of a Cuban strike force to land on the Cuban coast in supplementation of the guerrilla action contemplated under

the March 17, 1960 paper. These CIA officers began to consider the formation of a small force of infantry (200-300 men) for contingency employment in conjunction with other paramilitary operations, and in June began to form a small Cuban tactical air force. Eventually it was decided to equip this force with B-26 aircraft which had been widely distributed to foreign countries including countries in Latin America.

6. There were ample reasons for this new trend of thought. The air drops into Cuba were not proving effective. There were increasingly heavy shipments of Communist arms to Cuba, accompanied by evidence of increasingly effective control of the civilian population by Castro. The Special Group became aware of these adverse factors which were discussed repeatedly in the Committee meetings during the fall of 1960. The minutes of the conferences indicate a declining confidence in the effectiveness of guerrilla efforts alone to overthrow Castro.

7. In this atmosphere the CIA began to implement the new concept, increasing the size of the Cuban force in training and reorienting the training toward preparation for its use as an assault force on the Cuban coast. On November 4th, CIA in Washington dispatched a cable to the project officer in Guatemala describing what was wanted. (See Annex 4) The cable directed a reduction of the guerrilla teams in training to 60 men and the introduction of conventional training for the remainder as an amphibious and airborne assault force. From that time on, the training emphasis was placed on the assault mission and there is no evidence that the members of the assault force received any further preparation for guerrilla-type operations. The men became deeply imbued with the importance of the landing operation and its superiority over any form of guerrilla action to the point that it would have been difficult later to persuade them to return to a guerrilla-type mission. The final training of the Cubans was done by 38 U.S. Army Special Forces personnel under Lt. Colonel David Crowe who arrived on January 13 in the training camp in Guatemala where 400-500 Cubans had been assembled.

8. As mentioned in paragraph 5 above, in order to prepare for this operation, the CIA had been obliged early to organize a task force for planning the operation, and then later was to adjust that organization to the execution phase. (See Annexes 5 & 6) In both phases the task force commander, Mr. J.D. Esterline, reported upward through Mr. R.M. Bissell, Deputy Director, Plans, to General C.P. Cabell, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the Director, Mr. Allen Dulles. The latter, while accepting full responsibility for the operation, generally did not inject himself into military operational matters.

9. During the early months of the development of the plan, the Director, CIA looked to the 5412 Committee (Special Group) for guidance and approval of his covert plans for Cuba. In the period December 10, 1960 to February 8, 1961, former Ambassador Whiting Willauer and Mr. Tracy Barnes of CIA were charged with keeping the President and the Secretary of State informed. By the end of January following the change in administration, the President assisted by a restricted group of advisors from the National Security Council took over the function of approval and the 5412 Committee tended to recede from a position of responsibility. However, the Director of Central Intelligence continued to keep the Committee informed of the covert aspects of the plan.

10. The Director of Central Intelligence briefed the President on the new paramilitary concept on 29 November 1960 and received the indication that the President wished the project expedited. The concept was formally presented to the Special Group on December 8, 1960. At this meeting, Colonel Jack Hawkins, USMC, in charge of the paramilitary section for the Cuba project, described the new concept as one consisting of an amphibious landing on the Cuban coast of 600-750 men equipped with weapons of extraordinarily heavy fire power. The landing would be preceded by preliminary air strikes launched from Nicaragua against military targets. Air strikes as well as supply flights would continue after the landing. The objective would be to seize, hold a limited area in Cuba, maintain a visible presence, and then to draw dissident elements to the landing force, which hopefully would trigger a general uprising. This amphibious landing would not entirely eliminate the previous concept for infiltrating guerrilla teams. It was expected that some 60-80 men would be infiltrated prior to the amphibious landing.

11. The Special Group was also briefed on the quality of the Cuban force in training in Guatemala. Lt. Colonel

Frank Egan, the Army officer on duty with CIA in charge of training, described the superior characteristics of the individuals, particularly as to motivation, intelligence, and leadership qualities. He expressed the opinion that such a force would have no difficulty inflicting heavy casualties on a much larger militia force.

12. There is no evidence that the Special Group formally approved this plan at the time but the CIA representatives were encouraged to continue in its development. A comment was made at the meeting that the existence of the U.S.-backed force of Cubans in training was well known throughout Latin America.

13. During this period the CIA Task Force headquarters for the projects was developing a detailed operation plan to support the new concept. It is referred to in this study as Operation Trinidad, named after the Cuban town on the southeast coast which was to be the site of the amphibious landing. On January 11th, Ambassador Willauer representing State and Mr. Barnes of CIA first discussed with representatives of the Joint Staff the over-all problem of effecting the overthrow of Castro. As a result, a working committee including representation of CIA, State, Defense, and the JCS was formed to coordinate future actions in pursuit of this objective. At this meeting the Trinidad Plan as such was not discussed.

14. At about this time, the change in the national administration produced a break in the continuity of the development of the plan. On January 22nd, several members of the new administration including Mr. Rusk, Mr. McNamara, Mr. Bowles, and Mr. Robert Kennedy were introduced to the Cuba project at a briefing at the State Department. General Lemnitzer and Mr. Dulles were also present. A Joint Staff concept was presented by General Lemnitzer of the U.S. directed or supported actions in ascending order necessary to overthrow Castro.

15. Early in January, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that there was need for an over-all United States plan of action for the overthrow of Castro and produced a paper, JCSM-44-61/3/ (See Annex 7), in which they recommended the institution of an interdepartmental group to consider various courses of action in ascending degree of U.S. involvement, which, after approval by the President, would become an over-all plan to be supported by subordinate plans prepared by the agencies concerned. This recommendation reached the Secretary of Defense, but appears to have been lost in the activities arising out of the change in administration.

/3/Document 28.

16. On November 18, 1960, President-elect Kennedy had first learned of the existence of a plan for the overthrow of Castro through a call on him at Palm Beach by Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell. He received his first briefing on the developing plan as President on January 28 at a meeting which included the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Assistant Secretary Mann, Assistant Secretary Nitze, Mr. Tracy Barnes, and Mr. McGeorge Bundy.^{4/} (See Annex 8) After considerable discussion, the President authorized the following:

^{4/}See Documents 30 and 31.

- a. A continuation and accentuation of current activities of the CIA, including increased propaganda, increased political action, and increased sabotage. Continued overflights of Cuba were specifically authorized.
- b. The Defense Department was to review CIA proposals for the active deployment of anti-Castro Cuban forces on Cuban territory and the results of this analysis were to be promptly reported to the CIA.
- c. The State Department was to prepare a concrete proposal for action with other Latin American countries to isolate the Castro regime and to bring against it the judgment of the Organization of American States. It was expected that this proposal would involve a commitment of the President's personal authority behind a special mission or missions to such Latin American leaders as Lleras, Betancourt, and Quadros.

17. Following this meeting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff undertook to evaluate Plan Trinidad in the form developed

by the CIA up to that point. The Chiefs approved and forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 3 February 1961, JCSM-57-61, "Military Evaluation of the CIA Paramilitary Plan--Cuba."/5/ (See Annex 9) The evaluation was summarized in paragraphs 1 p and 1 q as follows: "In summary, evaluation of the current plan results in a favorable assessment, modified by the specific conclusions set forth above, of the likelihood of achieving initial military success. It is obvious that ultimate success will depend upon political factors, i.e., a sizable popular uprising or substantial follow-on forces. It should be noted that assessment of the combat worth of assault forces is based upon second- and third-hand reports, and certain logistic aspects of the plan are highly complex and critical to the initial success. For these reasons, an independent evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the invasion force and detailed analysis of logistics plans should be made by a team of Army, Naval and Air Force officers, if this can be done without danger of compromise of the plan. Despite the shortcomings pointed out in the assessment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that timely execution of this plan has a fair chance of ultimate success and, even if it does not achieve immediately the full results desired, could contribute to the eventual overthrow of the Castro regime."

/5/Document 35.

18. Because of the feeling of lack of direct knowledge expressed by the Chiefs, it was decided to send a team of three officers from the Joint Staff to examine and report on the military effectiveness of the Cuban Expeditionary Force at its Guatemala base. This visit was made in the period 24-27 February and resulted in a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff/6/ (See Annex 10) which included the estimate that because of the visibility of activities at Retalhuleu in Guatemala and Puerto Cabezas in Nicaragua, the odds against surprise being achieved was about 85 to 15. The JCS air evaluation pointed out that if surprise were not achieved, the attack against Cuba would fail, adding that one Castro aircraft armed with 50 caliber machine guns could sink all or most of the invasion force. The Joint Chiefs in approving this report on 10 March 1961 commented to the Secretary of Defense that, "Based upon a general review of the military portion of the plan, an evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the forces and an analysis of the logistics plan from a military standpoint, since the small invasion force will retain the initiative until the location of the landing is determined, the plan could be expected to achieve initial success. Ultimate success will depend on the extent to which the initial assault serves as a catalyst for further action on the part of anti-Castro elements throughout Cuba." The Joint Chiefs of Staff in their forwarding memorandum to the Secretary of Defense recommended that, "A military instructor experienced in the operational logistics be assigned to the training unit immediately for the final phase of the training." Such an officer, Lt. Colonel Ray Wall, USMC, was dispatched from Washington and remained with the CEF (Cuban Expeditionary Force) for some time, assisting in correcting some of the logistics deficiencies previously noted by the inspection team.

/6/JCSM-146-61, Document 56.

19. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported the Trinidad Plan as one having "a fair chance of success" the plan encountered difficulties in other quarters. From its inception the plan had been developed under the ground rule that it must retain a covert character, that is, it should include no action which, if revealed, could not be plausibly denied by the United States and should look to the world as an operation exclusively conducted by Cubans. This ground rule meant, among other things, that no U.S. military forces or individuals could take part in combat operations. In due course it was extended to exclude pre-D-Day air strikes in support of the landing since such strikes could not have the appearance of being launched from Cuban soil before an airstrip had been seized by the landing force. This effort to treat as covert an operation which in reality could not be concealed or shielded from the presumption of U.S. involvement raised in due course many serious obstacles to the successful conduct of the operation which will be the subject of subsequent comment.

20. The President and his advisors were thoroughly aware of the difficulties of preserving the covert character of an operation as visible as a landing on a hostile shore and from the outset viewed the Trinidad Plan with caution. In particular, the State Department representatives opposed features of the plan because of the difficulty of concealing U.S. participation and also because of their fear of adverse reactions to the United States in Latin American countries and in the United Nations. They objected in particular to the conduct of any tactical air

operations unless these aircraft were either actually or ostensibly based on Cuban soil.

21. On the other hand, working to overcome this reluctance to approve the Trinidad Plan was the need to decide quickly what to do with the Cuban Expeditionary Force. The President was informed that this force must leave Guatemala within a limited time and that, further, it could not be held together long in the United States if it were moved there. If the decision were taken to disband the force, that fact would soon become known and would be interpreted as a renunciation by the U.S. of the effort to free Cuba from Castro. Faced with two unattractive alternatives, the President and his advisors asked the CIA to come up with various proposals for the use of this force as alternatives to Trinidad.

22. These proposals were the subject of detailed consideration on March 11th when the President and the National Security Council met to consider the various plans then being entertained for Cuba. Mr. Bissell of CIA presented a paper entitled, "Proposed Operation Against Cuba" which summarized the action to date and presented four alternative courses of action.^{/7/} (See Annex 11) It concluded by recommending the Trinidad Plan which he described to be an operation in the form of an assault in force preceded by a diversionary landing as the action having the best chance of achieving the desired result. The assault in force was to consist of an amphibious/airborne assault with concurrent (but no prior) tactical air support, to seize a beachhead contiguous to terrain suitable for guerrilla operations. The provisional government would land as soon as the beachhead had been secured. If initial military operations were successful and especially if there were evidence of spreading disaffection against the Castro regime, the provisional government could be recognized and a legal basis provided for U.S. logistic support.

^{/7/}See Documents 58 and 59.

23. The military plan contemplated the holding of a perimeter around a beachhead area. It was believed that initial attacks by the Castro militia, even if conducted in considerable force, could be successfully resisted. The scale of the operation, a display of professional competence and determination on the part of the assault force would, it was hoped, demoralize the Castro militia, cause defections therefrom, impair the morale of the Castro regime and induce widespread rebellion.

24. After full discussion of this plan the President indicated that he was willing to go ahead with the over-all project, but that he could not indorse a plan so "spectacular" as Trinidad. He directed that the CIA planners come up with other alternative methods of employing the Cuban forces. An acceptable plan should provide for a "quiet" landing, preferably at night, without having the appearance of a World War II type amphibious assault. The State Department requested that any beachhead seized should include an airfield capable of supporting B-26 operations, to which any tactical air operations could be attributed.

25. During the period 13-15 March the paramilitary staff of CIA worked intensively to devise a plan or plans having the desired characteristics, and presented a briefing to the JCS Working Group late in the morning of March 14. They produced for consideration three such alternatives as general concepts. They were based on three possible landing areas: (1) The Preston area on the north coast of Oriente Province; (2) the south coast of las Villas between Trinidad and Cienfuegos; and (3) the eastern Zapata area near Cochinos Bay.

26. On March 14th these three alternatives were referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their evaluation. The Joint Staff prepared this evaluation, the results of which the respective Service action officers presented to their respective Chiefs prior to the JCS meeting on 15 March. At this meeting, following a briefing by the Joint Staff Working Group, the Joint Chiefs approved the evaluation and reported to the Secretary of Defense that of the three, the Zapata concept was considered the most feasible and the most likely to accomplish the objective. They added that none of the alternative concepts were considered as feasible and likely to accomplish the objective as the Trinidad Plan.^{/8/} (See Annex 12) This preference for the Trinidad Operation seems to have been overlooked in the subsequent consideration of the plan by some of the senior civilian officials, including the Secretary of Defense to whom the views of the Chiefs were addressed.

27. An important question developed in the course of this study is the extent to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the Zapata Plan as it finally took form. The action on March 15th merely indicated a preference for the Zapata concept as opposed to the two other concepts considered (neither of which was the original Trinidad Plan). However, the record is clear (See Annex 13) that the Chiefs subsequently took active part in considering changes to the plan as it developed into final form, did not oppose the plan and by their acquiescing in it gave others the impression of approval. They considered the plan as a body four times after March 15th while the plan was in the formative stage, but did not review the plan in its final form because of the shortness of time between the submission of the plan to the JCS, April 15, and the actual landing. While individual Chiefs gave it considerably more personal attention than the above record suggests, they did not and probably could not give the plan the same meticulous study which a commander would give to a plan for which he was personally responsible. Also, individual Chiefs had differing views as to important aspects of the operation which in turn differed from those held by senior civilian officials.

28. On the same day as the Chiefs' action, March 15th, the President was briefed at the White House on the three alternative course of action which the Chiefs had considered.^{9/} After full discussion, the President again withheld approval of the plan and directed certain modifications to be considered. The CIA returned on the following day, March 16th, and presented a modification for the landing at Zapata which Mr. Bissell considered on balance more advantageous than the Trinidad Plan, wherein there would be air drops at first light instead of the previous day in the late afternoon, with the landing in the night and all the ships withdrawn from the objective area by dawn without completing the unloading at that time. The President authorized them to proceed with the plan, but still without giving it his formal approval.

/9/See Document 65.

29. As the Trinidad Plan developed, the question of air strikes became a matter of extended discussions. On January 4th, Colonel Hawkins wrote a memorandum to the Chief, WH/4 (Mr. Esterline) entitled, "Policy Decisions Required for Conduct of Strike Operations Against Government of Cuba."^{10/} (See Annex 14) The paper includes the statement, "The Cuban air force and naval vessels capable of opposing our landing must be knocked out or neutralized before our amphibious shipping makes its final run into the beach. If this is not done we will be courting disaster." The memorandum further recommended that the air preparation commence not later than dawn on D-1 and that a maximum number of aircraft be employed for this purpose. The State Department consistently resisted this kind of air preparation because of its "spectacular" nature and because of the inability to attribute pre-D-Day strikes to airplanes in Cuba. They also opposed the use of jets, although former Ambassador Whiting Willauer, who with Mr. Tracy Barnes monitored the plan in the period December 10-February 8, 1961 at the request of Secretary of State Herter, had pointed out the need for jet cover to protect the landing in discussions of the Special Group in January. It was felt that the range of jets would obviously require them to operate from U.S.-controlled bases and hence could not be brought within the requirements of non-attribution.

/10/Document 9.

30. In the end a compromise was reached with regard to the air plan. Early in April, it was decided to stage limited air strikes on D-2 at the time of diversionary landing of 160 men to be made in eastern Cuba. These strikes were for the purpose of giving the impression of being the action of Cuban pilots defecting from the Cuban Air Force and thus support the fiction that the D-Day landing was receiving its air support from within Cuba. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not favor these D-2 air strikes because of their indecisive nature and the danger of alerting prematurely the Castro force. Mr. Bissell of CIA also later stated at a meeting on April 6 that CIA would prefer to conduct an all-out air strike on the morning of D-Day rather than perform the D-2 defection strikes followed by limited strikes on D-Day. Nevertheless, the political advantages led to their inclusion in the

plan but with the realization that main reliance for the destruction of the Castro Air Force must be placed on the D-Day strikes.

31. At the time of the meeting with the President on 16 March,¹¹ preparations in the field were proceeding on the assumption that the landing would take place. The President agreed to this procedure but reserved the right to call off the plan even up to 24 hours prior to the landing. He approved the establishment of an interdepartmental working group to carry forward the work begun in January (see paragraph 13 above) and to assure closer coordination within the Executive Branch. On 23 March this working group produced a paper containing agreed tasks prepared by the Joint Staff for assignment to the various agencies of the Federal Government.¹² (See Annex 15) This paper was the first successful action to formalize the interdepartmental coordination which up to this point had depended largely upon ad hoc committees and meetings at Presidential level. Because of the high security classification of the operations, few if any records were kept at these meetings and decisions were rarely in written form. Papers bearing on the operation were normally distributed at the start of a meeting and gathered up at the end.

¹¹/See Document 66.

¹²/See Document 72.

32. Initially, the Zapata Plan had a D-Day of 5 April. By 29 March it was apparent that no such D-Day could be kept and the President on that day advanced it to 10 April. This date later became infeasible for political reasons so that it slipped again to 17 April, the date of the actual landing.

33. On 12 April an important conference took place with the President, the Secretary of State, the JCS, and other NSC officials, in which Mr. Bissell of the CIA presented a paper which outlined the latest changes in the Zapata Operation, including the defections, the air strikes on D-2 and D-Day/¹³ (See Annex 16), and the following timetable:

¹³/See Documents 92 and 93.

D-7--Commence staging main force--staging completed night of D-5.

D-6--First vessel sails from staging area--last vessel departs early morning D-4.

D-2--B-26 defection operation--limited air strikes.

D-2--Diversionary landing in Oriente (night of D-3 to D-2).

D-Day--Main landings (night of D-1 to D)--limited air strikes. Two B-26's and liaison plane land on seized air strip.

D to D+1--Vessels return night of D to D+1 to complete discharge of supplies.

D+7--Diversionary landing in Pinar del Rio.

The President did not give final approval to the plan at this meeting. However, he was informed that the decision could not be delayed much longer as the no-go time for preliminary operations would be 12 o'clock Friday, 14 April, and for the main landing, 12 o'clock Sunday, 16 April.

34. Colonel Jack Hawkins, USMC, went to Puerto Cabezas to attend the final briefing of the Brigade and battalion commanders of the CEF. (See Annex 17) While there, on 13 April he was asked for a final evaluation of the quality and readiness of the Brigade. He replied in most enthusiastic terms (See Annex 18), praising the

combat readiness of the Brigade and the Cuban Air Force, and expressing confidence in the success of the project./14/ His views were circulated in Washington and reached the President.

/14/See Document 98.

35. Meanwhile, the ships of the invading force were approaching Cuba. The first operational event scheduled to occur was a diversionary landing 30 miles east of Guantanamo by a group of 160 men planned for the night of 14-15 April. The landing failed to take place, probably because of weak leadership on the part of the Cuban officer responsible for the landing. This failure may have had a considerable effect on the main landing as the diversion was intended to draw Castro's forces to the east and confuse his command.

36. At dawn on 15 April, the D-2 air strike took place against three Cuban air fields, a total of eight B-26's being employed for the purpose. Initial pilot reports indicated that 50% of Castro's offensive air was destroyed at Campo Libertad, 75%-80% aircraft destruction at San Antonio de Los Banos, and that the destruction at Santiago included two B-26's, one DC-3, one Lodestar and one T-33 or Sea Fury. Subsequent photographic studies and interpretation have assessed a greatly reduced estimate of the damage, amounting to five aircraft definitely destroyed and an indeterminable number of other planes suffering some damage. The attacking force lost one aircraft and crew to antiaircraft fire.

37. At about mid-day on D-1, 16 April, the President formally approved the landing plan and the word was passed to all commanders and officials involved in the operation. The frame of mind at that moment of the senior officials responsible for the approval of this operation seems to have been about as follows. It offered what appeared to be a last chance to overthrow Castro by Cubans before the weapons and technicians acquired from the Communists and repressive internal measures would make the task too hard without overt U.S. intervention. It was recognized as marginal and risky, but the Cuban Brigade, if not used quickly, would become a political liability, whereas used in a landing it might achieve important success before Castro became too strong. Even if unable to hold the beachhead, something would have been accomplished as the Brigade could turn guerrilla and provide a strong reinforcement to the resistance movement in the island.

38. CIA authorities had developed an elaborate propaganda program (See Annex 19) to support the military action against Castro. This was based on the use of the clandestine radio SWAN, the programs of 11 CIA controlled radio stations and extensive leaflet drops. The program was executed as planned, except for the D-day leaflet drops for which no means of delivery was available. The plan had been to drop the leaflets from B-26's and other aircraft involved in the support of the landing, but the military situation did not permit the diversion of effort. The content of the propaganda program was developed and approved within CIA.

39. There is no evidence of any effort at any higher level to guide and coordinate the over-all propaganda effort. In particular, the United States Information Agency was left in the dark with regard to the operational plans. On 5 April, Mr. Edward R. Murrow, Director of the United States Information Agency heard from a *New York Times* reporter that operations were underway for a landing in Cuba, backed and planned by the CIA. The reporter indicated that the *Times* had a very full story on the operation which, however, they did not intend to print but he did hope to persuade USIA to authorize briefings of the press in Miami following the landing. (See Annex 20)

40. Armed with this information, Mr. Murrow called on the Director of Central Intelligence who informed him that preparations were indeed underway, but did not give him details of the magnitude or the time of the landing which, indeed, had not been determined at that time. Under the terms of the interdepartmental coordination paper referred to in paragraph 31 above, the Department of State undertook to provide policy guidance beginning D-3 to the USIA in support of the plan, but this guidance was apparently not given. Hence, word of the landing received over the wire services on D-Day caught the USIA unprepared and without guidance.

41. In parallel with its propaganda program, the CIA had continued and accentuated activities directed at

stimulating political unrest in Cuba and harassing the Castro government. These actions included such things as clandestine broadcasts in Havana utilizing dormant TV channels, the infiltration of small provocateur groups equipped with printing presses and radios, the development of additional agent and guerrilla assets within the island, and the penetration of pro-Castro organizations. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

42. With regard to agent, guerrilla, and dissident assets, the pre-invasion reports differed somewhat but suggested considerable strength. (See Annex 20 A, Cuban Internal Situation 18 May 1961, and Annex 20 B, Map showing agents and assets.) It had been estimated by the CIA that from 2500 to 3000 persons supported by 20,000 sympathizers were actively engaged in resistance in Cuba, and that some 25 per cent of the Cuban populace would actively support a well-organized, well-armed force which was successful in establishing a stronghold on the island. At a CIA briefing on April 3, the view was expressed that the percentage of the Cuban population opposed to Castro at that time was much higher than the foregoing estimate, but that many would probably remain neutral until there was a strong indication of which side was winning.

43. At about 9:30 P.M. on 16 April, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, telephoned General C.P. Cabell of CIA to inform him that the dawn air strikes the following morning should not be launched until they could be conducted from a strip within the beachhead. Mr. Bundy indicated that any further consultation with regard to this matter should be with the Secretary of State.

44. General Cabell, accompanied by Mr. Bissell, went at once to Secretary Rusk's office, arriving there about 10:15 P.M./15/ (See Annex 21) There they received a telephone call from Colonel Jack Hawkins who, having learned of the cancellation of the D-Day strikes, called to present his view of the gravity of the decision. General Cabell and Mr. Bissell then tried to persuade the Secretary of State to permit the dawn D-Day strikes. The Secretary indicated that there were policy considerations against air strikes before the beachhead airfield was in the hands of the landing force and completely operational, capable of supporting the raids. The two CIA representatives pointed out the risk of loss to the shipping if the Castro Air Force were not neutralized by the dawn strikes. They also stressed the difficulty which the B-26 airplanes would have in isolating the battlefield after the landing, as well as the heavier scale of air attack to which the disembarked forces would be exposed. The Secretary of State indicated subsequently that their presentation led him to feel that while the air strikes were indeed important, they were not vital. However, he offered them the privilege of telephoning the President in order to present their views to him. They saw no point in speaking personally to the President and so informed the Secretary of State. The order cancelling the D-Day strikes was dispatched to the departure field in Nicaragua, arriving when the pilots were in their cockpits ready for take-off. The Joint Chiefs of Staff learned of the cancellation at varying hours the following morning.

/15/See Document 108.

45. Realizing the seriousness of this cancellation, the CIA officials set about to try to offset the damage. The invasion force was informed, warned of likely air attacks and the ships told to expedite unloading and to withdraw from the beach by dawn. A continuous cover of 2 B-26's over the beach was laid on. General Cabell arranged with the JCS to alert the fleet to a possible requirement for air cover and Early Warning destroyers. At 0430, he called on the Secretary of State at his home, reiterated the need to protect the shipping and by telephone made the request to the President. The request for air cover was disapproved but the Early Warning destroyers were authorized, provided they remained at least 30 miles from Cuban territory.

II. The Battle for the Beachhead, D-Day to D+2

(See Annex 22 entitled, "Sequence of Events D-2 to D+2 and Organization and Operation of the Command Post"; Operation Maps 1-3; and Annex 23, Colonel Beerli's Memorandum of 26 April 1961)

D-Day

Blue Beach

46. The ships in which the Cuban Expeditionary Force was embarked reached the objective area generally on time in the night of D-1 and the morning of D-Day. At Blue Beach the Brigade Commander, Jose Perez San Roman, went ashore at 0115 and immediately commenced the unloading of troops and supplies. (See Annexes 24, 25 and 26) The landing was discovered at once by local militia, some firing occurred, and the alarm was transmitted to troop and air headquarters throughout the island. In view of the situation, it was decided to give up the planned transshipment of the force earmarked to Green Beach and to put this force ashore at Blue Beach.

47. Castro's forces, though tactically surprised, reacted with speed and vigor. At dawn they began air attacks against the shipping and the beaches. In spite of these attacks, all vehicles and tanks at Blue Beach were unloaded from the LCU's by 0730, and all troops were ashore by 0825.

48. At 0930 an enemy Sea Fury hit and sank the freighter Rio Escondido, which carried in it 10 days' supply of ammunition for the Brigade and other valuable supplies. All crew members were rescued and transferred to the Blagar.

49. In the face of continuous air attacks, at 10 o'clock [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] the contract skipper in charge of the shipping, radioed CIA Headquarters that if jet air support were not immediately available, the ships would put out to sea. By this time, not only had the Rio been sunk at Blue Beach, but the Houston had been hit at Red Beach. CIA Headquarters approved the movement of the vessels to the south which began at once. The freighters Atlantico and Caribe preceded the two LCI's and three LCU's which followed the cargo ships at a slower speed imposed by the presence of the LCU's

50. After landing, the troops ashore pushed out from the beach as planned. Parachutists of the First Battalion dropped at 0730, seized the important road center of San Blas 10 miles northeast of Blue Beach, and established outposts to the north and east to cover the routes of ingress into the beachhead. They were quickly reinforced by the Third Battalion and a heavy weapons (4.2 mortars) detachment. They made contact with Castro forces in the afternoon which pushed back their outpost situated to the east. Starting at about 1700 and intermittently thereafter, San Blas was under attack from forces coming down the road from the north.

51. Radio communications within Blue Beach were non-existent during the entire operation. In going ashore, the troops had been obliged to wade through fairly deep water with the result that most of the portable radios got wet and never functioned thereafter.

Red Beach

52. The Second Battalion at Red Beach ran into militia units almost immediately upon landing, but cleared them from the beach area. The landing of the Battalion was slowed down by motor trouble with the aluminum ships' boats which were the only landing craft available. Out of nine, only two boats were usable for the 20-minute run from the Houston to the beach. The Fifth Battalion which was to follow the Second never did get ashore, partly because of the boat troubles, partly because of lack of initiative on the part of the Battalion Commander. Very few supplies were got ashore, other than those carried by the Second Battalion while debarking.

53. At daybreak, Red Beach was attacked by enemy aircraft, and at about 0630 the Houston was hit. Somewhat later, the ship went aground on the west shore of the Bahia de Cochinos about five miles from the landing beach. At that time it still had on board about 180 men of the Fifth Battalion who landed but never got into the fight at Red Beach. Later, many worked their way south to be picked up on the swampy keys by the U.S. Navy after the operation. In this air attack, the LCI Barbara J was also damaged by machine gun fire which disabled two of its engines, and a near miss, which caused it to take water. The damage to the Barbara J was not reported to CIA Headquarters until the next day at about 1700.

54. After cleaning up the beach area, the troops of the Second Battalion pushed north about four miles but soon encountered militia forces which prevented them from reaching the southern exit of the road across the swamp which they were to block. Fighting went on astride the road throughout the day, enemy tanks appearing in mid-afternoon and enemy artillery becoming active at about 1800.

Air Action

55. The parachute drops made by 5 C-46's and one C-54 took place at 0730 on D-Day. Indications are that the drops were reasonably accurate but considerable ammunition was lost near San Blas. The parachutists north of Red Beach apparently landed in the presence of the enemy and were not heard from thereafter. A total of 172 parachutists took part in the drops.

56. B-26 aircraft rotated over the beachhead through D-Day, sank one gunboat, and made effective strikes against enemy ground troops at Red Beach, inflicting several hundred casualties, according to report. In all, a total of 13 combat sorties were flown on D-Day, in the course of which 4 B-26's were lost to enemy T-33 action. In the same period, the Castro air force lost 2 Sea Furies and 2 B-26's to antiaircraft fire.

57. Impressed by the ease with which the T-33 aircraft could destroy the obsolete B-26 type aircraft, the CIA leaders decided to attempt, by a bombing attack, to destroy the remaining Castro aircraft at night on the ground. Six aircraft were scheduled to strike San Antonio de los Baños, believed to be the main base of operations, in two waves of three each during the night of 17-18 April. The mission was flown but was unsuccessful because of heavy haze and low clouds over the target.

58. Because of the developing shortage of ammunition in the beachhead at the end of D-Day, an air supply drop was arranged consisting of four C-54's and two C-46's. Of these drops, five were successful, but in one case most of the supplies drifted into the water from which only a part could be salvaged.

D+1

59. During the night of D-Day-D+1, the invasion shipping departing from the landing area for the south proceeded to a point about 50 miles off the Cuban coast. Here the two LCI's and three LCU's rendezvoused as directed, but the two freighters, the Atlantico and the Caribe continued south without pausing. They did not turn back until intercepted and encouraged to return by the United States Navy, the Atlantico some 110 miles to the south, and the Caribe 218 miles south of the Cuban coast. Thus, the Caribe was never available for resupply operations while the fight on the beach lasted and the Atlantico did not get back to the rendezvous point until 1645 on D+1, 18 April.

Red Beach

60. The troops north of Red Beach came under heavy attack during the early hours of D+1. At 0300 enemy tanks were reported approaching from the north and by 0730 the situation was so difficult that the decision was made to move the force to Blue Beach. This movement began at 0900 and was completed about 1030. By that time, ammunition was low in the Red Beach force, but casualties, about 20, were comparatively light.

61. After reaching Blue Beach, the retreating force was allowed about two hours of rest, after which they were given additional ammunition and ordered back toward Red Beach in order to block the coast road to the movement of the force with which they had been engaged in the Red Beach area. They encountered this force somewhere west of Blue Beach and heavy fighting ensued. Exactly what occurred is not known, but it is assumed that the invaders eventually succumbed to the superior numbers of Castro forces moving down from the north.

Blue Beach

62. Enemy artillery fire began falling on the troops in the San Blas area at 0400 and continued most of the day. In the absence of radio communication, it was necessary to send officer couriers from the San Blas area to Blue Beach in order to communicate with the Brigade Commander who had set up his command post on the beach. At 0730 Roberto San Roman, brother of the Brigade Commander, went back to the beach for this purpose, reporting the situation around San Blas and seeking information. The Brigade Commander at that time indicated that the situation at Red Beach was critical. In order to cover Blue Beach, he had stationed some of his reserve forces to the east blocking the coast road coming from that direction and others to the northwest to cover the approaches from that quarter.

63. During the day artillery fire and enemy pressure on the San Blas forces compelled a gradual contraction of their position around the town. They attempted a counterattack to the north in the afternoon, but it soon bogged down in the face of superior forces.

64. By the end of the day, ammunition was very low throughout the beachhead. Only M-1 ammunition seems to have been reasonably plentiful, although the commander of the Heavy Weapons Company indicates that he was never out of 4.2 mortar ammunition. He indicates, however, that it was necessary to ration it carefully. In spite of the heavy fighting, there appeared to have been surprisingly few casualties among the invaders.

65. In the evening, the Brigade Commander was asked by CIA Headquarters via the Blagar whether he wished evacuation. He replied, "I will not be evacuated. We will fight to the end here if we have to."

Air Action

66. On D+1 it became necessary to utilize some American civilian contract pilots to protect the beachhead area because some of the Cuban pilots either were too tired to fly or refused to do so. Six sorties were flown during the afternoon of D+1, attacking a long column of tanks and vehicles approaching Blue Beach along the coast road from the north. The attack was reported to have been very successful with an estimated 1800 casualties inflicted on the enemy and the destruction of 7 tanks. Napalm was used in these attacks, as well as bombs and rockets.

D+2

67. As events turned out, the night of D+1/D+2 offered the last opportunity to get ammunition to the beach. The Atlantico had returned from its trek to the south, rendezvousing with the other ships about 50 miles off the coast at 1645 on D+1. It began discharging cargo at once into the LCU's, completing the transfer at 2200, at which time *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* reported to CIA Headquarters that the LCI Blagar would escort the LCU's to Blue Beach unless otherwise advised. He indicated that his estimated time of arrival on the beach would be 0630, that is to say, dawn on D+2.

68. The Blagar began to move northward with the three LCU's, reporting to CIA Headquarters, however, that if low jet cover were not furnished by first light, the Captain believed that he would lose all the ships. Prior to this time he had requested the escort of a U.S. Navy destroyer. At 2145 CIA Headquarters wired the Blagar that a destroyer escort was not possible, to which message the Captain replied that if he could not get destroyer escort in and out of Blue Beach, his Cuban crew would mutiny. At CIA Headquarters in Washington these messages were discussed and the critical decision was taken to stop the northern movement of the ammunition ships and direct them to rendezvous some 60 miles south of the Cuban coast.

69. The reasons for this decision appear to have been as follows. The CIA leaders in Washington were aware of the liberal amount of ammunition (3 days' supply) which had been taken ashore on D-Day and also of the air drops on the night of D+1. (See Annex 27) Further, they had ordered additional drops on the night of D+1/D+2. Considering the climate in which this operation had been planned in Washington, the CIA leaders apparently felt

that it was hopeless to ask for either destroyer escort or jet cover for the ammunition convoy. Without this overt U.S. support, it was felt that the loss of the ships would be inevitable if they tried to run in daylight--if, indeed, they could get the Cuban crews to make the attempt. Under these circumstances, they felt justified in calling off the sea resupply effort and made no further attempt beyond an arrangement for another air drop to get in ammunition before the final surrender. Except for one C-46 which landed on the Blue Beach airstrip, the attempt to resupply by air was unsuccessful because of enemy control of the air over the beachhead.

70. Although permission was not sought for jet escort for the ammunition ships, Mr. Bissell of CIA sought and received Presidential authority to have the Navy to fly CAP over the beachhead from 0630 to 0730 on the morning of D+2. The purpose of this mission was to allow the B-26's to provide close support to the troops in the beachhead and cover for air resupply. This CAP was flown but, as indicated below, was of no avail.

71. Within the beachhead, the troops in the San Blas area began a general retreat in the morning of D+2. The last message received from the Brigade Commander by the Blagar at 1432 read: "Am destroying all equipment and communications. I have nothing left to fight with. Am taking to the woods. I can't wait for you." Units and individuals arriving at Blue Beach shortly thereafter found the Brigade Command Post gone and heavy artillery fire falling in the vicinity. Pressure on the beachhead was coming from the north and the northwest. The last known report on the situation indicates that at 1700 Blue Beach was still clear of the enemy. It appears that fighting ceased shortly thereafter and by nightfall resistance in the beachhead had ended.

Air Action

72. On the morning of D+2 American pilots were again used for the protection of the beachhead. The morning sorties were directed to arrive over the beachhead in the period 6:30 to 7:30 A.M. to take advantage of the one-hour period of Navy cover. For an undetermined reason, they came in almost an hour early with the result that two B-26's were destroyed by the T-33's. A total of 7 sorties were flown on this occasion with undetermined results.

73. As indicated above, three cargo aircraft tried to fly in ammunition on the morning of D+2 but were turned back by the presence of enemy air. A fourth C-46, succeeding in landing on the Blue Beach airstrip in the hours of darkness, unloaded ammunition and picked up a B-26 pilot who had been shot down, departing at daylight. (See Annex 28)

74. These sorties ended the action of the invasion force which began stand-down activities thereafter with a total of 21 aircraft still in commission. It is difficult to be sure of the losses suffered by the Castro Air Force. The D-2 air strikes positively destroyed 5 Castro aircraft, with undetermined damage to others, and 4 other combat aircraft were destroyed in the beachhead area.

/16/75. It may be asked how near the landing ever came to success. Had the ammunition shortage been surmounted, which is to say, had the Castro air been neutralized, would the landing force have accomplished its mission? Considering their lack of experience, the Cubans ashore fought well and inflicted considerable losses on the Castro militia while they had ammunition. Contrary to the view held prior to the landing that with control of the air the CEF could have maintained themselves for some time, with the rapid appearance of the vastly superior Castro forces on the scene, the ultimate success of such a small landing force became very unlikely. The limited number of B-26 crews, if forced to continue to operate from Nicaragua, would have been strained to provide continuous daylight air support to the beachhead. An attempt by the landing force to exercise the guerrilla option and take to the hills would have been virtually impossible because of the presence of the encircling Castro forces and of the instructions which the Cuban invasion units had received to fall back on the beaches in case of a penetration of the beachhead. Under the conditions which developed we are inclined to believe that the beachhead could not have survived long without substantial help from the Cuban population or without overt U.S. assistance. Although under these conditions the guerrilla alternative did not exist, with control of the air the CEF might have been able to withdraw wholly or in part by sea.

/16/Admiral Burke and Mr. Dulles consider that there is insufficient evidence to support the conjectures in this paragraph. The well motivated, aggressive CEF fought extremely well without air cover and with a shortage of ammunition. They inflicted very severe losses on the less well trained Cuban Militia. Consequently, it is reasonable to believe that if the CEF had had ammunition and air cover, they could have held the beachhead for a much longer time, destroyed much of the enemy artillery and tanks on the roads before they reached the beachhead, prevented observation of the fire of the artillery that might have been placed in position and destroyed many more of the local Militia en route to the area. A local success by the landing party, coupled with CEF aircraft overflying Cuba with visible control of the air, could well have caused a chain reaction of success throughout Cuba with resultant defection of some of the Militia, increasing support from the populace and eventual success of the operation. [Footnote in the source text.]

III. Involvement of the U.S. Navy

(See Annex 29, Subj: Rules of Engagement Operations "Bumpy Road")/17/

/17/A 4-page narrative account of the Rules of Engagement, covering the period March 24-April 20, prepared in CNO by Commander Mitchell.

76. As originally planned, the only involvement of the U.S. Navy in Operation Zapata was the requirement for one destroyer to escort the CEF ships on D-2 and D-1 to the transport area about 3 miles off-shore, and for one LSD to deliver landing craft (3 LCU's and 4 LCVP's) to the transport area. Also, there was the requirement for U.S. Naval air cover over the CEF ships during the hours of day-light on D-1.

77. As the date for the invasion approached, there were numerous discussions of the rules of engagement which would govern the use of Naval units. In final form, the approved rules of engagement allowed the U.S. Naval forces to open fire only if they or the CEF were attacked while under escort, and the escorting destroyers were not to approach within 20 miles of Cuban territory. If it became necessary for U.S. forces to intervene to protect the CEF ships, the operation would then be automatically cancelled, and the CEF ships would withdraw to a port to be designated by the CIA. Because of concern over the possible abandonment of the operation as the result of U.S. intervention, the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the request of CIA dispatched the following message on April 13 to CINCLANT, Admiral Dennison: "In summary, hope is that overall operations will not need to be aborted because of U.S. military intervention and to this end CEF prepared to take substantive risks."/18/

/18/See Document 96.

78. With the cancellation of the D-Day air strikes and the subsequent landing and combat on the beach, the requirements placed upon the U.S. Navy progressively increased. The rules of engagement indicated above remained in effect until 0422R, 17 April, when CINCLANT was directed by JCS 994221/19/ to be prepared to provide CAP for CEF shipping outside territorial waters and Early Warning for CEF ships. This was an anticipatory action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff while the request was being made to the White House for CAP following the cancellation of the D-Day air strikes. Only the employment of an EW vessel was authorized and these instructions were dispatched to CINCLANT at 0550./20/ The rules of engagement for U.S. Naval forces remained the same, except that the EW destroyers were not to close within 30 miles of Cuban territory (i.e., 10 miles farther away than previously authorized).

/19/Document 111.

/20/See footnote 3, Document 111.

79. At 1530, 17 April, based upon a CIA request which had Presidential approval, the JCS directed CINCLANT/21/ to establish a safe haven for CEF ships with U.S. Naval air cover over the CEF ships in

accordance with the following restrictions:

/21/See Document 115.

"a. Carrier ship operation no closer than 50 miles from Cuban territory.

"b Aircraft shall operate no closer than 15 miles to Cuban territory.

"c. No more than 4 aircraft on station at one time."

Further, CINCLANT was instructed that the rules of engagement were modified as follows:

"a. U.S. aircraft shall attack if unfriendly aircraft makes aggressive move by opening bomb bay doors when headed towards ship to be protected or start a strafing run on it. Attacks will not be made by U.S. aircraft under any other condition.

"b. No hot pursuit inside the 15 mile line from Cuban territory.

"c. U.S. aircraft ship shall not come up close to unfriendly aircraft except when attacking it.

"d. If unfriendly aircraft is shot down every effort shall be made to hide the fact that such action has occurred."

Note that the above rules of engagement still give a tactical advantage to the attacking Cuban aircraft before they can be taken under fire by the U.S. forces.

80. At 1337R, 18 April, based upon a call from Admiral Burke from the White House, the JCS directed CINCLANT to conduct a photo and visual reconnaissance using unmarked naval aircraft as soon as possible to determine the situation on the beach./22/ The aircraft were authorized to protect themselves from attack and were to take all precautions to avoid being identified as U.S.

/22/See Document 122.

81. Based upon a call from Admiral Burke at the White House, the JCS at 1449R, 18 April, directed CINCLANT to prepare unmarked naval planes for possible combat use./23/ The number to be left to CINCLANT's discretion. CINCLANT was advised in this same message that there was no intention of U.S. intervention. These aircraft were made ready but permission was not given to use them.

/23/See Document 123.

82. At 1957R, 18 April, the JCS informed CINCLANT of the possibility that C-130 aircraft with U.S. Air Force markings removed might be used for night drops on Blue Beach the night of 18/19 April./24/ These air drops by C-130 were never conducted because the aircraft would have been unable to reach the beachhead prior to dawn.

/24/See Document 124.

83. Upon the request of CIA and with the approval of the President after a conference at the White House, the JCS at 0334R, 19 April directed CINCLANT to furnish air cover of 6 unmarked aircraft over CEF forces during the period 0630 to 0730 local time 19 April to defend the CEF against air attack from Castro planes./25/ He was directed to not seek air combat but to defend CEF forces from air attack. Further to not attack ground targets. (Note: The purpose of this CAP was to provide cover to CEF transport and B-26 type aircraft which were due at the beachhead during this period.) In this same message CINCLANT was directed to be prepared to conduct evacuation from Blue Beach using unmarked amphibious craft with crews in dungarees, and that if the

evacuation by U.S. ships were ordered he was to furnish air cover to protect landing craft.

/25/See Document 140.

84. At 1157R the JCS confirmed a telephone call to CINCLANT made by Admiral Burke at 1020R upon orders from the White House directing CINCLANT to send two destroyers to a position off Blue Beach to determine possibilities for evacuation./26/ CINCLANT was also directed to fly reconnaissance over the beach to determine the situation. No ground attacks were authorized but active air to air combat was authorized.

/26/See Document 147.

85. On 19 April at 1312R, based upon a call from Admiral Burke from the White House, the JCS directed CINCLANT to have destroyers take CEF personnel off the beach and from the water to the limit of their capability; use CEF boats and craft as practicable; provide air cover; if destroyers fired on they are authorized to return the fire to protect themselves while on this humanitarian mission./27/ (Note the reason that amphibious force craft were not used was that Phibron 2 had not yet arrived off the objective area.)

/27/See Document 151.

86. At 2052R, 19 April, the JCS informed CINCLANT that existing instructions in respect to air and surface protection for CEF ships remain in effect./28/ This was the safe haven for CEF ships 15 miles or more off-shore. No further requirement for an air CAP in the beachhead area.

/28/See footnote 2, Document 156.

87. On 20 April, upon direction of the President to Admiral Burke the JCS at 1946R directed CINCLANT:

"a. Take charge of CEF ships and personnel and get them safely to Vieques. Navy on scene Commander can relay message to CEF ships via me.

"b. Conduct destroyer patrols off Blue Beach tonight for possible evacuation of survivors and instruct CO he is authorized to ground his ship if it will facilitate mission. Use of amphibious ship and craft authorized in addition to DD if desired. Repeat patrol tomorrow night approaching area in sight of land but outside gun range prior to darkness. Provide air cover. Rules of Engagement during patrols same as before."/29/ These rules are to open fire only in self-defense.

/29/See Document 161.

IV. Exercise of Control in Washington

88. The CIA Command Post for Operation Zapata as well as the communications center was in Quarters Eye on Ohio Drive. (See Annex 30--Communications Net) During the operation, the senior CIA Task Force officials, Mr. Esterline, Colonel Hawkins, USMC, Lt. Colonel Gains (USAF) and Captain Jacob Scapa (U.S. Naval officer on loan to the CIA for use as a staff adviser on naval matters) manned the Command Post around the clock, making those operational decisions which they felt within their authority and seeking higher approval from the Secretary of State or the President for those matters beyond their authority. Mr. Bissell and General Cabell, who were immediately available for consultation, were usually the emissaries sent to obtain this latter kind of approval.

89. There was formal and continuous liaison between the CIA Command Post and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was effected by an exchange of liaison officers between the Command Post and the Joint Staff (General Gray). In addition, the Command Post transmitted messages and selected operational cable traffic to the Joint Staff by

telephone and TWX. There was telephone and cable contact with CINCLANT.

90. Within the Pentagon, General Gray had a situation briefing in the Joint Staff at 0730 and 1600 daily which the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, JCS attended. The other Chiefs maintained liaison officers in General Gray's section who kept their seniors informed.

91. The technical performance of the CIA communications net was reported to have been excellent. There was an impressive volume of traffic transmitted over it. Nevertheless, the President, the Secretary of State and others had insufficient knowledge of the situation to react in time and to make the needed decisions. This inadequacy resulted from many factors: the loss of important signal equipment in the sinking of the Rio Escondido, the wetting of the portable radios carried ashore and the resulting failure of radio communications within the Brigade net ashore, the lack of information on the part of the Brigade Commander himself, and, most importantly, the absence of an experienced American officer or headquarters in the combat area with the responsibility to summarize and present the changing situation to the authorities in Washington.

92. As a result of these factors, the President and his advisors were generally in the dark about important matters as to the situation ashore and were uninformed of the flight of the cargo ships. To clarify the situation, the U.S. Navy was directed to fly a reconnaissance mission over the beach on the afternoon of D+1, reporting about 1900 that there was no evidence of fighting at Blue Beach where the beachhead apparently had a depth of about 10 miles. This was the last indication of the situation ashore which the President received until the following morning when he received the message that the beachhead had collapsed and that men were fighting in the water.

93. In the urgency to obtain reliable information, it was proposed on the morning of D+2 to send an American observer ashore with a radio and Mr. Robertson on the LCI Barbara J was chosen to go. However, the fall of the beachhead voided the mission.

232. Memorandum No. 2 From the Cuba Study Group to President Kennedy

Washington, June 13, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Secret; Eyes Only; Ultrasensitive.

IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF FAILURE OF THE OPERATION ZAPATA

Summary

1. The proximate cause of the failure of the Zapata Operation was shortage of ammunition which developed from the first day of the landing, April 17th, and became increasingly critical until it resulted in the surrender of the landing force about 1400 on April 19th.

2. There were three primary reasons for this shortage of ammunition. The logistical plan for the landing made ample provision for ammunition with the men and in floating reserve. However, upon landing there is evidence that the Cubans wasted their ammunition in excessive firing, displaying the poor ammunition discipline which is common to troops in their first combat.

3. Far more serious was the loss of the freighters Rio Escondido and Houston through air attack at about 0930 on the morning of April 17th. The Rio was a particular loss as it had ten days of reserve ammunition on board, as well as other important supplies. The Houston should have been able to land most of its supplies before being hit, but the unloading was delayed by trouble with the outboard motors of the ships' boats as well as by the apparent lethargy of the Fifth Battalion charged with the unloading.

4. The air attack which sank these ships caused all others in the landing area to put out to sea, as the only available protection in the absence of control of the air, with the order to rendezvous 50 miles off the coast. The freighters Atlantico and Caribe headed south and never stopped until intercepted by the U.S. Navy at points 110 miles and 218 miles, respectively, south of Cuba.

5. The Caribe was so far away that its cargo, principally aviation supplies, was never available for movement to Blue Beach while the fight lasted. The Atlantico, which had considerable ammunition on board, did rejoin the other ships of the expedition at 1816, April 18th, at a point about 50 miles south of the beach and transferred her supplies to the waiting two LCI's and three LCU's for a night run to the beach.

6. By the time the supplies were transferred and the convoy had started north it was too late to hope to resupply the beach under cover of darkness. The convoy commander asked CIA Operational Headquarters, Washington, for destroyer escort and U.S. Navy jet cover without which he believed that he would lose his ships to air attack the next morning. He added that without U.S. Navy support the Cuban crew would mutiny if sent back to the beach.

7. As a result of these messages, CIA Headquarters, feeling that it would be futile to order these ammunition craft to attempt a daylight unloading, called off the mission and the attempt to get ammunition to the beach by sea ended. The President was not requested for specific authority to extend the air cover to protect the ammunition convoy.

8. These causes for the ammunition shortage rested in turn on others which lay deeper in the plans and organization of this operation and the attitude toward it on the part of Government officials. The effectiveness of the Castro Air Force over the beach resulted from a failure to destroy the airplanes on the ground (particularly the T-33's whose importance was not fully appreciated in advance) before or concurrently with the landing. This failure was a consequence of the restraints put on the anti-Castro Air Force in planning and executing its strikes, primarily for the purpose of protecting the covert character of the operation. These restraints included: the decision to use only the B-26 as a combat aircraft because it had been distributed widely to foreign countries; the limitation of pre-landing strikes to those which could be flown from non-U.S. controlled airfields under the guise of coming from Cuban strips, thus eliminating the possibility of using jet fighters or even T-33 trainers; the inability to use any non-Cuban base within short turn-around distance from the target area (about nine hours were required to turn around a B-26 for a second mission over the target from Nicaragua); prohibition of use of American contract pilots for tactical air operations; restriction on munitions, notably napalm; and the cancellation of the strikes planned at dawn on D-Day. The last mentioned was probably the most serious as it eliminated the last favorable opportunity to destroy the Castro Air Force on the ground. The cancellation seems to have resulted partly from the failure to make the air strike plan entirely clear in advance to the President and the Secretary of State, but, more importantly, by misgivings as to the effect of the air strikes on the position of the United States in the current UN debate on Cuba. Finally, there was the failure to carry the issue to the President when the opportunity was presented and explain to him with proper force the probable military consequences of a last-minute cancellation.

9. The flight of the Caribe and Atlantico might have been prevented had more attention been paid in advance to the control of the ships to include the placing of some Americans aboard. The CIA officer responsible for all the ships involved was a *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* who was aboard the LCI Blagar with no means to control the freighters, or, indeed, to locate them after they disappeared. Only the initiative of the U.S. Navy in the vicinity brought them back to the scene of action. The absence of Americans on board these vessels was an application of the general order to keep Americans out of the combat area. This order had been violated in a few cases, but it was apparently not considered important to do so in the case of the freighters.

10. The lack of full appreciation of the ammunition situation at the end of D+1 in the CIA Operational Headquarters was largely the result of the difficulty of keeping abreast of the situation on the beach, and the location and movement of the ships at sea from the distance of Washington. Also, there was a confidence in the

supply of the beach by air which turned out to be unjustified. Had there been a command ship in the sea area with an advance CIA command post on board, a more effective control would have been possible.

11. The Executive branch of the Government was not organizationally prepared to cope with this kind of paramilitary operation. There was no single authority short of the President capable of coordinating the actions of CIA, State, Defense, and USIA. Top level direction was given through ad hoc meetings of senior officials without consideration of operational plans in writing and with no arrangement for recording conclusions and decisions reached.

233. Memorandum No. 3 From the Cuba Study Group to President Kennedy

Washington, June 13, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Secret; Eyes Only; Ultrasensitive.

CONCLUSIONS OF THE CUBAN STUDY GROUP

1. It is concluded that:

a. A paramilitary operation of the magnitude of Zapata could not be prepared and conducted in such a way that all U.S. support of it and connection with it could be plausibly disclaimed. Accordingly, this operation did not fit within the limited scope of NSC 5412/2. By about November 1960, the impossibility of running Zapata as a covert operation under CIA should have been recognized and the situation reviewed. The subsequent decision might then have been made to limit the efforts to attain covertness to the degree and nature of U.S. participation, and to assign responsibility for the amphibious operation to the Department of Defense. In this case, the CIA would have assisted in concealing the participation of Defense. Failing such a reorientation, the project should have been abandoned.

b. Once the need for the operation was established, its success should have had the primary consideration of all agencies in the Government. Operational restrictions designed to protect its covert character should have been accepted only if they did not impair the chance of success. As it was, the leaders of the operation were obliged to fit their plan inside changing ground rules laid down for non-military considerations, which often had serious operational disadvantages.

c. The leaders of the operation did not always present their case with sufficient force and clarity to the senior officials of the Government to allow the latter to appreciate the consequences of some of their decisions. This remark applies in particular to the circumstances surrounding the cancellation of the D-Day strikes.

d. There was a marginal character to the operation which increased with each additional limitation and cast a serious doubt over its ultimate success. The landing force was small in relation to its 36-mile beachhead and to the probable enemy reaction. The air support was short of pilots if the beach was to require cover for a long period. There were no fighters to keep off such Castro airplanes as might escape the initial air strikes. There were few Cuban replacements for the battle losses which were certain to occur on the ground and in the air. It is felt that the approval of so marginal an operation by many officials was influenced by the feeling that the Cuban Brigade was a waning asset which had to be used quickly as time was against us, and that this operation was the best way to realize the most from it. Also, the consequences of demobilizing the Brigade and the return of the trainees to the U.S.A., with its implication that the United States had lost interest in the fight against Castro, played a part in the final decision.

e. The Cuban Expeditionary Force achieved tactical surprise in its landing and, as we have said, fought well and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. Although there had been considerable evidence of strong pockets of

resistance against Castro throughout Cuba, the short life of the beachhead was not sufficient to trigger an immediate popular reaction, and Castro's repressive measures following the landing made coordinated uprisings of the populace impossible. The effectiveness of the Castro military forces, as well as that of his police measures, was not entirely anticipated or foreseen.

f. In approving the operation, the President and senior officials had been greatly influenced by the understanding that the landing force could pass to guerrilla status, if unable to hold the beachhead. These officials were informed on many occasions that the Zapata area was guerrilla territory, and that the entire force, in an emergency, could operate as guerrillas. With this alternative to fall back on, the view was held that a sudden or disastrous defeat was most improbable. As we have indicated before, the guerrilla alternative as it had been described was not in fact available to this force in the situation which developed.

g. The operation suffered from being run from the distance of Washington. At that range and with the limited reporting which was inevitable on the part of field commanders absorbed in combat, it was not possible to have a clear understanding in Washington of events taking place in the field. This was particularly the case on the night of D+1 when an appreciation of the ammunition situation would have resulted in an appeal for U.S. air cover and an all-out effort to supply the beach by all available means.

h. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had the important responsibility of examining into the military feasibility of this operation. By acquiescing in the Zapata Plan, they gave the impression to others of approving it although they had expressed their preference for Trinidad at the outset, a point which apparently never reached the senior civilian officials. As a body they reviewed the successive changes of the plan piecemeal and only within a limited context, a procedure which was inadequate for a proper examination of all the military ramifications. Individually, they had differing understandings of important features of the operation apparently arising from oral briefings in the absence of written documents.

i. Although the intelligence was not perfect, particularly as to the evaluation of the effectiveness of the T-33's, we do not feel that any failure of intelligence contributed significantly to the defeat.

j. The planning and conduct of the operation would have been improved if there had been an initial statement of governmental policy, assigning the mission and setting the guidelines within which it was to develop. Thereafter, there was a need for a formalized procedure for interdepartmental coordination and follow-up with adequate record-keeping of decisions.

2. In the light of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion that the preparations and execution of paramilitary operations such as Zapata are a form of Cold War action in which the country must be prepared to engage. If it does so, it must engage in it with a maximum chance of success. Such operations should be planned and executed by a governmental mechanism capable of bringing into play, in addition to military and covert techniques, all other forces, political, economic, ideological, and intelligence, which can contribute to its success. No such mechanism presently exists but should be created to plan, coordinate and further a national Cold War strategy capable of including paramilitary operations.

234. Memorandum No. 4 From the Cuba Study Group to President Kennedy

Washington, June 13, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Secret; Eyes Only; Ultrasensitive.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CUBAN STUDY GROUP

[Here follow the first five recommendations, which deal with the planning and coordination of cold war strategy

and with the restructuring of procedures for carrying out paramilitary operations.]

Recommendation No. 6

In the course of its work, this Group has been exposed to the views on Cuba of many U.S. officials and of individuals, Cuban and U.S., who have been close to the Cuban problem. We have been struck with the general feeling that there can be no long-term living with Castro as a neighbor. His continued presence within the hemispheric community as a dangerously effective exponent of Communism and Anti-Americanism constitutes a real menace capable of eventually overthrowing the elected governments in any one or more of weak Latin American republics. There are only two ways to view this threat; either to hope that time and internal discontent will eventually end it, or to take active measures to force its removal. Unless by "time" we are thinking in terms of years, there is little reason to place reliance on the first course of action as being effective in Castro's police state. The second has been made more difficult by the April failure and is now possible only through overt U.S. participation with as much Latin American support as can be raised. Neither alternative is attractive, but no decision is, in effect, a choice of the first.

While inclining personally to a positive course of action against Castro without delay, we recognize the danger of dealing with the Cuban problem outside the context of the world Cold War situation. Action against Castro must be related to the probable course of events in such other places as Southeast Asia and Berlin which may put simultaneous claims on our resources.

It is recommended that the Cuban situation be reappraised in the light of all presently known factors and new guidance be provided for political, military, economic and propaganda action against Castro.

235. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara

JCSM-414-61

Washington, June 16, 1961.

//Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret. The source text bears a stamped indication that it was seen by the Secretary of Defense.

SUBJECT

Contingency Outline Plan (Cuba) (S)

1. On 1 May 1961, in a memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff,/1/ you requested that the Joint Staff and CINCLANT be assigned the responsibility for preparing instructions necessary to implement a Cuban Contingency Plan which would minimize the lead time required and maximize security during the period between the decision and invasion.

/1/Document 190.

2. CINCLANT has developed an outline plan/2/ with a 5 day lead time. This plan has been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The following major considerations are involved:

/2/Not found.

a. Cost--Requirement for shipping and repositioning of units results in an estimated initial cost of \$52.4 million and a cost of maintenance on a 30 day basis of \$8.2 million.

b. Redeployment--The redeployment of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade from PACOM will reduce the capability of CINCPAC to react to contingencies in his area as long as those forces and related shipping are deployed in Atlantic or Gulf Coast waters.

c. Training and Morale--A short reaction time requires that units be on a continuing alert status over a long period of time. This adversely affects a unit's ability to maintain training efficiency and may affect morale. This could offset the advantages gained by a short reaction time.

d. Repositioning--The plan requires the repositioning of two major Army combat units to a presently inactive Army post (Fort Polk, Louisiana) and the possible closing of another (Fort Devens, Massachusetts). This may have serious domestic political implications.

e. Security--The required movement to pre-position forces as envisioned in the plan would be impossible to conceal. Accordingly, it is unlikely that any cover plan would hide the intent and purpose of proposed actions. However, deception plans could be designed for the purpose of misleading the Cuban forces as to the specific areas and timing of the assault.

3. CINCLANT has stated that a more economical use of forces can be achieved if more time is allowed between the order to execute and the initial assault. He estimates that he could implement a modification of his current operations plan for Cuba in 18 days from "Execute" to "Assault" and this plan would bring Cuba under control in a relatively short period of time.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude, therefore, that more leeway must be provided in the reaction time; and that with activation of some additional amphibious shipping CINCLANT will be able to achieve a reaction time within 18 days from "Execute" to "Assault". This is the course of action recommended.

5. In the event emergency conditions, such as an immediate requirement to succor US citizens whose welfare has been placed in serious and immediate jeopardy, an airborne assault of approximately two divisions could be initiated against the Havana area with a lead time of five to six days. The combat elements of the force could close in 81-1/2 hours. All combat elements and scheduled support units could close in 114 hours. Marine augmentation forces could be air landed at Guantanamo for defense and expansion of control in that area, a Marine BLT could seize a beachhead in the Havana area as a diversionary support of the airborne assault, and follow-on forces would be phased in as rapidly as possible. It is recognized that this course of action is less desirable and is intended to be used if the situation so warrants.

6. As a result of our review, a memorandum has been prepared for dispatch to CINCLANT/3/ giving him additional guidance.

/3/Not found.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arleigh Burke

Chief of Naval Operations

[end of document]



FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963
Volume X
Cuba, 1961-1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

Cuba, 1961-1962

236. Informational Memorandum

Washington, June 22, 1961.

//Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, A Item 8. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the source text, but it was initialed as seen by General Taylor, indicating that the memorandum may have been prepared in response to the continuing interest of the members of the Cuba Study Group in the subject. The memorandum was apparently drafted in the Central Intelligence Agency.

SUBJECT

Comments by Fidel Castro 14 and 15 June on the Invasion of 17 April 1961

1. The airborne battalion was dropped in at points too close to the landing beaches. If they had been dropped at a more remote point of the causeways and had cut these, Castro could not have moved in his tanks, motorized artillery and "10,000 rockets". Apart from lack of air cover, the invaders' main errors were this failure to drop the airborne battalion far enough inland and this failure to cut the causeways to Playa Giron and Playa Larga. Also, the paratroopers did not engage the enemy until approximately 0800 on D-Day. Castro was mystified at the delay in entering into action. The invaders did not know of certain special trails by which Castro had been able to infiltrate men (not heavy stuff) into the Cienaga de Zapata.
2. After the Houston was sunk about five miles south of Playa Larga, the Battalion which it was carrying got ashore and bivouacked. Castro could not understand why it did not march to Playa Larga and join the forces which had been landed and were in combat.
3. Castro himself was in the second or third tank that advanced from Australia to Parite (which Castro said should be called "Palite") and the tank in front of him was knocked out.
4. The invading forces fought very well as long as they thought they had air cover. After it failed, it was an easy matter to get them to surrender.
5. Castro said 15 June that his air force consisted of four T-33's and two Sea Furies and one B-26. 14 June he had said, "We dispersed my T-33's, Sea Furies and F-27's and we dispersed them very well," with the apparent intended implication that a second strike would not have gotten all of them. He also said 14 June: "I had a few more aircraft than I had pilots, and I had nine pilots and lost two." Castro said he was mystified that no additional effort was made to get the planes.
6. Castro said the Cienaga de Zapata area was "ideal ground" from the military viewpoint and that if the

causeways had been cut the invasion force could have accomplished the mission of holding a piece of Cuban territory long enough to establish a base for ships and air and for proclamation of a provisional government which could be overtly supplied. At Parite ("Palite") at 1500 on 15 June Castro said: "Right here I would have used four or five of the 75 mm. anti-tank guns if I had been an invader. I also would have used a couple of their 81 mm. (4.2 in.) mortars, and the paratroopers, with the 75 mm. anti-tank guns and the mortars could have controlled this entrance, which is where we came through. I could, in the invaders' position, have held the place, and at this particular place it would have been almost impossible for us to flank them."

7. The invasion had a "good plan, poorly executed". If the invaders had had good air cover, sent the paratroopers farther inland, and cut the causeways, the story would have been different.

8. Castro's air force concentrated on attacking enemy shipping whereas the invasion force planes engaged in ground attacks.

9. Castro knew the time but not the place of the invasion. At first he thought it might be near Baracoa where the U.S. Navy was engaged in simulated operations.

10. On 15 June, on the beach at Playa Giron, Castro said: "Tuesday afternoon 18 April we stood at Playa Giron. We had won after 36 hours of combat."/1/

/1/A note on the source text at this point, in an unknown hand, reads: "He must have been confused as to the date."

237. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Coerr) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, June 22, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC 5902 Memoranda. Top Secret. Drafted in ARA by Frank J. Devine. Cleared in ARA, INR, and with U. Alexis Johnson. A memorandum for the files attached to the source text indicates that the memorandum, which was marked to be sent to the Secretary through Under Secretary Bowles, never went beyond Bowles. Bowles was "handling a good deal of the covert-type operations on Cuba" and he was deemed by S/S to be the proper recipient. When Bowles initialed the approval lines on the memorandum, he used the initials "DR," but there is no other indication that he cleared the approvals with Rusk.

SUBJECT

United States Government Relations with Cuban Exile Groups

Discussion

Item No. g of the NSC Record of Actions of May 5, 1961:/1/

/1/Document 205.

"Agreed that relations with the Revolutionary Council should be improved and made more open, and while it cannot be recognized as a government-in-exile, support should be given to it insofar as it continues to represent substantial Cuban sentiment."

Dr. Morales-Carrion has been designated as the official point of contact for the Cuban Revolutionary Council within the United States Government. At the suggestion of Mr. Richard Goodwin of the White House Staff, the

CRC has now presented its budget to Dr. Morales-Carrion. The fact that funds presently available to the CRC continue only through June 30 faces us with the necessity for early and highly significant decisions. Dr. Morales-Carrion is scheduled to meet with Mr. Goodwin at the White House in the immediate future, and I believe it is essential that he be in a position to reflect the Department's views with regard to our Government's relationships--including financial--with Cuban exile groups.

Without at this point entering into an exhaustive discussion of the pertinent details, many of which are already known to you, I would like to call attention to the following points:

- (1) The Cuban Revolutionary Council no longer has the same composition as it did at the time of the abortive invasion of Cuba or when the above-quoted NSC action was written. Withdrawal of Manolo Ray deprived it of its most liberal--and so far left as to be quite controversial--element and has shifted its center of political gravity appreciably to the right.
- (2) It is far from certain that the popular acceptance or the political prospects of the CRC in Cuba are such as to make it an ideal group with which too closely to associate and/or identify the US Government.
- (3) The "military" portion of the CRC's budget contemplates continuing financial provisions for veterans, survivors, and dependents of participants in the Bahia de Cochinos invasion effort. Despite the aura of general confession which has come into existence, I consider it completely inappropriate for financing of this sort to be presented to or handled by the Department of State. This merely provides public and official confirmation of US Government complicity in the invasion attempt.
- (4) The "civil" portion of the CRC budget includes administrative, operating, propaganda and other types of contemplated expenses. They are rather clearly based upon Dr. Miro Cardona's contention that our assistance to anti-Castro groups must be limited to or channelled through the CRC. I am not convinced that we should accept any such limitation or that the Department of State or any other overt agency of the USG should necessarily engage in financing of all the types of activities which are contemplated.

Recommendations:/2/

/2/Bowles initialed approval of each recommendation with Rusk's initials on June 30.

That in his conversation with Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Morales-Carrion be authorized to present the following views:

- (1) That in the implementation of item g of the NSC Record of Actions of May 5, the United States should treat the CRC in friendly, sympathetic and a somewhat favored manner but should refrain from agreeing or acting to deal exclusively with that body or to channel its dealings with other exile groups through it.
- (2) That the Department should not become involved with the military portion of the CRC budget; that payments to surviving relatives of those killed in the invasion attempt should be handled exclusively in a covert manner and with definite terminal cut-off date; that payment to dependents of any invasion captives who continue to be held in Cuba should continue to be funded until their release through covert channels; that all payments to members of the invasion forces who have returned or would return to the United States should be shifted from covert channels into the overt procedures applicable to regular Cuban emigres and funded by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
- (3) That financial provision for expenses listed in the "civil" portion of the CRC budget be most carefully reviewed and of those which are approved it be determined precisely which, if any, are appropriate for overt funding by our Government and which must be handled in a covert way in order not to be self-defeating.
- (4) That future dealing with anti-Castro Cuban groups on a covert basis be made contingent upon more effective

cover arrangements and include provision for assistance to all acceptable groups (not including Batistianos) displaying a willingness and a capacity to contribute to agreed upon objectives.

238. Memorandum for the Record

Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, June 23, 1961.

//Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, Bay of Pigs. Secret. Drafted by Taylor. Taylor and Dulles briefed Eisenhower at President Kennedy's request. This was the last task associated with Taylor's responsibilities on the Cuba Study Group. On June 26 President Kennedy addressed a letter to Taylor asking him to become Kennedy's military adviser in the White House with the title of Military Representative of the President. Taylor accepted and began to exercise his new responsibilities on July 1. (Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, pp. 196-197)

SUBJECT

Meeting with General Eisenhower at Gettysburg, June 23, 1961

PRESENT

General Eisenhower

General Taylor

Mr. Allen Dulles

1. The purpose of the visit to Gettysburg was to brief General Eisenhower on the findings of the Cuban Study Group in particular relation to the contents of an article by Stewart Alsop in the Saturday Evening Post of June 24, 1961. In the course of the meeting the following points were discussed and the findings of the Cuban Study Group on these points were explained to General Eisenhower.

a. The Alsop article allegation contained in the following paragraph:

"That plan (the Eisenhower plan), like the final Kennedy plan, was based on the assumption that there would be widespread anti-Castro uprisings and defections. It was hoped that these would make any overt American military intervention unnecessary. But the Eisenhower plan also envisaged American intervention on a `contingency basis.' American aircraft would intervene, either openly or in unmarked planes, if necessary to maintain control over the beachhead and prevent destruction of the anti-Castro forces."

In response to questions, General Eisenhower emphasized that there never had been an operational plan presented to him, hence no "Eisenhower plan" could have existed. He does not believe that he ever knew of the proposal of an amphibious operation, and certainly was not aware of any plan approximating the Trinidad Plan.

b. The role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to include their attention to logistics.

c. The air strike plan and the circumstances surrounding the cancellation of the D-Day strikes.

d. The cause of the ammunition shortage and the effectiveness of the T-33's.

e. The loss of communications equipment. General Eisenhower had the impression that all of the communications equipment was in one ship, which was sunk through air attack. It was explained to him that communications equipment was on two ships, and an auxiliary means of communication to Washington existed from the Brigade

Commander by way of the landing craft.

f. The eleven conclusions reached by the Cuban Study Group.

2. General Eisenhower listened to the presentation, took issue with none of the points raised and appeared to indicate general approval. He observed that the over-all lesson seemed to be the danger of changing an operational plan at the last minute. This observation led him to discuss the pressure placed upon him just prior to D-Day in Normandy to cancel the airborne landings.

3. One reaction on General Eisenhower's part was to suggest the need for a public statement which would correct some of the misapprehensions about the Cuban affair. However, after discussing the difficulties inherent in such an action, he withdrew the suggestion.

4. He recognizes the need for improving governmental machinery for handling complex interdepartmental operations such as the Cuban affair. In the course of discussing this point he expressed some concern over the present status of the National Security Council resulting from the elimination of the Planning Board and the OCB. He agreed that some new agency was probably necessary to fill the gap, and that the 5412 Committee with an expanded charter might provide the vehicle.

5. He commented upon his closeness to the 5412 Committee and the support given him in covert matters by the Presidential Board on Intelligence.

6. The entire discussion was most cordial. I received the impression that General Eisenhower perceives the need of suppressing further public debate of the Cuban operation. He expressed disapproval of the recent TV appearance of Mr. Miller and Senator Clark in which the Cuban operation was argued./1/

/1/Taylor added a final handwritten paragraph to the typed text that reads:"7. General Eisenhower expressed the feeling that the U.S. would have to get rid of Castro--preferably using as a reason for intervention some Castro mistake. As the visitors left, he reiterated his appreciation to President Kennedy for arranging the briefing." The final sentence had been typed as the closing sentence of paragraph 6 before Taylor crossed it out and revised the text.

MDT

239. National Security Action Memorandum No. 54

Washington, June 26, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba--Security, 1961. Confidential.

TO

The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

Service of Cuban Volunteers in U.S. Armed Forces

The President has noted and concurred in your proposed program to enable Cuban volunteers to serve in the U.S. armed forces, as stated in the attachment to your memorandum of June 8, 1961./1/

/1/Document 227.

It is assumed that you will inform the Departments of State, Justice and Health, Education and Welfare, and the U.S. Information Agency of the part each will play in carrying out this program.

It is requested that after a suitable interval has elapsed the Department of Defense prepare a report on the results of this program for transmittal to the President through this office.

McGeorge Bundy/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Bundy signed the original.

240. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy

Washington, June 28, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 6/61-12/61. No classification marking.

Present trade with Cuba

The first four months of 1961 show that trade with Cuba is running at an annual rate of about \$35 million each way. About nine-tenths of our exports are food and medicines, and nearly all of the imports are foods and textile fibers. This level of trade compares with an annual rate of half a billion dollars in normal times (57-59). This trade thus has no strategic significance and very little general economic significance. To invoke the Trading with the Enemy Act at this time would be a gesture with no real significance. The matter is under constant review, however, and if the situation changes a different decision can be made.

McG. B./1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

241. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, June 29, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 2, July 20, 1961. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Parrott.

SUBJECT

Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 29 June 1961

PRESENT

Messrs. Bowles, Gilpatric, Bundy, Dulles

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

2. Cuba

The State Department position on the official attitude that should be adopted vis-a-vis the Cuban Revolutionary

Council was agreed to by the Group (i.e. that in effect the CRC not be treated as a U.S. instrument, exclusive channel, or point of approval). It was noted that the other three papers/^{1/} tabled at last week's meeting (covering propaganda, depend-ency payments, and Radio Swan) were agreed between State and CIA, as the Group had requested, with the exception of the overall matter of financing.

^{1/}Copies of these papers are *ibid.*, S.G. 1, June 29, 1961.

It was recognized that the financing problem requires further detailed consideration, but that on the other hand certain activities must continue into the new fiscal year and CIA has no funds budgeted to cover them. It was thus agreed that CIA should continue funding dependency payments and certain essential CRC activities for the next month, using this time to try to work out an eventual solution.

On the subject of the projected 1962 budget for clandestine activities,^{2/} Mr. Dulles said that he felt some items might be unduly expensive and that he wanted to examine them in further detail, consulting with Defense where appropriate. The Group agreed that the operations proposed in the categories of intelligence, counter-intelligence, covert political action and propaganda appeared to be generally acceptable but that the scope of the proposed paramilitary operations required further study. Mr. Dulles pointed out in the latter connection that although it is not necessary to embark at once on the new recruiting included in the budget, there are some agents on hand who will have to be supported and occupied. It was agreed that a month's advance from the Bureau of the Budget for all these items less paramilitary should be sought at once.

^{2/}The budget for clandestine activities considered by the Special Group was outlined in an undated 8-page memorandum prepared for the Special Group by the CIA that detailed a program of covert action. The memorandum was supplemented by a 5-page annex that provided a breakdown of the proposed expenditures. On June 28, Thomas Parrott sent copies to J. Patrick Coyne at the White House, Joseph Scott at the Department of State, and General Lansdale at the Department of Defense, under cover of a memorandum that indicated that the Special Group would discuss the proposed program of covert action against Cuba at its June 29 meeting. (*Ibid.*) For the revised version of this paper, dated July 17 and considered by the Special Group on July 20, see the Supplement.

These decisions were made subject to review by General Taylor next week.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

Thomas A. Parrott/^{3/}

^{3/}Printed from a copy that indicates Parrott signed the original.

242. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 7, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7-761. Secret. Drafted by Hurwitch on July 10.

SUBJECT

Cuban Revolutionary Council

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Antonio de Varona, Revolutionary Council Member

Dr. Carlos Piad, Washington Representative, Revolutionary Council

Dr. Morales-Carrion, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

Mr. Robert Hurwitch, Officer in Charge, Cuban Affairs

Dr. Varona expressed his discouragement over the Council's future, the future of Cuba, and said he felt that the U.S. was abandoning Cuba to its fate under Castro.

He continued that Mr. Goodwin had informed Dr. Aragon (Miro Cardona's secretary) that no decision would be reached regarding support for the Council until the Council had broadened its base and achieved greater unity among the exile groups. He said that it would be difficult to include groups such as those led by Sanchez Arango or Marquez Sterling in the Council. Sincere attempts had been made to reach an understanding with the Manolo Ray group; these had failed. He suggested that the U.S. name new Council members.

Varona then turned to the necessity of organizing a new invasionary force. He said that Nicaraguan President Somoza had offered to assist to that end. He urged that all Cuban young men in exile of military age undergo compulsory military training as a first step toward training such a force. When informed that U.S. compulsory military training was for eighteen months, he replied that for his purposes two months were sufficient and that in view of Cubans' special refugee status, special arrangements should be made for them under U.S. law. He stated that once trained the force he envisaged would also require sufficient equipment to overcome Castro's military power. When asked what basis he had for thinking in these terms, Varona replied that he understood that Cubans were to be recruited in the U.S. armed forces on an individual basis and also that Cuban pilots would be given training. Of what purpose were these steps by the U.S. if not to train a new invasionary force, Varona asked.

When Varona received no encouragement for this line of reasoning, he said that he would insist upon clarification of this point in a meeting that might take place soon between Miro Cardona and the President. As far as he, Varona, was concerned, the struggle against Castro to be successful involved three basic aspects, all inter-related and inter-depend-ent: a massive propaganda campaign, sabotage, and a frontal military attack on Cuba.

243. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 7, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7-761. Confidential. Drafted by Hurwitch on July 14.

SUBJECT

Activities in U.S. of Fair Play for Cuba Committee and 26th of July Movement

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. James McDonnell, SCA

Mr. Robert Hurwitch, ARA:CMA/C

I had previously mentioned to Mr. McDonnell ARA's concern over the activities in the U.S. of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and the 26th of July Movement. I had observed that while these activities appeared to be primarily of internal security concern, there were foreign policy implications as well. Unlimited activity on the part of these groups served to confuse the American public about the true nature of the Castro regime. Further, Cuban exile groups had expressed concern over these activities as counter-productive to their own efforts to impress the American public with the dangerous threat that Castro presented. I had inquired whether the

Attorney General's office was fully aware of the Department's interest in these groups.

In response to this inquiry, Mr. McDonnell consulted with the Office of the Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division. Mr. McDonnell reported that that office was keenly aware of public, Congressional and governmental interest in the activities of these groups. The Internal Security Division is following these activities on a day-to-day basis, compiling evidence with a view toward citing these organizations. The registration of the FPCC had already been solicited by that office and had been refused by the FPCC. The Internal Security Division is now examining its information on the FPCC to determine whether to seek court action to force the FPCC to register.

Comment:

In view of the close and constant attention being paid to both these groups by the Assistant Attorney General's office and Mr. McDonnell's oral transmission of the Department's interest as well, there does not appear any necessity at this time to stimulate the Attorney General's office to further action in this regard.

244. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to the President's Assistant Special Counsel (Goodwin)

Washington, July 8, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, Papers of Arthur Schlesinger, Cuba 1961, Box 31. Secret.

SUBJECT

Cuban Covert Plan/1/

/1/An apparent reference to a preliminary draft of the July 17 program of covert action considered by the Special Group on July 20. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 2, July 20, 1961) See the Supplement.

Analysis of this plan shows that it envisages (a) "an island-wide resistance organization responsive to Agency direction"; (b) "support and guidance to those anti-Castro groups who are revealed to have a potential for clandestine operations"; and (c) "primary operations bases" in the US. In short, what is intended is a CIA underground formed on criteria of operational convenience rather than a Cuban underground formed on criteria of building political strength sufficient to overthrow Castro.

Despite the pretense of political impartiality, the effect of these CIA specifications is obviously to favor those groups most willing to accept CIA identification and control, and to discriminate against those groups most eager to control their own operations; i.e., the plan discriminates in favor of mercenaries, reactionaries, etc., and discriminates against men of independence and principle. Thus these criteria eliminate the Manuel Ray group; yet I can find nowhere in the documents any explicit exclusion of pro-Batista people.

Leaving aside the moral merits of this discrimination, the practical effect is to invest our resources in the people least capable of generating broad support within Cuba. The Agency fails to confront the key problem: i.e., that those most capable of rallying popular support against the Castro regime are going to be more independent, more principled and perhaps even more radical than the compliant and manageable types which CIA would prefer for operational purposes.

My recommendation is that you stop this paper in its present form and demand that it be recast to make political sense. The key is the statement that our covert activity "should be viewed only as the covert contribution to any national program designed to bring about the eventual replacement of the Castro government." This is correct; and there follows from it (a) that our covert activity should encourage the spread of the political sentiments

within Cuba most likely to rally support for Castro's overthrow (which means, for example, Ray rather than Batista), and (b) that our covert activity should harmonize with our basic national policy of rescuing the Cuban Revolution, as set forth in the White Paper./2/

/2/See Document 79.

It is a fallacy to suppose that clandestine activity can be carried out in a political vacuum.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr./3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

245. Report Prepared by a Committee of the United States Intelligence Board

Washington, July 11, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, Papers of Arthur Schlesinger, Cuba, White Label, Box 31. Secret; NoFORN. The report was approved by the USIB on July 11.

THE MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA

A Report Prepared by an Ad Hoc Committee of the United States

Intelligence Board

[Here follow a table of contents and a definition of the problem addressed in the report, which reads as follows: "To assess the extent of Sino-Soviet Bloc military collaboration with the Castro regime, and to examine in detail the Cuban military buildup since Castro came to power."]

Conclusions

1. The Soviet Bloc continues to extend considerable military assistance to Cuba in the form of military equipment, training, and technicians and advisers. Thus far, aircraft consisting of MIG-type jets, some helicopters, light transports, piston trainers, and a wide assortment of armaments ranging from small arms through medium artillery and heavy tanks have been positively identified. There are tenuous indications that Cuba may receive some Soviet jet light bombers. An estimate of the total quantities and types of equipment received thus far is shown in Annexes 1. and 2./1/ Some military equipment--such as a few Soviet T-54 medium tanks--which probably has been received in Cuba but that has not been positively identified or enumerated is not included in Annex 1. There is no evidence that any nuclear weapons or guided missiles are now in Cuba. Military training of Cubans in the Bloc is continuing and some probably have already returned for duty in Cuba. Soviet Bloc military technicians and probably instructor pilots are in Cuba. No Chinese Communist military personnel have been identified as being in Cuba.

/1/Not printed.

2. There is no evidence that any Sino-Soviet Bloc country has dispatched or is organizing a "volunteer" force for military service in Cuba.

3. The Sino-Soviet Bloc has gone a long way toward identifying itself with the maintenance of the Castro regime. The viability of Cuba's economy has become dependent on continued Bloc assistance. The successful Soviet effort to provide Cuba with all its petroleum needs has been at considerable expense and disruption to its normal tanker operations and the Soviet Union has given priority to other Cuban needs even on occasion at the expense

of other trading partners.

4. The Sino-Soviet Bloc's support for the Castro regime is part of its larger efforts to isolate the United States and to weaken and eventually destroy its influence throughout the world. The Soviets desire to establish Cuba as a secure base of operations for furthering their aims throughout Latin America. The Castro regime has already become an effective instrument of the Bloc toward achieving these ends in Latin America and, to a lesser extent, among underdeveloped and emerging nations throughout the world. In short, for most practical purposes, the present Cuban Government can be regarded as Communist, and its military dependence on the Bloc is steadily increasing. Cuba, under the present Communist control, provides a better base of operations for subversion and propaganda throughout Latin America than the Soviets have ever had. The strongly anti-United States and pro-Soviet regime of Castro serves their purposes well; it gives a native color to Communist agitation and limits the risk of a hemisphere-wide reaction against outside Communist intervention.

5. The Soviet Bloc military equipment already shipped to Cuba, as well as prior military purchases by Castro from Western sources, have contributed substantially to a major buildup of ground and air forces there. As a result, the Cuban ground forces are probably now better equipped than those of any other Latin American country. The Cuban military buildup is reflected in the great expansion of personnel in the Cuban military and militia forces. The present Cuban ground forces consist of the Revolutionary Army of approximately 32,000, the Revolutionary National Police of 9,000, and the militia estimated at more than 200,000. The combat effectiveness of the combat elements of the army and the militia has greatly improved since November 1960 and together they must now be considered as constituting one of the most effective ground forces in Latin America. Present capabilities of the Cuban Navy are limited to the patrol of selected portions of the coast. The combat capability of the Cuban Air Force is still low, but it can provide limited support to the ground forces and assist in maintaining internal security. However, with the acquisition of MIG aircraft and the return of Bloctrained personnel, the capability of the air force will be greatly enhanced over the coming months. If augmented by aircraft of the civil airline, the Cuban Air Force has a fair troop and cargo transport capability.

6. Initially, the purpose of Cuba's military buildup was self defense. Anti-Castro guerrillas were active in several areas inside Cuba and exile groups had posed a constant invasion threat. However, the current sharpening and strengthening of all the instruments of police state control suggest that the related motive of tightening the dictatorship is an equal, if not presently the prime, purpose of the military buildup. The regime, which is imposing a thorough socio-economic revolution on the country at a faster pace than almost any other government in history, evidently estimates that its domestic objectives can be achieved only through the regimentation of the Cuban people under a police state. This clearly parallels the objectives of the Cuban Communist Party and thus furthers the aims of the international Communist movement.

7. The militia is a primary instrument of the state in strengthening and extending its control. Drawn from rural and urban lower income groups, a hard core of the militia is well-equipped and is organized with increasing efficiency while a larger portion is undergoing regular part time military training. Some militia units have been assigned to duties normally carried out by the armed forces. The militia provides the government with a substantial armed force with which to control the populace as a whole and subjects a relatively large number of Cubans to military discipline and political indoctrination. At the same time, it contributes toward solving the serious unemployment problem. Communist influence in the militia is extensive. The militia has proven an effective fighting force in the anti-guerrilla campaigns in the Escambray mountains early this year and against the anti-Castro force that landed on 17 April. The effectiveness of the militia reflected an improved state of training, acceptable leadership, and generally good morale as well as the regime's ability to mass large numbers of men in critical areas.

8. The Castro regime is convinced that the Cuban revolution is the vanguard of "the anti-imperialist rebellion" that will inevitably sweep all of Latin America. It is actively encouraging and covertly assisting Communist and Communist-influenced revolutionary groups in other Latin American countries at every opportunity. Its methods include intensive propaganda supported by the Castro-subsidized international news agency that has close

working ties with Sino-Soviet Bloc news agencies and reflects the propaganda line of Moscow and Peiping. Cuban diplomatic missions have frequently provided Communist-oriented student and labor groups with propaganda material and financial assistance. The arms buildup in Cuba permits the Cubans to supply weapons to pro-Castro groups in other countries. Receipt of Bloc military equipment permits Cuba to furnish Western-manufactured arms now in their possession for this purpose.

9. Cuban subversion is further supported by the Castro-subsidized travel to Cuba of numerous Latin Americans who are exposed there to further political indoctrination and, according to frequent reports, given military training. During the Havana meeting in May and June 1961 of the executive committee of the Communist-front International Union of Students, it was announced that Cuba plans to offer 1,000 scholarships to Latin American students for study in Cuba.

[Here follow a 22-page Discussion section and 5 supporting annexes.]

246. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 13, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7-1361. Official Use Only. Drafted by Hurwitch on July 17.

SUBJECT

Views of Carlos Lechuga, Cuban Ambassador to the OAS

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Tad Szulc, *New York Times*

Mr. Robert Hurwitch, ARA:CMA/C

Szulc said that he had recently had a three-hour luncheon conversation with Cuban OAS Ambassador Lechuga whom he had known previous to Castro's rise to power. According to Szulc, Lechuga insisted that he was not a Communist. He inquired whether there was any thinking in U.S. official circles toward resumption of diplomatic relations with Cuba which could in turn lead to a general easing of tensions between Cuba and the U.S. He said that he and many others in high places in the Castro regime were becoming increasingly concerned over the degree of Communist influence in Cuba. The bad state of Cuban-U.S. relations left him and his friends no alternative to turning toward the Sino-Soviet Bloc for assistance. A friendlier attitude on the part of the U.S., Lechuga is reported to have said, would assist the non-Communists in Cuba and he felt confident that anti-American propaganda emanating from Cuba would cease. Szulc said he felt Lechuga had a good point and inquired as to my reaction.

I replied that I doubted Lechuga's sincerity. It was, I thought, more likely that Lechuga was conducting a campaign for easing tensions in order that Cuba might remain a member in good standing within the inter-American community and at the same time maintain its political-military ties with the Bloc. Accomplishment of this status for Cuba would, from Lechuga's standpoint probably constitute success in his mission.

247. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Woodward) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles)

Washington, July 18, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7-1861. Confidential. Drafted in ARA/CMA by Robert A.

Stevenson and Edwin E. Vallon, and in L/ARA by Marjorie M. Whiteman. Robert F. Woodward was appointed Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs on July 14 and entered on duty on July 17.

SUBJECT

Congressional Resolution Calling for Recognition of a Cuban Government-in-Exile

Discussion:

From a legal position, there is no precedent or authority to grant recognition to an exile group which does not have or has not had control over territory of the State which it purports to represent. Governments-in-exile recognized during World War II by the United States were refugee governments. The granting of recognition to an exile group having no control, past or present, over any of the territory of the State concerned could have serious consequences as to the legality and practicability of the grant. In the question here considered, for example, subsequent to recognition, the United States would have to look to the new government for the fulfillment of Cuban treaty and other obligations including, of course, Cuban obligations with respect to the Guantanamo Base. Correspondingly, the Castro regime would be relieved of fulfillment of Cuban treaty obligations and could, for example, proceed to harass the Base without accountability as the Government of Cuba. It would also no longer be possible for the Swiss Government to represent United States interests in Cuba, which, of course, includes the protection of United States citizens to the degree possible under Cuban and International Law.

From a political standpoint, it is conceivable that a Cuban Government-in-Exile at some stage might play a positive and helpful role in combatting Castro-Communism and in aiding in Castro's downfall. However, to undertake such a development at this time would run counter to our present policy of seeking multilateral action on Cuba within the OAS framework. It would constitute in Latin American eyes an act of unilateral intervention into Cuban affairs. Secondly, there is no indication that the Cuban exile opposition has reconciled its differences or "shaken down" sufficiently to agree upon or pull together in support of a Government-in-Exile. Thirdly, there is no indication that internal opposition groups would support such a move; rather, there is indication that internal opposition is skeptical of all exile opposition efforts.

Conclusion:

It is ARA's conclusion that Representative Anfuso's/1/ resolution (copy attached)/2/ is not appropriate at this time. However, we should stress the Department's agreement with the "Whereas" clauses which he cites in justification of his resolution. If possible, it should be emphasized to Representative Anfuso that:

/1/Representative Victor L. Anfuso (D.-New York).

/2/This proposed resolution was not found attached and has not been found in Department of State files.

1. The act would be lacking in legal justification or legitimacy and would relieve the Castro regime from the responsibility for fulfilling its treaty obligations with the United States;
2. It would no longer be possible for the Swiss to represent United States interests in Cuba, including protection of United States citizens;
3. The United States at this time would very probably be almost alone in recognizing such a government, which would tend to emphasize the lack of support for the United States position from its Latin neighbors and might lend itself to exploitation by Communist propagandists; and that
4. It would not be helpful to the multilateral efforts which are now in progress.

248. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, July 19, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba, May 1961-. Secret.

SUBJECT

U.S. Government Relations with Cuban Revolutionary Council

The Cuban Task Force had agreed that the President should be advised to meet at an early date with Dr. Miro Cardona and tell him, in essence, that U.S. Government support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council would be phased down and possibly out, unless the CRC could produce evidence of broader-based support than it now appears to have.

General Taylor felt that this was such an important matter, and one so closely allied to Cuban covert operations, that the President should have the benefit of consideration of this projected advice, by the Special Group. Accordingly, I suggested to Richard Goodwin that any such action be deferred, if possible, until after the Special Group meeting of July 20th. He intimated that this was not an entirely controllable situation but undertook to try to hold off such a meeting if possible.

In checking with him on July 17th, Goodwin said that Miro Cardona was in town, that the President had previously agreed to see him any time he wanted to, and it might be impossible to avoid such a meeting in the next day or so. General Taylor then took the position that if such a meeting were unavoidable, he would agree to exclude the problem from the Special Group agenda provided that State (Assistant Secretary Woodward) agreed with the Task Force line. General Taylor recognized that this is essentially an overt political decision and, thus, primarily the responsibility of State.

I explained the situation to Mr. Woodward on July 18th, in the presence of his Special Assistant, Mr. Wollum. Mr. Woodward had not been aware of the discussions in the Task Force, which took place before he assumed his present position. Pending a discussion he proposed to have with Goodwin--he saw no particular objection to the proposed line. He did feel that it might be unwise for exile leaders to have continuing access to the President. I pointed out that this particular connection was probably unique, since it grew out of the President's meetings with CRC leaders immediately after the collapse of the invasion.

Mr. Goodwin informed me on July 19th that on the previous day the President had telephoned him at 10:00 a.m., directing that an appointment be arranged with Miro Cardona at 11:30. Before this meeting, Goodwin gave the President the Task Force line. In the course of the actual meeting, however, the President told Miro Cardona the U.S. would support the CRC and that he hoped it could be so reorganized as to become a useful body. The President also said that he wanted to continue payments to the dependents of members of the strike force who were either killed or captured; no specific duration for this was mentioned, but he said that another look should be taken at some future time.

The President did not precisely say to Miro Cardona (as he had been advised to do by Goodwin) that the U.S. might have to support exile groups other than the CRC.

Mr. Goodwin proposes to see Miro Cardona on July 19th as a follow-up. He will attempt to make sure that the CRC leader does not go away with inflated ideas of what the President told him. On the other hand, Goodwin recognizes that he cannot go as far as he would have liked (specifically on the matter of support to others) so long as the President did not deal specifically with this.

Thomas A. Parrott/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

249. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 20, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7-2061. Secret. Drafted by Wollam.

SUBJECT

Views on Cuban Revolutionary Council

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Fernando F. Cabada, Jr.; Hotel Dupont Plaza, Room 519

ARA--Park F. Wollam

Mr. Fernando Cabada was referred to this office by Mr. Devine and Mr. Braddock. His background is well known to them and to various others in the Department with whom he is related.

Mr. Cabada stated that he came unofficially but that he felt it was most urgent to convey his views to someone in the US Government. Cabada says he is a member of the Unidad Revolucionaria, a Cuban underground movement. He claims that the MRR, MRP, DR, MDC, Rescate and 30th of November movements and the UR as they operate underground in Cuba are now united in a National Revolutionary Council. He claims that the various organizations are fully coordinated and that they have a potential action capability now and for the future. He further asserts that the underground action movements in Cuba have not been subject to the political wrangling going on among exiles outside of Cuba, and that they have been devoted entirely to militant subversive action.

Cabada states that the underground will possibly be sending two representatives of the directorate to the United States in the near future. These two are among some of the group directors who are in asylum in various embassies in Cuba, although most of the others were jailed or eliminated after the April invasion. When and if the two members come to the United States Cabada may join them "officially". Until such time, however, he said his representations are unofficial.

Cabada stated that in recent weeks the National Revolutionary Council movement has realized that complete unity is absolutely essential and decided that it might well throw in its lot with the CRC and Dr. Miro Cardona; presumably, some preliminary talks on this subject were held in Miami about June 22 at which time Dr. Cardona supposedly sent \$10,000 to each of the action groups with no strings attached as some sort of a gesture. The preliminary talks were generally satisfactory although there were still some details to be arranged. The desire of the UR to achieve unity with the CRC is becoming greater all the time and the possible arrival of the delegates from the Cuban underground is supposed to bring this about, according to Cabada, barring some unforeseen difficulties.

A major factor in the underground's decision to join forces with Cardona's Council was the belief that Miro Cardona's group had the full confidence of the United States. The united underground would not unify with the CRC unless it was certain of this fact. This is the most important aspect of the situation as described by Cabada.

Cabada states that many of the Cuban underground people do not have the highest regard for Miro Cardona and

some of the others in the CRC, but they feel that united they could be effective with US support.

Cabada had heard that Miro Cardona had been in Washington during the past few days and that it had been reported that Miro had visited with President Kennedy. While reports of this visit were conflicting, many Cubans had gotten the impression that President Kennedy expressed dissatisfaction with the CRC or had in some way indicated that the CRC was losing its importance in the eyes of the United States. This, according to Cabada would be a most unfortunate development at a time when it looks as if unification of all the major groups for the single purpose could be achieved. The underground group, which is already feeling some bitterness and disillusion as a result of the April invasion, would be further disheartened if the efforts at unity failed or if it were found that upon achieving unity, the groups no longer had confidence or support of the United States.

Cabada repeated this argument several times to make certain that he left no doubt as to his idea of the importance of the present "crisis" now facing revolutionary groups.

Additional Comments:

Cabada claimed that the exile groups were now feeling the weight and importance of the underground groups in Cuba and were realizing that political figures in exile as such were impotent without the backing of the underground groups. To illustrate this he claimed that Manolo Ray had opposed the desire of the MRP underground to join with the Revolutionary Council. The MRP, finally determined on unity, had ousted Ray. He claims that Ray was ousted by the MRP some two or three days before Ray claims he was forced out by the CIA.

Cabada stated that after the April invasion roundup everyone thought that their covert resources in Cuba had been destroyed. The UR, however, found that it had about 60 percent of its resources left and other groups also have some things remaining. What is needed is a coordinated action plan taking advantage of all these groups and it is the Cuban underground which will continue to carry on the bulk of the fight against Castro. Cabada thought that the achievement of unity among the seven major Cuban underground groups under the banner of the Revolutionary Council and Dr. Miro Cardona was notable in view of the fact that Miro was not liked by many. He repeated numerous times that it was most urgent that the United States remain in support of Miro Cardona in order that unity could be accomplished. He felt that further splintering would be a most serious set-back.

I told Cabada that I was completely new here and not informed on the matters he discussed, but that I would pass his information along.

250. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, July 20, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 3, July 27, 1961. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Parrott on July 21.

SUBJECT

Minutes of Meeting of Special Group, July 20, 1961

PRESENT

General Taylor, Messrs. Johnson, Gilpatric, Dulles, Bundy (for items 1 and 2, and part of 3)

Mr. Barnes was present for items 1 through 3

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

3./1/ Cuba--Covert Program

/1/Project to be carried forward to higher authority. [Footnote in the source text.]

The DCI introduced discussion of this paper/2/ with the comment that the covert program must be keyed into over-all U.S. policy and that an aggressive set of clandestine actions should not be undertaken until it is clear what the general direction of U.S. policy toward Cuba is going to be. The Group agreed with this. Mr. Johnson expressed his understanding that essentially a stand-by attitude was in effect at the moment. In this connection, reference was made to the recent meeting of top-level authority with Dr. Miro Cardona, which evidently resulted in an understanding that the Revolutionary Council would continue to be supported, for the present at least.

/2/Dated July 17. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 2, July 20, 1961) For text, see the Supplement.

Under Objectives, the Group accepted Mr. Dulles' suggestion to reword paragraph 2 a of the paper, to read as follows:

"a. The basic objective is to provide support to a U.S. program to develop opposition to Castro and to help bring about a regime acceptable to the U.S."

Regarding the question of propaganda, Mr. Dulles said that he thought CIA officials should sit down with USIA to coordinate plans to the extent possible; General Taylor agreed that this would be useful. Mr. Dulles cautioned, however, that USIA's appropriations for Latin America had been deeply cut and that, therefore, its capabilities were not very large.

General Taylor then raised a basic question as to where responsibility for approval actually lies, in the case of several possibilities cited under the paramilitary section. After some discussion, it was agreed that any major operations in this field would be subject to further approval by the Special Group.

It was also agreed that sabotage operations, particularly, require a close policy look. In this connection, the second sentence on page 8 of the paper was changed to read: "Actual sabotage operations will be carried out only after policy approval by the Special Group."

There was then a lengthy discussion on guerrillas, the Group finally agreeing that over-all U.S. policy must be more sharply defined on this point. It was the opinion of the Group, however, that supply of existing guerrilla elements, to the extent necessary to avoid dispersion, would be in the U.S. interest. This was interpreted to include such items as ammunition, food and clothing. Mr. Dulles undertook to take a sharp look at the recommendations and plans for guerrillas, with a view to discussing this subject at next week's meeting.

The Special Group approved the budget as presented, with the following provisos: only 50% of each major item would be drawn down in the near future; the large item for boats, under Paramilitary, would be eliminated for the time being, before the 50% figure was applied; expenditures for sabotage and guerrilla operations would be deferred, and both activities would be subject to next week's discussion. The DCI said that the Agency would come back to the Special Group with a progress report, across the board, in less than six months, at which time further authorizations would be considered.

It was the consensus that this whole program should be discussed with highest level authority.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

Thomas A. Parrott/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Parrott signed the original.

251. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, July 22, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 2, July 20, 1961. Top Secret. A handwritten note on the source text reads: "Seen by Secretary."

SUBJECT

Special Group Meeting, July 20, 1961

The following items were taken up at the meeting of the Special Group on July 20./1/

/1/For a record of this meeting, see Document 250.

[Here follows a summary of items unrelated to Cuba.]

3. Cuba--Covert Program for FY 1962

A lengthy paper on this subject/2/ was presented by the Agency covering the following activities: (a) intelligence and counter intelligence; (b) political action; (c) propaganda; and (d) paramilitary activities. The budget proposed for FY 1962 to cover these activities totaled \$13,778,132. The intelligence and counter intelligence proposals were approved, as were the political action proposals. The objective of the latter is to identify and support opposition groups. The question of how much support and whether it should be provided will be decided at the time of identification. With regard to propaganda, the Group considered the budget high (\$4,204,000) and the Group decided to review these activities before fifty per cent of that amount had been spent. In the meanwhile ARA and the Agency will be discussing what USIA can do. With regard to the proposed paramilitary activities the Group agreed that the Agency should continue to plan in this field. In the meanwhile it is understood that policy recommendations should be developed regarding sabotage, terrorist and guerrilla activities. ARA has been asked to take the initiative in this in consultation with Mr. Goodwin of the White House and Mr. Barnes of the Agency. With regard to bases for training purposes it was agreed that nothing would be considered outside U.S. territory. The Agency proposal to purchase ships was deferred./3/

/2/See footnote 2, Document 250. For text, see the Supplement.

/3/After this item, Johnson wrote "President approved." He also added a marginal notation that Joseph Scott had informed ARA on July 22 of the decisions reached by the Special Group and approved by the President.

[Here follows a summary of items unrelated to Cuba.]

252. Editorial Note

On July 24, 1961, an Eastern Air Lines plane, en route from Miami to Tampa, Florida, with 33 passengers aboard, was hijacked at gunpoint by one of the passengers, who forced the pilot to fly to Havana. The Cuban Government released 32 of the plane's passengers and its 5 crew members on July 25, and they were flown to Miami on a scheduled Pan American Airways flight. The only passenger detained in Cuba was the man who had seized the plane, identified by the FBI as Cuban-born Wilfredo Roman Oquendo. On July 26 Castro offered to return the hijacked plane if the United States would promise to return Cuban planes similarly seized and flown to

the United States. Secretary of State Rusk rejected Castro's offer on July 27, with the observation that claims relating to seized planes were matters for the courts to decide.

An attempted hijacking on August 3 was foiled when FBI and border patrol officials captured the would-be hijacker, ex-convict Leon Bearden, on the ground at El Paso, Texas, before he could force the pilot to fly a Continental Airlines 707 jet to Havana. On August 9, however, a Pan American Airways flight, en route from Mexico City to Guatemala, was seized by a gunman later identified as Albert Charles Cadon, a Frenchman, and forced to fly to Havana. The plane and passengers, except for Cadon, were returned to the United States the same day.

On August 15 the Eastern Airlines jet that had been seized was released in Havana in return for the release of a Cuban gunboat that had been seized on July 29 by its 3 crewmen, who asked for and received asylum at Key West, Florida. The details of all of these developments were chronicled in *The New York Times*, July 25-August 16, 1961.

253. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, July 26, 1961.

//Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Confidential. Prepared by Admiral Burke.

SUBJ

Mtg at White House with the President on 26 Jul 61 prior to my receiving DSM on retirement

1. The President talked about Cuba. He asked me if I thought we would have to go into Cuba. I said yes. He asked would Castro get stronger. I said yes. Castro would increase his power over his people. He asked whether we could take Cuba easily. I said yes, but it was getting more and more difficult. He asked what did I think would happen if we attacked. I said all hell would break loose but that some day we would have to do it. The danger would be that Castro would flee and go to some other country--Russia or Brazil. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

[Here follows discussion of unrelated topics.]

Arleigh Burke/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

254. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, undated.

//Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 4, August 3, 1961. Secret; Eyes Only. This paper condensed for the President's consideration a July 25 memorandum prepared in the CIA for the Special Group entitled "Internal Action Operations Against Cuba," and an August 1 memorandum also prepared in the CIA for the Special Group entitled "Program of Covert Action Directed at the Castro Regime." (For texts, see the Supplement.) The August 1 memorandum was a revision of the July 17 memorandum on the same subject considered by the Special Group on July 20. (See the Supplement) On August 3, the Special Group considered the condensed set of recommendations and approved them for referral to the President, after reducing the proposed budget to cover 6 months rather than 12 months expenditures. (Memorandum for the files by J.W. Scott, August 4; Minutes of Special Group meeting, August 3; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. V, 4, August 3 1961, and S.G. 5, August 10, 1961, respectively) On August 4, Parrott sent a memorandum

to the Special Group indicting that the covert action program for Cuba had received final approval. (Ibid., August 3, 1961)

Recommendation

It is recommended that the Special Group approve the following covert action program against Cuba:

a) Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Collection of intelligence on the internal Cuban situation and the attitude of the Cuban people, particularly with regard to opposition elements. Improved and expanded collection of operational intelligence on Castro's plans, intentions and capabilities. Penetration of Cuban security services and protection of Agency operations against action by these services.

b) Political Action

Foster support for U.S. national policies with respect to Cuba, throughout Latin America. Combat Castro's subversive efforts in that area. Assist in strengthening unified opposition to Castro among Cubans, inside and outside of Cuba. Identify and support, if found, any such groups or leaders with real potential for overthrowing and replacing the Castro government.

c) Propaganda

Continue to support propaganda assets, including magazines, newspapers, news letters and radio. Conduct continual review of the effectiveness of these media. Attempt to destroy the popular image of Castro in Cuba, and combat his propaganda efforts throughout Latin America.

d) Paramilitary

Expand present personnel and support aspects inside and outside of Cuba, for use in working with or through Cuban groups in developing an underground organization or organizations. Once such a secure organization is established, engage in infiltration and exfiltration of personnel, supplies and materiel, in intelligence collection and propaganda, and in a low key sabotage and resistance program. Large scale sabotage activities may be planned for, but will not be mounted until approved by the Special Group. Provide modest support, as approved by the Special Group, to those guerrilla elements that might arise in Cuba and which are believed worthy of support. Maintain a limited air capability largely through pilot training.

e) Support

Maintain necessary personnel, forward-operating base on U.S. territory, maritime base, operational or training sites and communications facilities.

A maximum of \$12,738,132 is authorized for funding of the above program. Only fifty percent of this total will be withdrawn initially from the Bureau of the Budget, with later withdrawals to be dependent on a review, within six months, of the operational progress made.

Budget breakdown (for 12 months) is as follows:

Intelligence and counterintelligence -- 739,132

Political action -- 200,000

Propaganda -- 4,204,000

Paramilitary -- 3,570,000

Support -- 4,025,000

[Total] -- 12,738,132/1/

/1/Johnson crossed out the proposed 12-month total of \$12,738,132, and wrote in a 6-month total of \$5,360,000.

255. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, August 16, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 6/61-12/61. Top Secret. Prepared by Komer. Another copy of this memorandum has a handwritten notation that indicates the briefing was for President Kennedy, General Taylor, and McGeorge Bundy. (Ibid., Subjects, Guantanamo Base, 8/16/61-10/4/63)

SUBJECT

JCS Briefing on Cuban Contingency Planning

The briefing was given by Captain Hadden USN, with General Dean backing up.

I. Contingency Planning Against Violence at Guantanamo Base

It was stated that this plan/1/ had approval of DOD, State and the President. It calls for response appropriate to character of attack. CINCLANT has interpreted this to include returning fire as appropriate if anyone shoots at US, and extending the base perimeter as required. In other words the Base Commander is now authorized to protect himself to the extent necessary, including going out and silencing guns in the hills if they are shooting at him. He doesn't have to check with anybody before he does so. Query--Do we want to leave him this authority? (Wym Coerr says anti-Castro Cubans are reportedly thinking of faking attack on base in order to embroil US.)

/1/None of the plans cited in the memorandum has been further identified.

Water supply seems well in hand; with austere use local stores could last three weeks. By this time tankers available on short notice could bring in more. There are 3100 non-military personnel, mostly depend-ents, on the base. A Marine BLT (1500) afloat is never more than 48 hours away, and usually closer.

II. Contingency Plan for Response to Cuban Provocation Leading to Open Hostilities

In this case CINCLANT will (a) defend Guantanamo; (b) support or re-establish a Cuban government friendly to US; (c) restore and maintain order. The progression of events would be blockade, then reinforcement of Guantanamo, finally air and amphibious attack.

Force tabs include 15,500 Marines and a 9000-man Marine air wing; 23,000 Army, mainly 18th Airborne Corps (82nd Airborne Division and an infantry brigade); a naval covering force, and an air task force including fighters and troop carrier wings.

III. Alternative Contingency Plan for Larger-scale Action

JCS also have a plan which is based on a concept of generating forces far beyond Cuban capabilities to resist. This plan in effect calls for overthrowing the Castro government by an overwhelming land, sea and air operation. It includes the above forces plus substantial add-ons, e.g. a total of 53,000 Army troops (two airborne divisions plus) and overwhelming air strength. JCS estimate these forces could take all of Cuba within ten days and secure it in five days more (though of course guerrillas in hills would take longer to flush).

Reaction Time Needed. Both plans are now based on 18 days total response time from date of decision. However, some forces can be generated much more rapidly:

4-24 hours--can get a 1500 man BLT to Guantanamo.

24 hours--could drop 2 airborne battle groups supported by 7 DDs and 4 fighter squadrons.

48 hours--11,800 man task force of 4 battle groups, backed by 2 carriers, 36 destroyers, and 8 fighter squadrons.

5 days--2 airborne divisions with 23,000 men.

15-18 days--sealift elements come in. Up to this point the forces dropped lack heavy equipment for offensive punch. It (tanks, etc.) comes in by sea and US forces then move out to occupy Cuba.

Assumptions are that the necessary base rights and overflight clearances have been gotten (one airbase in Bahamas is essential and we are checking with UK on it); forces from Puerto Rico must fly over Haiti and Dominican Republic.

All of the above plans are for unilateral US action. Though the JCS hope there would be some OAS support, the underlying thought behind both plans was to be ready to do something overwhelming soon. In this case sizable OAS forces would only slow us down, though the plans do contemplate token contributions. Query--Shouldn't we have alternate plans based on substantial LA contribution, so that in case we want to make it an OAS rather than strictly US operation, we'll have some idea of how to fair [phase?] the LA's in?

Above plans call for only conventional weapons. They are based on immediate neutralization of whatever Cuban air strength exists so no requirement exists for nuclears (it would be a political disaster anyway). There are CIA and military government annexes, but no use of Cuban forces is contemplated. No Soviet reaction is assumed.

One weakness in the plans is that the military will be prepared only to provide five days support for the indigenous personnel, i.e. Cubans in occupied areas. Obviously after five days we will have an awful lot of Cubans to care for. The plan merely says this would be responsibility of the State Department!

R. W. Komer



FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1961-1963

Volume X

Cuba, 1961-1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington

Cuba, 1961-1962

256. Memorandum From the President's Assistant Special Counsel (Goodwin) to President Kennedy

Washington, August 22, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Security, 1961. Secret.

The following is an extremely condensed statement of first thoughts regarding some aspects of our Cuba policy.

The Conference at Punta del Este/¹/ adds, I believe, two new factors to our consideration of Cuba policy.

/¹/A special meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, attended by representatives of all of the American Republics, was held at Punta del Este, Uruguay, August 5-17, to establish the Alliance for Progress. The charter for the Alliance was signed at the conclusion of the meeting on August 17. For text of the charter, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961*, pp. 395-409.

First, is the conversation with Che Guevara which is appended to this paper.²/ I believe this conversation--coupled with other evidence which has been accumulating--indicates that Cuba is undergoing severe economic stress, that the Soviet Union is not prepared to undertake the large effort necessary to get them on their feet (a Brazilian told me "you don't feed the lamb in the mouth of the lion"), and that Cuba desires an understanding with the U.S. It is worth remembering that Guevara undoubtedly represents the most dedicated communist views of the Cuban government--and if there is room for any spectrum of viewpoint in Cuba there may be other Cuban leaders even more anxious for an accommodation within the U.S. This is only a speculative possibility but it is, I believe, a reasonable speculation.

/²/Document 257.

Second, is the emerging fact that any hope for OAS action--along the lines of the Colombian initiative/³--is dead. It is my strong belief that the big countries (Brazil and Mexico especially) are not prepared to buy this, that they feel such action would be a meaningless gesture at great internal political cost to them, and that there is no point on going ahead without the support of the large countries. A numerical majority--led by Nicaragua and Peru--would not be in our interest.

/³/On May 6 the Government of Colombia proposed a meeting of Latin American Foreign Ministers to discuss the Cuban problem. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/5-661) For documentation on this initiative, see vol. XII, pp. 250 ff.

This being so I believe we should consider the following general lines of action.

(A) Pay little public attention to Cuba. Do not allow them to appear as the victims of U.S. aggression. Do not create the impression we are obsessed with Castro--an impression which only strengthens Castro's hand in Cuba and encourages anti-American and leftist forces in other countries to rally round the Cuban flag.

(B) Quietly intensify, wherever possible, the economic pressure. This means selectively discouraging those doing business with Castro, aiming sabotage activities at key sectors of the industrial plants such as refineries, invoking the Trading with the Enemy Act upon the first apparent provocation, and focussing some expert attention on the problem of economic warfare.

This also means quiet military pressure--perhaps through frequent unpublicized naval maneuvers off the Cuban coast, Guantanamo buildups, the spread of false intelligence, etc. The object of this is to continue the diversion of important resources into military activities and equipment. This should be done as quietly as possible to avoid adverse propaganda effects as well as an invasion psychology here.

(C) Continue and step up covert activities aimed, in the first instance, at destruction of economic units, and diversion of resources into anti-underground activities. This should be done by Cuban members of Cuban groups with political aims and ideologies.

(D) Step up propaganda aimed at:

1. Telling the Cuban people how their government is sacrificing their welfare to international communism.
2. Widely publicizing the economic failures of the Castro regime throughout Latin America.

(E) Form the Caribbean Security pact strictly as a defensive measure. Aside from the substantive value of such an organization in dealing with the spread of revolution, it will have an adverse impact on the psychology of peaceful coexistence which Castro is now trying to create, and might prove a useful screen for some of our activities.

(F) Seek some way of continuing the below ground dialogue which Che has begun. We can thus make it clear that we want to help Cuba and would help Cuba if it would sever communist ties and begin democratization. In this way we can begin to probe for the split in top leadership which might exist.

Dick

257. Memorandum From the President's Assistant Special Counsel (Goodwin) to President Kennedy

Washington, August 22, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Security, 1961. Secret.

SUBJECT

Conversation with Commandante Ernesto Guevara of Cuba

The conversation took place the evening of August 17 at 2 A.M. Several members of the Brazilian and Argentine delegations had made efforts--throughout the Punta del Este Conference--to arrange a meeting between me and Che. This was obviously done with Che's approval, if not his urging. I had avoided such a meeting during the Conference. On Thursday we arrived in Montevideo and I was invited to a birthday party for the local Brazilian delegate to the Free Trade area. After I arrived, and had been there for about an hour, one of the Argentines present (who had been on the Argentine delegation) informed me they were inviting Che to the party. He arrived about 2 A.M. and told Edmundo Barbosa DaSilva of Brazil and Horatio Larretta of Argentine that he had

something to say to me. The four of us entered a room, and the following is a summary of what took place. (The Argentine and Brazilian alternated as interpreters.)

Che was wearing green fatigues, and his usual overgrown and scraggly beard. Behind the beard his features are quite soft, almost feminine, and his manner is intense. He has a good sense of humor, and there was considerable joking back and forth during the meeting. He seemed very ill at ease when we began to talk, but soon became relaxed and spoke freely. Although he left no doubt of his personal and intense devotion to communism, his conversation was free of propaganda and bombast. He spoke calmly, in a straightforward manner, and with the appearance of detachment and objectivity. He left no doubt, at any time, that he felt completely free to speak for his government and rarely distinguished between his personal observations and the official position of the Cuban government. I had the definite impression that he had thought out his remarks very carefully--they were extremely well organized. I told him at the outset that I had no authority to negotiate my country's problems, but would report what he said to interested officials of our government. He said "good" and began.

Guevara began by saying that I must understand the Cuban revolution. They intend to build a socialist state, and the revolution which they have begun is irreversible. They are also now out of the U.S. sphere of influence, and that too is irreversible. They will establish a single-party system with Fidel as Secretary-General of the party. Their ties with the East stem from natural sympathies, and common beliefs in the proper structure of the social order. They feel that they have the support of the masses for their revolution, and that that support will grow as time passes.

He said that the United States must not act on the false assumptions that (a) we can rescue Cuba from the claws of communism (he meant by other than direct military action); (b) that Fidel is a moderate surrounded by a bunch of fanatic and aggressive men, and might be moved to the Western side; (c) that the Cuban revolution can be overthrown from within--there is, he said, diminishing support for such an effort and it will never be strong enough.

He spoke of the great strength of the Cuban revolution, and the impact it has had on liberal thought throughout Latin America. For example, he said, all the leftwing forces in Uruguay were joining forces under the banner of Cuba. He said civil war would break out in many countries if Cuba were in danger--and such war might break out in any event. He spoke with great intensity of the impact of Cuba on the continent and the growing strength of its example.

He said that in building a communist state they had not repeated all of the aggressive moves of the East. They did not intend to construct an iron curtain around Cuba but to welcome technicians and visitors from all countries to come and work.

He touched on the matter of the plane thefts./1/ He said he didn't know if I knew but they had not been responsible for any hijackings. The first plane was taken by a young fellow who was a good boy but a little wild and who is now in jail. They suspected that the last plane was taken by a provocateur (a CIA agent). He is afraid that if these thefts keep up it will be very dangerous.

/1/See Document 252.

He began to discuss the difficulties of the Alliance for Progress. He asked me if I had heard his speech at the closing of the conference. I said I had listened to it closely. He said that it explained his viewpoint on the Alliance for Progress. (In this speech he said the idea of the Alianza was fine, but it would fail. He spoke also of the play of historical forces working on behalf of communism, etc.--that there would be either leftist revolutions or rightist coups leading to leftist takeovers, and there was also a strong chance that the commies would get in through popular election.) He then said he wished to add that there was an intrinsic contradiction in the Alianza--by encouraging the forces of change and the desires of the masses we might set loose forces which were beyond our control, ending in a Cuba style revolution. Never once did he indicate that Cuba might play a more

direct role in the march of history.

He then said, now that he had discussed our difficulties he would like to discuss his own problems--and he would like to do so very frankly. There were in Cuba, he said, several basic problems.

1. There was disturbing revolutionary sentiment, armed men and sabotage.
2. The small bourgeoisie were hostile to the revolution or, at best, were lukewarm.
3. The Catholic Church (here he shook his head in dismay).
4. Their factories looked naturally to the U.S. for resources, especially spare parts and at times the shortages of these resources made things very critical.
5. They had accelerated the process of development too rapidly and their hard currency reserves were very low. Thus they were unable to import consumer goods and meet basic needs of the people.

He then said that they didn't want an understanding with the U.S., because they know that was impossible. They would like a *modus vivendi*--at least an interim *modus vivendi*. Of course, he said, it was difficult to put forth a practical formula for such a *modus vivendi*--he knew because he had spent a lot of time thinking about it. He thought we should put forth such a formula because we had public opinion to worry about whereas he could accept anything without worrying about public opinion.

I said nothing, and he waited and then said that, in any event, there were some things he had in mind.

1. That they would not give back the expropriated properties--the factories and banks--but they could pay for them in trade.
2. They could agree not to make any political alliance with the East--although this would not affect their natural sympathies.
3. They would have free elections--but only after a period of institutionalizing the revolution had been completed. In response to my question he said that this included the establishment of a one-party system.
4. Of course, they would not attack Guantanamo. (At this point he laughed as if at the absurdly self-evident nature of such a statement.)
5. He indicated, very obliquely, and with evident reluctance because of the company in which we were talking, that they could also discuss the activities of the Cuban revolution in other countries.

He then went on to say that he wanted to thank us very much for the invasion--that it had been a great political victory for them--enabled them to consolidate--and transformed them from an aggrieved little country to an equal.

Guevara said he knew it was difficult to negotiate these things but we could open up some of these issues by beginning to discuss subordinate issues. He suggested discussion of the airplane issue (presumably, we would use the airplane issue as a cover for more serious conversation).

He said they could discuss no formula that would mean giving up the type of society to which they were dedicated.

At close he said that he would tell no one of the substance of this conversation except Fidel. I said I would not

publicize it either.

After the conversation was terminated I left to record notes on what had been said. He stayed at the party, and talked with the Brazilian and Argentine.

The Argentine fellow--Larretta--called me the next morning to say that Guevara had thought the conversation quite profitable, and had told him that it was much easier to talk to someone of the "newer generation."

The above is substantially a complete account of the entire conversation./2/

/2/On August 23 the Department of State summarized in circular telegram 312 to all Latin American posts a statement released by the White House on August 22 in which it was pointed out that the conversation between Goodwin and Guevara at Punta del Este was a casual cocktail party conversation in which Goodwin restricted himself to listening. The posts were authorized to assure their host governments that there had been no change in U.S. policy toward Cuba, as recently defined by President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk in public statements. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8-2361)

Dick

258. Memorandum From the President's Assistant Special Counsel (Goodwin) to President Kennedy

Washington, September 1, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 6/61-12/61. Secret. Another copy of this memorandum is dated September 6. (Ibid., Schlesinger Papers, Box 31, Cuba 1961) Another record of this meeting, drafted by Barnes, is in Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 1, Area Activity-Western Hemisphere-Cuba.

The Cuban Task Force met at the White House on Thursday, August 31. Present were Under Secretary Ball, Assistant Secretary Woodward, two members of the ARA Bureau, Dick Bissell, Tracy Barnes and myself.

The following decisions were made:

1. We would proceed immediately to discuss with other Caribbean governments the possibility of organizing a Caribbean Security Force. This could be organized on the basis of informal understandings within the framework of existing treaty arrangements, as a series of new bilateral treaties, or a formal, multilateral treaty. It was thought that the basis of organization would depend on the judgment of other Caribbean countries as to how they could accomplish the objective of establishing the force without running serious internal political risks. The United States, for its part, would prefer the formal multi-lateral arrangement. Such a Caribbean Security Force would have at least four major aspects:

(1) Advance commitment to come to the aid of other signatories threatened by Castro revolutions and, perhaps the designation of specific units for participation in necessary multilateral actions.

(2) The establishment of a pool of intelligence information concerning subversive activities with provision for exchange of such information.

(3) The establishment of a Caribbean air and sea patrol to watch for suspected infiltration of Castro arms or agents.

(4) A training program in combatting subversive tactics, police organization and procedure, etc.

It was conceded that the substantive aspects of this arrangement could, if necessary, be achieved informally. However, the decision to seek a more formal arrangement was primarily arrived at on the basis of internal political considerations in the United States.

2. It was decided that our public posture toward Cuba should be as quiet as possible--trying to ignore Castro and his island.

3. Our covert activities would now be directed toward the destruction of targets important to the economy, e.g., refineries, plants using U.S. equipment, etc. This would be done within the general framework of covert operations--which is based on the principle that para-military activities ought to be carried out through Cuban revolutionary groups which have a potential for establishing an effective political opposition to Castro within Cuba. Within that principle we will do all we can to identify and suggest targets whose destruction will have the maximum economic impact.

4. We will intensify our surveillance of Cuban trade with other countries and especially U.S. subsidiaries in other countries; and then employ informal methods to attempt to divert this trade--depriving Cuba of markets and sources of supply. I understand that we have already had a few successes in this effort.

5. We will establish next week--in the State Department--a psychological warfare group. This will be a full-time group of three or four people charged with the responsibility of assembling all available information on the Sovietization of Cuba, repression of human rights, failure of the Cuban economy, etc.--much of which has been hitherto classified--putting this information into readable, popularized form, and developing methods of disseminating it through Latin America. Such dissemination would not be primarily through USIA channels but would include feeding it to Latin papers for "exclusive" stories, helping to prepare scripts for Latin American broadcasts, perhaps a direct mailing list of intellectuals and government officials to be handled by a front group, etc. The basic idea is to get this stuff into channels of Latin American communication, instead of treating it as official U.S. propaganda. We have selected someone to head this effort--Jim O'Donnell of George Ball's office who was a free-lance magazine writer (including work for the *Saturday Evening Post*) for many years and whom Ball highly recommends.

6. The CIA was asked to come up--within the week--with a precise, covert procedure for continuing the below-ground dialogue with the Cuban government. The object of this dialogue--to explore the possibility of a split within the governmental hierarchy of Cuba and to encourage such a split--was fully detailed in my last memorandum to you./1/ This is an effort to find an operational technique./2/

/1/Document 256.

/2/In a telephone conversation with Ball on September 7, Goodwin said that he had gone over the results of the Cuban task force meeting with the President. The President had reviewed the memorandum that Goodwin had prepared concerning the meeting, and had "agreed with all of the things that we are doing." Goodwin said that the President wanted "to play it very quiet with Castro" because he didn't want to give Castro the opportunity to blame the United States for his troubles. President Kennedy asked for a study of the current economic situation in Cuba and a prognosis of future developments. Ball indicated that he would get Hilsman and INR started on such a study. (Kennedy Library, Papers of George W. Ball, Subject Series, Cuba, 1/24/61-12/30/62)

Dick

259. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Woodward) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball)

Washington, undated.

//Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba, August 1961. Secret. Drafted on September 7 in ARA/CMA by Park F. Wollam and Hurwitch. Cleared in CMA by Edwin E. Vallon, in ARA by Daniel M. Braddock, and in the CIA by Bissell.

SUBJECT

USG Relationships with Cuban Exile Groups

Problem:

To determine the Department's position with respect to Dr. Miro Cardona's insistence that all U.S. assistance (other than that provided by HEW) to Cuban exiles and underground resistance groups be channelled through the Cuban Revolutionary Council.

Discussion:

During July 1961 when the question of the USG's relationships with Cuban exile groups arose, the Department's position was that the CRC should be accepted and treated as a leading element among the Cuban exile groups; that the U.S. should refrain from affording to the CRC any direct and overt character as a USG instrument in the campaign against Castro; and that the CRC should not be accorded any status as exclusive channel or required point of approval with respect to dealings and relationships established between this Government and other Cuban groups. As far as I have been able to determine, this position was approved by the White House. ARA believes that this basic framework of our relationships to the CRC should be maintained.

An essential element to this relationship is the budgetary support of the CRC which enables it to remain viable. Withdrawal of this support would probably result in the collapse of the CRC, leaving a clear field in the Cuban exile community to the groups backed by Batista and Prio. While we of course have no objection to the activities of Prio, such a development would deprive the Cuban exile movement of the broad base of support which it now enjoys, and would seriously delay the revolutionary effort. ARA believes that it is in our interest to perpetuate the existence of the CRC at this time.

The basic question is what role in our view should the CRC play in present plans regarding Cuba. Miro's contention is that only through a highly centralized operation, fully controlled by the CRC, is it reasonable to hope for eventual success against Castro. A decentralized operation, much of which he maintains is at present kept from CRC's knowledge, signifies in his view deepening rather than healing the split among Cuban exiles and a repetition of past errors. He has stated that he would not continue unless the CRC fully participated in plans and operations regarding Cuba. It is possible that he might retreat somewhat from this first position.

It has been generally agreed that an important mistake was made in the past by not taking the anti-Castro Cubans more fully into our confidence. Clearly, we shall have to rely heavily upon Cubans (both in and out of Cuba) to accomplish our objectives. I feel that the U.S. role should be one limited to purveying funds, materiel and know-how to the Cuban opposition groups based upon plans jointly arrived at. The CRC has been requested to broaden its base and from latest reports appears to have achieved some success in this direction. As far as we are able to determine most of the underground groups now organized in Cuba either have some allegiance to the CRC or at the least do not oppose it.

It would appear reasonable, then, that we should agree with Miro's point of view as far as dealing centrally through the CRC regarding matters involving CRC affiliated organizations is concerned. Two questions arise: security and effectiveness. With regard to the first, it is my understanding that present operations involve dealing with various Cuban opposition groups, separately. The possibility of some security leaks, but not involving the entire plan, is evident under this arrangement. Dealing centrally with the CRC does incur the risk of disclosure of the entire plan. With regard to the second question, centralization may mean wrangling among CRC members,

use of funds for political ends, and an ineffective operation.

ARA believes that in general the stature of the CRC both in the U.S. and abroad should be enhanced. To the extent feasible, Cuban exile prop-aganda programs should emanate from the CRC, so that the Cuban exile community speaks with a single voice. Propaganda programs and propaganda activities based upon the utilization of Cuban exiles should be the result of a coordinated US-CRC effort. The CRC should be covertly supported in these programs.

In essence, the ARA view concerning our future relationship to the CRC is that we should display greater confidence in its ability to carry out most of the major tasks confronting us with respect to Cuba, while we at the same time maintain flexibility vis-a-vis other exile and resistance groups.

Recommendations:/1/

Ball initialed his approval of each of the recommendations on September 8.

1. That we inform Miro that the USG will continue covert budgetary support for the CRC for administrative expenses and propaganda work.
2. That we encourage Miro to intensify his efforts to broaden the CRC's base.
3. That we inform Miro that with respect to clandestine activities in Cuba involving underground groups not opposed to working with the CRC, U.S. assistance will be coordinated under the strictest terms of secrecy with him, based upon plans mutually agreed upon.
4. That we inform Miro that we must retain freedom to give direct assistance to groups that decline to work with the CRC.
5. That we inform Miro that we plan to keep him generally informed as to our activities regarding groups not represented in the Council.
6. That we inform Miro that in the event of security leaks or ineffectiveness the arrangements described in recommendation 3 and/or 5 would be modified.
7. That we step up the level of U.S. representation to plan and coordinate with the CRC on matters of common interest herein referred to.

260. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, September 9, 1961.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 1, Area Activity-Western Hemisphere-Cuba. Secret.

SUBJECT

Meeting in the White House on 9 September 1961 re Status of the Cuban Revolutionary Council

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Richard Goodwin, Assistant to the President for Latin American Affairs

Mr. Robert Woodward, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs

Mr. Park Wollam, Department of State

Mr. Robert Hurwitch, Cuban Desk Officer, Department of State

1. Before the meeting with Dr. Miro Cardona, the head of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, and his secretary, Mr. Ernesto de Aragon, at 11:30 a.m., there was a preliminary meeting held in the office of Mr. Goodwin with him, Mr. Woodward, Mr. Wollam, and *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* to reach agreement on the suggested statement to be made to Dr. Miro Cardona as to the United States Government's relationship to the Revolutionary Council. There is attached hereto a copy of the guidance/^{1/} which was not to be handed to Dr. Miro but to be read to him. The only question that I had was under Section C, Paragraph 2, where it was stated that, where all groups are not willing to work with the Revolutionary Council, Dr. Miro would be kept informed "of these activities." I suggested that this should be somewhat limited to state that he would be kept informed "in general of these activities." Mr. Goodwin said that he did not expect to give a copy of this paper to Dr. Miro, and that he thought that we could play it so that Dr. Miro would simply have a general idea of what we were doing, sufficient to neutralize his protests.

/1/Not found attached but printed as Document 261.

2. At the meeting Dr. Miro was given the substance of the attached, which was translated from English as Mr. Goodwin gave it into Spanish by Mr. Aragon. The Spanish translation was followed very carefully by those in attendance who spoke Spanish and several corrections were made, so that an exact translation was the result.

3. Dr. Miro made no comments, but then stated that if he were to be informed of everything that he had one other basic requirement. He pointed out that the President of the United States had said that Cuban exiles would be accepted into the United States Army. He said that he was faced with a dilemma in that in his position he was called upon to encourage Cubans to join the Army. The question in his mind was whether he was simply encouraging them to become professional soldiers or whether they were equipping themselves for an invasion of Cuba. He recognized the fact that the United States, due to the international situation, could not afford to have a unilateral invasion of Cuba. However, he needed to be reassured that these Cubans were being recruited into the American Army for an eventual joint action with other nations and Cuban exiles to overthrow Fidel Castro. He felt that for the Cuban Revolutionary Council to participate in propaganda activities and clandestine operations aimed at sabotage within Cuba was not sufficient in itself. Likewise, he felt that he could not encourage young Cubans to enter the Army when they might instead be going to college to prepare themselves to become professional men and residents of a new country. Plus that, he objected strenuously to the fact that CIA and the United States Government would back individual groups of Cubans who refused to deal with the Cuban Revolutionary Council. He insisted that by not centralizing all authority in the Council we were creating di-versified groups, and actual gangs would muddy the future of Cuba even if Fidel Castro were overthrown.

4. Mr. Goodwin showed extreme patience and made what might be described as rather eloquent pleas to Dr. Miro's realism and patriotism to understand that the United States could not go so far as to commit itself at this point to armed invasion of Cuba, and to the fact that all Cubans could not be united at this point within the Cuban Revolutionary Council. In spite of these lengthy pleas on the part of Mr. Goodwin, there were rebuttals on the part of Dr. Miro, and Dr. Miro stated that he would not commit himself to continuing as head of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. He said that he would retire to Baltimore to meditate until Monday,^{2/} when he would make a final decision, but that his belief was that at that point he would write an "eloquent and gracious" letter to the President thanking him for his support but declining his continuance as the director of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. Instead he would revert to the status of adviser and common soldier in the resistance to the Communist regime in Cuba.

J.D. Esterline/^{3/}

/2/September 11.

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Esterline signed for [*text not declassified*], Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division.

261. Memorandum Prepared by the President's Assistant Special Counsel (Goodwin)

Washington, September 9, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba, August 1961-. Secret. A typed notation at the top of the source text reads: "Goodwin Memo." A September 20 memorandum from H. Bartlett Wells of INR/DDC to Deputy Under Secretary Johnson describes the memorandum as Goodwin's record of the points made in his conversation with Miro Cardona. (Ibid.)

RELATIONS WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL

1. The United States regards the Revolutionary Council as the central point of contact in its dealing with the Cuban exile and underground activity. Dr. Miro Cardona--as Chairman of that Council--has the complete confidence of the United States Government. The following is a complete outline of the structure of our future relationships with the Council:

A. Budgetary--A basic administrative budget will be allocated. This will be somewhere in the neighborhood of one million dollars per year. There will be considerable flexibility in the use of this money allowed to the Council. Detailed advance justification will not be required, but complete accounting for monies spent will be essential.

All other allocations of money will be on the basis of specific projects submitted by the Council and approved by the United States. In this category will fall most of the propaganda activities and all clandestine activities within Cuba.

B. Composition of Council--The Council will continue to broaden its base, allowing entry to all substantial exile groups which are not identified with Batista or with Communism.

C. Underground Activities--

1. All groups willing to work with the Council in connection with their underground activities will be dealt with through Dr. Miro. This means that the operating U.S. Agency will meet jointly with Dr. Miro and with the appropriate representative of the underground group to discuss activities, including the transfer of supplies and money.

2. All groups which are not willing to work in this manner will be dealt with bilaterally (the U.S. and the group involved); but Dr. Miro will be kept informed of these activities.

3. In all contacts with underground groups it is understood that the nature of these contacts and the matters discussed will be held in the strictest secrecy between the United States, Dr. Miro and the group concerned. It is not intended that information of this sort be disseminated to other members of the Council. Where Dr. Miro is informed of clandestine activities it is for his information only, or that of a specially appointed assistant for these matters. It is further understood that if this arrangement proves insecure, i.e., if information is not kept completely secret, it will be terminated.

4. A CIA agent will keep in constant contact with Dr. Miro.

D. Council Relationships--

1. All problems arising out of the activities of the Council will be discussed between the Council and the Bureau of ARA of the State Department. However, Dr. Miro will still retain his contact with the White House in such cases where he considers such contact to be urgently necessary.

262. Letter From President Kennedy to the President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (Miro Cardona)

Washington, September 14, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba, August 1961-. Secret. A note on the source text indicates that the letter was seen and approved by Hurwitch, Vallon, Coerr, Woodward, Braddock, and Wollam.

Dear Dr. Miro Cardona: I write to express my confidence in your leadership of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. The United States Government deeply admires the distinguished service you have already rendered to the cause of a free Cuba; and I hope you will continue to lead this fight until your country is liberated from the tyranny which has been imposed on it. I am sure that any problems arising from your relationship with the United States can be worked out in the spirit of mutual cooperation and common aspirations which lie behind all our efforts.

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that indicates President Kennedy signed the original.

263. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Kennedy and Senator Kubitschek of Brazil

Washington, September 15, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 149. Confidential. Drafted by DeSeabra. Approved in the White House on October 26. Senator Juscelino Kubitschek, former President of Brazil, was visiting Washington as part of a trip that took him to several countries around the world.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

President Kennedy pointed out that even the neutralization of Western Germany could have a definite weakening effect on the rest of Europe. Then the Chief Executive asked Senator Kubitschek for his comments on the Cuban problem and, specifically, what Senator Kubitschek thought the U.S. should do. Senator Kubitschek said that Cuba was a most serious problem for the entire Hemisphere, and it had become another Berlin for the more vocal and articulate left-wing elements in Latin America. One disturbing fact was that many people thought of self-determination only in terms of Cuba, never of Berlin. As for the best line of action to be taken by the U.S., it should be kept in mind that any act or even attitude on the part of the U.S. that could be construed as aggression would immediately bring about a strong anti-U.S. reaction from Latin American left-wing groups. At the same time, it is an obvious fact that Cuba can readily become a dangerous focus of political agitation in the Hemisphere. Senator Kubitschek mentioned next that he was in Europe at the time of the attempted invasion of Cuba and was keeping in close touch with events. He noticed that many Europeans and Latin Americans held the secret hope that Castro would be toppled. Instead his position and that of his supporters were much strengthened by the failure of the invasion. In an effort to forestall expansion of Castro-type movements, is it better to concentrate solely on assistance to underdeveloped countries or is it desirable in addition to contain or somehow blockade Cuba so that its revolutionary ideology cannot be exported to the rest of the Hemisphere?

President Kennedy commented that he realized that direct action by the U.S. or the OAS might easily be regarded as a positive threat to the independence, sovereignty and right to self-determination of nations in the Hemisphere. As for possible lines of action, one would be to stress the present general policy of ignoring Cuba, thus depriving Castro of the publicity on which he flourishes; another, to undertake appropriate political and economic action that would circumvent the danger posed by the Castro regime to the entire Hemisphere.

Senator Kubitschek agreed that any direct military action against Cuba would rouse vast areas of public opinion against the U.S. He himself would favor some form of indirect action. With reference to public opinion in Brazil, Senator Kubitschek pointed out that the Brazilian press was infiltrated by Communist sympathizers, and even in the more conservative dailies there were writers who consistently presented the Cuban regime in a favorable light. He felt that some understanding was needed among nations in the Hemisphere with a view to taking some action with regard to Cuba that would not be construed as an aggression that in turn would build up Castro as a martyr or hero. A small committee could be set up to sound out the Latin American governments on what to do about Castro. He went on to add that there was no serious Communist threat in Brazil. Out of a population of 70 million, there were 20 million voters, and no more than 500,000 Communists or Communist sympathizers, which are at worst an active minority. In his view, the bulk of the population is anti-Communist and essentially friendly to the U.S. Therefore, a well-thought-out plan of indirect action would probably receive a good measure of popular support, even though Dr. Goulart has taken a stand favoring Cuba. Senator Kubitschek mentioned in passing his talks with Prado of Peru and Frondizi of Argentina on the need for discreet action to isolate Cuba.

President Kennedy indicated that Colombia was also concerned about the Cuban situation. All in all, it was a difficult choice to make regarding the course to be followed because even indirect action might precipitate a reaction that would rouse Castro to hurl more challenges at the U.S. The crux of the problem is to limit Castro's influence while avoiding direct controversy. It will be necessary therefore to weigh in the balance the advantages to be gained by direct action, as contrasted to the disadvantages that would ensue if Castro were put in a position where he would be the voice of revolution and independence, all of it aimed against the United States.

Senator Kubitschek commented that President Kennedy had stated the issues in very clear terms. He felt that even the most indirect and discreet action called for the greatest care. He then went on to review the recent events in Brazil, asserting that Quadros was a man of great nervous instability--as shown by his sudden resignation--who had been moving ever closer to Cuba. Under Quadros' administration Cuba gained prominence in headlines. There was a growing reluctance to accept his pro-Communist and pro-Cuban policies on the part of the military, the whole situation coming to a head with the much-publicized decoration of Che Guevara. The present administration is fully aware of the military's attitude and is expected to move warily, even taking a few steps backward from the extreme positions reached by Quadros. He added that in Brazil the situation had definitely taken a turn for the better. In conclusion, he said that he had been most happy to have had this opportunity to meet President Kennedy, whom he knew through his books and his brilliant career, and for whom he had the greatest admiration. He voiced the conviction that President Kennedy, with his youth, vigor and intelligence, would provide sustained leadership in the defense of the ideals of the Western World.

[Here follows discussion of other matters.]

264. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Kennedy and President Frondizi

New York, September 26, 1961, 9 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 149. Confidential. Drafted by Barnes and approved in the White House on November 3. The conversation took place at the Hotel Carlyle in New York. President Kennedy and Argentine President Arturo Frondizi were in New York for the opening session of the U.N. General Assembly.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Referring to the Cuban problem, President Kennedy said that it was important that it be understood that it was not a question of the United States versus Cuba, or of Castro versus Kennedy, because a debate of this kind would only enhance Castro's prestige. He said that it was necessary to isolate Cuba and increase its economic problems, which were already serious. He said that it was important not to leave the impression of the United States, great imperialist power from the North, attacking poor, brave Cuba, which is the impression Castro wants to give.

President Frondizi said that he believed that the basic action to be undertaken with regard to Cuba was to accelerate the launching of the Alliance for Progress, and that he did not believe that another invasion of Cuba should be attempted. He said that it was necessary to show that with democratic methods, with American support for the Latin American people, it was possible to achieve the conditions Castro was seeking in his own country.

President Kennedy said that there were Cubans in all of these countries trying to influence liberals, leftists, and labor movements, and that it was important to take action to discredit the Cuban revolution, identifying it as foreign, alien, and anti-Christian, and not permitting it to be considered as a revolution that was trying to improve the living conditions of the Cuban people. He said that it was necessary to show that Castro and company were subversives in the hemisphere, and that it was not a problem of the United States against Cuba.

President Kennedy asked whether President Frondizi saw any merit in the Colombian proposal to try to call a meeting of Foreign Ministers, in order to declare that Cuba is a Soviet satellite and that therefore, according to the terms of the Rio Treaty, can no longer be considered a member of the American family. He also asked whether President Frondizi considered that it might be possible, or advisable for Argentina, on the basis of the Cuban documents or for any other reasons, to break relations with Cuba, and if it did so, whether this would create internal problems in the country. He added that any action taken by the United States had to have the support of Argentina.

President Frondizi said that the solution to the problem must be found within the framework of the OAS. On the basis of his conversations with other Latin American Presidents, he believed that it was indispensable to proceed vigorously with the Alliance for Progress, and on this platform later take decisions within the OAS. Then a meeting of the OAS might be called, in which the Colombian proposal would be a good working tool.

President Kennedy said that some time would be required to get the Alliance for Progress organized, and asked as to the possible date for such a meeting of consultation.

President Frondizi said that it might be the beginning of 1962.

President Kennedy said that with regard to this problem he was somewhat concerned about the position of Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, and to a certain degree, Ecuador. As to Brazil, certain doubts existed as to the position to be taken by President Goulart. He said that in his opinion, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina were the key countries, and from the American viewpoint, nothing could be done without Argentina.

President Kennedy said that it was necessary to do something so that Castro, as a Communist, should not be appealing to the Latin American people, and that it was necessary to isolate Cuba, pointing it out as a stranger in the house, so that it would not be so appealing to non-Communist leftists.

President Frondizi said that he was planning on stopping by in Brazil later on in the year to speak with President Goulart, and that the latter had requested him to tell him about the results of his conversations with President Kennedy. He said that if Brazil and Argentina worked together, it would be possible to make progress in Latin America.

265. National Security Action Memorandum No. 100

Washington, October 5, 1961.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and Richard Goodwin, as Director of the Cuban Task Force.

TO

The Secretary of State

SUBJECT

Contingency Planning for Cuba/1/

For the nature of the contingency planning required, see Document 266.

In confirmation of oral instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State Woodward, a plan is desired for the indicated contingency in Cuba.

McGeorge Bundy/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

266. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, October 5, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 6/61-12/61. Secret. Prepared by Thomas A. Parrott.

SUBJECT

Cuba

In accordance with General Taylor's instructions, I talked to Assistant Secretary Woodward yesterday about the requirement for the preparation of a contingency plan. He told me on the telephone he would be leaving for two weeks and, therefore, his Deputy, Wymberley Coerr, would have to take this project on.

I then met with Mr. Coerr and outlined the requirement to him. I said that what was wanted was a plan against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scene. I said that my understanding was the terms of reference governing this plan should be quite broad; we agreed, for example, that the presence and positions of Raul and Che Guevara must be taken into account. We agreed that this was an exercise that should be under the direction of State with participation by Defense and CIA. I also pointed out to Mr. Coerr that Mr. Goodwin had been aware of this requirement.

Mr. Coerr said he would get his people started on this right away. As to timing, I said that I did not understand that this was a crash program but that it should proceed with reasonable speed. He then set Monday as a target date for a first draft.

I had mentioned to Mr. Woodward the President's interest in this matter, before General Taylor had told me he preferred this not be done. Therefore, I felt it necessary to tell Mr. Coerr, on the assumption that Mr. Woodward would have already told him. I asked that this aspect be kept completely out of the picture. He understood this fully and volunteered that it could be presented as an exercise emanating from his own office. I said I would leave this up to him but it was perfectly all right to attribute it to General Taylor.

On the covert side, I talked to Tracy Barnes in CIA and asked that an up-to-date report be furnished as soon as possible on what is going on and what is being planned. I asked that this be related to the broad plan that was approved by the Special Group and by higher authority in August. I did not tell Mr. Barnes of Presidential interest. However, during the time that I had been trying to reach him, he had seen Mr. Goodwin who had told him about this requirement./1/

/1/On October 6 Barnes sent a memorandum to Esterline instructing Branch 4 of the Western Hemisphere Division to prepare a contingency plan based on the assumption of the unexpected removal of Castro from power. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 1, Area Activity-Western Hemisphere-Cuba) See the Supplement. A memorandum produced in Branch 4 on October 6, entitled "What Would Happen If Castro Died?," is *ibid.*, DDO/WH Files: Job 73-00853R, Box 1, WH Division Liaison with Dept of State. See the Supplement.

TAP

267. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Coerr) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)

Washington, undated.

//Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 15, October 20, 1961. Secret. Drafted by Hurwitch on October 18 and cleared by Wollam on October 19. Sent through Wells in INR/DDC.

SUBJECT

U.S. Relations with the Cuban Revolutionary Council

Problem

To determine the desirability of obtaining compliance with the recent inter-agency and White House agreement, pursuant to an NSC decision of May 5, 1961, regarding the means of improving and making more open U.S. relations with the CRC, headed by Dr. Miro Cardona.

Discussion

1. The Cuban Exile Community Situation.

A power struggle has developed between Miro Cardona and ex-President Prio Socorras. Miro is generally regarded by Cubans as: anti-Batista, anti-Prio, anti-Communist, having been briefly associated with the Castro regime, and personally a man of honor. Prio is generally regarded by Cubans as: anti-Batista, anti-Communist, having remained in Cuba under Castro an inexplicably long time, as having headed a corrupt regime and therefore a symbol of Cuba's past ills which led to Batista and in turn Castro, and opportunistic. Dr. Miro is known in the exile community to have the confidence of the White House. Dr. Prio (who is wealthy) has undertaken a campaign to discredit Miro and to gain the ascendancy in the community. The key organized groups in the community (students, labor, women, legal profession, among others) hold the balance of power, and are financed directly by CIA. As long as this method of financing pertains, these groups will probably remain

independent of both Miro and Prio control, although there is clear indication that part of one group (the magistrates) has already been seduced by Prio.

If this situation is permitted to continue, Prio may emerge as the principal spokesman of Cubans in exile. To limit this possibility Miro has repeatedly expressed the desire that these key organized groups be financed by CIA through the CRC as the major means of enhancing his own power position in the community.

ARA believes that if Miro's desire in this were granted, most of the members of these key organized groups would join the CRC.

2. The Underground Attitude Toward the Exile Community.

The Ambassador of Italy at Habana, who of the friendly diplomats is widely regarded as a keen and most knowledgeable observer of the Cuban scene, personally gave ARA the following assessment two days ago:

Although the underground is disdainful of Cubans who live in the security of the U.S., it recognizes the necessity for an exile organization. Miro is the only prominent exile acceptable to the underground. Prio is entirely unacceptable.

The underground expects to have the principal say in any post-Castro government.

The foregoing supports ARA's assessment obtained from a variety of other sources.

3. U.S. Relations with Miro.

Several months ago the White House asked Miro to broaden the CRC base. (As indicated above, CIA direct financial support of the key organized exile groups makes Miro's task in this regard virtually impossible.)

During the first half of September, the White House reaffirmed its confidence in Miro's leadership. He was, however, informed that his requests for a U.S. commitment to invade Cuba and for CRC exclusive jurisdiction over all underground groups were denied. He was at the same time offered the following working arrangement which he accepted:

1. a basic administrative budget of approximately one million dollars per year
2. provision for supplementary budget on a case basis
3. expansion of CRC base
4. underground groups willing to work with Miro to be dealt with through Miro
5. maintenance of secrecy

In addition, he was assured that his additional requests (which the White House considered of secondary importance), including financing of the key organized exile groups through the CRC, would not present insurmountable problems.

The President, to prevent Miro's resignation taking effect, addressed a letter to Dr. Miro/1/ confirming his confidence in Miro's leadership. This letter was delivered by the Department with oral confirmation of all the above points.

Little of the working arrangement has been put into practice, nor is that little functioning satisfactorily. None of Miro's secondary requests have been granted. Miro is consequently seriously dispirited and the Department's relations with him may become precarious. He plans to arrive in the Department today. Unless ARA can offer him something concrete, he will probably ask for a White House appointment. If the White House is unable to reassure him, he will probably resign. Under the emotional strain of the imprisonment of his son in Cuba combined with the six months (since April 17) of delay by the United States in fully clarifying his position, he may feel forced to break his word and make the President's letter public.

Recommendation:/2/

/2/The source text is not marked to indicate Johnson's response to the recommendations. On November 13, Joseph Scott of INR/DDC sent a memorandum to Johnson to inform him that "in accordance with the President's wish and your instructions" Miro Cardona had been dissuaded from resigning as President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba, August 1961-)

1. That you request as soon as possible a report from CIA on its implementation of our commitments to Miro.
2. That, through the Special Group or otherwise, you obtain an agreed line of action by all interested agencies to implement our commitments to Miro in line with our basic objective of seeking the most effective methods of contributing to Castro's downfall.

268. Memorandum From the Assistant to the President's Military Representative (Parrott) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, October 20, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (CI) Meetings, 6/61-10/62. Secret; Eyes Only.

SUBJECT

Special Group meeting, Friday, October 20, 1961

The following are things that you will want to follow up on as a result of today's Special Group meeting:

[Here follows consideration of topics unrelated to Cuba.]

5. Cuba: Summary of Covert Program. After you left, it developed that there was some difference of opinion between ARA in State and the Agency on the most desirable US posture toward Dr. Miro Cardona. This came as a surprise to Johnson, Dulles and myself. It was agreed that the presentation of this summary to Higher Authority should be deferred until there is agreement. It was felt that, if agreement can be reached, then there might be some usefulness in Mr. Dulles and Mr. Johnson going along with you at some appropriate time so as to get this matter straightened out. (In case this is more than usually obscure, see the last three paragraphs of the attached summary.)/1/

/1/The attached summary is entitled "Cuban Covert Program Report," October 13. It summarizes an October 12 memorandum for the Special Group entitled "Cuban Program Report." (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 15, October 20, 1961) See the Supplement. The first part of the summary deals with operational details. The final three paragraphs read as follows:

"The position of Dr. Miro Cardona presents something of a problem. His organization--the Cuban Revolutionary

Council--and portions of the Frente now allied with the CRC, are being subsidized at about \$90,000 per month. Miro expects this to continue at least until 29 June 1962.

"Some, but very little, operational benefit is realized. Miro has used the funds to support individuals of his choosing and has not devoted attention to strengthening internal Cuban opposition. Other exile leaders interpret this support as evidence of U.S. selection of Miro as leader of a post-Castro government.

"Since this situation is inconsistent with present U.S. policy, possible solutions are being sought under the leadership of the State Department."

Suggested Action: None, until State and CIA are ready to move. One or the other will be in touch with you at that time.

T.A.P./2/

/2/Print

269. Memorandum From the President's Assistant Special Counsel (Goodwin) to President Kennedy

Washington, November 1, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Security, 1961. Top Secret; Eyes Only for the President.

I believe that the concept of a "command operation" for Cuba, as discussed with you by the Attorney General, is the only effective way to handle an all-out attack on the Cuban problem. Since I understand you are favorably disposed toward the idea I will not discuss why the present disorganized and uncoordinated operation cannot do the job effectively.

The beauty of such an operation over the next few months is that we cannot lose. If the best happens we will unseat Castro. If not, then at least we will emerge with a stronger underground, better propaganda and a far clearer idea of the dimensions of the problems which affect us.

The question then is who should head this operation. I know of no one currently in Cuban affairs at the State Department who can do it. Nor is it a very good idea to get the State Department involved in depth in such covert activities. I do not think it should be centered in the CIA. Even if the CIA can find someone of sufficient force and stature, one of the major problems will be to revamp CIA operations and thinking--and this will be very hard to do from the inside.

I believe that the Attorney General would be the most effective commander of such an operation. Either I or someone else should be assigned to him as Deputy for this activity, since he obviously will not be able to devote full time to it. The one danger here is that he might become too closely identified with what might not be a successful operation. Indeed, chances of success are very speculative. There are a few answers to this:

(1) Everyone knowledgeable in these affairs--in and out of government--is aware that the United States is already helping the underground. The precise manner of aid may be unknown but the fact of aid is common knowledge. We will be blamed for not winning Cuba back whether or not we have a "command operation" and whether or not the Attorney General heads it.

(2) His role should be told to only a few people at the very top with most of the contact work in carrying out his decisions being left to his deputy. If that deputy is someone already closely identified with the conduct of Cuban affairs then it would appear as if normal channels are being followed except that decisive attention would be

given to the decisions which came through those channels. There are probably three or four people who could fulfill this criterion.

This still leaves a substantial danger of identifying the Attorney General as the fellow in charge. This danger must be weighed against the increased effectiveness of an operation under his command.

RNG

270. Editorial Note

At a meeting in the White House on November 3, 1961, President Kennedy authorized the development of a new program designed to undermine the Castro government in Cuba. The program was codenamed Operation Mongoose. The meeting that the President called to consider the program convened at noon and lasted until 12:55 p.m. According to the President's Appointment Book the meeting was attended, in addition to the President, by Attorney General Robert Kennedy; by Ball, U. Alexis Johnson, Wymberley Coerr, and Robert Hurwitch from the Department of State; by Cabell, Bissell, Amory, and King from the CIA; and by McGeorge Bundy and Goodwin from the White House staff. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book) Robert Kennedy's handwritten notes on the meeting, which suggest that McNamara, Nitze, and General Edward Lansdale also attended, read as follows: "McNamara, Dick Bissell, Alexis Johnson, Paul Nitze, Lansdale (the Ugly American). McN said he would make latter available for me--I assigned him to make survey of situation in Cuba--the problem and our assets. My idea is to stir things up on island with espionage, sabotage, general disorder, run & operated by Cubans themselves with every group but Batistaites & Communists. Do not know if we will be successful in overthrowing Castro but we have nothing to lose in my estimate." (Kennedy Library, Papers of Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General Papers, Handwritten Notes, 11/7/61)

No other record of this meeting has been found, but the decisions that were taken during and following the meeting are summarized in Document 278.

On November 6 Goodwin discussed the meeting in a telephone conversation with Ball:

"Goodwin said the Cuban thing discussed on Friday is moving ahead. Ball said Alex had given him a report on Saturday. Goodwin said it was moderating and toning down and assuming a more logical approach to it. The Lansdale problem with CIA will be worked out. Goodwin talked to Bissell and asked he appoint someone to work with Lansdale. On the over-all thing there are two things: the economic part which is non-covert and the diplomatic relations status. Goodwin asked if a memo could be prepared on what has been done and how it is being handled, since it is non-covert. Then he and Ball should talk with them and decide how to work it in the over-all thing. Ball said he would get the work started on this right away. Goodwin asked that it be done in the next couple of days." (Kennedy Library, Papers of George W. Ball, Subject Series, Cuba, 1/24/61-12/30/62)

According to subsequent testimony before a Senate Select Committee chaired by Senator Frank Church, Lansdale prepared a report, in response to Robert Kennedy's instruction, in which he observed that Castro enjoyed considerable popular support in Cuba. Lansdale concluded that if the United States sought to undermine the Castro government, it should adopt a different approach from the "harassment" operations that had been directed against Castro up to that time. In contrast to operations conceived and led by CIA officials, Lansdale proposed a program in which the United States would work with Cuban exiles who had been opposed to Batista and later became disillusioned with Castro. The objective of Lansdale's proposed program was to have "the people themselves overthrow the Castro regime rather than U.S. engineered efforts from outside Cuba." Lansdale's concept for Operation Mongoose envisioned the development of leadership elements among Cubans opposed to Castro. At the same time he proposed to develop "means to infiltrate Cuba successfully" and to organize opposition "cells and activities" inside Cuba. Lansdale testified that his plan was designed so as not to "arouse premature actions, not to bring great reprisals on the people there and abort any eventual success." (*Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report of the Select Committee to Study*

Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate (Washington, 1975), pages 140-141)

Lansdale's recommendations became the conceptual basis for the Mongoose operation, knowledge of which was carefully controlled and limited. Overall control of the operation was entrusted to a new group established for the purpose, called the Special Group (Augmented), a slightly expanded version of the NSC 5412 Special Group, which oversaw covert operations. The Special Group (Augmented) consisted of the regular Special Group members, McGeorge Bundy, U. Alexis Johnson, Roswell Gilpatric, John McCone, and General Lyman Lemnitzer, augmented by Robert Kennedy and General Maxwell Taylor. Although Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara were not regular members of the group, they occasionally attended meetings. President Kennedy appointed Taylor as chairman of the group, but Robert Kennedy was the principal motive force within the group and the informal link between the group and the President. General Lansdale was appointed Chief of Operations and coordinated the CIA's Mongoose operations with those of the Departments of State and Defense. Within the CIA, the Mongoose operation was run by Task Force W, under the direction of William Harvey, with overall guidance from Lansdale and the Special Group (Augmented). The CIA developed an operational force of approximately 400 people at CIA headquarters and at its Miami Station, and had primary responsibility for the implementation of the Mongoose operation. (Ibid., page 140)

[end of document]



FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1961-1963

Volume X

Cuba, 1961-1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington

Cuba, 1961-1962

271. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Board of National Estimates (Kent) to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles

Washington, November 3, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Security, 1961. Secret. President Kennedy expressed a desire for an assessment of the situation in Cuba in a conversation with Goodwin on September 7; see footnote 2, Document 258. On October 31 McGeorge Bundy told Ball in a telephone conversation that President Kennedy wanted an assessment prepared by the CIA in conjunction with a meeting on Cuba that the President had scheduled for November 3. (Kennedy Library, Papers of George W. Ball, Subject Series, Cuba, 1/24/61-12/30/62) The assessment was subsequently issued on November 28, under the same title but in a slightly expanded format, as NIE 85-61. (Central Intelligence Agency, ODDI Registry of NIEs and SNIEs: Job 79-R01012A) Major General Richard Collins, Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff, sent a brief of NIE 85-61 to Secretary of Defense McNamara on November 28. (Memorandum from Collins to McNamara, J2DM-455-61; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Cuba, 1961, 121--353)

SUBJECT

The Situation and Prospects in Cuba

Summary

1. The Castro regime has sufficient popular support and repressive capabilities to cope with any internal threat likely to develop within the foreseeable future. The regime faces serious, but not insurmountable, economic difficulties. The contrast between its roseate promises and the grim actuality is producing disillusionment and apathy. Some specially motivated elements have recently dared to demonstrate their disapproval. The bulk of the population, however still accepts the Castro regime, or is at least resigned to it, and substantial numbers still support it with enthusiasm. At the same time, the regime's capabilities for repression are increasing more rapidly than are the potentialities for active resistance.

The Economic Situation and Prospects

2. The Cuban economy is now feeling the impact of three revolutionary changes: (a) the loss of most of its experienced middle and upper level managerial talent; (b) the imposition of elaborate state controls; and (c) a drastic shift in the trading pattern, from primary dependence on the US to primary dependence on the Soviet Bloc. The US embargo has produced some economic difficulties through the denial of spare parts for previously acquired equipment, almost all of which was of US origin. Nevertheless, the production of sugar, the principal

export crop, has been increased, and the production of tobacco and tropical fruit, the other leading exports, has been maintained. Although Cuba's free world trade and foreign exchange reserves have declined sharply, the Bloc is taking enough exports and returning enough consumer goods and machinery to keep the economy going.

3. The domestic production of foodstuffs and other consumer goods, and the imports obtained from the Bloc and elsewhere, are together not sufficient to compensate for the loss of former imports from the US. Personal consumption has declined, especially in the cities, and most drastically in the case of the upper and middle classes. In some rural areas, however, especially in centers of sugar production, living conditions have been substantially improved, particularly in terms of housing and sanitation. These examples of the tangible benefits received by some keep alive the hopes of many others.

4. In addition to trade, the Bloc has extended to Cuba some \$357 million in credits for industrial development. However, only a few of these development projects are yet underway, nor is much likely to be accomplished for another year or more.

5. In general, the Cuban economy is characterized by major shortages and a high degree of disorganization. This state of affairs will continue for some time to come, and may indeed get somewhat worse. In view of the availability of Bloc assistance, however, we do not believe that the economy will deteriorate so far as to bring about Castro's overthrow, or force him to make basic changes in his policy. On the contrary, the situation will probably begin to improve within a year or so, as the new Communist-type organization takes hold, managerial experience increases, and foreign trade is adjusted to new channels.

Popular Acceptance of the Regime

6. Initially, almost all Cubans hailed the triumph of the Revolution with enthusiasm. Disillusionment, however, came quickly to the urban middle class, urban organized labor, and the landed gentry. It has since spread to small peasant proprietors and even to humbler folk, who are beginning to appear in significant numbers in the flow of refugees from Cuba.

7. The severe internal repression which accompanied the defeat of the April invasion stilled, for a time, all manifestations of opposition within the country. By September, however, this effect had worn off sufficiently for Catholic crowds in Havana and other cities to dare to defy the regime's prohibition of certain public religious observances. This was the first occasion on which the regime had been forced to use gunfire to disperse hostile public demonstrations. It was therefore indicative of a significant change in the psychological situation.

8. There have also been some increase in small-scale guerrilla and sabotage activity and a considerable increase in such passive forms of resistance as absenteeism. However, most disaffected Cubans now think primarily in terms of escape. In mid-September, some 15,000 had completed legal arrangements to leave the country which were then cancelled by the government, and some 500 were in asylum in the several Latin American embassies in Havana. Illegal departures occur almost daily.

9. Despite these manifestations of disaffection, the great bulk of the population still accepts the regime and substantial number still support it with enthusiasm. The sprawling revolutionary bureaucracy now embodies a new class with a very definite personal stake in the regime.

Castroist Political Organization

10. The regime is now in the process of a complete reorganization of the form of government in Cuba, and of the organization of a new totalitarian political party to operate and control it. The Communist model is apparent in both instances.

11. The traditional provincial and municipal governments are being replaced by juntas (Soviets) for

"coordination, execution, and inspection" (JUCEI). Already established in each province of Cuba, the JUCEIs consist of a "provincial congress," representative of all major economic entities in the territory, which meets occasionally; a "plenum" of the congress, which meets every few months; and several smaller bodies which meet frequently and actually direct the provincial administration. The primary function of all JUCEIs is the local implementation of plans received from higher authority.

12. The new totalitarian political machine is to be the United Party of the Cuban Socialist Revolution, a merger of the amorphous 26 of July Movement (or what is left of it) with the well organized Communist Party. Although Castro is of course to be the supreme head of this party, the man who is pushing the project is Blas Roca, the Communist Secretary General. Party membership is to be limited to the elite of the revolutionary struggle and prerequisite to appointment to any important political or economic position.

13. A significant arm of the Castroist political organization is the paramilitary Association of Rebel Youth (AJR), derived from the previous Communist youth organization. These teenagers, of the type that would be found in juvenile gangs, are a terror to their parents, their schoolmates, and the general public. They have charge of indoctrination in the schools and have been active in the formation of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (see paragraph 22). Active participation in the AJR is to be prerequisite to educational and eventually political advancement.

The Castroist Security Apparatus

14. The forces now available to the regime to suppress insurrection or repel invasion are:

- a. The Rebel Army (32,000)
- b. The Rural Police (9,600)
- c. The Rebel Air Force (2,000)
- d. The Navy (2,000)
- e. The Militia (250,000, including 83,000 women)
- f. The Rebel Youth (150,000, including 10,000 girls)
- g. The National Police (9,000)
- h. The Maritime Police

15. The administrative and command structure of these forces is extremely loose; the improvisation of ad hoc commands including disparate elements is the common practice. Confusion and lack of coordination are therefore likely in any emergency situation.

16. The army has been strengthened by the receipt of Bloc arms and is being instructed in their use by Bloc personnel. However, it has had little or no combined arms or field training. It displayed great tactical ineptitude at the time of the April landing.

17. About a fifth of the army are veterans of Castro's guerrilla struggle against Batista. The remainder are early adherents. In time, however, Castro came to doubt, with reason, their loyalty to the course the Revolution had taken on achieving power. The militia were therefore established as an alternative armed support for the regime. The original units were composed of Castro's most ardent followers. In time, however, the militia was so greatly expanded by recruitment under pressure that its revolutionary zeal was considerably diluted. Castro has therefore

transferred his favor and reliance to the newly organized Rebel Youth, who are now his most fanatical followers.

18. In general, the militia and the Rebel Youth, both part-time forces, have only light arms which are issued to them only on occasion. They are not capable of sustained combat, but are effective for controlling and coercing the general public. In addition, some selected units of the militia and the Rebel Youth are specially armed and trained and are, in effect, army units specially dedicated to Fidel Castro.

19. The capabilities of the air force have been greatly enhanced by the acquisition of MIG aircraft and the return of personnel from training in the Bloc. There are now about 35 MIG-15's and MIG-19's operational in Cuba.

20. The navy is unreliable and distrusted; most of its personnel were taken into custody at the time of the April landing. Mutinies, defections, and purges have left it few professionally trained and technically qualified men.

21. Recently, the professional security agencies of the government--Army G-2 (the Secret Police), the National Police, and the Maritime Police--were transferred from the Ministry of the Armed Forces to a newly created Ministry of the Interior. This change is likely to enhance their effectiveness. It does not indicate a reduction of Raul Castro's power, since Ramiro Valdes, the new Minister of the Interior, is one of his close associates. Valdes is a Communist, formerly head of Army G-2.

22. A network of Committees for the Defense of the Revolution is being established to provide an additional agency for political surveillance and control. What these committees lack in professional competence, they make up for in pervasiveness and zeal. The Rebel Youth have been particularly active in promoting their formation. The announced goal is 100,000 committees with over a million members covering every community in Cuba.

If Castro Were to Die

23. Fidel Castro's personal prestige and popularity were indispensable to the regime in the earlier stages of its development. None of his lieutenants could have inherited the personal authority which he then exercised. His loss now, by assassination or by natural causes, would certainly have an unsettling effect, but would probably not prove fatal. The revolution is by now well institutionalized; the regime has firm control of the country; its principal surviving leaders would probably rally together in the face of a common danger. Indeed, a dead Castro, incapable of impulsive personal interventions in the orderly administration of affairs, might be more valuable to them as a martyr than he is now.

24. The fact remains that Castro has had to control tensions, jealous-ies, and conflicts of interest and purpose among his principal lieutenants: Raul Castro, the head of the armed forces; "Che" Guevara, the director of industrial development; Nunez Jimenez, the director of agrarian reform. There could be a falling out among them at Castro's funeral. There would almost certainly be a struggle for power among them afterward, which might break into the open.

25. A coordinated estimate of the Cuban situation and prospects, NIE 85-62, "The Situation in Cuba," is scheduled for USIB consideration in January.

For the Board of National Estimates:

Sherman Kent/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature with an illegible signature above it.

272. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, November 4, 1961.

SUBJECT

Meeting on Cuba, 1400 Hours, 4 November 1961

1. Pursuant to the President's instructions at a meeting on 3 November, a further meeting on Cuba was held in the Cabinet Room on 4 November. It was attended by the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Paul Nitze, General Lansdale, Mr. Alexis Johnson, Mr. Richard Goodwin and the undersigned.

2. Mr. Goodwin had tabled a paper/¹/ on a proposed organization for an accelerated build up of resistance to Castro. The suggestions in this paper were not, however, discussed at the meeting. The Attorney General mentioned that he had not seen the paper until the meeting, which I believe to have been the case with other participants. On the matter of organization, however, there seemed to be tacit but general acceptance of views that had been expressed the preceding day to the effect: (a) that there was a need for close operational coordination of all arms of the U.S. Government that could contribute to the operation, and (b) that responsibility for its direction should be lodged in a task force, conceived of at the minimum as a committee and at the maximum as a separate office, partly for the express purpose of making possible denial that this was another exclusively CIA undertaking.

/¹/Goodwin's paper is apparently the unsigned paper dated November 4 which is *ibid.* For text, see the Supplement.

3. I gave some further account of the kinds of operations we are now preparing and of what we believe to be the state of resistance within Cuba. In summary, I endeavored to make the following points: (a) Our approach to date has been to build up competent CIA controlled and independent Cuban capabilities and to set as their first priority task the creation of one or more competent resistance organizations within the Island. This is necessarily a rather slow business unlikely to begin to yield spectacular results for some time. Meanwhile, however, we are encouraging minor sabotage and planning for larger scale action. (b) In the pursuit of this course we have been in touch with numerous Cuban groups and are trying to bring them along to a point where they can do sound operational planning and hopefully will be able before long to mount infiltration, exfiltration and sabotage operations in a reasonably professional manner. (c) A different approach to the problem would be one which would offer maximum support to any and all politically acceptable elements who wish to infiltrate men and arms into the country or to undertake externally based commando type activities. We have a number of plans before us submitted by Cuban groups for such action. If we adopt the policy of encouraging the promptest possible action on the largest possible scale, it must be understood that sizeable losses will be involved because this implies launching operations before there is an internal organization ready and able to cooperate, before training has been completed, and without taking the time required for the observance of maximum security and counter-espionage precautions. (d) If we are prepared to accept the losses implied in this different approach, the two approaches can be pursued simultaneously with some hope that they will be mutually reinforcing. As we are successful in building a competent resistance organization, it will be in a position to give invaluable help to cruder and larger scale operations. At the same time, if some of these operations are successful they will contribute immeasurably to the climate in which a professionally organized resistance can be built up.

4. The Attorney General urged as the main action to be taken that there was needed an impartial survey of the operational situation and opportunities by someone who had not been close to the operation. It was agreed that this would be undertaken by General Lansdale. I said there could be no objection to such a survey provided (a) it would not interfere with on-going operations and (b) those employed on it were competent in clandestine operations. In connection with the latter reservation, I emphasized we are not now and will for some time not be at a stage in which there is large scale guerrilla fighting; rather the kinds of things that will need to be done for

some little time are typical covert operations and an understanding of them requires knowledge of and experience in such operations.

5. In connection with on-going activities, I said I took it to be the consensus of the meeting, without waiting for the outcome of the survey, that their pace should be stepped up as rapidly as possible, including what has been referred to as large scale sabotage if feasible against really strategic targets. It was agreed that this was the sense of the meeting.

6. After the meeting broke up I had a brief conversation with the Attorney General. I emphasized to him (a) that the Agency personnel now active in operations against Cuba were a completely new group and that he should not be under the impression that people physically and emotionally tired from [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] were those upon whom we were relying for new activities, (b) that if he had any criticism of the Agency's organization or approach I hoped he would state them directly to us, and (c) that I specifically disagree with certain of Goodwin's organizational proposals especially that which would place responsibility for underground and guerrilla activities in a Department of Defense designee.

Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

Deputy Director (Plans)

273. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, November 8, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Security, 1961. Secret; Eyes Only. This paper was apparently prepared in response to the requirement to examine existing programs and options in conjunction with the establishment of Operation Mongoose.

TYPES OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME

1. Non-Sensitive Activities: A variety of non-sensitive political warfare and propaganda activities are being conducted outside Cuba. These include: (a) working with the Cuban Revolutionary Council and the number of other Cuban groups in Miami in an effort to improve their competence to undertake action on their own and also to minimize the effects of disunity among the Cubans; (b) efforts to induce the defection of prominent Cubans from the Castro regime; (c) black operations with the objective of having Castro's diplomats declared PNG or having additional countries break diplomatic relations with Cuba; (d) speaking tours by teachers, student, labor, jurists and women's groups throughout the hemisphere; (e) support of publications and distribution of pamphlets; (f) the support of anti-Castro radio programs on some 60 Latin America stations and 3 stations in Florida; (g) the operation of Radio Swan; (h) the use of a broadcasting ship for intruding radio broadcasts on Cuba t.v. channels. There is believed to be little risk that these activities will give rise to political embarrassment, except for that resulting from the jealousy of various Cuban groups and criticism by one of alleged support to another. The following paragraphs constitute a list of politically more sensitive types of activities in progress or contemplated.

2. Agent Training: There are currently some [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Cubans already trained or now in training as activists who can be infiltrated to organize the resistance and to develop sabotage activities. In addition there are some [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Cuban students in training for infiltration to conduct Agit/Prop activities. For the most part the training is being done in Florida. The men are trained in compartmented small groups; the largest single unit, already trained, numbers [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. No subsequent group will be as large. The candidates are of course volunteers and are from a number of the political groups with which we are in contact.

3. Infiltration/Exfiltration: We maintain and employ for training and operational purposes a fleet of some 7 craft.

They are used primarily for the infiltration and exfiltration of individuals and, if and when feasible, of arms. Currently, infiltrations are apt to involve no more than 3 to 5 individuals at a time but larger groups (up to 15 or 20) may be infiltrated in the future if and when this becomes feasible. No Americans are allowed on any craft that is going within the 12-mile limit around Cuba. Many infiltration/exfiltration operations involve a meet-at-sea with a Cuban fisherman or a Cuban craft.

4. Building an Intelligence and Resistance Organization: Contact is still maintained, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], with [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] agents in Cuba. Their present function is restricted to the furnishing of intelligence and in some cases the maintenance of communication with internal resistance leaders. Every effort will be made to infiltrate additional trained agents and communicators as rapidly as possible for the purpose of building an internal resistance organization and establishing effective secure communication with internal resistance leaders. The objective will be to develop one or more nets of dependable sympathizers and the means of communication both among themselves and to the outside. In the first instance such internal assets, to the extent to which they are subject to control from outside, will be used for intelligence collection, further clandestine recruiting, assisting in infil/exfiltration operations, and mounting low risk sabotage operations. They will be deliberately restrained in this phase from exposing themselves by operations involving high risk or the assembly in one operation of any sizeable number of the resistance.

5. Accelerated Resistance Activities: In parallel with the necessarily time consuming effort to build a secure underground organization, it is now planned to support in the next few months larger scale infiltrations of men and arms for sabotage and perhaps ultimately guerrilla activities when well-conceived operations are proposed by reputable opposition leaders now outside the country or are requested by the resistance leadership from within. In most cases the sponsorship and ultimate responsibility for such operations will rest with Cubans and the Agency's role will be that of furnishing support in the form of funds, training, equipment, communications, frequently the facilities to conduct the actual infiltration itself, and resupply following infiltration if required and feasible. These will necessarily be higher risk operations in which some casualties must be anticipated. It will be impossible to conceal U.S. geographical origin but every effort will be made not only possibly to forestall identification of U.S. Government support but also to avoid any appearance of U.S. Government control or ultimate responsibility. What will be impossible to disprove is that the Cubans responsible obtain help in the U.S.

6. Air Operations: If the internal resistance grows, it will be desirable at some point to undertake air resupply missions. These would be conducted by Cuban crews using common types of commercial aircraft. They will be night missions and would be undertaken only if reception parties had been identified and were in possession of agent radio sets and, hopefully, beacons so that resupply could be carried out with reasonable efficiency. Aside from such air activity, proposals have been received for both leaflet drops and bombing raids. One successful leaflet mission was recently conducted by Cubans from Florida entirely on their own after Agency support had been refused. Such operations rather infrequently carried out may have a useful morale effect. Up to the present time it has been felt that air bombing, quite aside from international repercussions, would be contraproductive in its effect on the Cubans.

274. Inter-Agency Staff Study

Washington, undated.

//Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Inter-Agency Staff Study. Secret; Eyes Only. The source text is undated, but a draft of the study, found in the same file, is dated November 9. No additional drafting information is given on the source text, but Robert Hurwitch of ARA/CMA is listed as the drafter on the preliminary draft, and the other agencies listed to receive copies, and presumably to comment, were Defense and CIA. The study was apparently prepared in conjunction with the planning exercise initiated with the establishment of Operation Mongoose on November 3. The annexes cited in the study were not found attached to the source text.

PLAN FOR CUBA

This study has as its purpose to determine the courses of action which the U.S. would follow with reference to Cuba in the event of Fidel Castro's death in order to insure the replacement of the Castro regime with a friendly government.

A. Background of Present Situation in Cuba.

Castro Cuba, dominated by the Sino-Soviet Bloc, poses a serious threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere. Within Cuba, the Castro regime is encountering currently serious economic difficulties. If the regime maintains its present firm political control of the island, however, and if there is a continued high level of Bloc assistance, conditions could begin to improve after 1962. (See Annex A.)

Nine Latin American nations no longer maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba. The more important Latin American nations, however, maintain relations and are for a variety of reasons still reluctant to break relations with or join in collective action against Cuba. (See Annex B.)

Destruction of the Castro regime and of the Communist apparatus is in the U.S. national interest.

Sino-Soviet Bloc provides political and economic and military support to the Castro regime to promote Bloc objectives in Latin America. We do not believe the Sino-Soviet Bloc would defend Cuba militarily, although they have the capability to do so.

Asian and African neutrals are generally split on the Castro issue while NATO and SEATO allies share U.S. evaluation of the problem but regard it as a U.S. responsibility.

B. Contingency: The Death of Fidel Castro or Other Elimination of Castro, and the Existence of Certain Minimum Military-Political Conditions.

1. Assumptions:

The courses of action which follow are based upon the assumption that in the event of Castro's death the Communist Party in Cuba would maintain control. Dorticos would probably continue as President and Raul Castro would probably assume the Premiership. The Cuban militia, the largest and most effective armed force in Cuba, would respond promptly to Raul's orders and would exterminate whatever scattered outbreaks of resistance may have occurred. The subsequent reign of terror would quickly establish the successor regime in control and would crush any hope of effective U.S. intervention short of a massive assault. The defense of Cuba under Raul would probably be ruthless and pushed to even greater extremes than under Fidel. The successor regime would, regardless of U.S. action, blame the U.S. for Castro's death and would launch a violent anti-U.S. propaganda campaign. There would not be an attack against Guantanamo. (See Annex C.)

Latin American Governments and public opinion would generally believe that the U.S. was responsible for Castro's death. Latin American Governments and important sectors of the population would nevertheless not publicly challenge our statement of innocence. Communist and pro-Communist elements as well as extreme nationalists and opportunistic political opponents of the existing governments would undoubtedly launch anti-American campaigns, with anti-Government overtones. These campaigns would probably include demonstrations and attacks against U.S. official installations. There would be no significant changes in the number of nations which do not maintain relations with Cuba. (See Annex D.)

Meanwhile in the U.S. the popular desire for vigorous action against Cuba would increase as a result of the Cuban regime's likely actions following Castro's death. The Sino-Soviet Bloc would increase the propaganda campaign against the U.S. possibly including threats of military support which the Bloc would not supply. Insofar

as the rest of the world is concerned the Communist inspired propaganda campaign would probably be echoed by a majority of neutralist nations. The U.S. would be widely blamed for Castro's death.

2. Courses of Action:

The courses of action which we would pursue fall into four principal categories:

1. Upon news of the death or other elimination of Castro from Cuban scene we would order that the U.S. armed forces prepare immediately for armed intervention in Cuba in a manner that these preparations are kept from public knowledge and are subject to immediate halt.

2. Before intervening in Cuba we would determine on the basis of reliable intelligence whether the minimum desirable political conditions in Cuba exist, namely:

(a) that events stemming from Castro's death have created a chaotic situation where (1) the successor government would perpetrate widespread atrocities against its own people; (2) resistance would be open and widespread; (3) dissidents would take and appear in a position to hold for several days some Cuban territory; and (4) a substantial group of dissidents would call for outside assistance.

(b) that Latin American Governments would be in a position to resist internal pressures to undertake significant anti-U.S. measures both domestic and/or in the OAS.

(c) that the Sino-Soviet Bloc, according to the best intelligence estimates at the time, would not engage in major military action.

(d) that remaining friendly governments would be in a position to resist internal pressures to undertake significant anti-U.S. measures both domestic and/or in the U.N.

(e) that U.S. Congressional and public opinion would generally support the President's action. The armed forces would have five days notice before being ordered to intervene in order to assemble the requisite forces to accomplish its mission.

3. If it is determined that the minimum desirable political conditions exist in Cuba as above enumerated we would review the international situation and determine whether the danger posed by the Castro regime to the U.S. national security is of such an order of magnitude as to justify intervention in Cuba of U.S. forces, which would be contrary to international law including the UN Charter and OAS commitments.

4. If after reviewing the international situation we determine that armed intervention in Cuba is in the overall national interest we would order intervention in Cuba with the use of U.S. armed forces.

C. Conclusions.

1. Reaction to U.S. Invasion:

In the event of the invasion of Cuba by the U.S. we have concluded the successor regime would mobilize all its forces and would attempt to rally public support. Most of the people would passively wait to see what happens. Many persons would defect from the Castro forces and the underground would become more active. The elements committed to the regime would fight and numerous individuals and groups would resist until physically eliminated.

Although many Latin American Governments and important segments of the population would privately welcome the elimination of communism from Cuba, they would publicly decry U.S. military action as

intervention and consequently a flagrant violation of U.S. commitments in the OAS (for these commitments, see Annex E). The Communist and pro-Castro elements, as well as extreme nationalist and opportunistic political opponents of the existing governments would intensify their anti-American campaigns and would succeed to the extent of seriously threatening the stability of some governments and/or obtaining public denunciation of the U.S. followed in some instances by measures against U.S. national interests in those countries, including private American investments and the Alliance for Progress program. One or more Latin American nations might propose OAS action adverse to U.S. interests, which the U.S. could probably delay.

The Sino-Soviet Bloc would not use military force in Cuba but might apply pressure in other areas. Communist propaganda apparatus would attack U.S. on world-wide basis. The Bloc would introduce or support in the UN a resolution condemning the U.S.

A majority of the neutral nations as well as important sectors of the population would publicly condemn the U.S. Most of the neutrals would support a Bloc-inspired UN resolution charging the U.S. with having violated its commitments to the UN. (For these commitments, see Annex F.)

The political penalties which the U.S. will suffer as a result of having invaded Cuba in violation of U.S. international commitments, including those to the UN and OAS, are severe, but can be borne. The serious criticism of the U.S. which will be aroused by this illegal and interventionist act will be offset by the reservoir of good will which the U.S. enjoys throughout the Free World. Although the U.S. cannot defend this action as justified under international law, we can stress the morality of the action on the basis that a chaotic, near civil war situation exists off our shores where millions of Cubans are seeking freedom by throwing off the Communist yoke and have requested our assistance.

The disappearance of Castro from the Cuban political scene under widely-known conditions of chaos and open resistance to his regime will help destroy the Castro myth and the appeal his regime has had for the peoples of many underdeveloped nations.

The destruction of a Communist regime and its replacement by a friendly government will remove a threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere and will weaken the belief that the Communist Bloc is the eventual winner of the world struggle and should therefore be placated rather than opposed.

Our relations with friendly nations will remain good, after perhaps a slight deterioration in certain instances. American investments will suffer less in the long run than they would if Castro-Communism continued and spread throughout the hemisphere. The Alliance for Progress program will not encounter serious obstacles as a result of this action. If the operation is quickly and successfully accomplished, the political damage will be correspondingly reduced.

Widespread organized Communist disturbances will occur immediately but the more quickly the Castro regime is crushed the greater the difficulty the Communists will encounter in maintaining existing disturbances and in mounting further disturbances. A successful invasion may strengthen the will of Latin American Governments to destroy the Communist menace in their own countries.

The Congress and the people of the U.S. will applaud the action.

2. Suitability and Feasibility of Plan:

The U.S. steps proposed above are suitable for the quick eradication of the Castro regime and its replacement by a friendly government. We can foresee no way other than invasion to accomplish the objective as stated in the problem.

The proposed steps are feasible. The logistics problem is simplified because of the proximity of Cuba to the U.S.

and its great distance from the Bloc. We have the preponderance of military and economic power to carry out the task quickly.

Cuba is not believed to be important enough to the Soviet Union to justify the risk of a major war. Moreover, the USSR cannot supply a significant force over long sea distances against the hostile navy. Therefore, the USSR will not intervene militarily. The USSR may increase its pressure in Berlin, Laos or other parts of the world, but will stop short of a direct major confrontation with the U.S.

3. Acceptability as to Cost:

Castro's armed forces now have the ability to inflict significant losses upon an invading force. We believe, however, that losses would be acceptable given the size and power of the forces we plan to bring against Cuba. Our forces in other parts of the world must be prepared to handle increased brush-fire actions generated by the Soviet Bloc.

The Nation's economy can sustain any armed intervention in Cuba and the subsequent program of rehabilitation in Cuba.

D. Contingency Check List.

1. U.S. Resources to Accomplish Objective of Replacing Castro Regime with Friendly Government:

- (a) U.S. military
- (b) Cuban exiles
- (c) Cuban underground
- (d) Diplomatic influence
- (e) Economic resources to assist friendly government
- (f) Psychological warfare
- (g) Favorable minority of Latin American countries
- (h) Favorable minority in rest of world
- (i) Possible but improbable token military support from L.A.

2. Resources of Cuba and Sino-Soviet Bloc to Prevent Accomplishment of Objective:

- (a) Cuban forces, Cuban Communist apparatus, and partial public support
- (b) Communist international apparatus (apart from military intervention in Cuba)
- (c) Possible world-wide military and paramilitary pressure
- (d) Denunciation in international organizations of U.S. intervention
- (e) Communist-inspired demonstrations in Latin America against Americans and against anti-Communist governments

3. U.S. Steps to Accomplish Objective:

Pre-Invasion

(a) Create the above-described minimum desirable conditions in Cuba (see 2(c), page 5 above)

Action: CIA, DOD, State-USIA

(b) Make known world-wide the creation of the minimum desirable conditions as they occur, as well as progress toward them.

Action: State-USIA, CIA

(c) Sound out the Chiefs of State of two countries regarding possible use of token forces with due regard for security. (Annex G)

Action: State

(d) Evaluate and designate among Cuban exiles and underground groups those individuals who could best participate in the formation of an initial Cuban national, provincial, and municipal government.

Action: State (exiles), CIA (underground)

(e) Review and improve as necessary existing structure for liaison and coordination within the Executive Department to insure that CINC-LANT is kept aware of all aspects of the political and military situation. Augment CINCLANT's staff, as necessary.

Action: State, Defense, CIA

(f) Lay groundwork for psychological warfare and press information programs for invasion support.

Action: State-USIA

(g) Keep key members of Congress progressively informed regarding general situation in Cuba.

Action: State

Invasion Period

(a) Invade Cuba with U.S. forces under CINCLANT.

Action: DOD

(b) Inform L.A. Governments that invasion is underway and warn them they can shortly expect Communist-directed violence in their countries. Invite their support and offer them assistance.

Action: State

(c) Organize participation of anti-Castro forces and coordinate their activities with CINCLANT.

Action: DOD, CIA, State

(d) Launch all-out psychological warfare and propaganda campaign for all sectors, stressing the morality of the intervention.

Action: State-USIA, CIA and DOD

(e) Use diplomatic action to reduce criticism of U.S. action insofar as possible.

Action: State

(f) Organize civil government with participation of designated Cubans.

Action: DOD, State, CIA

(g) Provide program for immediate emergency assistance to civil populace.

Action: DOD, State

(h) Arrange for participation and support by other L.A. forces which may be induced to join.

Action: DOD, State

Post Invasion Phase

(a) Seek out and eliminate pro-Communist resistance.

Action: DOD, CIA

(b) Continue occupation in force and replace, as feasible, military government installed during invasion with provisional Cuban government.

Action: State, CIA, DOD

(c) Provide plan for long-range economic assistance. (See Annex K)

Action: State, AID

(d) Take measures to control entry into Cuba.

Action: State

(e) Re-establish a U.S. Country Team in Habana.

Action: State

275. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, November 22, 1961.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 5, DCI (McCone), Caribbean Survey Group. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone.

Monday, November 20, 1961, 7:00 pm, President Kennedy called personally and asked that I meet with him and Attorney General Robert Kennedy at 4:30 pm the following day.

The meeting was held for the purpose of discussing all possible courses of action in Cuba. Present were:

The President

Robert Kennedy

General Lansdale

Mr. Goodwin of the White House staff.

The President explained that General Lansdale had been engaging in a study of possible action in Cuba, acting under the direction of the Attorney General, and he, the President, desired an immediate plan of action which could be submitted to him within two weeks.

The Attorney General expressed grave concern over Cuba, the necessity for immediate dynamic action, indicating that such action would embody a variety of covert operations, propaganda, all possible actions that would create dissensions within Cuba and would discredit the Castro regime, and political action with members of the OAS in support of the action. He proposed that the Lansdale committee be made up of representatives of CIA, State, USIA and DOD (Lansdale) and that it be organized so that this committee could "cut across" organization channels within the agencies.

McCone's views were solicited and he stated:

- a) That he observed that the Agency and indeed the Administration appeared to be in a condition of "shock" as a result of the happenings in Cuba and, therefore, were doing very little. He supported dynamic action but emphasized that action should not be reckless.
- b) He supported the Lansdale committee concept.
- c) This committee should report to the "5412" group, which he stated was properly organized, met regularly, had senior representation, and was a proper unit to give political guidance to the Lansdale committee and also to evaluate action proposals of the committee.
- d) He proposed that the facilities of all Departments of Government and the CIA be made available to the extent needed, but these facilities be maintained "in place" and that under no circumstances should an attempt be made to "lift" elements of departments or agencies out of their "in place" position and placed under the Lansdale group. He explained that the resources or assets of the departments and the CIA were most extensive and depended upon support, logistics, communications, etc. which were an integral part of the departments and agencies, and if an attempt was made to "lift" certain activities, these activities could not properly function because of lack of support and communication.

The above points seemed to be generally agreed, and it was decided that Robert Kennedy would attend the "5412" committee on Wednesday, November 22nd, to discuss the plan.

McCone advised Robert Kennedy his plans to leave Washington for a few days and offered to revise his travel plans if necessary, but Kennedy felt this not necessary.

The above was discussed in considerably more detail between General Lansdale and McCone in the President's office after the meeting. Lansdale confirmed the possibility that he would be required to go to South Viet Nam as

a Special Advisor to President Diem and, therefore, might be available for only two or three weeks. It was therefore obvious that he must be backed up by a very able officer who can take over if Lansdale leaves.

Lansdale then proposed that Mr. James Critchfield be the CIA man on his committee, indicating that Critchfield was a most able and experienced officer.

On Wednesday, November 22nd, all of the above was reviewed at a meeting in Mr. Dulles' office, attended by Mr. Dulles, General Cabell, Mr. Bissell, Mr. Helms, Mr. Kirkpatrick and Mr. McCone. There was general agreement on all the points mentioned above. Mr. Bissell proposed alternate names to Critchfield, feeling Critchfield could not easily be spared from his present responsibilities.

McCone urged that the most able man available be placed at Lansdale's disposal, even at some inconvenience to other operations because in all probability this man, if he won the confidence of the "5412" committee, the Attorney General and the President, would have to fill Lansdale's responsibilities when Lansdale left. McCone left the meeting with the question of the individual unresolved.

276. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, November 29, 1961, 9-10:20 a.m.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2, DCI (McCone) Memo for the Record, 29 November 1961-5 April 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone.

Discussion with Attorney General Robert Kennedy, 9:00 to 10:20 a.m., November 29, 1961.

(1) Cuba.

K. reviewed briefly Cuban experience stating his report to the President/1/ was written in a single copy which would be given to me today for reading and return--highly critical of CIA and JCS, particularly critical of Bissell for statements made to President that operation would succeed, or at best substantial guerrilla complement be landed in Cuba for future operations--criticized Bissell because Pigs Bay area not guerrilla country and surveys establishing area as guerrilla country had been made in 1895--criticized JCS for having spent only twenty minutes on operation prior first reporting to President endorsing operation.

/1/Not found.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

(12) Activities of the Lansdale group were discussed. Lansdale will probably not go to South Vietnam; he will head an inter-agency group. Kennedy resented CIA resistance to this idea, hoped that we would appoint the most able man to the Lansdale committee (not J.C. King) and agreed without reservation that the Lansdale committee must operate under the 5412 Committee.

John A. McCone/2/

Director

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

277. Memorandum From General Edward Lansdale to Attorney General Kennedy

//Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Cuban Project-1962. Secret; Eyes Only. A note

on the source text indicates that a copy was sent to Goodwin.

Washington, November 30, 1961.

Friday/1/ is apparently the "day of decision" for your special project. General Taylor's group has it scheduled as the main item for discussion.

/1/December 1.

A special Intelligence Estimate/2/ seems to be the major evidence to be used to oppose your project. Copies have just been made available this afternoon, and one is attached./3/ I have underlined key conclusions.

/2/SNIE 85-61; see Document 271.

/3/Not found attached.

I suggest two points:

1. The intelligence which supports conclusions about the internal situation is far from adequate.
2. The conclusion on page 4, paragraph 9, concerning the possibility of an uprising being fomented is a "conclusion of fact" quite outside the area of intelligence. The key factor in such a conclusion must be our own ability to take action. It is the heart of our proposal that we can take effective action, if proper management is provided.

278. Memorandum From President Kennedy

Washington, November 30, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Security, 1961. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Internal evidence indicates that the memorandum was apparently drafted by McGeorge Bundy. An earlier version of this memorandum was sent to the same seven people on November 22. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-2261) The most significant difference between the two memoranda was that the responsibilities assigned to General Lansdale under point 2 in the November 30 memorandum had been assigned to Attorney General Kennedy in the November 22 memorandum, with Lansdale in a subordinate role as the Attorney General's Chief of Operations. Point 4 in the November 22 memorandum reads "The NSC 5412 group will be informed of activities." The Attorney General was included under point 6 in the November 22 memorandum among those listed as controlling dissemination of knowledge of the operation.

MEMORANDUM TO

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

The Director of CIA

The Attorney General

General Taylor

General Lansdale

Richard Goodwin

The following is a summary of the major decisions which have been made in regard to the Cuba Operation.

1. We will use our available assets to go ahead with the discussed project in order to help Cuba overthrow the communist regime.
2. This program will be conducted under the general guidance of General Lansdale, acting as Chief of Operations. It will be conducted by him through the appropriate regular organizations and Departments of the government.
3. The program will be reviewed in two weeks in order to determine whether General Lansdale will continue as Chief of Operations.
4. The NSC 5412 group will be kept closely informed of activities and be available for advice and recommendation.
5. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency will appoint senior officers of their department as personal representatives to assist the Chief of Operations as required. These senior officers should be able to exercise--either themselves or through the Secretaries and Director--effective operational control over all aspects of their Department's operations dealing with Cuba.
6. Knowledge of the existence of this operation should be restricted to the recipients of this memorandum, members of the 5412 group and the representatives appointed by the Secretaries and the Director. Any further dissemination of this knowledge will be only with the authority of the Secretaries of State or Defense or the Chief of Operations.

279. Editorial Note

On December 1, 1961, President Kennedy issued a proclamation, under the provisions of section 408 (b) of the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended, in which he established that the sugar quota for Cuba, for the first 6 months of 1962, would be zero. (Proclamation No. 3440, 26 Federal Register 11714, also printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, January 1, 1962, page 34)

In a speech to the Cuban people the same day, Prime Minister Castro stated: "I am a Marxist-Leninist and I will continue to be a Marxist-Len-inist until the last day of my life." (The translated text of Castro's speech is printed in *The New York Times*, December 3, 1961) United States Representative deLesseps Morrison seized upon Castro's December 1 speech as an admission of his true Communist colors, and in a statement made before the Council of the Organization of American States on December 4, Morrison called upon the governments of the organization to protect the peoples of the hemisphere from "any extension of the treachery of Fidelismo." (*American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961*, pages 320-323)

The Department of State reinforced Morrison's statement in circular telegram 1065 to all Latin American posts on December 6 instructing the posts to assess the local reaction to Castro's speech, and determine whether Castro's admission would help establish the basis for stronger measures to isolate Cuba in Latin America. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12-661)

280. Draft Memorandum for the Record

Washington, December 1, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 90 D 410. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text. The memorandum reports on the December 1 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented). A note attached to a copy of this memorandum in CIA files suggests that it was drafted by Parrott. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 5, Area Activity--Cuba)

Cuba

The Attorney General told the Group about a series of meetings which had been held recently with higher authority. Out of these had come a decision that higher priority should be given to Cuba. General Lansdale had been designated as "Chief of Operations," with authority to call on all appropriate Government agencies for assistance, including the assignment of senior representatives from State, Defense and CIA. General Lansdale is to keep the Special Group informed of his progress, but is authorized to take actions now which are clearly desirable to strengthen operations and facilities now in being. In making this appointment, the need for General Lansdale in the Far East had been recognized but it had been decided that for the time being his responsibility would be Cuba.

After some discussion, it was agreed that General Lansdale should develop a long-range program which would be reviewed by the Special Group and then presented for approval to higher authority. At that time, formal language would be proposed to record the decision to pursue a new or revised Cuba policy. General Lansdale will meet with the Special Group next week to report progress and actions required.

General Lansdale then gave his appreciation of the situation. He said that, bearing in mind the objective of fomenting eventual revolution within Cuba, he had surveyed all resources available. He had concluded that there are a sizeable number of latent as well as active resources, but that there is a very difficult job ahead. He stressed also the necessity of coming to an agreement at some early date as to the future of Cuba after the Castro government is overthrown, so that appeals to potential resistance elements can be geared to a positive long-range program. General Lansdale also thought it important to obtain cooperation and assistance from selected Latin American countries, preferably those not previously involved with U.S. anti-Castro activities.

General Lansdale then said that he has looked at the proposed operation designed to sabotage a power plant. He had concluded that the conception and planning of this project has been very well done by CIA; on the other hand, he feels that it would be unwise to mount the operation in the immediate future because it would tend to increase Cuban security measures and thereby make it more difficult to get on with building up resistance elements. The Group agreed that, considering all these circumstances, the sabotage operation should be postponed. In this connection, Mr. Bissell, although not disagreeing with the decision, said that he thought it should be noted that a cancellation of plans for early December would almost certainly mean a delay of at least two months, taking into consideration the impending weather conditions as well as moon phases.

Mr. Bissell also said that he thought it desirable to proceed at once with building up the Agency's maritime capability and providing ECM equipment for two C-54's. It was agreed that these measures are consistent with the new approach and should be pursued.

Finally, in answer to the Chairman's question as to the significance of the two weeks review which had been elsewhere alluded to, the Attorney General said that this was intended to mean a review by the Special Group, with subsequent reference to higher authority.

281. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)

Washington, December 7, 1961.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 5, DCI (McCone), Caribbean Survey Group. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

MEMORANDUM FOR

General Taylor

Mr. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric

Mr. McCone

SUBJECT

Cuba

This is to inform you, as the NSC 5412 group, of activities to date on the Cuba project, within the strict security requirements of the project directed by the President.

Policy. The President's memorandum of 30 November 1961,^{/1/} which was read to the Special Group at its last meeting, stated that it had been decided that the United States will use all available assets in a project to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime.

^{/1/}Document 278.

Concept. The decision stated above was made after consideration of a concept of how to help the Cubans overthrow the Communist regime. The regime is to be overthrown by a popular movement of Cubans from within Cuba. The movement is to have the end objective of establishing a free Cuba, of, by, and for Cubans, with the overthrow of the Communist regime a necessary step towards this end. The U.S. will help establish a Cuban nucleus within Cuba, which will work for activating a genuine popular movement to overthrow the regime, and the U.S. will help generate supporting actions for the growth of the movement, particularly in encouraging other nations of the Western Hemisphere to do likewise.

Actions. A working group has been formed by the project's Chief of Operations, with the personal representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, as well as a selected staff. The Chief of Operations is representing the Secretary of Defense, pro tem. It is planned to employ personal representatives of the Directors of the FBI and USIA, when required. The initial work of the group has been to sharply re-orient the U.S. effort, from being simply an unintegrated series of harassment activities to become a program designed to help Cubans build a popular movement within Cuba, which can (with outside help) take effective actions deposing the Communist regime.

CIA. CIA was found to have important contacts and operational capabilities for use in achieving the policy goal set by the President. It is noted, also, that there is an impressive potential for increasing the CIA's capability. The orientation of planning and programming, however, was definitely out of phase with the objective of establishing a popular movement from within Cuba to overthrow Castro and the Communist regime. In the main, CIA thinking has been to apply militant force covertly (such as action teams for "smash and grab" raids on up to armed resistance groups), in the hope that a popular uprising would possibly harass the regime. The early task, then, has been to re-orient this 180#, with militant (sabotage, etc.) actions to be considered as part of the support of the popular movement we are generating. The basic strategy of building our action upon a genuine internal popular movement is underlined; this will apply the major lesson to be learned from earlier operations in Indonesia and Cuba.

The tasks assigned to the representative of the Director of Central Intelligence are:

- a. The CIA organization directed towards Cuba is to be tightened and re-oriented with a hard look at operational effectiveness, especially the management and programs of the field station in Florida.
- b. A nucleus for a popular Cuban movement will be formed and positioned within Cuba. This will include the development of a team from Cubans in the U.S., and the development of similar teams under local auspices from Caribbean countries.
- c. A program for this Cuban nucleus to use will be developed. Basic intelligence concerning several initial operational points has been requested. There will be a sharp definition of incentives and of a platform for political polarization, for use with the Cuban nucleus. Further, ideas will be developed for local actions that will help generate the national movement required to force the regime out.
- d. Special support projects will be readied for use on call. These projects (such as operations to scuttle shipping and otherwise hamper the regime) will be timed to support actions by the movement and to permit the movement to take credit for them. Support in terms of psychological warfare materiel (such as clandestine broadcast transmitters inside Cuba) are to be brought to a practical stand-by capability.

At the same time, the special project team is working on bold new actions to help the popular movement for CIA executive follow through. These include:

1. Enlisting the cooperation of the Church to bring the women of Cuba into actions which will undermine the Communist control system, harass the regime's economic program, and encourage a wave of non-cooperation in all segments of the population.
2. Exploiting the potential of the underworld in Cuban cities to harass and bleed the Communist control apparatus. This effort may, on a very sensitive basis, enlist the assistance of American links to the Cuban underworld. While this would be a CIA project, close cooperation of the FBI is imperative.
3. Labor, students, and other special groups are being considered for practical operational capabilities, for operations which must be mounted quite outside the framework of the existing U.S. programs which aim to match the activities of Communist fronts. This effort is to come mainly from activities in other OAS countries, and suitable Latin American case officers to undertake such positive actions are being considered on a priority basis.
4. Powerful Cuban personalities, with existing capabilities for action within Cuba and who propose a military-type of overthrow, are being assessed for a role in actions which would help generate the popular, anti-regime movement.

State. The Department of State's actions have been essentially at the formal diplomatic level, and thus quite passive or reactive. State must develop and use its dynamic possibilities in political and economic warfare which will be crucial for the success of a popular movement within Cuba.

The representative of the Secretary of State has been tasked with:

- a. The possibilities for strong and effective OAS encouragement of the Cuban people in a popular movement will be exploited, particularly noting the President's forthcoming visit to Latin America and the Secretary of State's actions with the OAS in January.
- b. State will help with the nucleus for a popular Cuban movement, particularly in the development of a political platform and in the continuing development and public support of leadership (noting necessary consideration of existing Cuban emigre groups and their future cooperation with the internal Cuban movement).

c. Certain supporting actions will be undertaken by State, notably:

1). Appropriately enlisting the initiative of Latin American countries separately in action programs which encourage the popular movement within Cuba. This is being closely coordinated with a similar task assigned to CIA.

2). Making available the names of American returnees from Cuba, for screening in conjunction with CIA for possible leads to operational contacts.

d. Develop, in consultation with top State officials, a practical plan for economic warfare which fully applies the U.S. capability to frustrate the Communist economic program for Cuba. Definite and decisive actions by other U.S. organizations (including Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture) are to be enlisted under the direction of the Department of State.

Defense. The main Department of Defense role is indicated as one of contingency support in later phases of the popular movement's development. To this end, improved arrangements for training, personnel, and military hardware support of covert operations is under active study. However, immediate support of State and CIA actions is being activated, particularly in the field of intelligence and in consideration of maritime and air needs in readiness for the time when CIA operations require such support. Planning for overt U.S. military operations is not envisioned under this policy.

USIA. The U.S. Information Agency's role in providing open support for developing the popular movement within Cuba is an important one, but must be correctly timed with the actual commencement of the movement. The U.S. will be identified as being in sympathy with the just and true aspirations of the Cuban people, aspirations which are being killed by a Communist dictatorship. Discussion with a designated USIA representative is being scheduled.

Justice. Support from the Department of Justice, particularly the security and investigative capabilities of the FBI and the INS, is being planned through a special representative of the Attorney General.

HEW, Other U.S. Agencies. The support capabilities of other U.S. organizations are being considered and will be brought into the project as appears most practical.

EG Lansdale

Brigadier General, USAF

282. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, December 8, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 22, December 14, 1961. Secret; Eyes Only.
Prepared by Parrott.

SUBJECT

Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 8 December 1961

PRESENT

General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, General Cabell

General Lansdale attended for items 1 and 2

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

2. Cuba

General Lansdale presented the outline of a program/^{1/} designed to overthrow the Castro government. This program is centered around the selection and eventual introduction into Cuba of a nucleus of anti-Castro Cubans; once they are in the country and in a position to operate, then a number of collateral supporting actions would be undertaken.

/^{1/}See Document 281.

It was agreed that the immediate requirement was for the selection of a suitable group which could agree on a platform for an eventual new government, and which is willing and capable of carrying out the proposed tasks inside the country. When a selection has been made the program will be discussed further with higher authority.

It was noted that General Lansdale would report periodically to the Special Group on progress he is making.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

Thomas A. Parrott/^{2/}

/^{2/}Printed from a copy that indicates Parrott signed the original.

283. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, December 14, 1961.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 5, DCI (McCone), Caribbean Survey Group. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by J.S. Earman, McCone's Executive Assistant.

PRESENT

Mr. McCone, General Cabell, Mr. Bissell, Mr. Amory, Mr. Helms, Mr. Sheldon, Mr. Kent, Mr. Bross, Mr. Montague, Mr. Earman

1. Mr. McCone stated that the purpose of this meeting was to discuss and make known to those present U.S. policy toward successfully overthrowing the Castro regime. At this point the Director read a memorandum, which had been approved by the President, establishing a group composed of Brig. General Edward Lansdale, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, as the Chief of Operations and representatives from State, Defense, and CIA, and USIA and the Department of Justice (FBI) as required, for the purpose of carrying out of the above-stated policy.^{1/} He commented that the President had discussed Cuba with the Attorney General who in turn had brought Lansdale into the program. The Director said he wanted to make it clear that the basic policy as approved by the President is to assist the Cubans in overthrowing the Communist regime in Cuba. Mr. McCone also noted that the last sentence of the memorandum referred to above provided that only the Secretaries of State and Defense or the Chief of Operations could approve the information contained therein being made available to other than those represented on the group and stated this had been amended to allow the DCI the same authority. The Director said that when he had been approached for comments on the above-mentioned memo, he had indicated that (1) he favored the establishment of the group, (2) it should be responsible to the Special Group (5412), and (3) the internal organization and facilities of the participating agencies should be utilized and there

should not be created a separate and outside entity.

/1/Apparent reference to Document 278.

2. The Director then read the memorandum from General Lansdale addressed to the members of the 5412 Group outlining activities to date on this project,^{/2/} and noted his intention of obtaining permission to have copies made and circulated on a strict need-to-know basis. In this connection, the Director said that knowledge of this project must be held to an absolute minimum; however, he did not intend to skip any echelons in the Agency in obtaining advice and support. He said it was perfectly clear from the Lansdale memorandum that the whole action is by and large that of CIA and that the President and the Attorney General had directed him (DCI) to keep in close personal contact with all activities and operations relating to this project. He noted that Lansdale had initially suggested that Mr. Helms be designated as the CIA representative and report only to the DCI. Mr. McCone said he had refused this concept and made it clear that this refusal was not based on any misgivings about Mr. Helms' capabilities but, rather, is based on his policy of obtaining the advice and support of other senior officers also. He remarked that, as he sees it, this is a community project within the strict security limitations imposed by the President, with action, however, at the Helms level. He stated that the Agency will of course provide Lansdale with all support and assistance following the guidelines laid down by the Special Group.

/2/Document 281.

3. The Director noted that in addition to actions taken, he desires that there be provided a continuous evaluation of the probabilities of success and that these evaluations by and large will be carried out by DD/I. In response to a query from the Director, Mr. Amory stated it would not be necessary for more than about five or six people in his area to be knowledgeable of this program, i.e., Messrs. Amory, Kent, Sheldon, Montague, and Brown. The Director again emphasized that while it is his desire to keep knowledge of this program narrow, he does not wish to skip any echelons that might contribute to its success.

4. The Director commented that Lansdale had criticized the April 1961 Cuban operation by stating that CIA had "jumped" at paramilitary operations, sabotage, etc., without creating a political climate within Cuba to accept such activities. The Director also said that Lansdale had made a similar comment about the *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* operation.

5. Referring back to the Lansdale memorandum, the DCI emphasized the following actions taken and findings to date by the Lansdale group:

[Here follows a summary of General Lansdale's memorandum, Document 281.]

6. With regard to the use of Cubans, the Director said he desires that every possible security check be made and, in connection with current authorized operations directed against Cuba, he desires that each one be examined to ensure that they are within the bounds of the U.S. policy toward Cuba as previously indicated. Mr. Bissell commented that there are certain low-level types of sabotage operations now planned to show that resistance is still in fact alive and that General Lansdale has concurred that they be carried out. He also noted that one of our highest priorities is to build a resistance net and every effort is being made to hold down the natural desire to carry out sabotage actions willy-nilly. Mr. Bissell also said it is necessary to move people in and out of Cuba and he considers this type of activity as falling within the terms of reference of the President's policy. Mr. Bissell remarked that in following the doctrine of preparing the proper political climate as outlined by Lansdale, he wanted to point out that it is not easy to start a mass political movement in a police state. This he said was made abundantly clear during the April 1961 operations when the Cubans used the militia and even families for reporting on anyone opposed to Castro. He stated that the mass movement envisaged for Cuba must be developed by political sentiment. Mr. McCone noted this agreement and remarked that this can be accomplished by getting to the dissidents, the mothers, the man on the street and in the field, etc. It was noted that such action can best be accomplished by a small clandestine organization rather than a large group trying to cover the

waterfront.

7. Mr. Sheldon asked whether it is planned that the nets now established in Cuba will be assigned to covert intelligence collection and Mr. Bissell advised that this is a first priority.

8. Mr. Amory pointed out that the plan for Cuba as outlined in this discussion in his opinion is a very long-range problem, and commented that no authoritarian regime has been overthrown in the 20th Century by popular uprising from within without some kind of support--war or otherwise.

9. General Cabell commented that we must be careful to keep our records straight and that he too agreed that this is a long-range problem. He pointed out that Lansdale is often inclined to commit and promise that CIA can do more than we are capable. He said we must not allow anyone to commit the Agency to a task it cannot fulfill. The Director commented that he fully agreed and directed that careful memoranda for the record be prepared on all actions directed, taken, or refused.

10. Mr. Amory suggested that a review be made of the question as to whether or not Guantanamo should be used as a base of operations. He said if the answer is in the affirmative and Castro attempts to throw the U.S. out, then the U.S. would be faced with formulating a new policy toward Cuba. Mr. Amory also commented that in connection with infiltration of agents and supplies by sea, he would suggest that DD/P consider getting in touch with the Stevens Brothers who are, in his opinion, the foremost experts on small boat operations. The Director concurred.

11. In connection with the article appearing in the *Washington Post* of 14 December 1961 regarding Operation [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], the Director stated it appeared to him that the breakdown was caused by improper and/or inadequate maintenance of equipment. He directed that in future maritime operations, and all others insofar as feasible, a system of checks and double checks be established, and necessary dry runs be made or back-up craft be readied and, where warranted, participate in the actual operation. Mr. Bross commented that the new Chief of Station for the DD/P installation in Florida had been instructed to review all maritime equipment and operations as the first matter of business upon reporting to the Station today.

J.S. Earman

Executive Officer

284. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, December 21, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 24, January 5, 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Parrott on December 22.

SUBJECT

Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 21 December 1961

PRESENT

General Taylor; Mr. Johnson; Mr. Gilpatric and General Lemnitzer; Mr. McCone and Mr. Bissell

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

2. Cuba

General Lansdale gave a brief progress report. He stressed the fact that the proposed operation is primarily a political one, and that economic and paramilitary aspects are secondary to the political. Steps have been taken to increase intelligence coverage and to begin preparations for economic warfare.

General Lansdale felt that by perhaps the first week in January he would be in a position to present certain proposals to the Special Group for policy decision, or for transmission to higher authority./1/ It was noted that if the necessity for quick policy decisions should arise before the next meeting, arrangements could be made to secure concurrence of members of the Group individually.

/1/Johnson's debriefing notes on the meeting, prepared at the Department of State, indicate that the President wanted Cuba to be given high priority. According to the notes, McCone remarked that Cuba would be a long-term job. (Ibid.)

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

Thomas A. Parrott/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Parrott signed the original.

285. Memorandum for the File

Washington, December 27, 1961, 2:45 p.m.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2, DCI (McCone) Memo for the Record, 29 November 1961-5 April 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone.

SUBJECT

Discussion with Attorney General Robert Kennedy, 2:45 P.M., 27 December 1961

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

5. With regard to the Lansdale operation, McCone advised Mr. Kennedy substantially along the lines of his statement to the Special Group as covered by a memorandum attached to the minutes of last Thursday's meeting, December 21./1/ McCone also stated that CIA was preparing for consideration by Lansdale a series of actions each of which would fit into the policy guidance established by Lansdale. Both McCone and Helms (who was present at this part of the discussion) pointed out the very great difficulty of creating an effective internal political resistance to a well-organized, authoritarian regime equipped with a substantial military force and an effective internal security police. As an example McCone stated that of the 27 or 28 agents CIA now has in Cuba, only 12 are in communication and these communications are infrequent. A team of 7 that were infiltrated December 19th were captured and two of them were on TV in a "confession show" last Saturday night, December 23rd.

/1/The memorandum cited has not been found. For a record of the December 21 meeting, see Document 284.

John A. McCone/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

[end of document]



FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963
Volume X
Cuba, 1961-1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

Cuba, 1961-1962

286. Memorandum for the Record

//Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Parrott.

Washington, January 11, 1962.

SUBJECT

Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 11 January 1962

PRESENT

General Taylor; Mr. Johnson; Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer (Items 2-5); Mr. McCone (Items 1-3) and Mr. Bissell

The Attorney General (Item 1 and part of 2)

Mr. Richard Helms (Item 1)

General E.G. Lansdale (Item 1)

1. Progress Report on Cuba

General Lansdale summarized progress to date, identifying four major broad programs. He emphasized that the current bottleneck is the procurement of suitable Cubans to accomplish the initial task of infiltration. He also touched on other activities which are being undertaken while this problem is being solved, including such things as covert prop-aganda actions in connection with the OAS meeting of 22 January and selective harassment of the Cuban Government in the form of limited sabotage, etc.

Several members of the Group noted the difficulty of the task ahead, with Mr. McCone calling attention to the fact that the prevailing spirit within Cuba appears to be one of apathy rather than resistance, and that a fanatical pro-Castro minority exists along with an efficient police mechanism.

It was noted that the prevailing policy on sabotage is still in effect, i.e., that no actions which would be dangerous to the population will be undertaken, nor will major demolitions be done at this stage. It was agreed that whenever this policy appears to require change, the matter will be discussed with the Special Group.

It was noted that CIA is proceeding to set up an interrogation center for Cuban refugees in the Miami area and

that this will be carefully examined to insure that it will be adequately staffed to produce the optimum amount of intelligence on conditions inside Cuba.

The Group agreed that maritime capabilities for infiltration should be clearly sufficient for any foreseeable tasks of this nature. The need for isolated and uncontaminated real estate was also brought out.

General Lansdale was asked to produce for next week's meeting a consolidated summary of progress to date and an overall plan showing departmental tasks and responsibilities, along with timing of implementation. This plan would then be shown to higher authority.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

Thomas A. Parrott/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Parrott signed the original.

287. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, January 12, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2, DCI (McCone) Memo for the Record, 29 November 1961-5 April 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by J.S. Earman.

The Director met with the Attorney General on 11 January 1962 and discussed the following subjects:

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

3. Cuban operation

The Attorney General asked the Director for his frank and personal opinion of General Lansdale and the Cuban effort. The Director pointed out that (a) an operation of this type, as presently planned, has never been attempted before, (b) it will be extremely difficult to accomplish, (c) the CIA and the U.S. Government are short on assets to carry out the proposed program, and (d) the Agency, however, is lending every effort and all-out support.

JSE

Executive Officer

288. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs (Hurwitch) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)

Washington, January 16, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Gen. Agency Report. Secret. Approved in ARA by Goodwin and Woodward.

SUBJECT

Diplomatic, Political and Economic Action With Respect to Cuba

As requested at your meeting of January 12, 1962,/1/ there is attached a description of the principal causes of action in the diplomatic, political and economic fields with respect to Cuba which the Department of State is

prepared to undertake. While the Department will push ahead vigorously with this program right after the OAS MFM,^{2/} further details with respect to timing must await results of our initial efforts.

^{1/}No other record of this meeting has been found.

^{2/}The reference is to the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, held at Punta del Este, Uruguay, January 22-31, 1962. Documentation relating to this meeting, which focused on the "Communist Offensive in America," and led to the formal exclusion of Cuba from participation in the Inter-American system, is printed in vol. XII, pp. 250 ff. For text of the Final Act, signed at the conclusion of the meeting on January 31, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, pp. 320-331.

Attachment

Diplomatic and Political Action

1. The Department of State is engaging in continuous discussions and negotiations with the other OAS member nations with a view toward reaching wide agreement at the forthcoming MFM on resolutions which would condemn Cuba and in effect isolate it from the rest of the Hemisphere.
2. At the same time, we expect that publicity emanating from the MFM will result in arousing the sympathy of the rest of the Hemisphere for the plight of the Cuban people, oppressed by the Castro-Communist dictatorship.
3. If the MFM does not result in mandatory sanctions against Cuba and it probably will not result in such sanctions, we would continue our efforts on a bilateral basis to persuade appropriate Latin American governments to take steps designed to isolate Cuba.
4. To maintain the momentum against Cuba stemming from the MFM, the Department of State will right after the MFM send guidance to U.S. Embassies in Latin America instructing them to exploit every available opportunity with such local groups as students, labor organizations, rural organizations, and businessmen's groups to gain sympathy for the Cuban people, and increase hostility to the Cuban regime.
5. As U.S. plans crystallize with respect to a people's movement in Cuba, the Department would be prepared to explore with Latin American nations such as Venezuela the feasibility of obtaining cooperation where required and of stimulating them to undertake a similar program of their own.
6. The Department of State will initiate action to obtain from our Embassies an inventory of operational assets in the Caribbean area.

Economic Action

1. The outcome of the forthcoming OAS Foreign Ministers Meeting will have a direct bearing on economic actions which the United States may undertake with respect to Cuba. Assuming that as a minimum the Meeting results in agreement to condemn Cuba as an accomplice of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and in general adopts language to the effect that Cuba presents a threat to the peace and security of the Hemisphere, the Department of State would be prepared to recommend to the President that remaining trade between the United States and Cuba be barred.
2. In imposing the embargo, the Department, in collaboration with other appropriate U.S. agencies, would continue to ensure that U.S. controls are as effective as possible.^{3/}

^{3/}Specific measures to this end have been already proposed by the Department and have been incorporated in the basic paper. These proposals are under active study as to their feasibility and we expect action on many, if

not all, these suggestions in the near future. [Footnote in the source text. Reference to a "basic paper" is an apparent reference to Document 291.]

3. If the United States embargoes remaining trade with Cuba as a result of the OAS MFM, the Department would be prepared to undertake a determined effort with our NATO allies (bilaterally and in the NATO forum, as appropriate) in order to persuade these nations to take steps to isolate Cuba from the West. We would undertake similar steps with Japan, which engages in comparatively significant trade with Cuba.

4. If the United States embargoes remaining trade with Cuba, appropriate U.S. agencies would be in an enhanced position to explore discreetly the desirability and feasibility of enlisting the cooperation of U.S. private sectors to join the U.S. Government in its efforts to isolate Cuba economically from the West. The AFL-CIO, the International Transport Federation, and the National Foreign Trade Council, among others, would appear to be promising possibilities in this regard.

5. With respect to timing, the Department of State will push ahead vigorously on the economic front immediately after the OAS MFM. While a specific timetable cannot otherwise be presented, all opportunities to isolate Cuba economically will be thoroughly explored and exploited where feasible.

6. The Department of State has explored with negative results the feasibility of a program of preclusive buying of essential items entering the Cuban trade as well as pre-emptive action with respect to tanker charters. Other than major sabotage efforts, the foregoing suggested causes of action would appear to be the principal economic measures that might be undertaken against Cuba.

289. Special National Intelligence Estimate

SNIE 80-62

Washington, January 17, 1962.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, McNamara Briefing Notebooks, 12 Jan. 63. Secret. A covering note indicates that this estimate, submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, was prepared by CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Joint Staff, and NSA. All members of the USIB concurred on January 17 except the representatives of the AEC and the FBI who abstained on the grounds that the topic was outside their jurisdiction.

THE THREAT TO US SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA

The Problem

To estimate the threat to US security interests in the Caribbean area over the next two decades.

The Estimate

1. US security interests in the Caribbean relate principally to the maintenance of independent and friendly states in the Western Hemisphere. The Caribbean is not only the basin around which are located a large number of American republics, but it is the link between the US and the larger American republics in the southern continent. In addition, the US is concerned with keeping its southern flank free of hostile military power, and with maintaining the unrestricted operation of the Panama Canal and of other US installations.

2. Threats to US interests could arise from a variety of sources: the vulnerability of the area to attack from outside the hemisphere; the establishment of a military presence within the area by hostile powers; attempts by the Communist powers, with the help of the present Cuban Government, to spread Communist revolution to other parts of the area by military action or subversion; the growth of indigenous radical nationalism; and instability rising from attempts by governments in the area to interfere in the affairs of their neighbors or to impose their will upon them. A discussion of each of these threats follows in the paragraphs below.

3. Vulnerability to outside attack. The area of the Caribbean is within range of Soviet ICBMs and long-range bombers, and cities, canals, and military installations could also be attacked by missile-carrying submarines. In the event of general war, some US installations, such as the canal and air and naval bases, probably would be subjected to Soviet attack.

4. Establishment of a hostile military presence. Cuba and any other Caribbean state which fell under Communist control could be used by the USSR as areas in which to establish missile, submarine, or air bases, designed to bring North America under attack or to add to the deterrents to any conceivable US military action in the Caribbean or elsewhere. On the whole, we believe the establishment of such Soviet bases is unlikely for some time to come. Their military and psychological value, in Soviet eyes, would probably not be great enough to override the risks involved.

5. The Soviet leaders would be concerned lest steps toward the establishment of such bases would provoke the US to overthrow the Castro regime before bases could become operational and would generally heighten the risk of war. Moreover, Soviet bases in Cuba could involve the USSR in difficult political and control problems with the Cuban Government; the Soviets have been very careful to retain control over situations which involve them in any serious degree of risk, and they would be mindful of the danger that Cuban initiatives could expose the USSR to serious risks of general war. Finally, the Soviet leaders, for the present at least, appear to prefer not to make their presence too obvious or apparent, lest they discourage rather than encourage the spread of communism to other Latin American countries. Since their essential aim in Latin America is not military conquest but Communist revolution, we believe they will prefer to use Cuba as a symbol of spontaneous popular revolution and as a base for subversive operations.

6. Nevertheless, the USSR can and probably will augment its naval, air, and communications capabilities in the area by the development of arrangements or facilities not openly identifiable as Soviet military bases. For example, the improvement of Cuban naval and air installations would provide facilities suitable for Soviet use, and special installations and arrangements could be set up for intelligence collection or subversive purposes.

7. This reluctance to establish military bases might not extend over the entire period under review. If communism spread to other countries in the area, and if the US appeared to be weakening in world power and national will, the Soviet leaders might be emboldened to buttress their gains by openly establishing Soviet military bases in the area, with the object of further weakening US prestige and further strengthening and protecting their local satraps. If such bases were established, the first step might be the establishment of jointly-operated submarine or air bases, on the theory that the establishment of such bases would be less likely to incur risk of a US reaction than would the establishment of missile bases, while at the same time constituting a demonstration of Soviet presence and protection.

8. Possibilities of the spread of communism in the area. The area of the Caribbean presents a picture of great variety, in terms of social structure, economic organization, and political direction. A few states have had or are passing through full-fledged social revolutions; in others the pressures for revolution are building up. Some states have very backward economies, while others are moving toward modern industrial societies. Many are single crop or commodity exporters; others are moving toward more balanced economies. In each country there are groups seeking to overthrow the existing order; even Mexico, which can be considered to have completed its revolution, harbors groups who believe that the revolution has been arrested and that a new leftward movement should be set in train. Some of these revolutionary groups are Communist led; some are not.

9. It appears to us very likely that during the next decade or two the Communist element among the revolutionary forces will grow in size, although its growth in influence would not necessarily be proportionate to the growth in size. The important question is not whether communism grows, but whether the non-Communist revolutionary forces can grow more rapidly, can control the revolutionary movement, and can achieve an acceptable level of momentum and progress in social, economic, and political change. This question cannot be answered at this stage of Latin American history; much depends upon such factors as the degree of success of the Alliance for Progress in achieving real social change, the skill and determination of local non-Communist leaders, and the activities and achievements of Castro's Cuba and of the local Communists in exploiting and subverting revolutionary unrest.

10. We believe that Castro's Cuba will continue to do what it can to export its revolution. It has to some degree handicapped itself by openly espousing Marxism-Leninism, but to the extent that it can capitalize on the failure of non-Communists to achieve real reform, it may yet succeed in bringing sympathetic forces to power elsewhere. For some of these countries, Venezuela for example, the critical choice between communism and non-communism may come within the years immediately ahead. For some of the others it may come later. During the next two decades, all could escape communism, but some may fall under Communist control. Local factors of an unforeseeable character, such as the quality of emerging leadership, may prove more decisive than existing political trends or degree of backwardness. In addition, factors external to the area, such as Communist successes or reverses in other underdeveloped countries, developments within the Communist Bloc itself, or changes in the appreciation of the general power balance between the Communist Bloc and the Free World will play a part.

11. Growth of indigenous, non-Communist, radical nationalism. Those states which experience a profound social, economic, and political transformation without coming under Communist control will almost certainly develop a greater sense of national identity and a stronger impulse to assert political independence. As broad-based political movements replace military or personal rule, there will develop a much stronger feeling that the Latin American states can be masters of their own destinies, and the new political leaders will be obliged to stress their devotion to national sovereignty and especially their independence of US policy. In some instances national sovereignty may come to mean that anything can be attempted with little concern or US reaction.

12. This is not to say that the growth of nationalism will necessarily be accompanied by a rise of anti-US attitudes. To the extent the US succeeds, it will tend to reduce the antagonism toward the US among the broad mass of the people, but at the same time it will win the enmity of established elites. In any event, the very emergence of new forces, and the identification--rightly or wrongly--of the old order with the US, will tend to promote suspicion of US motives and policies and will encourage the new leaders at least to strike a pose of independence and self-determination. As a consequence, the US role in the control and operation of canals or other US installations will almost certainly come under heavy attack, and the US freedom of action will probably become increasingly restricted. In the event of open differences with the US, an opportunity might be presented for hostile extra-hemispheric powers to gain a measure of influence.

13. Such a trend toward radical nationalism appears to us to be unavoidable, although it will probably move at a variable and indeterminable pace. In some countries it probably will gather force more slowly than in others. In Panama today, where the Canal Zone offers a visible target for agitation, it appears to be particularly strong; in some of the more isolated countries of the area it may mature only after major reforms have occurred and a new sense of self-confidence develops.

14. Rivalries and tensions within the area. Historically, the Caribbean area has been rife with personal feuds and petty tensions between states. Conspiracies and revolts against some leaders or countries have been organized, armed, and initiated on the soil of others. Combinations and alignments have been developed among groups of countries or leaders against others. We believe this kind of activity will continue in the years ahead, although it may take a somewhat different form than in the past. The pace of social, economic, and political change will not be uniform. Oligarchs cut off from power in one state may move to others and may receive aid and comfort in

their plots to reassume control at home. Similarly, frustrated revolutionists will, as in the past few years, use asylum in sympathetic countries to organize and plan revolutions in their home countries. While the form may be the same as in the past, the ultimate stakes will not be personal power so much as the social and economic structure of the nation itself.

290. Editorial Note

During the course of his summary remarks to the National Security Council on January 18, 1962, concerning the problems affecting the foreign policy and national interests of the United States, President Kennedy referred briefly to Cuba as follows:

"We hope that Castro can be effectively isolated at the coming meeting at Punta del Este, but we expect this to continue to be a very large problem on which further action might be necessary. The time has not yet come when we must force a solution to the Cuban problem." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings 1962, No. 496, 1/18/62)

291. Program Review by the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)

Washington, January 18, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1-2062. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached distribution list indicates that 14 copies of the program review were prepared. Copies were sent to the President, Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Rusk for Johnson, McNamara for Gilpatric, McCone, Murrow, Woodward for Hurwitch, General Craig for the JCS, Helms, and Wilson. Three copies were kept by Lansdale.

THE CUBA PROJECT

I. Objective

The U.S. objective is to help the Cubans overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace.

II. Concept of Operation

Basically, the operation is to bring about the revolt of the Cuban people. The revolt will overthrow the Communist regime and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace.

The revolt requires a strongly motivated political action movement established within Cuba, to generate the revolt, to give it direction towards the object, and to capitalize on the climactic moment. The political actions will be assisted by economic warfare to induce failure of the Communist regime to supply Cuba's economic needs, psychological operations to turn the peoples' resentment increasingly against the regime, and military-type groups to give the popular movement an action arm for sabotage and armed resistance in support of political objectives.

The failure of the U.S.-sponsored operation in April 1961 so shook the faith of Cuban patriots in U.S. competence and intentions in supporting a revolt against Castro that a new effort to generate a revolt against the regime in Cuba must have active support from key Latin American countries. Further, the foreignness (Soviet Union and Bloc) of the tyranny imposed on the Cuban people must be made clear to the people of the Western Hemisphere to the point of their deep anger and open actions to defend the Western Hemisphere against such foreign invasion. Such an anger will be generated, in part, by appeals from the popular movement within Cuba to other Latin Americans especially.

The preparation phase must result in a political action organization in being in key localities inside Cuba, with its

own means for internal communications, its own voice for psychological operations, and its own action arm (small guerrilla bands, sabotage squads, etc.). It must have the sympathetic support of the majority of the Cuban people, and make this fact known to the outside world. (It is reported that the majority of Cubans are not for the present regime, but are growing apathetic towards what appears to be a hopeless future or the futility of their status.)

The climactic moment of revolt will come from an angry reaction of the people to a government action (sparked by an incident), or from a fracturing of the leadership cadre within the regime, or both. (A major goal of the Project must be to bring this about.) The popular movement will capitalize on this climactic moment by initiating an open revolt. Areas will be taken and held. If necessary, the popular movement will appeal for help to the free nations of the Western Hemisphere. The United States, if possible in concert with other Western Hemisphere nations, will then give open support to the Cuban peoples' revolt. Such support will include military force, as necessary.

III. Estimate of the Situation

Our planning requires sound intelligence estimates of the situation re Cuba. The latest National Estimate (SNIE 85-61) of 28 November 1961/1/ contains operational conclusions not based on hard fact, in addition to its intelligence conclusions; this is a repetition of an error in the planning for the unsuccessful operation of last April.

/1/See Document 271.

The planning indicated herein will be revised, as necessary, based on the hard intelligence estimate of the situation by the U.S. Intelligence community. A new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 85-62 on Cuba), due on 23 January, apparently has been postponed until 7 February./2/

/2/Not issued until March 21. See Document 315.

It is recognized that one result of the Project, so far, has been to start the collection of Intelligence on Cuba in depth, to provide facts on which to base firm estimates and operations.

IV. Initial Phase (30 Nov 61-81 Jan 62)

A. Establish a U.S. mechanism for the project

Status: The President's directive of 30 November 1961/3/ was implemented by creating a U.S. operations team, with Brig. Gen. Lansdale as Chief of Operations, and with tasks promptly assigned. His immediate staff are Mr. Hand and Major Patchell. Representatives of Secretaries and Agency Directors are:

/3/Document 278.

State--Woodward (Goodwin, Hurwitch)

CIA--Helms

Defense--Brig. Gen. Craig

USIA--Wilson

B. Intelligence Support

Status: CIA made a special survey of U.S. capabilities to interrogate Cuban refugees in the USA (1,700-2,000

arriving per month) and on 16 January approved a program increasing the staff at the Opa Locka Interrogation Center in Florida from the present 2 people to 34. CIA will build up agent assets (positive intelligence assets inside Cuba are very limited and it has no counter-intelligence assets inside). Special intelligence assets will be exploited more fully. The Cuba Project needs far more hard intelligence in depth than is presently available. CIA will require further assistance from Defense and other U.S. organizations in this intelligence effort, and is submitting specific qualifications for personnel on 19 January.

C. Political platform for peoples' movement inside Cuba.

Status: State has sketched in a broad outline./4/ CIA is to produce the firm platform statement of aims for which the Cubans who will operate inside Cuba are willing to risk their lives, and upon which popular support can be generated.

/4/An apparent reference to Document 288.

D. Nucleus for popular movement

Status: To date, CIA has been unable to produce the necessary political action agents for this purpose. Upon re-evaluation of its capabilities, CIA now hopes to complete spotting and assessing eight to ten Cuban political action agents by 15 February, from among Cubans available in the United States. The minimum need for the Project to be effective is 30 such political action Cubans and CIA is tasked to make a priority search for them among Cubans in the U.S. and Caribbean area.

E. Deployment of nucleus

Status: CIA is tasked to select 20 localities within Cuba where political action groups can be established. Initial selection and plans for establishing these action groups are now due 1 February. Havana, and localities in the provinces of Camaguey and Las Villas will receive priority consideration, according to present intelligence. Planning on this must be adjusted as firmer intelligence is acquired.

F. Diplomatic actions

Status: State is concentrating on the OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers, which opens 22 January, hoping to get wide Western Hemisphere support for OAS resolutions condemning Cuba and isolating it from the rest of the Hemisphere. A companion resolution, to offer OAS relief directly to the suffering Cuban people (similar to U.S. relief to Russia, 1919-20) is being considered, as a means to reach the Cuban people sympathetically without going through their Communist government. The OAS meeting is to be supported by public demonstrations in Latin America, generated by CIA, and a psychological campaign assisted by USIA.

The major task for our diplomatic capability is to encourage Latin American leaders to develop independent operations similar to this Project, seeking an internal revolt of the Cuban people against the Communist regime. This is yet to be initiated by State and must be vigorously pressed.

G. Economic warfare

Status: This critical key to our political action Project is still in the planning stage under State leadership. State is basing future economic actions, including plans for an embargo on Cuban trade, on the outcome of the forthcoming OAS meeting. Meanwhile, State has chaired an Economic action group, which agreed on developing 13 actions. 15 February is set for a report on implementing plans, so that actions can be initiated. CIA was unable to undertake action to sabotage the sugar harvest, which commences about 15 January, and upon which Cuba's one-crop sugar economy depends. (Sabotage of transport, mills, sugar sacking and cane fields was explored.)

H. TV intrusion

Status: Equipment to enable TV intrusion of Havana TV broadcasts has been reactivated on a small vessel under CIA control. CIA plans to attempt intrusion on 22 January during Castro's forthcoming speech and parade demonstrations.

I. Special sabotage support

Status: State has explored, with negative results, the feasibility of pre-emptive action with respect to tanker charters (most Bloc shipments to Cuba are carried in Western bottoms). CIA has initiated action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible results (stoppage of some Cuban transport) are not expected until mid-1962. *[5 lines of source text not declassified]*

J. Military actions

Status: Defense has been tasked with preparing a contingency plan for U.S. military action, in case the Cuban people request U.S. help when their revolt starts making headway. This contingency plan will permit obtaining a policy decision on the major point of U.S. intentions, and is looked upon as a positive political-psychological factor in a peoples' revolt, even more than as a possible military action. Defense also has been tasked with fully assisting State and CIA, as commitments of Defense men, money, and materiel are required.

K. Major elements of the population

Status: Both State and CIA are continuing to explore their capabilities (with results largely negative to date) for mounting special group operations inside Cuba focused upon dynamic elements of the population, particularly *[1 line of source text not declassified]* through Labor contacts to reach the workers. Other elements include enlistment of the youth and professional groupings. Special consideration is to be given to doing this through Latin American operational contacts. This is vital to the success of our political action nucleus when CIA can put it into place.

L. Outlook

Status: As reported to the Special Group last week, there has been a period of a realistic second look at CIA capabilities to mount the required clandestine operations against Cuba, and a subsequent start in "tooling up." After this second look, CIA has concluded that its realistic role should be to create at least the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support for it, to improve CIA operational capability, and to help create a climate which will permit provocative actions in support of a shift to overt action. This outlook, although arrived at thoughtfully within CIA, is far short of the Cuba Project's goals. CIA must take yet another hard look at its potential capabilities, in the light of the following tasking, to determine if it cannot make the greater effort required.

V. Target Schedule

A. Intelligence

Task 1: NIE 85-62 on Cuba due 7 February (CIA).

Task 2: By 15 February, Opa Locka Interrogation Center to be made an effective operation for collection and processing of intelligence (CIA with support of Defense, State, I&NS, FBI).

Task 3: Intelligence collection from Cuban refugees elsewhere than Miami area. CIA to survey other refugee

points (*[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* etc.) and on a priority basis to ensure maximum coverage of all such source points. 15 February target date.

Task 4: CIA to continue its re-examination of intelligence assets, with priority on agents inside Cuba, and report on capability by 15 February. Also included is coverage of intelligence through third country sources, particularly those having diplomatic relations with Cuba.

B. Political

Task 5: CIA to submit plan by 1 February for defection of top Cuban government officials, to fracture the regime from within. The effort must be imaginative and bold enough to consider a "name" defector to be worth at least a million U.S. dollars. This can be the key to our political action goal and must be mounted without delay as a major CIA project.

Task 6: CIA to complete plans by 1 February for Cover and Deception actions, to help fracture the Communist regime in Cuba. Defense, State and FBI are to collaborate on this.

Task 7: By 1 February, CIA to submit operations schedule for initiating popular movement within Cuba. This must include localities selected inside Cuba, assessment of selected Cubans, their infiltration, activity assignments, and political platform. One section must deal with the "underground," assess its true status and plans to use it.

Task 8: State to follow up the OAS meeting by having U.S. Embassies in Latin America exploit all opportunities to enlist local sympathy for the Cuban people and to increase hostility towards the Communist regime in Cuba. State to submit report on results of this assignment by 13 February, so further planning can be programmed.

Task 9: By 15 February, State to submit an inventory of operational assets in the Caribbean area, including capabilities of local governments or groups to mount operations on their own, to help achieve the Project's goals. Plans for early use of such capabilities are due by 19 February.

Task 10: CIA to submit operational schedule for using assets in the Caribbean area to achieve the Project's political action goals. The objective of working on dynamic elements of the Cuban population (such as workers, farmers) is underscored. Due 19 February.

C. Economic

Task 11: State to prepare recommendations to the President on U.S. trade with Cuba, as follow-up to OAS meeting. (If the minimum result of the meeting is an agreement to condemn Cuba as an accomplice of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and adoption of a general statement that Cuba presents a threat to the peace and security of the Hemisphere, State is prepared to recommend to the President that remaining trade between the U.S. and Cuba be barred.)

Task 12: State to plan, with Commerce and other U.S. agencies, on how to halt the diversion of vital items in the Cuban trade. Due date 15 February. Cooperation of other OAS nations, particularly Canada and Mexico, is to be explored by State.

Task 13: State with Commerce and others involved, to plan on how to make "positive list" items to Latin America be subject to the same licensing procedures as applied to such shipments to other parts of the free world. Due 15 February.

Task 14: State to obtain from Commerce proposal to amend present export controls of technical data (petrochemical, communications equipment) so that Cuba is treated the same as the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Due 15

February.

Task 15: State by 15 February to submit recommendations on issuance of transportation order (T-3) under authority of the Defense Production Act of 1950/5/ forbidding U.S.-owned vessels to engage in trade with Cuba.

/5/Enacted September 8, 1950. (64 Stat. 798, et seq.)

Task 16: State plan due 15 February on feasible extension of U.S. port treatment now given to Bloc and Cuban vessels to charter vessels of Bloc and Cuba (Treasury to advise on this).

Task 17: State to report by 15 February on feasibility of harassing Bloc shipping by refusing entry into U.S. ports (statedly for security reasons), if vessels have called or will call at Cuban ports.

Task 18: [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Task 19: State to report by 15 February on possibilities for obtaining the discreet cooperation of the National Foreign Trade Council to urge U.S. shippers to refuse to ship on vessels which call at Cuban ports. (Commerce to assist on this.)

Task 20: State to report by 15 February on possibilities to obtain the discreet cooperation of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers to influence U.S. firms having subsidiaries abroad to adhere to the spirit of U.S. economic sanctions. (Commerce to assist on this.)

Task 21: CIA to submit plan by 15 February for inducing failures in food crops in Cuba. [1 line of source text not declassified]

Task 22: State to report by 15 February on status of plans to gain cooperation of NATO allies (bilaterally and in the NATO forum, as appropriate). Objective is to persuade these nations to take steps to isolate Cuba from the West.

Task 23: State to report by 15 February on status of actions undertaken with Japan, which has comparatively significant trade with Cuba, along lines similar to those with NATO nations.

Task 24: CIA to submit plan by February on disruption of the supply of Cuban nickel to the Soviet Union. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

D. Psychological

Task 25: USIA to submit plan by 15 February for the most effective psychological exploitation of actions undertaken in the Project, towards the end result of awakening world sympathy for the Cuban people (as a David) battling against the Communist regime (as a Goliath) and towards stimulating Cubans inside Cuba to join "the cause."

Task 26: CIA to submit by 15 February its operational schedule for a psychological campaign to provoke a relaxing of police state control within Cuba. This is to include effective means of publicly indicting "peoples' criminals" for justice after liberation of Cuba (not only individual top officials, but members of the Vigilancia, etc.).

Task 27: CIA and USIA will report on progress as of 15 February in developing identification of the popular movement inside Cuba, as with songs, symbols, propaganda themes.

Task 28: By 15 February CIA will report on plans and actions for propaganda support of the popular movement

inside Cuba. Included will be exactly what is planned for use by the movement inside Cuba, and feasibility of using smuggled food packets (such as the "I Shall Return" cigarette packets to Philippine guerrillas in World War II) as morale boosters in generating the popular movement.

E. Military Action

Task 29: Defense to submit contingency plan for use of U.S. military force to support the Cuban popular movement, including a statement of conditions under which Defense believes such action would be required to win the Project's goal and believes such action would not necessarily lead to general war. Due 28 February.

Task 30: CIA to submit by 15 February its operational schedule for sabotage actions inside Cuba, including timing proposed for the actions and how they affect the generation and support of a popular movement, to achieve the Project goals.

Task 31: CIA to submit specific requests to Defense for required support by Defense as early as possible after its plans firm up. Requests for all major needs are expected by 23 February.

Task 32: Defense will submit plan for "special operations" use of Cubans enlisted in the U.S. armed forces. Due 28 February.

VI. Future Plans

By 20 February, it is expected that sufficient realistic plans for individual tasks will have been received, and initial actions started, to permit a firm time-table to be constructed. Since the President directed that the Chief of Operations conduct the Project through the appropriate organizations and Departments of the Government, and since these U.S. organizations are mainly in the initial inventory and development of capabilities phase concerning assigned tasks, a precise operations timetable as of today would be too speculative to be useful.

CIA has alerted Defense that it will require considerable military support (including two submarines, PT boats, Coast Guard type cutters, Special Forces trainers, C-54 aircraft, F-86 aircraft, amphibian aircraft, helio-couriers, Army leaflet battalion, and Guantanamo as a base for submarine operations). Also, CIA apparently believes that its role should be to create and expand a popular movement, illusory and actual, which will create a political climate which can provide a framework of plausible excuse for armed intervention. This is not in conformity with the Presidential directive now governing Project tasking. Actually, the role of creating the political climate and plausible excuse for armed intervention would be more properly that of State and Defense, if such an objective becomes desirable.

292. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations in the Deputy Directorate for Plans (Helms) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone

Washington, January 19, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 5, DCI (McCone), Caribbean Survey Group. Secret; Eyes Only.

SUBJECT

Meeting with the Attorney General of the United States Concerning Cuba

1. I attended a meeting on Cuba at 11:00 A.M. today chaired by the Attorney General. Others present were:

Brig. General E.G. Lansdale (OSD)

Major James Patchell (OSD)

Brig. General William H. Craig (JCS)

Mr. [name not declassified] (CIA)

Mr. George McManus (CIA)

(The Department of State was not represented although invited.)

2. The Attorney General outlined to us "How it all started", findings as they developed, and the general framework within which the United States Government should now attack the Cuban problem. Briefly, these were the main points:

(a) After failure of the invasion, the United States Government became less active on the theory "better to lay low."

(b) Over the months the complexion of the refugee flow changed (i.e. upper classes out first, then middle classes--dropping to lower middle class, etc.) which, he stated, indicated a strong feeling of opposition to Castro within Cuba.

(c) Progress in Cuba toward a police and Communist state was more rapid during this period than that made by any country in Eastern Europe in an equivalent period of time. Because of the rapidity of advance, immediate action on the part of the United States Government was necessary.

(d) With these factors in mind, the Attorney General had a discussion at the White House during the autumn of 1961 with the President, the Secretary of Defense, and General Lansdale. The Secretary of Defense assigned General Lansdale to survey the Cuban problem, and he (Lansdale) reported to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Attorney General (in late November) concluding:

(1) Overthrow of Castro regime was possible

(2) Sugar crop should be attacked at once

(3) Action to be taken to keep Castro so busy with internal problems (economic, political and social) that Castro would have no time for meddling abroad especially in Latin America.

Detail: United States Government was precluded from destroying the current sugar crop (1) we were late and overly optimistic and (b) "the assets of the United States Government were not as great as we were led to believe".

(e) Accordingly, a solution to the Cuban problem today carries "The top priority in the United States Government--all else is secondary--no time, money, effort, or manpower is to be spared. There can be no misunderstanding on the involvement of the agencies concerned nor on their responsibility to carry out this job. The agency heads understand that you are to have full backing on what you need."

(f) Yesterday (18 January 1962), the President indicated to the Attorney General that "the final chapter on Cuba has not been written"--it's got to be done and will be done.

(g) Therefore, the Attorney General directed those in attendance at the meeting to address themselves to the "32 tasks" unflinching (see program review--The Cuba Project dated 18 January 1962/1/). He said, "It is not only

General Lansdale's job to put the tasks, but yours to carry out with every resource at your command."

/1/Document 291.

3. The Attorney General inquired about the progress in establishing a refugee interrogation center at Miami and was informed that this would be in operation by 15 February 1962--the target date. With respect to interrogating the back-log of Cubans in the U.S.A., we agreed that we would attack this problem by getting at the more recent arrivals first. The Attorney General was informed that one could not relate, in time, the establishment of an interrogation facility with the placing of agents in Cuba--in other words, a body of information would have to be developed by intensive interrogation of many sources over a period of time.

4. It was General Lansdale's view that there were several tasks among the "32" outlined upon which action could be taken without awaiting this detailed intelligence information. He noted, for example, the defection of top Cubans as being within the immediate capabilities of the CIA.

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293. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Members of the Caribbean Survey Group

Washington, January 20, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1-2062. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attachment to the memorandum indicates that the Caribbean Survey Group was composed of the Project Officers within the Departments of State and Defense, CIA, and USIA who had day-to-day responsibility for the management of Operation Mongoose, under the oversight of the agency principals represented on the Special Group (Augmented). The distribution list for this memorandum indicates that copy 1 went to Assistant Secretary Woodward at State for Goodwin and Hurwitch as well, copy 2 went to Brigadier General Craig at Defense, copy 3 went to Helms at CIA, and copy 4 went to Wilson at USIA.

At yesterday's meeting,/1/ the Attorney General underscored with emphasis that it is your responsibility to develop and apply the maximum effort of your Department (Agency) to win the goal of the Cuba Project.

/1/See Document 292.

As he so adequately tasked us, there will be no acceptable alibi. If the capability must be developed, then we must acquire it on a priority basis. It seems clear that the matter of funds and authority offers absolutely no defense for losing time or for doing less than the very best possible effort in your tasks.

In reviewing our program, I appreciate the difficult problems inherent in getting bureaucratic procedures and personnel aroused to do the dynamic thinking and actions demanded by this project. However, I also am very clear about the unreserved requirement laid upon us. You should be equally clear about this. As the Attorney General said, it is untenable to say that the United States is unable to achieve its vital national security and foreign policy goal re Cuba. Castro and his Communist henchmen have many difficult problems to meet in maintaining even a status quo, and we have all the men, money, material, and spiritual assets of this most powerful nation on earth.

It is our job to put the American genius to work on this project, quickly and effectively. This demands a change from business-as-usual and a hard facing of the fact that we are in a combat situation--where we have been given full command.

It is my firm intention to avoid impeding your thinking and actions, except where coordination and constructive

direction in the overall interest are involved. In turn, it is your responsibility to keep me informed adequately of your plans and progress. As the Attorney General made plain, you are to call on me, as the Chief of Operations for the Project, at any time for advice and help. He offered the same for himself.

In the meantime, we must believe that you are getting fully into action on your assigned tasks, and are working towards additional tasks you can come up with to win the Project goal. You were given dead-line dates in the tasks listed in my 18 January paper to the President.^{/2/} I trust that you are not merely attempting to just meet those dates, but are making your own time-table and making it with shorter dead-lines. The urgency and importance of our Project must be reflected in the thinking and actions of the U.S. government people who are to help us win--and that is up to you.

^{/2/}Document 291.

294. Memorandum for the File

Washington, January 20, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2, DCI (McCone) Memo for the Record, 29 November-5 April 1962. Secret. Prepared by McCone on January 22.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE OF DISCUSSION WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT KENNEDY,
SATURDAY, JANUARY 20, 1962, 3:00 TO 4:00 P.M.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

4. McCone brought up the Lansdale paper of January 18th,^{/1/} pointing out that the paper was extreme in some regards, most particularly its criticism of the estimate of the Cuban situation. McCone stated that since his estimate was an official DCI paper he would request General Lansdale to support his criticism; McCone also questioned the conclusions in the final paragraph of the paper under Future Plans. No comment was made on the 32 tasks, however, McCone stated that from quick reading he questioned whether many of them could be done in the time schedule, and some of them probably not at all. However, comments on the paper were being prepared and would be submitted.

^{/1/}Document 291.

It was agreed that General Taylor was to call a special meeting of the 5412 committee to be attended by Lansdale and the AG for the specific purpose of discussing this paper. The meeting would be held in all probability on Saturday, January 27.^{/2/} Action: McCone should discuss this meeting with General Taylor and the Agency's position on the Lansdale paper prepared well in advance of the meeting and circulated to the appropriate parties concerned.

^{/2/}The meeting was held on January 25. See Document 296.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

John A. McCone^{/3/}

^{/3/}Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

295. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for the Special Group

Washington, January 24, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 5, DCI (McCone), Caribbean Survey Group. Secret; Eyes Only.

SUBJECT

The Cuba Project

I--Objective

In accordance with the objectives of the Cuba project program review presented to the President and the Special Group by Brig. Gen. E.G. Lansdale on 18 January 1962,/1/ CIA will collect and process intelligence and counterintelligence, conduct covert propaganda and political action operations, and develop a covert resistance movement to help the Cubans overthrow the Castroite-Communist regime.

/1/Document 291.

II--Concept of Operation

Fully recognizing the urgency and necessity of achieving our objective in this grave undertaking, CIA will use all available assets to develop a resistance organization inside Cuba to assist in bringing about a revolt of the Cuban people. Because of the present severity of Communist and police controls inside Cuba, it is not likely that we can make the resistance groups self-sustaining as is envisaged in General Lansdale's "Concept of Operation" section (p.1). External support will be essential to their survival. Except for the results of sabotage which will become known during the development of the movement and intended uprisings at the climactic moment, the movement will be primarily underground and clandestine. Since the movement will be clandestine, it will have to be highly compartmented and secure, thus limiting the size of the unit in each area where agents will be established. Open and significant political action by members of the movement would result in the destruction of these elements of the resistance. CIA will, however, create and expand a resistance movement which will help develop a political climate in which a large scale uprising may be possible. If the movement develops an impetus of its own, we shall not be able to control it from start to finish and at any time it may be sparked suddenly and prematurely into an uprising. It should be recognized that an uprising of this kind, which might result from our plan of action or from causes which we do not control, constitutes a serious danger. Because of this danger we must enlarge the "Concept of Operation" to include plans for this contingency in order that the United States Government will be ready with sufficient military assistance to guarantee the success of any uprising within the framework of our objective. If our efforts achieve the optimum result of generating an uprising of significant size, the U.S. Government will probably wish to support it by military action because the alternative would be to see the revolt fail. If a revolt does not develop of its own momentum, then consideration should be given to provoking an uprising and supporting it with military action. The consequences of a ruthlessly suppressed uprising encouraged even remotely by the United States could spell the end to any deniable efforts to unseat the Castro government and the end of Cuban faith in the United States and the practical end of resistance inside Cuba.

III--Estimate of the Situation

Although CIA will act on the basis of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 85-62 on Cuba, scheduled for completion in February 1962,/2/ our operational plans and actions will require significantly additional basic intelligence. To acquire this information, we are now urgently expanding our intelligence collection facilities.

/2/Document 315.

Our collection, covert action and resistance activities will have to overcome the repressive Cuban police controls of the population based on refinements introduced by experts from the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The pervasive

informant system, efficient propaganda machine, and military and civil suppression are supported by jet fighter, radar, patrol boats, and communications capabilities far beyond the level of April 1961.

Internal purges and escapes from Cuba have seriously diminished those groups from which leadership could be expected and the failure of the invasion has lessened our current recruitment capability inside and dampened the will to resist. Nevertheless, the deteriorating economic situation provides a climate in which opposition is more likely than in a rising economy. We believe, however, that the Soviet Bloc will seek to maintain its Cuban foothold in the Western Hemisphere, thus challenging the Monroe Doctrine, by extending economic aid to Cuba to help offset losses which will result from our actions. Our efforts must be concentrated within this period of economic difficulty to prevent improvement which might hinder the resistance movement from taking firm roots. We must recognize that our efforts to destroy the Cuban economy by sabotage, sanctions, and other measures of economic warfare will run a major risk of attribution to the U.S. and of Cuban propaganda exploitation. In addition, sabotage actions will inevitably result in a considerable attrition of resistance potential and assets.

IV--Initial Phase

In the initial period of three to four months this Agency will move toward the completion of assigned tasks. Although all CIA assets are now being directed to meet target deadlines, clandestine operations are ill-suited to rigid scheduling. The timetable for clandestine operations depends step by step upon the introduction of more and more concealed assets inside Cuba plus an increasing flow of information from Cuba. As our assets and knowledge grow, we shall move with greater speed. If we were to adhere to all the elements of the proposed Cuba Project timetable, we should be forced to act on the basis of extremely inadequate information. CIA will attempt, therefore, to adhere to or improve upon assigned deadlines but with full cognizance that the imposition of arbitrary scheduling upon clandestine operations can be used only to prod the participants but not to predetermine results.

Tab "A" of this paper discusses the tasks currently assigned to CIA, progress to date, and reporting deadlines.

Tab A

SUBJECT

Tasks Assigned to CIA in General Lansdale's Program Review

A. Tasks

Part V, pp. 5-8, of General Lansdale's program review of the Cuba Project, dated 18 January 1962, assigns 32 specific tasks to elements of the U.S. Government. Of these, 16 are assigned to CIA solely or jointly. The tasks have been reviewed by this Agency, and it has been determined that substantially all reporting and planning deadlines can be met. Work on all tasks, with and without assigned dates for completion, is in progress. The following detailed observations are keyed to General Lansdale's paper.

1. Task 1, p. 5. The intelligence community is hard at work on NIE 85-62 and is attempting to meet the deadline of 7 February. As was agreed in a conversation of 23 January 1962 with General Lansdale, a short extension may be necessary.
2. Task 2, p. 5. The Opa-Locka Interrogation Center in Florida will be in operation on 15 February--the deadline date.
3. Task 3, p. 5. The survey is in progress and will be completed on the stipulated date. On the basis of the information obtained the possibility of establishing additional interrogation points will be determined.

4. Task 4, p. 5. An operational assessment of the stay-behind net in Cuba will be completed and reported by the deadline of 15 February. Because communication with singleton agents is by SW, not W/T, it is unlikely that assessment can be completed by the date stipulated; an extension to 28 February may be necessary, although every effort is being made to complete the work before that date. *[3 lines of source text not declassified]* A progress report on the status of this program will be made by 15 February, although this Agency cannot be sure that the cooperation of all intended participants will have been obtained by that date. CIA has also taken the following additional steps in respect to Task 4.

a. A cable has been sent to field stations to give added impetus to the search for assets and the development of both unilateral and joint operations. Progress reports have been required by 1 March.

b. A survey of the Cuban Chinese community and of operational access to it is under way. Target date: end of February.

c. An assessment of more than one hundred persons to determine their suitability for return to Cuba as agents in the guise of students is also being conducted. Target date: end of February.

5. Task 5, p. 5. The 1 February deadline will be met, and by that date we shall also have begun the search for suitable intermediaries. *[10 lines of source text not declassified]*

6. Task 6, p. 5. By the assigned date we shall complete and submit a coordinated plan. We shall also have begun action on cover and deception operations by that date.

7. Task 7, p. 5. By 1 February CIA will submit an operational schedule for the initiation of an organized resistance movement inside Cuba. The schedule will include the localities selected and the assessment of some candidates. A full assessment will be completed in accordance with the schedule listed in para. 4, above, in conformance with Task 4. It should be noted, however, that this operational schedule (like the schedules called for in Tasks 10, 26, and 30) will necessarily be tentative and subject to later revision as the number of assets inside Cuba increases and as the flow of intelligence is augmented. Moreover, the development of a resistance movement will not remain controllable, so that operational timetables produced during the next four weeks can serve only as guides for a proposed sequence of actions.

8. Task 10, p. 5. CIA has on hand both propaganda and political action assets in the Caribbean area and elsewhere in Latin America. It is planned to use those assets both to support the Project inside Cuba and to generate and mobilize public and official opinion against Castro outside Cuba. The operational schedule will be submitted on the stated date.

9. Task 18, p. 6. Discussions with the appropriate AFL-CIO officials have been conducted and a report of developments will be submitted by 15 February.

10. Task 21, p. 7. Plans for inducing the failure of crops will be submitted by 15 February. *[4 lines of source text not declassified]*

11. Task 24, p. 7. This deadline will also be met. Primary methods of disrupting the supply of Cuban nickel to the USSR could, if approved, *[11 lines of source text not declassified]*. It is suggested that consideration be given to assigning to the economic action group, chaired by the Department of State, responsibility for overt action designed to deny Canadian nickel to the USSR.

12. Task 26, p. 7. Together with Tasks 27 and 28, Task 26 constitutes an outline of a plan for a psychological warfare operation. These tasks are so closely interrelated that CIA proposes to submit by 15 February a single plan dealing with all three tasks.

13. Task 27, p. 7. See preceding paragraph.

14. Task 28, p. 7. See paragraph 12.

15. Task 30, p. 7. By 15 February CIA will submit an operational schedule dealing with the sabotage of (1) shipping in Cuban waters and harbors, (2) Cuban transport facilities, (3) communications facilities, (4) equipment for the refining of petroleum, (5) facilities for producing and distributing power, (6) industry, (7) food supplies, (8) key military and police installations and materiel. The schedule will also include the disruption of military and police communications and harassment of military and police training and personnel.

16. Task 31, p. 8. This deadline will be met.

B. Additional Undertakings

The following comments are keyed to Sections D through K, Part IV (pp. 3 and 4) of the program review.

17. Section D, p. 3. Six men, to form the initial nucleus, have been assessed in depth. Further assessment of candidates inside and outside Cuba is in progress, and it is expected that ten of these will be recruited by 15 February.

18. Section E, p. 3. To date fifteen locations have been selected as suitable centers of resistance because of (1) the presence there of groups among which there is patent or incipient unrest, (2) the presence of strategic and tactical targets for use or deactivation, and (3) proximity to potential unconventional warfare areas. [*4 lines of source text not declassified*]

19. Section F, p. 3. In support of State's efforts CIA has conducted propaganda operations, including a number of mass demonstrations, [*2 lines of source text not declassified*].

20. Section H, p. 4. One TV intrusion operation has been conducted, on 16 January. Plans for an intrusion during the scheduled parade and demonstration in Havana are being formulated.

21. Section K, p. 4. Groups with which CIA has exploitable access or entree include women, labor, students, teachers, jurists, and other professional classes. International contacts [*1 line of source text not declassified*] will also be utilized.

296. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, January 25, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 28, February 1, 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Parrott.

SUBJECT

Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 January 1962

PRESENT

General Taylor; Mr. Johnson; Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer; Mr. McCone and Mr. Bissell

Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Helms and General Lansdale were present for Item 1

1. Cuba

The Group considered General Lansdale's paper "Cuba Project," 19 January 1962;/1/ his paper "Task 33," 19 January 1962;/2/ and the CIA paper "Cuba Project," 24 January 1962./3/ In addition General Lansdale circulated, but retained, copies of a paper on actions taken to gain popular support for the U.S. position in connection with the OAS meeting, and another outlining actions taken on the spot, in Punta del Este./4/

/1/For text of Lansdale's program review, dated January 18, see Document 291.

/2/Not found.

/3/Document 295.

/4/Neither paper has been found.

After a lengthy discussion, all agencies currently involved (State, Defense, Joint Staff, CIA) agreed that they accept the tasks assigned to them. In the case of State, this is subject to concurrence by the Secretary upon his return. February 20th is recognized as a target date to take a searching look at progress up to that point and to recommend new lines of policy if appropriate.

General Lansdale commented that it appears that some clarification might be in order as to exactly what is intended in the planning papers. He emphasized that there is agreement that external support of internal operations should be provided for and that it is recognized there might be an internal revolt which could lead to a Cuban group's requesting U.S. intervention. He also said he had met with the JCS and that the latter had responded strongly to the idea of preparing for external action. Additionally, he had met with the intelligence estimators and it had been noted there will be some delay in the NIE/5/ because of the need to acquire more intelligence and to digest a sizeable input from the State Department.

/5/An apparent reference to NIE 85-62, Document 315.

Mr. Johnson then pointed out that before the establishment of the Lansdale group, higher authority had directed State and Defense to prepare a plan for military intervention in the event of the removal of Castro from the Cuban scene. He said a great deal of work has been done along these lines and that this should now be directed into the channel of an integrated politico-military plan to cover any contingency.

Mr. McCone made several points: (a) The NIE of November 28,/6/ which was commented on in General Lansdale's paper, was based on all available intelligence and dealt with certain operational aspects. The latter had been done at Mr. McCone's direction. (b) Clandestine operations are not susceptible to rigid scheduling and must be approached on a step-by-step basis. Therefore, schedules will have to be reexamined periodically. (c) Sabotage, sanctions and economic warfare can all be attributed to the United States. The Special Group should recognize this as a possible consequence. (d) A popular uprising within Cuba could be brutally suppressed in the manner of Hungary. In such an event, unless the U.S. is prepared to give overt assistance, future opportunities to unseat the Castro government would be lost.

/6/See Document 271.

In commenting on Mr. McCone's last point, General Taylor noted that the CIA paper of the 24th appears to question the feasibility of the basic objective of overthrowing the Castro regime without overt U.S. military intervention, and that it suggests the need to accept in advance of implementing the Project the definite possibility of having to use U.S. forces. He said that in his view more than contingency plans are required and that, so far as possible, authority should be obtained in advance to undertake major moves which might be required as circumstances develop. He conceded that it may be impossible to get such a firm determination very

far in advance. The Group agreed, however, that every effort should be made to line up various situations that might arise, and to formulate recommended policy to capitalize on these situations at the proper time. It was agreed that no action should be taken before February 20th which could have possibilities of involving the U.S. in charges of overt aggression.

General Lemnitzer noted that military contingency plans now in being provide enough American strength to accomplish the job without internal help. He said that while these plans are up-to-date, it will be necessary to build up a number of them based on varying assumptions. He also warned that planning for operations of this kind should not involve a firm commitment to a time schedule, as was the case in the earlier unsuccessful operation.

Finally, General Lansdale noted that task number 33 (a) has been withdrawn. The others under 33 will not be put into execution until future examination and approval.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

Thomas A. Parrott/7/

/7/Printed from a copy that indicates Parrott signed the original.

297. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)

Washington, January 26, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1-2662. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Attorney General Kennedy, Taylor, Gilpatric, Johnson, and McCone.

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Hurwitch, State

General Craig, Defense

SUBJECT

Tasks 29 and 33, Cuba Project/1/

/1/Task 29 is listed in the section under "Military Action" in the Program Review prepared by Lansdale on January 18. (Document 291) There were only 32 tasks listed in that review. Task 33 apparently was assigned to the Department of Defense in the January 19 memorandum that Lansdale cites in the memorandum printed here. The January 19 memorandum has not been found.

It is desired that there be an early determination of U.S. policy about the possible use of U.S. military force in the Cuba project. The policy determination will require a clear presentation of the factors to be considered. State and Defense are tasked with making the required presentation, under my guidance. Deputy Secretary Gilpatric of Defense and Deputy Under Secretary Johnson of State have agreed that each of the addressees will represent his Department for this purpose.

The presentation of factors to be considered will include a clear statement of the situations under which U.S. military force would be needed and a clear statement of the proposed use of U.S. military force to meet the needs of each situation. The paper presented for a policy determination on possible military intervention in Laos, known as the Plan 5 paper,/2/ provides general guidance for the presentation desired. The considerations noted

in paragraph J, page 4, of my 18 January program review, need to be included.

/2/Reference is to SEATO Plan 5/61.

Separate presentations will be made for the use of U.S. military force visualized in Task 29 of my 18 January program review and the use of the U.S. military in Task 33b, for which Defense was asked to develop plans in my 19 January memorandum.

298. Telegram From the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic to the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet

Norfolk, Virginia January 29, 1962, 8:20 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Cables, 1/11/62-1/29/62. Top Secret; Priority. Also sent to CJTF 122, CG USARLANT Ft Bragg, CG USARLANT Seymour-Johnson AFB NC. Repeated for information to JCS, CINCSTRIKE, CG CONARC, and COMTAC.

292020Z. Cuban Contingency Plans. A. CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61 (change 2). B. CINCLANT OPLAN 316-61./1/

/1/Neither of these operations plans has been found.

1. SecDef has expressed dissatisfaction with reaction times envisaged in references A and B.
2. Fast application of US air power against Cuban airfields, aircraft, missile and radar installations is required as first priority. The selective disruption of communications and transportation facilities is second priority with the limitation of avoiding destruction of populated areas. Air strikes against troop and armor concentrations is third priority. Reaction times from a condition of no warning are six hours, twelve hours and twenty-four hours. Armament is limited to conventional weapons only. Naval and Air Force tactical air will be employed. Additionally it is desired to reduce reaction times to 4 days for ref A and to 2 days for ref B.
3. In order to achieve the required air strike capability it will be necessary to:
 - A. Activate JTF 122.
 - B. Require COMAFTASKFOR and COMNAVTASKFOR to be prepared to conduct tactical air strikes against designated targets as directed by CJTF 122.
4. From previous studies of the subject it is known that the required reaction times for refs A and B can be achieved only by accomplishing certain of the alert and prepositioning of forces set forth in phases I and II of the referenced plans. Deployment of PACOM amphibious forces and some LANTCOM seaborne forces will be necessary.
5. From previous studies in which adees and their staffs participated in CINCLANT is aware of the magnitude of effort required to realize and maintain the readiness goals set forth above. However, the Cuban military capability and the direct threat presented to the US and Latin America are rapidly increasing.
6. CINCLANT desires action adees review their plans supporting refs A and B with the above in mind and comment by message at their earliest convenience. Specific information desired:
 - A. Estimate of TAC aircraft required to achieve air strike capability described in para 2 above west of longitude 79W.

B. Estimate of Naval aircraft required to achieve air strike capability described in para 2 above east of longitude 79W.

C. Prepositioning requirements for 6A and B above.

D. Alert and prepositioning requirements (related to phases I and II) to achieve a 4 day reaction time for ref A and a 2 day reaction time for ref B.

E. Estimates of length of time ready posture can be maintained.

F. Estimates of costs, and impact on other major plans and programs of achieving:

(1) Reaction time of six, twelve, and twenty-four hours for air strikes.

(2) The reduced reaction times of four days for ref A and two days for ref B./2/

7. Replies are desired by 5 Feb. based on best estimates available. Action adees should continue to study the problem and be prepared to participate in planning conference in near future.

/2/In CINCLANT telegram 312156Z to CINCSTRIKE, Dennison cited CINCLANT telegram 292020Z and stated that the studies to be conducted in accordance with his instructions in that telegram "will, among other things, be concerned with the provision of combat-ready air force and army forces to this command." He added: "The degree of readiness of these forces, and the speed with which they can move to or be assembled" at stated transfer points were matters of mutual concern. Accordingly, Dennison asked for CINCSTRIKE comments on CINCLANT telegram 292020Z, with particular reference to subparagraphs 6 D, E, and F. (Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historian's Office, Cable Files, Cuba, Jan-Aug 1962)

299. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to President Kennedy

Washington, January 31, 1962.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Cuba, 342.18 (31 Jan 1962). Confidential. The memorandum was drafted in DOD/ISA and was forwarded by Assistant Secretary Paul H. Nitze on January 30 for Secretary McNamara's signature. Gilpatric signed for McNamara. In his January 30 covering memorandum Nitze noted that the recommendation to terminate the recruitment policy as of June 30 had the concurrence of the Departments of State and Health, Education and Welfare, as well as that of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, and the respective Armed Services. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT

Service of Cuban Volunteers in U.S. Armed Forces

In accordance with instructions contained in National Security Action Memorandum No. 54 dated June 26, 1961,/1/ the Department of Defense, in coordination with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and the U.S. Selective Service System, instituted a program to offer qualified Cuban exiles career opportunities for service in the U.S. Armed Forces on a volunteer basis, with the clear understanding that they were not being prepared as a combat force.

/1/Document 239.

A suitable interval has now elapsed since the initiation of this program in August 1961 to report on its program.

Through the period ending 15 January 1962, 3,504 Cubans who expressed an interest in the program have been interviewed at the Cuban refugee center in Miami. Of this number 920 were determined to be eligible and had sufficient interest in the program to register with the local Selective Service Board.

Of this number 817 reported and were processed at the Armed Forces Examining Station in Miami. On the basis of mental, medical and security examinations, 441 were rejected as not meeting minimum U.S. service standards.

Of the remaining 376 otherwise qualified, 101 demonstrated an adequate level of English language ability, while 275 did not.

Of the former group, 59 entered the U.S. military services. A special school which, for international political reasons, operates under the auspices of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, has provided English language training for volunteers otherwise eligible and qualified. As of 15 January 1962, 29 graduates of this training had entered the U.S. Armed Forces. Out of the total of 376, 194 individuals are currently being processed and 94 have dropped out.

In sum, during the five-month period ending 15 January 1962, the program has resulted in 88 individual Cubans entering the U.S. Armed Services, 11 in the Army, 18 in the Navy, 18 in the Marine Corps and 41 in the Air Force. These modest results when compared to the number of Cubans initially expressing interest in the program are attributable to the following factors:

1. By far the largest drop in numbers occurs after the first interview with those Cubans expressing an interest in the program. Apart from those determined to be ineligible by reason of age or some obvious physical limitation, most who drop out at this stage appear to do so as a result of learning that it is actually volunteer service in the U.S. Armed Forces and not in a new invasion force which is being offered. There is some evidence that many do not accept this explanation and continue in the program only to drop out at some later stage when they become convinced that it is not, as they seem disposed to believe, a cover operation for building a new Cuban combat force.
2. The next point in the processing where a major drop-out occurs is in the medical, mental and security examinations stage. Of the total of 441 rejected, 190 were for mental and medical reasons and almost all of the remaining 251 were found unacceptable on the basis of admitted sexual deviations.
3. Among the 376 who passed the mental, medical and security tests, 77 voluntarily dropped out of the program at one point or another for unexplained reasons, while 17 were unable to qualify in English tests after having completed language training.

This attrition rate, while high, is not surprising when compared to our experience with some groups of U.S. citizens where the rate of rejection for service in the U.S. Armed Forces has been 1 out of 2 and there is no language barrier to be overcome. Nevertheless, to the extent that this program is intended to assist Cuban exiles now in the United States to maintain themselves and to usefully employ and further develop their individual skills and abilities, it cannot be regarded as a marked success. The cost, particularly in the case of the language training funded by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, when compared to the numbers who ultimately qualify and enter the U.S. Armed Services, suggests that this is a somewhat expensive process for the results obtained.

There is little likelihood that our experience with this program will be appreciably different in the months ahead. Interest in it among the Cuban exile population continues but is not great.

I recommend that this program be terminated by 30 June 1962 unless a review by the Department of State should determine that there are sufficient reasons to justify its continuance.

Roswell L. Gilpatric/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Gilpatric signed the original.

300. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs (Hurwitch) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Woodward)

Washington, February 1, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1-2062. Top Secret.

SUBJECT

"Cuba Project"

Attached for your urgent consideration is the latest version of the basic paper relating to the "Cuban Project."/1/ There is also attached a memorandum to each member of the group from General Lansdale./2/ A number of tasks listed in the basic paper have been assigned to the Department. Although I have done a little preliminary work on some of these tasks, I have been reluctant until now to proceed very far both because of uncertainty as to the final outcome of the Punta del Este meeting and in the absence of your guidance.

/1/Document 291.

/2/Document 293.

I shall appreciate an early opportunity, in view of the deadlines imposed, to discuss the paper with you and obtain your views as to the best manner of proceeding, particularly with regard to Task #9 (page 5)./3/

/3/Woodward responded, in a handwritten note on the memorandum, directed to Hurwitch and Goodwin: "I believe we can now forge ahead on all items feasibly attainable."

[end of document]



FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963
Volume X
Cuba, 1961-1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

Cuba, 1961-1962

301. Memorandum From the Deputy Legal Adviser (Meeker) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, February 2, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/62-8/62. Confidential. On February 8, Rusk sent this memorandum to McGeorge Bundy for the President with a covering memorandum that reads: "I believe the President might be interested in the attached legal comment on our position in Guantanamo. The political aspects are also being studied." (Ibid.)

SUBJECT

Guantanamo Base

Problem

What are the rights and legal position of the United States in the event of a Cuban denunciation of the Guantanamo Base arrangements?

Conclusions

If Cuba were to denounce and repudiate the arrangements by which the United States has a base at Guantanamo, the United States would be on strong ground to assert (1) that the Cuban denunciation and repudiation were ineffective; (2) that we retained our base rights; and (3) that we would be justified in resisting with force any attempt to evict our armed forces from the base. These conclusions stem from the following considerations:

(a) The right of the United States in Guantanamo is more than a right to maintain a base on territory under the sovereignty of Cuba and governed by Cuban law; by international agreement and treaty the United States obtained the lease of a defined area and received from Cuba the right of "complete jurisdiction and control" in that area.

(b) No date was set for the termination of these rights, and the relevant international instruments specify that they are to continue until modified or abrogated by agreement between the United States and Cuba.

Background

In February 1903 the President of Cuba and President Theodore Roosevelt signed an "Agreement for the Lease to the United States of Lands in Cuba for Coaling and Naval Stations".¹ This included a lease covering the Guantanamo base, whose boundaries were described in Article I of the Agreement. Article II stated: "While on

the one hand the United States recognizes the continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over the above described areas of land and water, on the other hand the Republic of Cuba consents that during the period of the occupation by the United States of said areas under the terms of this agreement the United States shall exercise complete jurisdiction and control over and within said areas" The Agreement contained no terminal date and no provision for termination.

/1/See footnote 2, Document 6.

The Treaty of Relations with Cuba which was signed in May 1903/2/ (and ratified the following year) stated in Article VII:

/2/For text of the treaty signed by the United States and Cuba on May 22, 1903, see 6 TIAS 1116-1119.

"That to enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the Government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations, at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United States."

On the basis of the February 1903 Agreement for Lease and the above-quoted Article VII in the 1903 Treaty of Relations, a lease was signed July 2, 1903/3/ and ratified later that year. The lease specified a rental, and contained certain other provisions in pursuance of the February Agreement.

/3/See footnote 2, Document 6.

In 1934 a new Treaty of Relations was signed with Cuba in May and brought into force June 9 of that year./4/ The 1934 Treaty expressly abrogated the Treaty of Relations signed May 22, 1903. However, Article III of the 1934 Treaty contained the following provision on Guantanamo:

/4/See footnote 3, Document 6.

"Until the two contracting parties agree to the modification or abrogation of the stipulations of the agreement in regard to the lease to the United States of America of lands in Cuba for coaling and naval stations signed by the President of the Republic of Cuba on February 16, 1903, and by the President of the United States of America on the 23d day of the same month and year, the stipulations of that agreement with regard to the naval station of Guantanamo shall continue in effect. The supplementary agreement in regard to naval and coaling stations signed between the two Governments on July 2, 1903, also shall continue in effect in the same form and on the same conditions with respect to the naval station at Guantanamo. So long as the United States of America shall not abandon the said naval station of Guantanamo or the two Governments shall not agree to a modification of its present limits, the station shall continue to have the territorial area that it now has, with the limits that it has on the date of the signature of the present Treaty."

As to the Isle of Pines, the 1903 Treaty of Relations had provided as follows in Article VI:

"That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the proposed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto being left to future adjustment by treaty."

In March 1904 the United States and Cuba signed a Treaty/5/ by which the United States relinquished in favor of Cuba "all claim of title to the Island of Pines." Article II of this treaty provided:

/5/For text of this treaty, signed on March 2, 1904, see 6 TIAS 1124-1125.

"This relinquishment, on the part of the United States of America, of claim of title to the said Island of Pines, is in consideration of the grants of coaling and naval stations in the Island of Cuba heretofore made in the United

States of America by the Republic of Cuba."

The treaty was ratified and entered into force 21 years later, in March 1925./6/

/6/The treaty was ratified by the Senate on March 13, 1925, and entered into force with an exchange of notes on March 17. (6 TIAS 1125-1127)

Discussion

The United States presence in Guantanamo rests upon international agreements containing no termination date and making no provision for unilateral termination. Our rights subsist "until the two contracting parties agree to the modification or abrogation" of the Guantanamo lease arrangements.

These arrangements differ from the military base agreements concluded in recent years, since the United States is given a right of "complete jurisdiction and control" in a defined base area. The Guantanamo arrangement more nearly resembles the arrangements with Panama concerning the Canal Zone than the military base agreements concluded by the United States with NATO allies and others during the last 12 years. In the case of the Canal Zone, the United States was granted "in perpetuity the use, occupation and control" of the Zone. The grant covered "all the rights, power, and authority within the Zone . . . which the United States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign of the territory." Another analogy is Article III of the Treaty of Peace with Japan,/7/ under which the United States received "the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants" of the Ryukyu Islands, pending the placing of these islands under trusteeship. It has been recognized that Japan retains residual sovereignty.

/7/Signed on September 8, 1951; for text, see 3 UST (pt 3) 3169.

A declaration by Cuba that it denounced, repudiated, or abrogated the Guantanamo Base arrangements would be legally ineffective. Those arrangements are to continue, according to their terms, until agreed otherwise between the United States and Cuba. An allegation of the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus (changed circumstances) as a ground for unilateral termination would not be well founded. Application of the doctrine has never been upheld by an international judicial tribunal. The leading writers on international law state that the doctrine may be applied only by agreement of the parties or through the decision of a tribunal.

Thus, if Cuba should claim that unilateral statements or actions on its part operated to deprive the United States of its Guantanamo base rights, we would be on strong legal ground in refuting this contention, and in using the necessary force to defend the base at Guantanamo and maintain our position there.

The treaty stipulations regarding the Isle of Pines, made in the Treaty of Relations of 1903 and the separate 1904 treaty ratified in 1925, do not affect the status of the Guantanamo Base. The latter treaty merely stated that the transfer of the Isle of Pines was in consideration of the "grants of coaling and naval stations . . . heretofore made" (i.e., Guantanamo). United States rights in the base were fixed by the terms of those grants and are not affected by any political connection with the transfer of the Isle of Pines.

[1 paragraph (13 lines of source text) not declassified]

302. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Goodwin) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)

Washington, undated.

//Source: Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328. Official Use Only. Drafting information on the source text indicates that the memorandum was drafted in ARA/RPA by W.G. Bowdler on February 8.

SUBJECT

Accomplishments of the 8th Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, Punta del Este, Uruguay, January 22-31, 1962/1/

/1/See footnote 2, Document 288.

United States Objectives

The essential objective of the United States at the Meeting was to achieve maximum agreement by the Members of the Organization of American States upon a program of action which would, in the most effective manner possible, (1) isolate and consequently weaken the Castro-communist regime's position in this Hemisphere, and (2) strengthen the determination and capability of the Member States to act individually and collectively to defend their political independence against the continuing Castro-communist efforts to undermine and overthrow their governments.

Negotiating Situation

During the preparatory stage for the Meeting, there was one group of governments, made up mostly of States bordering on the Caribbean including the United States, which believed that the most effective way of achieving the over-all objective was to approve an obligatory break in diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba. The second group, consisting of governments most of whom were somewhat farther removed from the immediate source of Castro-communist infection, were clearly opposed to any such obligatory break. They expressed their opposition in terms of doubts about the juridical bases for taking such action, particularly the applicability of the Rio Treaty to the situation as it was described in the convocation of the Meeting.

During the early stages of the Meeting, there developed a unanimity of opinion that the point of major importance to the OAS was the clear incompatibility between the Marxist-Leninist nature of the Castro regime and the principles and objectives of the inter-American system. The issue then became what action should be taken as a result of this incompatibility. The group which had favored obligatory sanctions came out in support of an immediate decision to exclude the present Cuban Government from the system, leaving implementation of the decision to the various organs and agencies of the system. The other group argued that exclusion could not be decided on immediately and that this matter should be studied to determine the proper juridical basis. The negotiations which followed centered upon this basic difference. The efforts of the United States were directed toward finding a formula to exclude the present Government of Cuba from participation in the organs and agencies of the inter-American system which would command the widest possible support. In the end, it was not possible to bridge the gap between the two points of view.

Resolutions Approved

The clear and unequivocal decision contained in Resolution VI that Cuba's adherence to Marxism-Leninism is incompatible with the inter-American system and that Cuba's alignment with the communist bloc breaks the unity and solidarity of the Hemisphere represents the most significant outcome of the Meeting. It was approved unanimously, with the exception of Cuba. The accompanying decision that this incompatibility "excludes the present Government of Cuba from participation in the inter-American system" received the support of 14 countries (Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, United States and Venezuela). Cuba voted against and 6 countries abstained (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Ecuador). These two points constitute the principal action taken by the Meeting and paved the way for the adoption of other Resolutions which further contributed to the achievement of our objectives.

The Meeting approved five additional Resolutions directed specifically at the Cuban problem by unanimous (except for Cuba) or close to unanimous votes. They include: (1) a declaration and warning of the true nature of the communist offensive in America and the means to combat it--Resolution I, "Communist Offensive in America", adopted 20-1 (Cuba); (2) the creation of a Special Consultative Committee on Security to advise the OAS and member governments on problems of communist aggression and intervention and which also calls upon the member governments to cooperate in the measures needed to anticipate and prevent communist intervention--Resolution II, "Special Consultative Committee on Security against the Subversive Action of International Communism", approved 19-1 with 1 abstention (Bolivia); (3) a strong reiteration of the importance of the Alliance for Progress--Resolution V, approved unanimously (without Cuba); (4) the immediate exclusion of Cuba from the Inter-American Defense Board--Resolution VII, "Inter-American Defense Board", approved unanimously (without Cuba); (5) the suspension of trade in arms and implements of war with Cuba and a directive to the Council of the OAS to study and recommend the extension of such suspension of trade to other items, particularly those of strategic importance--Resolution VIII, "Economic Relations", approved 16-1 with 4 abstentions (Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico).

The Meeting also adopted Resolutions on the importance of free elections--Resolution IV; on the principles of nonintervention and self-determination--Resolution III; and on strengthening the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights--Resolution IX. Only Cuba voted in the negative.

These actions mark a significant step forward by the OAS in dealing with the communist threat which confronts the system and the member countries. The exclusion of Cuba and other defensive measures agreed upon at Punta del Este will place the OAS and the member governments in a vastly improved position to anticipate and counteract the existing and future efforts of international communism, with the cooperation of the Castro regime, to destroy the political independence of each of the other American Republics.

303. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs (Hurwitch) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)

Washington, February 16, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1-1862. Top Secret.

SUBJECT

Status Report on Cuba Project

REF

Your memorandum dated January 18, 1962/1/

/1/Document 291.

Re paragraph F. Diplomatic Actions

Resolution adopted at the OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers/2/ resulted in condemning Cuba and isolating it from the rest of the Hemisphere. The substance of the meeting and the degree of unanimity were gratifyingly beyond that which had been initially expected. The Department of State is vigorously pressing for rapid implementation of the resolutions adopted. On February 14, 1962 the Cuban Government was by vote excluded from the OAS Council. Similar actions will be sought in other OAS organs. The early departure from the U.S. of the Cuban delegation to the OAS is anticipated.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 288.

Implementation of Resolution II (Special Consultative Committee on Security) is underway through an inter-Departmental committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Rostow. It is envisaged that the work of the Special Consultative Committee will complement U.S. unilateral and bilateral efforts in this field.

The feasibility of encouraging Latin American governments to develop independent operations leading to an internal revolt of the Cuban people is being scrutinized. Consideration is being given to sending a person down to explore this question with one or two of the Latin American Presidents.

The Department has sent cable instruction to all posts in Latin America to exploit all opportunities to enlist local sympathy for the Cuban people and increase hostility towards the Communist regime in Cuba. (Task 8)

Re para 6. Economic Warfare

The outcome of the OAS meeting provided excellent political basis in a multilateral context for a U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba. Upon termination of the MFM the Department re-iterated its previous recommendation that an embargo be imposed. The President took this action on February 3, 1962./3/ (Task 11)

/3/On February 3 the White House released a statement by President Kennedy announcing an embargo on trade between the United States and Cuba. The President stated that the embargo was to be total, with the exception of certain foodstuffs, medicines, and medical supplies, which would be excepted on humanitarian grounds. He noted that the embargo was being imposed in accordance with the decisions of the recent meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Inter-American system at Punta del Este. The intent of the embargo, the President stated, was to reduce the economic capacity of the Castro government to engage in acts of aggression, subversion, or other activities endangering the security of the United States and other nations of the hemisphere. (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962*, p. 106)

The Secretary has designated Mr. Rostow to make the presentation of the U.S. view of the Cuban problem and seek NATO cooperation. This presentation is scheduled to take place in Paris on February 20, 1962 at a NATO Council meeting especially called for this purpose. (Japan will be represented) (Tasks 22 and 23)

Mexico has adopted improved procedures for halting diversion to Cuba of U.S. origin products. Canada, whose controls have been generally effective, has been impressed with U.S. keen interest in this area. (Task 12)

The Department of Commerce is examining the question of licensing "positive list" items to Latin America. (Task 13)

Cuba is treated the same as the Sino-Soviet Bloc with respect to export controls of technical data. (Task 14)

State is terminating the staff work and the draft letter to Commerce recommending the issuance of transportation order T-3. (Task 15)

Bloc and Cuban chartered vessels are subject to port security regulations. (Task 16) Tasks 17, 19, and 20 do not appear to be feasible.

Task 18 is yet to be fully explored.

Re paragraph K. Major Elements of the Population

The Department has appointed a labor specialist to fill a newly created position for the purpose of invigorating and strengthening the non-communist Latin American labor movement.

Under the direction of Mr. McGhee, the Department is preparing instructions to go out next week to inventory all youth (under 35) assets. In addition, the Department is actively searching for an appropriate person to chair a special committee to be established for the purpose of influencing and using Latin American intellectual groups in support of the democratic cause. (Task 9)

304. Program Review by the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)

Washington, February 20, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 2/62-4/62. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached distribution list indicates that 12 copies of the program review were prepared. Copies were sent to the President through Bundy, Robert Kennedy, and Taylor; to Rusk through Johnson; to McNamara through Gilpatric; to McCone through Helms; to Murrow through Wilson, Goodwin, Craig for the JCS, and Harvey. Two copies were kept by Lansdale. In a covering memorandum to the same addressees, also dated February 20, Lansdale noted that the attached action plan had been developed in response to a request from the Special Group (Augmented) for such a plan. (Ibid.) For text of the action plan, see the Supplement.

THE CUBA PROJECT

The Goal. In keeping with the spirit of the Presidential memorandum of 30 November 1961,/1/ the United States will help the people of Cuba overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace.

/1/Document 278.

The Situation. We still know too little about the real situation inside Cuba, although we are taking energetic steps to learn more. However, some salient facts are known. It is known that the Communist regime is an active Sino-Soviet spearhead in our Hemisphere and that Communist controls inside Cuba are severe. Also, there is evidence that the repressive measures of the Communists, together with disappointments in Castro's economic dependency on the Communist formula, have resulted in an anti-regime atmosphere among the Cuban people which makes a resistance program a distinct and present possibility.

Time is running against us. The Cuban people feel helpless and are losing hope fast. They need symbols of inside resistance and of outside interest soon. They need something they can join with the hope of starting to work surely towards overthrowing the regime. Since late November, we have been working hard to re-orient the operational concepts within the U.S. government and to develop the hard intelligence and operational assets required for success in our task.

The next National Intelligence Estimate on Cuba (NIE 85-62)/2/ promises to be a useful document dealing with our practical needs and with due recognition of the sparsity of hard facts. The needs of the Cuba project, as it goes into operation, plus the increasing U.S. capability for intelligence collection, should permit more frequent estimates for our guidance. These will be prepared on a periodic basis.

/2/Document 315.

Premise of Action. Americans once ran a successful revolution. It was run from within, and succeeded because there was timely and strong political, economic, and military help by nations outside who supported our cause. Using this same concept of revolution from within, we must now help the Cuban people to stamp out tyranny and gain their liberty.

On 18 January, the Chief of Operations assigned thirty-two tasks to Departments and Agencies of the U.S.

government, in order to provide a realistic assessment and preparation of U.S. capabilities./3/ The Attorney General and the Special Group were apprised of this action. The answers received on 15 February provided the basis for planning a realistic course of action. The answers also revealed that the course of action must contain continuing coordination and firm overall guidance.

/3/See Document 291.

The course of action set forth herein is realistic within present operational estimates and intelligence. Actually, it represents the maximum target timing which the operational people jointly considered feasible. It aims for a revolt which can take place in Cuba by October 1962. It is a series of target actions and dates, not a rigid time-table. The target dates are timed as follows:

Phase I, Action, March 1962. Start moving in.

Phase II, Build-up, April-July 1962. Activating the necessary operations inside Cuba for revolution and concurrently applying the vital political, economic, and military-type support from outside Cuba.

Phase III, Readiness, 1 August 1962, check for final policy decision.

Phase IV, Resistance, August-September 1962, move into guerrilla operations.

Phase V, Revolt, first two weeks of October 1962. Open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime.

Phase VI, Final, during month of October 1962. Establishment of new government.

Plan of Action. Attached is an operational plan for the overthrow of the Communist regime in Cuba, by Cubans from within Cuba, with outside help from the U.S. and elsewhere. Since this is an operation to prompt and support a revolt by the people in a Communist police state, flexibility is a must for success. Decisions on operational flexibility rest with the Chief of Operations, with consultation in the Special Group when policy matters are involved. Target actions and dates are detailed in the attached operational plans, which cover:

A. Basic Action Plan Inside Cuba

B. Political Support Plan

C. Economic Support Plan

D. Psychological Support Plan

E. Military Support Plan

F. Sabotage Support Plan

G. Intelligence Support Plan

Early Policy Decisions. The operational plan for clandestine U.S. support of a Cuban movement inside Cuba to overthrow the Communist regime is within policy limits already set by the President. A vital decision, still to be made, is on the use of open U.S. force to aid the Cuban people in winning their liberty. If conditions and assets permitting a revolt are achieved in Cuba, and if U.S. help is required to sustain this condition, will the U.S. respond promptly with military force to aid the Cuban revolt? The contingencies under which such military deployment would be needed, and recommended U.S. responses, are detailed in a memorandum being prepared by the Secretaries of State and of Defense. An early decision is required, prior to deep involvement of the Cubans

in this program.

[Here follows the 39-page action plan. For text, see the Supplement.]

305. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)

Washington, February 20, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 31, February 21, 1962. Top Secret.

SUBJECT

The Cuba Project

Although I am not familiar with the context in which the paper dated 18 January 1962/1/ has been discussed and developed, I think it may be useful for you to have a few observations on it from a bystander's viewpoint.

/1/Document 291.

1. I believe that the Objective as stated is sound and desirable.
2. With regard to the Concept of Operations, I have serious misgivings. The concept appears to depend in large measure on building up an internal political action organization in Cuba which would enjoy the support of the majority of the Cuban people. Presumably, it would be primarily CIA's job to build such an organization. I have seen no hard intelligence which would lead me to suppose that there exists, or that the Agency has assets for bringing into existence in the near future, an internal political action organization which would assure the support of the majority of the Cuban people against the Castro regime. On the contrary, the evidence we have points toward the present regime's tightening its controls. This leads me to conclude, as others have, that unless a popular uprising in Cuba is promptly supported by overt U.S. military action, it would probably lead to another Hungary. Briefly, I do not believe we can unseat the present regime in Havana by anything short of outright military intervention.
3. There exist, of course, contingency plans for taking Cuba over in a matter of days. What does not exist, to my knowledge, is any agreement (a) to carry out such an intervention, (b) on a means of provoking it, or (c) an analysis of the possible consequences of intervention. I think we should bite the bullet and address ourselves to these points. Unless we are at least willing seriously to consider such a course of action, I am afraid we may be heading for a fiasco that could be worse for us than the ill-fated operation of last year. In a word, on the basis of the information available to me on the Lansdale approach, which is fragmentary to say the least, I tend to agree with the position taken by John McCone in the Special Group as reflected in the minutes of the meeting of January 25/2/ (copy attached).

/2/See Document 296.

306. Telegram From the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic to the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet

Norfolk, Virginia, February 24, 1962, 3:54 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Cables, 2/4/62-7/10/62. Top Secret; Priority. Also sent to CG USCONARC, COMTAC, CGUSARLANT, CG USAFLANT, CJTF 122, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CINCSTRIKE. Repeated to JCS. The White House copy of this telegram indicates that it

was seen by McGeorge Bundy and General Taylor.

241554Z. CINCLANT OPLANs 314/316-61./1/

/1/Neither of these operations plans has been found.

A. JCS 3385 DTG 220013 Feb 1962./2/

/2/Not found.

1. Ref A contains planning direction for development of quick reaction capabilities in connection with subject plans. The criteria set forth in ref A were discussed at a conference conducted at this Headquarters on 7 and 8 February. For your information, a summary of the conference is contained in paragraph 4.

2. In accordance with the directive contained in ref A, it is desired that:

A. Plans supporting CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61 be completed as expeditiously as possible.

B. In view of the information contained in ref A, adees review the info contained in the appended report and submit additional information required to CINCLANT.

3. As noted in Part II of the report contained in para 4 below, CINC-LANT believes that further development of plans supporting CINC-LANT OPLAN 316-61 may be unnecessary. In connection with submission of the information required by ref A, CINCLANT will re-open this question with the JCS. In the interim, OPLAN 314-61 takes precedence.

4. There follows a report in two parts entitled, "Planning Considerations for Reduction in Reaction Times."

"Part One--Fast Application of U.S. Airpower

1. Concept.

A. Naval and Air Force forces designated for CINCLANT OPLAN 314 will maintain a posture of readiness to conduct air strikes against Cuba within six, twelve or twenty-four hours from the time of receipt of an execution order.

B. The following order of priority for the selection of targets will apply:

Priority I: Cuban airfields, aircraft, missile and radar installations.

Priority II: Selective disruption of communication and transportation facilities limited by avoiding unnecessary destruction of populated areas.

Priority III: Troops and armor concentrations.

Air strikes will be concentrated on Priority I and II targets for the first twelve daylight hours.

C. The primary purpose for the fast application of U.S. airpower will be to eliminate the capability of Cuban Air Force to conduct air warfare, and to reduce the capability of Cuban ground forces to wage war.

D. Marine forces at Guantanamo will, in coordination with the execution of air strikes, break out and obtain surrounding high ground in order to assure permanent retention and use of this U.S. base and its airfields.

E. Coordination between CINCLANT and CINCONAD will be effected by CINCLANT in order to assure the air defense of forces located in CONUS.

2. Assumptions.

A. Required repositioning of Air Force and Naval forces will be authorized.

B. The airborne/amphibious assaults against Cuba will not begin earlier than four days following the day initial air strikes commence. (This limitation does not apply if forces are prepositioned for a four or two day reaction time for CINCLANT OPLAN 314 as discussed in Part II.)

C. Cuban forces will attack the U.S. naval base, Guantanamo, immediately after commencement of U.S. air strikes on Cuban soil. (Provided such an attack, prior to the utilization of U.S. air power, is not the cause for initiation of hostilities.)

3. Requirements.

A. Army forces: Assume increased readiness posture at home bases.

B. Naval forces: Consideration for the defense of Guantanamo is essential and must be included in repositioning requirements for the fast application of U.S. air power as set forth below:

(1) One CVA for general participation in air strikes in eastern Cuba.

(2) One Marine Air Group (MAG) located in Mayaguana to provide air cover and close air support for Marine forces at Guantanamo. If unable to obtain base rights for use of the Mayaguana airfield and associated facilities or equally suitable airfield, a second CVA will be necessary.

(3) One MAG located at Key West, available for support of Air Force forces with air attacks on western Cuba and to augment CONAD forces in southern Florida.

(4) Class V (A) ammunition available to support this concept is extremely limited. Air strikes in support of the fast application of air power will have to be curtailed to insure that sufficient stocks remain for execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 314.

(5) One Marine RLT headquarters and two reinforced battalions at Guantanamo in addition to present base defense forces. The Caribbean ready battalion and one air lifted battalion plus sea tail could be prepositioned on short notice. This would release amphibious vessels of the ready group, creating a relief in Naval assault shipping.

(6) Evacuate dependents from Guantanamo.

(7) It is imperative that the reinforcement of Guantanamo and evacuation of dependents be undertaken prior to the initiation of air strikes.

C. Air Force forces:

(1) Repositioning requirement for tactical units are:

(a) 8 tactical fighter squadrons at Homestead AFB, Florida.

- (b) One tactical fighter squadron and one tactical reconnaissance squadron at Opalocka Airfield, Florida.
- (c) One tactical fighter squadron at NAS Key West, Florida.
- (d) One air refueling squadron at MacDill AFB, Florida.
- (2) Prepositioning requirements for control and support forces are:
 - (a) Activation of AFTF 126 and subordinate headquarters.
 - (b) Activation of Opalocka Airfield with a group and facilities sufficient for initial prepositioning of tactical squadrons and additional squadrons arriving after order to execute strikes is given.
 - (c) Establishment of necessary communications and control facilities.
 - (d) Distribution of POL and ordnance required for prepositioned units.
- (3) Cost, impact on plans and programs and other considerations.
 - (a) Reduces availability of air refueling aircraft for other operations.
 - (b) Reduces reaction capability for other contingencies.
 - (c) Limits forces available for exercises.
 - (d) Reduces operational and training activities at bases providing support items and personnel to operating bases.
- (4) This posture can be maintained for an indefinite period of time.

Part Two--Reduction of Reaction Times of CINCLANT OPLANs 314 and 316 to Four and Two Days Respectively

1. Concept.

Execute those portions of CINCLANT OPLAN 314 which will produce a readiness posture in all forces equivalent to that necessary for D-2 or D-4 and suspend action at either one of these points. This will require execution of selected portions of Phases I, II, and III. Due to the continual growth and the estimated current strength of the Cuban armed forces the concept of operations set forth in CINCLANT OPLAN 316 may no longer be adequate to cope with the threat. Any major operations contemplated should be based upon CINCLANT OPLAN 314. Coordination between CINCLANT and CINCONAD will be effected by CINCLANT in order to assure the air defense of forces located in CONUS.

2. Army Forces.

A. Requirements.

- (1) Entire air echelon of TF 125 to be prepositioned at staging base in Florida.
- (2) Initial surface echelon of TF 125 to be embarked.
- (3) Air and surface echelons to be placed in DEFCON 2.

(4) Up-to-date vertical photography of drop zones and other critical areas is necessary, placing a requirement for the removal of overflight restrictions. Current vertical photographic intelligence is urgently required for all other forces as well as for Army forces.

(5) Prestockage at home installations of operational maps will be required for surface movement units. This is now being done for airborne echelon only.

(6) There is a requirement for one aircraft carrier for lift and operation of army helicopters and light aircraft. Provision from presently assigned CINCLANTFLT forces will dangerously reduce ASW effort. CINCLANT is developing a more satisfactory solution which will be forwarded separately to the JCS.

B. Cost, impact on plans and programs and other considerations.

(1) If troops are placed in full ready to launch status, combat effectiveness will begin to decrease after two weeks. After sixty days the combat effectiveness of all units will become very questionable.

(2) These forces are earmarked for use in other contingency plans in support of CINCNELM, CINCPAC and other CINCLANT plans. While in the advance readiness conditions they would be geographically oriented for rapid deployment to Middle East, Europe or Africa.

(3) Numerous programmed training exercises would have to be canceled.

(4) The following is an initial U.S. CONARC cost estimate for prepositioning only, of certain combat units in the air and surface echelon. It does not represent the total cost that would be involved:

Unit: 1 ABN DIV (Ft. Campbell, Ky.)

Move To: Florida

Unit: 1 ABN DIV (Ft. Bragg, N.C.)

Move To: Florida

Unit: INF BDE (Ft. Benning, Ga.)

Move To: Ft. Jackson, S.C.

Unit: Tank Bn (Ft. Benning, Ga.)

Move To: Ft. Stewart, Ga.

Unit: Armd Cav Regt capability (Ft. Hood, Tex.)

Move To: Ft. Stewart, Ga.

Unit: 3 FA bns (Ft. Sill, Okla.) (surface echelon)

Move To: Ft. Polk, La.

Unit: 1 FA bn (Ft. Sill, Okla.) (air echelon)

Move To: Florida

Unit: 1 FA bn (Ft. Knox, Ky.) (surface echelon)

Move To: Ft. Stewart, Ga.

Unit: 1 FA bn (Ft. Campbell, Ky.) (air echelon)

Move To: Florida

Other miscellaneous support units (5,000 personnel) at various installations. The following includes movement of units, opening costs at Ft. Stewart and Ft. Polk, and packing and crating etc.

1. Movement

A. Equipment--\$2,697,540 (without per diem)

B. Personnel (one-way, surface elements to surface staging area)--\$210,000 (without per diem)

C. Fill personnel and equipment shortages--\$1,497,000 (without per diem)

2. Per diem--\$58,000

3. Opening cost--\$365,240 (without per diem)

4. Installation support costs--\$95,500 per day

5. Packing and crating--\$1,767,500 (without per diem)

6. Cost of continued operations at prepositioning staging areas, not computed.

7. No MATS reimbursement is computed.

Total: \$6,537,280 (\$153,500 per day)

3. Naval forces.

A. Requirements.

(1) The entire Naval Task Force, as set forth in 314, will have to be almost wholly loaded and ready for sea in order to meet the four day reaction time. Forces to be employed in western Cuba could be in south eastern coast ports and those earmarked for eastern Cuba could be in Caribbean ports. This applies to MSTS shipping also.

(2) To meet the two day reaction time, the Naval Task Force must be at sea, or in port within required steaming time.

(3) The LANTCOM Marine division (-) to be earmarked.

(4) PACOM forces to be earmarked and deployed to the Caribbean, could be in port in Vieques or Panama depending upon the required reaction time.

(5) One MAG to be prepositioned at Mayaguana. Base rights for use of the airfield, unloading site, ammunition and POL facilities must be obtained. It is estimated that the MAG would be operational thereon in about 16 days,

utilizing short airfield for tactical support (SATS) equipment while construction forces pave present graded runway for jet operations. The MAG would provide close air support and air defense for defense of Guantanamo and for the eastern attack group in the Santiago/Guantanamo area. If base rights are unobtainable for Mayaguana or suitable alternate Caribbean airfield cannot be obtained, a CVA can be used to provide this support.

(6) One Marine air group to be prepositioned at Key West to provide air support to western Marine assault forces. This unit will be available in support of Air Force Task Force and CONAD prior to asst landings.

(7) A Marine RLT headquarters and two reinforced battalions to be prepositioned in Guantanamo in addition to present defense forces.

(8) Evacuate dependents from Guantanamo.

(9) The four preceding requirements, 5, 6, 7, and 8 above, are considered essential for both concepts set forth herein and should be implemented without delay.

B. Cost, impact on plans and programs and other considerations.

(1) It is estimated that a four or two day readiness posture can be attained in fourteen and sixteen days respectively.

(2) This posture could be maintained for a maximum of 60 days. If the requirement for reaction time is changed to five days, which would permit minor exercises to be conducted ashore and allow more leeway in sailing distance, a longer period could be held. Troop readiness could be maintained at a higher level.

(3) The readiness condition of most Naval surface and air units will be improved by deployment and by the opportunity for minor training while in an advanced state of readiness.

(4) Naval and Marine forces, less MAGs and Guantanamo reinforcements could be easily shifted in the event they are required in execution of other CINCLANT contingency plans for general war, until committed.

(5) The strike fleet general war posture will be degraded by units thereof being well south of planned positions. This will be emphasized particularly if a third CVA is required in place of a MAG at Mayaguana.

(6) Project Mercury support will be considerably reduced although some flexibility will exist depending upon the time prepositioning commences and the readiness time imposed.

(7) Use of the 5th MEB will have the following impact on PACOM plans:

(a) Withdrawal of PACOM LSD and LPH support for planned atomic tests by JTF-8 will be required.

(b) A reduction in earmarked forces for defense of SE Asia will be necessary.

(c) Capability to react to PACOM contingencies will be reduced.

(d) Relief of deployed amphibious forces will be hampered.

(e) Curtailment of certain amphibious exercises including support of army training requirements will be necessary.

(8) A comprehensive dollar cost has not been computed, however, some major considerations for costs, chargeable solely to attaining an increased readiness posture, are set forth below:

- (a) Pre-loaded MSTTS shipping for Marine forces (6 TAP, 20 TAK, 2 TAO), 4 million dollars per month.
- (b) Deferred upkeep of ships will result in expensive breakdowns.
- (c) There will be a considerable increase in expenditure of POL.
- (d) Increased stevedoring and shipping costs will be incurred.
- (e) A large increase in TAD funds will be necessary.
- (f) Construction costs at Mayaguana Airfield must be funded. An alternative to paving the runway would be to use SATS airfield matting at an estimated cost of 1.8 million dollars.
- (g) The cost of prepositioning MAG in Key West with resultant displacement of normal Key West units must be considered.

4. Air Force forces.

A. Prepositioning and alerting requirements for four day reaction:

(1) Prepositioning requirements for tactical units are:

- (a) 2 TFS at Homestead AFB.
- (b) 1 TFS at Opalocka Airfield.
- (c) 2 TFS at Palm Beach International Airfield.
- (d) 1 TFS at Key West NAS.
- (e) 1-1/3 TRS at Opalocka.
- (f) 1 ARS at MacDill AFB.
- (g) 1 AEW&C Det at McCoy AFB, Florida.
- (h) 1 Air Search and Rescue Detachment, Key West.

(2) Alerting of units at home base requirements:

- (a) 4 TFS--6 hours
- (b) 7 TFS--12 hours
- (c) 1 TRS--24 hours
- (d) 3 TCS C-130--12 hours
- (e) 2 TCS C-130--24 hours
- (f) 5 TCS C-123--24 hours

(g) 14 TCS C-119--recall to active duty within 24 hours.

(h) 6 ATS MATS--12 hours

(i) 6 ATS MATS--24 hours

(j) 1 Search and Rescue Detachment at MacDill--24 hours

(3) Prepositioning of control and support forces required is as contained in paragraph 3C(2) in Part I plus activation of Palm Beach International Airport for use by tactical air forces.

(4) Prepositioning of required tactical air forces at Homestead AFB will necessitate the evacuation of certain SAC forces from that base.

(5) Prepositioning of Army forces at MacDill AFB, McCoy AFB and Patrick AFB will require priority for use of ground handling equipment and airfield space facilities necessary to the troop carrier airlift operation.

B. Cost, impact on plans and programs and other considerations.

(1) Same as paragraph 3C(3) in Part I plus increased impact on bases providing logistical support.

(2) SAC will be denied the use of Homestead AFB for air operations and operations from McCoy AFB and MacDill AFB will be limited.

(3) Air research and development command air operations from Patrick AFB will be limited.

C. Requirements for two day reaction:

(1) Prepositioning of all tactical and support forces at operating bases in Florida will be required.

(2) Other requirements as listed in para 4A(4) and (5).

D. Cost, impact on plans and programs and other considerations.

(1) Practically all other TAC operations will have to be deferred.

(2) Others as in para 4B(2) and (3).

E. The Air Force forces can maintain either the four or two day posture for an indefinite period of time with costs and impacts as stated.

5. Joint Task Force 122 Headquarters.

A. It will be necessary to activate and fully staff the Headquarters of JTF 122 as a pre-requisite to prepositioning of forces for any increased capability of contingency forces.

B. For a two day reaction time the JTF 122 Joint Staff must be embarked and the flagship in port or offshore south of latitude 31 degrees N. For a four day reaction time the Joint Staff can be ashore in the Norfolk area ready to embark and sail in the flagship."

307. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs (Hurwitch) to the Deputy Under

Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)

Washington, February 26, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 90 D 410. Top Secret.

SUBJECT

Cuba Project

There is attached the working level draft regarding the use of U.S. military forces in support of the Cuba project. When approved, the paper would, of course, assume the form of a joint memorandum to the President from the Secretaries of State and Defense. Neither Mr. Woodward nor Mr. Goodwin have seen this as yet./1/

/1/On March 1 Hurwitch sent a copy of the working draft relating to the use of U.S. military force to Woodward, through Goodwin. Hurwitch noted that this draft, which was not found attached, "represents considerably wider agreement than appeared possible from earlier conversations and drafts in which DOD entered into second-guessing the world political situation." (Ibid., Central Files, 737.00/3-162) Woodward responded with a brief memorandum to Goodwin and Hurwitch, also on March 1, in which he observed that he felt it might prove possible to make good use of the OAS Special Consultative Committee on Security to organize moral, and perhaps military support for U.S. contingency military action against Cuba. He felt, on the other hand, that it might be a mistake to operate on the assumption that "Time favors consolidation of the political and military powers of the Communist regime." Woodward concluded: "I think we should examine the trends very carefully and analytically to see whether we may not gain steadily increasing advantage by not being in too much of a hurry, now." (Ibid.)

I feel that the significant area of agreement lies in paragraph 3, page 2. The disagreement shown in paragraph 2, page 2 stems from my reluctance to agree to language which is speculative or alarmist. The disagreement shown in paragraph 8, page 8 stems from my belief that reprisals by the Cuban government (even before the revolt began) would not provide politically feasible circumstances for the use of military force. Further, paragraph 8 is inconsistent with the substance of paragraph 3 a. (page 2).

A somewhat more detailed breakdown of paragraph 6, Enemy Capabilities might be useful (we have tried to keep the paper brief).

DOD has been reluctant to provide detail regarding Force Involvement. Paragraph 7 reflects as much as the DOD representative (Col. Seamens) felt at liberty to provide. I understand that military intervention would take place in several areas of Cuba simultaneously, with the preponderance of force focussed in the vicinity of (but not on) Habana.

The DOD representative intimated by telephone today that the JCS was unhappy about the draft--apparently feeling that he had conceded too much to State's position.

Attachment/2/

/2/Top Secret; Noform; Special Handling.

USE OF US MILITARY FORCE, CUBA PROJECT

1. Scope and Purpose

The objective of the Cuban Project is to help the Cubans overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and

institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace. The US has the maximum to gain in the East-West struggle if the Cuban people can accomplish this task without overt US military assistance. As the project matures and a genuine revolt occurs, the Cuban people may fall short of their objective and require external military assistance. The purpose of this paper is to determine the minimum desirable political-military conditions under which military intervention in Cuba by US forces in support of a revolt by the Cuban people would be feasible from both the international political and military standpoint. A policy decision with respect to the political and military conditions under which US military intervention should be undertaken in this context not only is desirable for contingency planning purposes, but also could serve as an added stimulus to the Cuban people to revolt, if the decision were favorable and were to be discreetly made known./3/

/3/McGeorge Bundy's handwritten notes on a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on February 26 read, at one point, as follows: "Lansdale Project: Consensus is that we are in no position to say when U.S. commitment." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 2/62-4/62)

In addition, the Communist regime's reaction to incipient internal revolt may be such as to justify US military intervention in Cuba under existing international law and our treaty obligations.

2. General

a. The Marxist-Leninist government of Cuba presents a threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere. The US can not tolerate permanently the existence of such a government which provides the Sino-Soviet Bloc with a stepping stone for subversion of other Latin American states.

State:

Defense: , and which may become a military base at close range, increasing our national vulnerability and defense costs as US forces are developed or shifted to meet this threat.

b. Time favors consolidation of the political and military powers of the Communist regime in Cuba. Almost all aspects of the problem of overthrowing the government continue to increase in difficulty and complexity. Sino-Soviet Bloc material, moral, political, military and financial assistance contributes toward strengthening the Communist regime.

State:

Defense: There is a potential threat of Soviet military bases in Cuba equipped with nuclear ballistic missiles.

The Cuba Project, therefore should be developed and executed as rapidly as prudence may permit.

c. Military intervention in Cuba by US forces should be considered when it is clearly apparent to the world that such action is justified by international law, treaty commitments, or on moral grounds as support for a revolt by the Cuban people as contemplated in the Cuba Project. Such situations are described in Appendix hereto.

3. Circumstances of Recognition of the New Cuban Government and Initiation of US Military Intervention

a. Cuba

The Cuba Project has created a chaotic internal situation in Cuba where:

(1) The revolution is open and seriously threatens the Communist regime;

(2) Areas are taken and held by the revolutionaries, and;

(3) Leadership of the revolt, unable to overthrow the government or sustain the revolution, requests assistance from the United States and/or the Organization of American States (OAS).

b. Latin America

Latin American Governments are in a reasonable position to resist internal pressures aimed at significant anti-US measures domestically and/or in the OAS.

c. Sino-Soviet Bloc

While the threat of general war resulting from US military intervention appears to be remote, an assessment of Sino-Soviet Bloc reaction should be undertaken by the USIB on a first priority basis.

d. Rest of the World

Remaining friendly governments are in a reasonable position to resist internal pressures aimed at significant anti-US measures domestically and/or in the United Nations.

e. US Congress

US Military forces have sufficient hard intelligence upon which to base the maintenance of a readiness posture providing the capability of adequate US military reaction in response to the situation in Cuba.

4. Political-Military Objectives

a. We should intervene militarily in Cuba under circumstances and in a manner which would ensure that the overthrow of the Communist Cuban Government and its replacement by a government with which we can live in peace results in increasing the security of the US and does not result in a net Sino-Soviet Bloc gain in the cold war elsewhere in the world. The leadership position of the US in the free world as a consistent advocate of peaceful solutions to international problems, the stability of friendly governments in the hemisphere, and the future of the Alliance for Progress program are among the significant factors to be considered in this regard. Additional significant factors to be considered include retention of US bases in the hemisphere, sources of strategic raw materials, and US control of the Panama Canal. Military intervention on the basis of international law or our treaty commitments would of course diminish the political risk.

b. To accomplish our objective with respect to the Cuba Project we would make clear to the world that we are responding to an appeal for assistance from a government representative of the people; that we are intervening for the purpose of restoring order and holding free elections; and that we will withdraw as soon as the new government advises that our assistance is no longer required.

c. We would conduct the military operation with sufficient force to overcome the Castro forces as quickly as possible while minimizing indiscriminate destruction, especially in populated areas. To this end DOD would keep close track of the state and location of Cuban forces and would coordinate with CIA in matters pertaining to covert programs in order to provide military assistance as required to hard-pressed elements of the revolt and to avoid inadvertent targeting of friendly forces or installations.

5. Contingencies World Wide

The United States must weigh the effect that the need for ready forces in support of the Cuba Project may have on the over-all US force posture to face contingency situations in other parts of the world. Once the revolt

begins, Communist Bloc military and para-military diversions could be expected anywhere. Embassies and unified and specified commands should be alerted to such possibilities.

6. Enemy Capabilities

- a. Cuban ground forces including regular forces, the ready reserve and the home guard are estimated at 275,000.
- b. Significant aircraft of the Cuban Air Force are estimated at 35 MIG-15s and 10 MIG-19s. Personnel strength is unknown.
- c. The Cuban Navy is capable of moderately effective patrol operations along selected portions of the Cuban coast. Combat capabilities are negligible. 4 PT and 3 PC type vessels have been received.
- d. In addition to normal combat forces indicated above, extensive military preparations have been undertaken such as the organization of large arms depots, tunneling, fortification of large gun emplacements around Havana, construction of beach defenses and installations of fire control and surveillance radar.

7. Force Involvement

- a. The application of US force in Cuba will be accomplished by the execution of prepared contingency plans by employing Army, Navy, and Air Force forces under the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Command (CINCLANT). In brief, US forces employed will be two Army Airborne Divisions, two Marine Division Wing Teams, tailored supporting forces to improve armor and artillery capabilities, Naval airpower and gunfire support and Air Force tactical air units as required. One additional Army division will be designated as ready reserve in the United States.
- b. It is not feasible to define limitations to the application of US force under each separate situation which requires US military intervention since enemy resistance will probably be the same in each situation. US military plans, however, provide a degree of selective application of force to primarily military objectives and resistance areas. Basically it is the DOD position that the operation be conducted as rapidly as possible, quickly confronting enemy forces with sufficient strength to be clearly beyond Cuban capability to resist, with the view toward early capitulation of Cuban units and avoidance of needless loss of life.

Appendix A/4/

/4/Top Secret; Noform; Special Handling.

CONTINGENCY SITUATIONS UNDER WHICH THE USE OF US MILITARY FORCE WOULD BE NEEDED

1. The Cuban Project has created a chaotic internal situation in Cuba where:
 - a. The revolution is open and seriously threatens the Communist regime;
 - b. Areas are taken and held by the revolutionaries, and;
 - c. Leadership of the revolt, unable to overthrow the government or sustain the revolution, requests assistance from the United States and/or the Organization of American States.
2. An attack on the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay. Such attack, however, must be more than simply a threat or demonstration. It should be a serious physical attempt--chemical, biological or force of arms--to oust the United States from the base.

3. An armed attack by Cuba against territory, people, or the land, sea or air forces of the United States or another American republic.
4. A decision by the members of the OAS under Article 8 of the Rio Treaty that armed force should be used, once the UN Charter requirement of UNSC authorization of "enforcement action" has been discharged.
5. Open Soviet military assistance to the Communist Cuban regime at any stage after initiation of the revolt.
6. Significant and/or repeated attack by the Cuban military establishment on commercial shipping or aircraft of the United States or another American republic on or over the high seas.
7. Significant sabotage or attack by the Communist Cuban government, of US military or naval installations.

State:

Defense: 8. Reprisals by the Communist Cuban government against counter-revolutionary forces which include those Cuban nationals friendly to the United States and who are closely associated with the US inspired resistance movement. This situation would require rapid action by the United States in an effort to preserve the lives of those Cubans who must be available to form the new government. Extermination of a limited group of counter-revolutionaries that are not connected with the over-all US plan would be considered insufficient provocation for US force employment unless requested by the primary group or groups of Cuban insurgents.

308. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 27, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2-2762. Secret. Drafted by G.H. Summ (ARA/CMA) on March 13.

SUBJECT

Cuban Revolutionary Council Spokesmen Stress Need for Military Action to Eliminate Castro Regime

PARTICIPATION

Jose Miro Cardona, Chairman, Cuban Revolutionary Council

Manuel Antonio de Varona, Cuban Revolutionary Council

Arturo Morales Carrion, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Robert A. Hurwitch, Deputy Director, Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs

During the course of two interviews, first with Mr. Hurwitch and later with both Mr. Morales and Mr. Hurwitch, Messrs. Miro and Varona stressed the need for military action as the only way to get rid of Castro and the threat of communism to the hemisphere. They said that now that the Meeting of Foreign Ministers was over, Cuban exiles were insistently raising the question as to what came next. According to Miro and Varona, neither the deteriorating economic situation, nor sabotage, nor commando raids, nor propaganda could succeed in overthrowing the Castro regime, and therefore the only possible solution was military, involving either U.S. forces, or U.S. plus Cuban forces, or Cuban forces supported by the U.S., or Cuban plus Latin American forces, or some combination of the above. They said that the exile community was becoming increasingly impatient over

the need for action, and that if they could not get an encouraging reply from us, they would probably have to resign from the Council. They could not go on any longer promising and deluding the exiles, they said, unless they had some encouragement that there was some plan underway to help them along military lines.

Mr. Morales made the following points:

- (1) Action of the kind requested might bring on Soviet retaliation, either in Cuba or elsewhere in the world. Miro and Varona perhaps had not been giving sufficient attention to this serious Cold War aspect of the problem.
- (2) The results of Punta del Este, and the change which it revealed in the attitudes of Latin American governments toward the problem of Cuba since the 7th Meeting of Foreign Ministers in San Jose, Costa Rica, were reasons for moderate optimism. Several Latin American countries are very disturbed about the threat Castro poses for their survival. In time they may be willing to take stronger steps. Punta del Este was a way station, not the end of the line.
- (3) At the first Punta del Este meeting in August 1961 the Cubans were accepted and even popular to a degree. At the second meeting they were completely ostracized.
- (4) There was considerable respect for Miro at Punta del Este.
- (5) A look at the internal situation in Cuba indicates that things are not going well there. Economic failures and the ascension of Communists to key posts have probably met with the disapproval of the Cuban people.
- (6) The recent debate in the UN reveals that the Cuban regime is almost hysterical at the way things are going.
- (7) If the Castro regime were to disappear tomorrow, the Communist threat in Latin America would still exist.
- (8) The Council must continue working on hemispheric public opinion. They should stress the point that Castro is a star being eclipsed by the Communists.

309. Program Review

Washington, March 2, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Lansdale. An attached distribution list indicates that eight copies of the program review were prepared and copies were sent to Attorney General Kennedy, Taylor, Rusk through Johnson, McNamara through Gilpatric, McCone through Helms and Harvey, and Craig for the JCS. Two copies were kept by Lansdale.

THE CUBA PROJECT

The Goal: The United States will help the people of Cuba overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace.

Developments:

30 November 1961: The above goal was set for the United States, with Brig. Gen. Lansdale as Chief of Operations and with operational lieutenants appointed as direct representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director, Central Intelligence. The Special Group (NSC 5412) was to be kept informed and be available for advice and recommendation.

December-January. Decisive effort was made to re-orient the operational concepts within the U.S. government

and to develop the hard intelligence and operational assets required for success. A joint effort was mounted to obtain intelligence in depth from refugees at Opa-Locka, Florida, and to provide more thorough access to operational assets. At the same time, reports from significant population groups, including religious and labor groups, indicated that the spirit of the Cuban people was dying under the Communist police-state controls and that some evidence on which to base hope for a better future was needed promptly to prevent this death of spirit. A review of operational assets dictated that the U.S. was powerless to hamper the sugar harvest, without U.S. attribution.

18 January 1962. The Chief of Operations assigned thirty-two tasks to Departments and Agencies, for a realistic assessment and preparation of U.S. capabilities./1/

/1/See Document 291.

15 February 1962. Detailed staff papers were received from Departments and Agencies, responding to assigned tasks. A basic action plan was then made, for the step-by-step development of an internal revolution, by the Chief of Operations with joint consideration and approval by the operational representatives (CIA, State, Defense, and USIA).

20 February 1962. Completed basic plan for paced operations inside Cuba, and support plans for political, economic, psychological, military sabotage, and intelligence actions./2/ The outlined concept would develop assets inside Cuba for a popular revolution in October (judged to be the earliest possible date by those responsible for operations), with U.S. and Latin American help from the outside. Each step would be taken as operationally feasible, collecting intelligence, building revolutionary assets, and taking advantage of targets of opportunity.

/2/Document 304.

21 February 1962. Plan was discussed by Special Group (NSC 5412) and decision was made to meet again on it the following Monday, with Secretary McNamara.

26 February 1962. Special Group (NSC 5412) met with Secretary McNamara. Chief of Operations was asked to submit a plan for an initial intelligence collection program only.

1 March 1962. Special Group (NSC 5412) agreed that the immediate objective of the U.S. during March, April, and May will be the acquisition of intelligence, and that other U.S. actions must be inconspicuous and consistent with an overt policy of isolating Castro and of neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere. At the end of May, the situation will be reviewed and a decision made as to the next phase. The Chief of Operations is to report to the President through the Special Group (NSC 5412 augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, JCS); the Special Group will be responsible for providing policy guidance for approving important operations, and for monitoring progress.

Intelligence Plan

As requested by the Special Group (NSC 5412), a plan for basic intelligence collection, upon which to base the decision to undertake actions to cause the overthrow of Castro, is submitted herewith./3/ In view of the new requirement for a comprehensive and definitive intelligence finding concerning the Cuban population vis-a-vis the regime, CIA requested that the initial period be extended through July 1962. This practical realism is reflected in the plan. Also, responsible CIA operational officers noted that at least 6 months should be added to the timing of phases set forth in the original basic action plan, if a decision to seek an internal revolution is deferred until the end of the collection and reporting period.

/3/Not found attached.

The attached plan reflects the Special Group's desire to collect definitive intelligence inside Cuba prior to a decision, while being consistent with giving the impression that the U.S. effort is to isolate Castro and to neutralize his influence in the Western Hemisphere. The plan gives maximal commitments of U.S. assets for intelligence collection in the periods shown.

310. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Goodwin)

Washington, March 6, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Top Secret; Sensitive.

At the 5 March meeting chaired by Secretary Rusk, on our favorite subject, the Secretary spoke of "other tracks" which might be opened for the U.S. to achieve its objective. He mentioned proof of "their" plots in Latin America, as an example. Also, there was joking reference to a "Bay of Pigs" in, perhaps, Guatemala, as a notional clandestine action for which "they" could be blamed.

General Taylor has asked me to report on these alternate "tracks," among other things, to the Special Group he chairs. I intend to complete this report on Friday, 9 March. Thus, request that you provide me the section on alternate "tracks" Secretary Rusk sees as possibly open to the U.S., by Thursday, 8 March. I plan to include this, as the State response, in my report. Alexis Johnson was present when Secretary Rusk mentioned this, and perhaps could be of assistance.

Along these same lines, and in response to direction, I am asking the Defense representative (Gen. Craig) to give me a brief but precise description of pretexts which the JCS believes desirable if a decision is ultimately made to use direct military intervention. I would appreciate it if you could provide a companion statement, a brief but precise description of pretexts which the State Department believes desirable in connection with any such direct military intervention.

311. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)

Washington, March 12, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 2/62-4/62. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached distribution list indicates that seven copies of the memorandum were prepared and copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Rusk through Johnson, McNamara through Gilpatric, Lemnitzer through Craig, and McCone through Helms and Harvey. One copy was kept by Lansdale.

SUBJECT

Policy Questions, Operation Mongoose

As Operation Mongoose goes into the approved activities of Phase I, a number of policy questions have started to arise. Current problems, needing resolution, are listed below. It is requested that the Special Group (Augmented) provide guidance, as a matter of some urgency.

1. Use of U.S. military installations. CIA desires to train small groups of Cuban nationals on the U.S. Air Force Bombing Range, Avon Park, Florida, immediately. Defense reports that the proposed area is adequate for this training, but that such training of covert agents who will be introduced ultimately into Cuba represents a security

problem and a departure from past security procedures, due to the fact that U.S. Government sponsorship will be apparent to trainees. Capture and interrogation of any of these covert agents could result in exposure (in international news media) of U.S. official involvement in efforts to unseat the present Communist Cuban regime. A policy determination is needed as to whether or not agents to be infiltrated into Cuba should be trained on U.S. Government installations.

There are other U.S. military installations and properties, in the Southeastern U.S. and Caribbean areas, which CIA would like to use for similar training and operational purposes in the future. The same policy determination could cover all uses of identifiable U.S. Government properties for training and deployment of Cuban nationals for covert infiltration into Cuba.

2. Arming of Cuban guerrillas. CIA needs a policy determination on the supplying of arms and equipment to deserving Cuban guerrillas, as they are located, assessed, and request help. Such requests are starting to surface, as the intelligence-collection effort is increased, and it is logical that the number of requests will increase as the operation proceeds. There is a need for clearly defining the limits of arming guerrillas (for self-defense, for training, for purposes short of open actions in revolt), to permit operational judgment to be used by designated operations officers, in Phase I.

3. Use of U.S. military personnel and equipment. CIA has requested Defense assistance in air and sea capabilities, including supplying equipment and supplying U.S. military crews to operate the equipment. Included in these requests are 2 LSD's (or similar ships) to lie off the coast in support of CIA maritime operations, with U.S. Navy crews of 200-300 depending upon the missions, 3 USAF cargo aircraft with "sheep-dipped" USAF crews for air re-supply, 2 amphibious aircraft with "sheep-dipped" USAF crews, and 2 submarines for black broadcast operations. (This is in addition to CIA requests for 6 PT type boats, 3 Helio aircraft, 2 82-foot Coast Guard cutters, and arms, communications equipment, etc.). Again, where U.S. military personnel and equipment are involved in Phase I, there is need for a policy determination which will permit operational judgment to be used by designated operations officers, as well as a need for rules of engagement.

312. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)

Washington, March 13, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached distribution list indicates that 10 copies of the memorandum were prepared. Copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Rusk through Johnson, McNamara through Gilpatric, Lemnitzer through Craig, McCone through Helms and Harvey, and Murrow through Wilson. Two copies were kept by Lansdale. For text of the attached action plan, marked with asterisks to indicate those items approved by the Special Group (Augmented) on March 5, see the Supplement.

SUBJECT

Institutional Planning, Operation Mongoose

As desired by General Taylor on 12 March, the planning for Operation Mongoose is now prepared on a format of separate planning for each Department and Agency involved. Revised planning along this line is submitted herewith.

Activities already approved are marked with an asterisk. Further planning must await determination of policy questions raised in my 12 March 1962 memorandum to the members of the Special Group (Augmented)./1/

/1/Document 311.

Planning transmitted to you by my memorandum of 10 March 1962/2/ should be returned to me for destruction as a matter of security.

/2/Not found.

[Here follows the 22-page action plan. For text, see the Supplement.]

313. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)

Washington, March 13, 1962.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Cuba 1962, 121-373.5. Official Use Only. Drafted in DOD/ISA by Mountain. Also sent to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for International Security Affairs, Manpower, and Public Affairs, the General Counsel, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the Secretary for Legislative Affairs.

REFERENCE

(a) SecDef Multi-Addee ltr of 10 Jul 1961--Subj: Service of Cuban Volunteers in U.S. Armed Forces/1/

/1/Not found.

SUBJECT

Service of Cuban Volunteers in U.S. Armed Forces

On January 31, 1962 the Department of Defense reported to the President on the status of the program to offer Cuban exiles opportunities to volunteer for service in the U.S. Armed Forces./2/ In view of the fact that the program has not succeeded in bringing any considerable number of Cubans into the U.S. Armed Forces, the Department of Defense recommended that the program be terminated by June 30, 1962.

/2/Document 299.

By a memorandum dated February 21, 1962 from Mr. McGeorge Bundy,/1/ copy of which is attached, this recommendation was approved.

It is therefore directed that appropriate measures be undertaken to terminate this operation by June 30, 1962. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) will be responsible for necessary coordination.

Roswell L. Gilpatric/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Gilpatric signed the original.

314. Guidelines for Operation Mongoose

Washington, March 14, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Preliminary drafts of this paper indicate that it was drafted on March 5 by General Taylor, and was revised slightly in response to suggestions made by

McGeorge Bundy and McCone. (Ibid., and Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 2/62-4/62) The copy of the guidelines found in Department of State files is attached to a handwritten covering memorandum by U. Alexis Johnson, dated March 16, which reads:

"Discussed with the President today--McCone, Gen. Taylor, Gilpatric, Attorney General, Mac Bundy, & Gen. Lemnitzer present.

"The President expressed general approval on the understanding there will be further examination of use of Americans for airdrops etc. during first phase when risk estimates are completed.

"The President also expressed skepticism that in so far as can now be foreseen circumstances will arise that would justify and make desirable the use of American forces for overt military action. It was clearly understood no decision was expressed or implied approving the use of such forces although contingency planning would proceed." (Department of State, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 90 D 410)

Also attached in Department of State files is a copy of the planning schedule of activities for Operation Mongoose, Document 312. It is not clear from Johnson's covering note whether the President approved only the attached guidelines, or also approved some or all of Lansdale's planning schedule.

1. Operation Mongoose will be developed on the following assumptions:

a. In undertaking to cause the overthrow of the target government, the U.S. will make maximum use of indigenous resources, internal and external, but recognizes that final success will require decisive U.S. military intervention.

b. Such indigenous resources as are developed will be used to prepare for and justify this intervention, and thereafter to facilitate and support it.

2. The immediate priority objective of U.S. efforts during the coming months will be the acquisition of hard intelligence on the target area. Concurrently, all other political, economic and covert actions will be undertaken short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt within the target area, or other development which would require U.S. armed intervention. These actions, insofar as possible, will be consistent with overt policies of isolating the local leader and of neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere, and will be taken in such a way as to permit disengagement with minimum losses in assets and U.S. prestige. The JCS will continue the planning and essential preliminary actions to assure a decisive U.S. military capability for intervention. At the end of this first period, or earlier if conditions permit, the situation will be reviewed and a decision taken as to the next phase of the program.

3. In order to get the covert phase of this program in motion, it will be necessary at the outset to use U.S. personnel, bases and equipment for the support of operations inside the target area. However, the CIA will concurrently expedite the development of non-attributable resources in order to reduce or eliminate this dependence should it become necessary after the initial phase.

4. During this period, General Lansdale will continue as chief of operations, calling directly on the participating departments and agencies for support and implementation of agreed tasks. The heads of these departments and agencies are responsible for performance through normal command channels to higher authority. General Lansdale is responsible for coordinating combined planning and execution, reporting to higher authority through the Special Group (5412), augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, JCS. The Special Group (5412 augmented) is responsible for providing policy guidance to the project, for approving important operations and for monitoring progress.

315. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 85-62

Washington, March 21, 1962.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, McNamara Briefing Notebooks, 12 Jan. 63. Secret. A covering note indicates that this estimate, submitted by McCone, was prepared by CIA, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, the Joint Staff, and NSA. All members of the USIB concurred on March 21 except the representative of the AEC, who abstained on the grounds that the topic was outside his jurisdiction.

THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA

The Problem

To analyze the situation in Cuba and the relationships of the Castro regime with both the Soviet Bloc and the Latin American republics, and to estimate the prospects over the next year or so.

Foreword

Cuba is now, in effect, surrounded by an iron curtain. Our information on internal developments is not as complete or as reliable as we could wish. On some important matters, it is seriously inadequate. These deficiencies are expressly noted where applicable in the text of this estimate: e.g., paragraphs 19, 30, 106, and 111. In general, the information available is sufficient to support the estimate. The estimate will be under continuing review as additional information is obtained.

Summary and Conclusions

1. The pattern of events in Cuba clearly reveals the historical step by step Communist procedure for attaining complete control of a country. During the past year Cuba has, in effect, gone behind an iron curtain. The regime has thoroughly reorganized its political, economic, police, and military systems in the classic Communist ideological fashion. It has also sought to identify itself with the Soviet Bloc in terms that would obligate the USSR to protect it. The Bloc, however, has avoided any explicit military commitment to defend Cuba. (Paras. 17-29)
2. In Cuba there is in process of development a single party organization essentially Communist in character. It is designed to be the means of directing and controlling the operations of the government, the economy, and the mass organizations through which revolutionary indoctrination and leadership are transmitted to the people. Fidel Castro will presumably be the titular head of this organization, but the real political power in Cuba is likely to be vested in a collective leadership including Castro but dominated by a group of veteran Communists. Some degree of friction is probable in this relationship, but an open conflict is highly unlikely. (Paras. 30-37, 133)
3. The regime has sought to commit the Cuban people to positive personal identification with it through propaganda, indoctrination, and mass organizations. At the same time, it has developed a pervasive system of surveillance and police control. (Paras. 38-53)
4. The forces available to the regime to suppress insurrection or repel invasion have been and are being greatly improved, with substantial Bloc assistance through the provision of materiel and instruction. Cuban military capabilities, however, are essentially defensive. We believe it unlikely that the Bloc will provide Cuba with strategic weapon systems or with air and naval capabilities suitable for major independent military operations overseas. We also believe it unlikely that the Bloc will station in Cuba combat units of any description, at least

for the period of this estimate. This attitude would not preclude the liberal provision of Bloc advisers, instructors, and service personnel, the provision of such defensive weapons and equipment as surface-to-air missiles and radars, and such improvement of Cuban naval and air facilities as would enable them to service Soviet units. (Paras. 54-69)

5. The state has taken over the direct control of all important economic activities in Cuba, and has developed a more elaborate organization for economic management. (Paras. 70-77)

6. Cuba is now faced with an economic crisis attributable in large part to an acute shortage of the convertible foreign exchange required to finance greatly needed imports of foodstuffs and of replacement parts for machinery and equipment of US origin. The Bloc provides a guaranteed market for Cuban sugar and minerals, and supplies foodstuffs, other consumers' goods, and industrial raw materials in return, but not in sufficient quantity to meet Cuba's needs. The Bloc has also extended credits for Cuban industrial development, but the actual implementation of these projects is slow. Castro has now told the Cuban people that they face years of privation. (Paras. 78-94)

7. The initial popular enthusiasm for the revolution has steadily waned. Many men who fought against Batista have been alienated by the even more dictatorial character of the Castro regime and its increasingly Communist complexion. The vaunted agrarian reform has done little to improve the lot of the peasants. Moreover, people are becoming fed up with the privations, exactions, and regimentation that characterize life in Castro's Cuba. (Paras. 95-103)

8. Nevertheless, Fidel Castro and the Revolution retain the positive support of at least a quarter of the population. The hard core of this support consists principally of those who now have a vested interest in the regime: the new managerial class and the Communists. These are reinforced by the substantial numbers of Cubans, especially those in the mass organizations, who are still under the spell of Castro's charismatic leadership or are convinced the Revolution has been to their advantage. (Para. 104)

9. There is active resistance in Cuba, but it is limited, uncoordinated, unsupported, and desperate. The regime, with all the power of repression at its disposal, has shown that it can contain the present level of resistance activity. (Paras. 107-114)

10. The majority of the Cuban people neither support the regime nor resist it, in any active sense. They are grumbling and resentful, but apparently hopeless and passive, resigned to acceptance of the present regime as the effective government in being with which they must learn to live for lack of a feasible alternative. (Para. 106)

11. The next year or two will be a critical period for the Castro regime. The 1962 sugar crop will be the smallest in years; the difficulty of acquiring convertible foreign exchange will be greater than ever. Want of convertible exchange will limit Cuba's ability to purchase foodstuffs and other needed supplies in the Free World. No substantial increase in the supplies provided by the Bloc is likely during 1962. In these circumstances it is unlikely that the total output of the Cuban economy in 1962 can rise above the 1961 level. Under consequent privations, the Cuban people are likely to become more restive. Much will depend on whether the regime succeeds in directing their resentment toward the US, or whether it comes to focus on the regime. (Paras. 92, 94, 106, 129)

12. The regime's apparatus for surveillance and repression should be able to cope with any popular tendency toward active resistance. Any impulse toward widespread revolt is inhibited by the fear which this apparatus inspires, and also by the lack of dynamic leadership and of any expectation of liberation within the foreseeable future. In these circumstances, increasing antagonism toward the regime is likely to produce only a manageable increase in isolated acts of sabotage or of open defiance on the part of a few desperate men. A sequence of disaffection-repression-resistance could conceivably be set in motion, but would be unlikely to cause major difficulties for the regime in the absence of considerable external support. (Paras. 114, 132)

13. The overriding concern of Cuban foreign policy is to obtain external support and protection against the hostility of the US. The USSR and other Bloc states will continue to render such aid and support to the Castro regime as they consider necessary. If the overthrow of the regime should be seriously threatened by either external or internal forces, the USSR would almost certainly not intervene directly with its own forces. However, interpreting even an internal threat as US intervention, the USSR would seek to deter the US by vigorous political action, including threats of retaliation on the periphery of the Bloc as well as ambiguous references to Soviet nuclear power. Nevertheless, the USSR would almost certainly never intend to hazard its own safety for the sake of Cuba. (Paras. 23-27, 122, 130, 134)

14. By the end of 1960, Castro had few admirers left among politically active Latin Americans, except the Communists, extremist splinter groups broken off from the established social revolutionary parties, and certain student and labor elements. (Para. 116)

15. At Punta del Este the OAS unanimously condemned communism in Cuba as incompatible with the inter-American system and laid the groundwork for increased efforts to combat Castro-Communist subversion. However, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador abstained on the operative resolution excluding the Castro regime from the organs of the OAS. The Castro regime will seek to cultivate those Latin American governments which have shown reluctance to support measures against it and will probably refrain from flagrant acts which could provide the occasion for US or OAS intervention in Cuba. (Paras. 115-120, 128)

16. The Castro-Communist threat in Latin America results from the ability of a well-organized subversive movement centered in Cuba to exploit the natural tendency of entrenched oligarchies to resist the growing demand for radical social reform. What is seen by radical revolutionary elements in Latin America is that, while others have talked of social reform, Fidel Castro has actually accomplished a radical social revolution in Cuba, and has done so in defiance of the Yankees with the support of an apparently more powerful patron. Relatively moderate reformist regimes are now ascendant in most Latin American countries, but, if the Alliance for Progress should fail to produce its intended social reforms in time to meet rising popular demands, the conviction will grow that Castro's way is the only way to get timely and positive results. Thus, despite Castro's alienation of the moderate reformists, there remains a danger that the Cuban example will set the pattern of the impending social revolution in Latin America. (Paras. 66-69, 115-118, 120-121)

[Here follows the 21-page Discussion section of the estimate.]



FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963
Volume X
Cuba, 1961-1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

Cuba, 1961-1962

316. Notes on Special Group Meeting

Washington, March 22, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers. Secret; Eyes Only.
Prepared by McCone.

Operation Mongoose: General Lansdale and Air Force reported on aerial resupply problems indicating high degree of safety although possibility of loss with consequent attribution could not be dismissed. Attorney General considered this most serious, as resulting public opinion would probably cause stand-down of all other operations. Resupply plan with one C-54 and one C-46 now being sanitized. Initial operation 30 days, probable rate between 6 and 15 per month. Following questions which I wish to discuss with Helms, Harvey and others were raised:

1. Is it not possible to conduct immediate intense training of a few Cuban pilots and have them available for these missions? Noted some Cuban airline pilots are now in Florida. As an alternative, could other nations (such as Turks) be readied for these missions?
2. Can we procure unattributable aircraft? Is it possible to buy from third countries and use Soviet aircraft for this purpose? Reported that American manufacturer had stated he could produce and deliver Russian-type MIGs or Russian-type IL 14's in 90 days. Has this matter been explored and if so should such equipment be available for covert operations in various parts of the world?
3. What evidence do we have of Cuban supply of arms to insurgent groups in the Caribbean, Central or Latin America?
4. Clandestine operations.
5. Could we now develop a policy for action if missile bases are placed on Cuban soil?

John A. McCone/1/

Director

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

317. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 29, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3-2962. Secret. Drafted on March 13 by Hurwitch.

SUBJECT

Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Jose Miro Cardona--Chairman, Cuban Revolutionary Council

Dr. Antonio Varona--Cuban Revolutionary Council member

Dr. Ernesto Aragon--Cuban Revolutionary Council member

Dr. Carlos Piad--Cuban Revolutionary Council member

Mr. McGeorge Bundy--The White House

Mr. Hurwitch--Deputy Director, CMA

Mr. Bundy regretted that due to his heavy responsibilities the President had been unable personally to receive Dr. Miro and the members of the CRC at this time. He assured Dr. Miro, however, that whenever he had a matter of a most urgent and crucial nature, the President would be pleased to see him.

Cuban Invasion Prisoners

Mr. Bundy expressed the President's deep personal concern over the prisoners' fate and said that the U.S. would continue its diplomatic efforts on behalf of the prisoners.

U.S. Cuban Policy

Dr. Miro and Dr. Varona urged that the CRC be given the wherewithal to invade Cuba and overthrow the Castro regime. Mr. Bundy replied that the U.S. was determined that, if the U.S. were to support any military action against Castro, such action must be decisive and complete. In view of the military state of Cuba, it did not appear that decisive action could be accomplished without the open involvement of U.S. armed forces. This would mean open war against Cuba which in the U.S. judgment was not advisable in the present international situation.

Future of the CRC

Dr. Miro said that present U.S. policy drastically limited the CRC's sphere of activity. Mr. Bundy acknowledged that inactivity placed a revolutionary group such as the CRC in a very difficult position. Dr. Miro stated that the CRC would either have to be permitted to organize and conduct commando raids, sabotage operations, or similar activities, or disband. Mr. Bundy replied that he was not in a position to decide this question, but that the matter would be carefully studied and Dr. Miro given a reply reasonably soon.

318. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, March 29, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers. Secret; Eyes Only.

The memorandum, which is dated March 30, was prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, but no other drafting information appears on the source text.

SUBJECT

Discussion of Operation Mongoose on 29 March 1962

It was the consensus of the meeting/1/ that some attempt should be made to arrange an exchange of food for the Cuban prisoners. (Bill Harvey and General Lansdale opposed.) This effort is to be explored with heavy emphasis on the humanitarian angle. In a discussion of handling this problem, through a third country approach, the Department of State proposed Canada. Mr. McCone was opposed. The DCI suggested France, and State was opposed. It was decided that the Department of State should choose a third country and carry through with the approach. The Attorney General is to make an exhaustive study of the legal ramifications of Public Law 480/2/ in connection with this idea.

/1/The meeting is not further identified.

/2/For text, see 68 Stat. 454.

The meeting decided that we would have to proceed on the assumption that the Communists have penetrated and will continue to influence refugees in southern Florida. This provides a fertile field for Communist tactics including demonstrations and riots. The Agency, the FBI, and the local police will have to watch this problem very closely.

319. Memorandum for the Record

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2, DCI (McCone) Memo for the Record, 29 November 1961-5 April 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone.

Washington, April 5, 1962.

MEMORANDUM ON SPECIAL GROUP-MONGOOSE PROJECT

1. CIA should be familiar with General Thomas White's responsibilities and activities as a member of the Latin American Subcommittee on Security which apparently is a part of the OAS. Mr. Wym Coerr, of State Department, is familiar with details.
2. Alexis Johnson reported that discussion between [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] and Cord Meyer having to do with the possible escape of [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] from the Isle of Pines.
3. Protracted discussion of entire Cuban operation at which time McCone expressed the following points of view:
 - A. He had given serious consideration to suggesting immediate military action to bring back the prisoners now concentrated in Havana but had withdrawn suggestion because of possibility of exchange of food for prisoners.
 - B. Thought we were not making sufficient progress with Cuban problem and expressed discouragement over possibility of success because our national policy was too cautious.
 - C. Questioned very much whether the military strength of Castro government was as large and effective as reported and noted that aerial photography did not reveal military installations sufficient to house, support, train

and supply a force ranging from 100,000 to 300,000 men.

D. Intelligence gathered from various sources indicated Castro may be having extreme difficulty and therefore we should take a good look at our policy.

E. Finally, stated that if one or two hundred prisoners were shot, we would probably have very serious problems with the 100,000 Cuban refugees in Florida.

For all of these reasons, McCone recommended that we review our policy and perhaps decide upon more aggressive action including direct military intervention. Johnson raised question of loss of friends and support of other South American countries. McCone stated maybe a show of strength would assist us to win friends rather than lose them.

It was decided to have a Special Meeting for the purpose of discuss-ing Cuban Policy on Wednesday, April 11, at 2:00 p.m.,/1/ to be attended by Special Group and Sec/State and Sec/Defense, Joint Chiefs and others.

/1/See Document 325.

The following was requested for the meeting:

1. Detailed analysis of Castro's military posture from all available photographic interpretations.
2. A summary of current appraisal of internal conditions gained from debriefing of agents recently exfiltrated, results from Opa-Laka Center and all other intelligence sources.
3. Any other information available on conditions in Cuba.

Question of weekly CIA progress and operational reports was brought up and it was concluded that CIA should issue these reports regularly every Tuesday, and that General Lansdale, reporting to the Special Group augmented, would summarize them as he did on 3 April.

This memorandum is to be used by Mr. Helms on an "Eyes Only" basis in preparation for the CIA actions necessary for the Wednesday meeting.

John A. McCone/2/

Director

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

320. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Board of National Estimates (Kent) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone

Washington, April 6, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Secret.

SUBJECT

The Internal Situation in Cuba

REFERENCES

A. NIE 85-62, "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba," dated 21 March 1962/1/

B. Memorandum for the Director, "Comment on Tad Szulc's *New York Times* Article on Castro's 26 March Speech," dated 5 April 1962/2/

/1/Document 315.

/2/Szulc's article appeared in *The New York Times* on page 1 on April 4 rather than April 5. Szulc analyzed a televised speech by Castro on March 26, in which Castro severely criticized Cuban Communist Party leader Anibal Escalante and other Communist "militants" whom Castro accused of trying to dominate the Cuban Government. Szulc reported that analysts in Washington had concluded that "the split between Premier Castro and the orthodox Communist leadership could result in a cooling of Cuba's relations with the Soviet bloc."

1. At the request of the Chief, Task Force "W" we have reviewed the conclusions of NIE 85-62 relating to the internal situation in Cuba in the light of more recent information. We perceive no reason to modify those conclusions except insofar as the Escalante affair enables us to speak more positively on the subject of Castro's present relations with the veteran Cuban Communists.

2. The salient conclusions of NIE 85-62, which we now reaffirm, are:

a. The initial popular enthusiasm for the Revolution has steadily waned. Nevertheless, Fidel Castro retains the positive support of at least a quarter of the population. There is some active resistance in Cuba, but it is limited, uncoordinated, unsupported, and desperate. The majority of the Cuban people neither support the regime nor resist it, in any active sense. (Paras. 7-10)

b. Cuba is now faced with an economic crisis attributable in large part to an acute shortage of the convertible foreign exchange required to finance greatly needed imports of foodstuffs and of replacement parts for machinery and equipment of US origin. The next year or two will be a critical period for the Castro regime. Nevertheless, the regime's apparatus for surveillance and repression should be able to cope with any popular tendency toward active resistance. In the circumstances, increasing antagonism toward the regime is likely to produce only a manageable increase in isolated acts of sabotage or of open defiance on the part of a few desperate men. (Paras. 6, 11-12)

3. In NIE 85-62 we discussed at length Castro's relations with the veteran Communists of the PSP, the prerevolutionary Communist party, and the prospect that the latter would eventually gain control of Cuba through working control of the ORI, the prototype of the more inclusive Communist party now in process of organization. (Paras. 30-37, 133) The Escalante affair sheds new light on this subject and requires modification of our conclusion that, while Castro would remain the titular leader, the real power in Cuba would probably come to be vested in a collective leadership dominated by the veteran Communists. (Para. 2)

4. Castro himself has now confirmed our estimate of tension within the ruling group, between the "old" and the "new" Communists. Escalante was purged precisely because he was working toward the end which we judged to be likely on the basis of the information available through mid-March. It is evident, however, that Castro has now checked the trend toward old-line Communist control of the ORI and has reasserted his personal leadership of Cuban communism.

5. It would be a mistake, however, to interpret this development as a revulsion by Castro from communism, or as an open split between Castro and the veteran Cuban Communists. Castro's dramatic expulsion of Escalante was almost certainly intended as a warning to other old-line Communists against distinguishing between themselves and the new Communists, but, in deploring such tendencies, Castro called for unity within the new party organization. Blas Roca responded by echoing Castro's denunciation of Escalante, making Escalante the

scapegoat for the old Communist group.

6. Tension and mutual distrust between the "old" and the "new" Cuban Communists will probably continue, but Castro's goal is still the communization of Cuba--with the collaboration of the old Communists and the support of the USSR, but under his own leadership and control. Castro has now reasserted his authority and the old-line Communists will take care to avoid provoking him further. However, their covert struggle for power within the regime will probably continue.

For the Board of National Estimates

Sherman Kent

321. Editorial Note

On April 8, 1962, a Cuban Military Tribunal announced a verdict in the trial of the 1,179 prisoners captured following the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion. Ignoring pleas for clemency from the Organization of American States and a number of Latin American governments, the Tribunal sentenced the prisoners to 30 years hard labor for treason, and set ransom at \$62 million. At a press conference on April 11, President Kennedy responded to a question concerning the ransom demand by observing: "I think Mr. Castro knows that the United States Government cannot engage in a negotiation like that, and he knows very well that the families cannot raise these millions of dollars." (*American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, page 360)

322. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Board of National Estimates (Kent) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone

Washington, April 10, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Top Secret.

SUBJECT

Probable Reactions to a US Military Intervention in Cuba

1. For the purposes of this estimate, we assume that:

- a. The US military intervention in Cuba would be made in sufficient force to overcome, within a few days, the frontal resistance of the Cuban armed forces and to consolidate US control of the principal governmental centers and the primary means of transportation and communications.
- b. The US would declare its intention to turn over the control of Cuba, as soon as possible, to a Cuban government responsible to the Cuban people, committed to social reform, and dedicated to the preservation of Cuban national independence within the inter-American community of nations.

Reactions Within Cuba

2. The Castro regime has made extensive preparations to resist a US military intervention. It apparently plans for both a strong initial defense against invasion and protracted warfare in the interior. A portion of the armed forces would be destroyed in the initial battle. Many of the remainder would probably surrender or desert when they realized the strength of the invasion and the hopelessness of further resistance. Substantial numbers, however, would continue a guerrilla resistance in the interior, according to plan. Their operations would be facilitated by caches of arms and supplies already established in relatively inaccessible areas.

3. Some Cubans would welcome the US military intervention as a liberation. At least as many more would regard it as designed to reimpose upon the Cuban people the yoke of "Yankee imperialism" and would accordingly be disposed to resist insofar as they were able. The great majority would be primarily concerned to keep out of harm's way and to avoid exposing themselves to retribution by either side in the continuing conflict.

4. The establishment of a representative and accepted Cuban government would be greatly hindered by the persistence of terroristic underground resistance in the cities, and by continuing guerrilla resistance in outlying areas. Out of fear as well as sympathy, most Cubans would probably be disposed to cooperate at least passively with the resistance, unless convincingly assured of effective US protection. Although the overthrow of the present regime might be quickly accomplished, the pacification of the country, to the extent necessary to permit the development of a credible representative alternative regime, might be long delayed.

5. In these circumstances, a prolonged US military occupation of Cuba would probably be necessary. Resistance elements would deliberately seek to provoke the occupying forces to take such arbitrary measures against the general population as would tend to confirm Cuban suspicions that the US intervention was anti-Cuban rather than anti-Castro, to the further detriment of the prospects for a satisfactory political solution.

6. Nevertheless, the bulk of the Cuban people would desire the restoration of peace, order, and national self-government, and the relief of economic distress. If the US was able eventually to establish reasonable security in most of the country, the inhabitants of the pacified areas would probably cooperate in the establishment of a new and more representative Cuban government, in part as the only effective means of obtaining the withdrawal of US military government. In this phase, however, the establishment of such a government would be hindered by the personal factionalism characteristic of Cuban leaders and the desire of all with political ambition to demonstrate their determination to protect Cuban national sovereignty against Yankee domination.

The International Reaction

7. The USSR would have no means to intervene effectively in Cuba with its own forces, and almost certainly would not resort to general war for the sake of the Castro regime. However, the USSR would exert every means of political and psychological pressure at its disposal to procure a universal condemnation of US aggression against Cuba and, if possible, a restoration of the status quo ante. To this end, it might make threatening references to Soviet missile power. Communist China and the other Bloc states would support these Soviet efforts. In the circumstances, there would probably be a first-class war scare, with panic among the neutralists and a high state of alarm in NATO.

8. Latin American political opinion generally would be shocked by a US military intervention in Cuba, regardless of sympathy or antagonism toward the Castro regime. Most Latin American governments would be glad to see Castro effectively disposed of, but would be constrained by domestic opinion to deplore publicly the US action. If forced to vote in the UN, virtually all would probably feel compelled to vote against the US. However, they might seek to forestall that embarrassment by proposing an OAS political intervention designed to get the US out of Cuba as quickly as possible, and at the same time to provide for the establishment of a democratic government in that country.

9. NATO governments would deplore the US action. Remembering Suez and other occasions, they would feel justified in voting to condemn the US. At the same time, however, they would work to find a political solution of the crisis, in order to reduce the risk of general war.

10. The Afro-Asian neutralist states would condemn the US military intervention in Cuba, and would therefore be disposed to support Soviet initiatives against the US in the UN, where their numbers count. At the same time, however, apprehension of the danger of general war might influence the more responsible neutralist governments to work for a political solution of the crisis.

For the Board of National Estimates

Abbot Smith/1/

/1/Smith signed for Kent above Kent's typed signature.

323. Memorandum From the Chief of Task Force W (Harvey) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone

Washington, April 10, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Sent to McCone through Deputy Director for Plans Helms.

SUBJECT

Operation Mongoose--Appraisal of Effectiveness and Results which can be Expected from Implementing the Operational Plan Approved at the Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on 16 March 1962/1/

/1/Regarding the March 16 meeting, see the source note, Document 314. No other record of the meeting has been found. The Operational Plan referenced here is apparently the plan submitted to the Special Group (Augmented) by Lansdale on March 13, Document 312.

1. Action: This memorandum contains the conclusions reached as a result of the reassessment of the Mongoose operational plan, conducted pursuant to your oral instructions to Mr. Helms on 5 April 1962./2/ The recommendations for action are contained in Paragraph 11 below.

/2/See Document 319.

2. Under the Mongoose operational plan as approved, CIA is authorized and directed between now and 31 July 1962 to mount a concentrated operational program to collect intelligence concerning Cuba and to develop, insofar as possible, clandestine resistance cadres inside Cuba. This plan permits intelligence, political, economic, and covert actions, short of those reasonably calculated to inspire revolt within the target area, or other developments which would require U.S. armed intervention. These actions, insofar as possible, will be consistent with overt policies of isolating Castro and of neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere and will be taken in such a way as to permit disengagement with minimum losses in assets and United States prestige. The plan provides that major operations going beyond the collection of intelligence be approved in advance by the Special Group. The plan does not provide for maximum, or even extensive, use of U.S. military personnel, bases, and facilities. No decision has been made that U.S. Military Forces will be committed at any time to support a revolt within Cuba or to intervene for any other cause.

3. Barring unforeseen difficulties, CIA can substantially fulfill the requirements of the present operational plan. However, this plan does not provide for a maximum intelligence and covert action program against Cuba. It probably does represent the maximum such program that can effectively be created within the current policy and other limitations. Fully effective implementation of the present program may require some limited use of U.S. military facilities, particularly training areas and submarines for agent infiltration and exfiltration. If a more intensive effort is to be undertaken, maximum use must be made of U.S. military facilities, personnel, and bases.

4. Under the present program, by August 1962 we will have far better hard intelligence coverage of Cuba, but it is doubtful if we will have achieved fully effective penetration of the top hierarchy of Cuban leadership. During the same period, we will have materially increased the clandestine resistance potential controlled by us in Cuba, but it will not be possible for us to field, activate, and keep alive large resistance groups. Our assets will consist

of a number of small clandestine teams with limited supplies and possessing varying degrees of resistance and revolt potential. The teams will not be knit together into any central organization within Cuba. It is unlikely that by this time we will have developed any viable long term political leadership for a new Cuba. Such leadership does not exist in the emigration and it is doubtful if it can be developed within Cuba at any time prior to the forceful overthrow of the Castro regime, although some potential leaders of promise possibly can be developed.

5. Given the anticipated success in carrying out the currently approved plan, we should be able by August 1962 or within a reasonable time thereafter, provided policy approval is given, to begin to prepare these assets for an organized revolt of substantial proportions. This additional time will be required since under existing limitations we are not permitted to prepare the teams or cadres from their inception for any concerted revolt nor, in fact, give them any assurance of ultimate U.S. assistance which would support and preserve such revolt.

6. Any revolt we are able to generate within a reasonable time after the expiration of Phase I of the current plan, although possibly substantial in size, could not be considered a really full scale revolt in the sense that it alone could overthrow the regime. In the face of Cuban counteraction, the revolt could only be kept alive for a few days unless supported by active U.S. military intervention.

7. The increased operational activity of the present program will attract some attention, may raise the Cuban and U.S. "noise level", and could lead to some public criticism and an increase in Cuban propaganda play. Any intelligence or covert action which is surfaced will, of course, be charged to the United States and specifically to CIA. If a maximum program is undertaken it will inevitably attract more attention and possibly lead to more intense criticism. The level of activity envisaged by the present plan is not likely to convince the Castro regime or the Cubans themselves that the United States is seriously contemplating either invading Cuba or intervening to assist any planned revolt.

8. There is substantial dissatisfaction in Cuba and a considerable latent resistance potential which is disorganized and dispirited at the present time. Internal Cuban conditions, including the availability of food and the general state of the economy, will probably deteriorate during the next several months. Basically, however, time is running against us and Cuba is likely to be a tougher nut to crack a year from today than it is now. The effective communization of the Cuban State, the increasing effectiveness of its security and control apparatus, the increased discouragement of the populace, including a measurable loss of hope and lessening of sporadic spontaneous resistance can only lead to this conclusion. We cannot completely rule out the possibility of a spontaneous uprising of greater or lesser proportions, but the possibilities of this are not believed great and, in any event, unless the United States is at the time of any such spontaneous uprising prepared to and does intervene, this uprising will be ruthlessly and rapidly crushed. Even if the Cuban economy continues to deteriorate, it will in our opinion be bolstered to the extent necessary to preserve the status quo by the Soviet Bloc which cannot afford to lose the Cuban bridgehead in the Western Hemisphere. The Castro regime will not fall as a result of such deterioration or such economic counteraction as we can take. In fact, after a period of deterioration, it is entirely possible that the economic situation may gradually improve. There are some possibilities that the Castro regime may be seriously threatened by a power split at the top level or by a palace guard revolt. These possibilities do not appear at the present time great and certainly any such development is insufficiently probable to count on, although efforts are being made to develop and exploit any opportunities to this end. In any event, even if such opportunities develop and can be exploited, this is likely to be a long and involved operation with marginal chances of complete success.

9. Even if the current operational plan attains maximum success, it is our firm conclusion that it will not lead to the overthrow of the Castro regime and that if that overthrow is a serious objective of the U.S. Government, it will be necessary at the conclusion of the present plan to face the decision of military intervention, then prepare for it and intensify the preparation for any necessary revolt or provocation upon which it is based. This will require additional time and will be more difficult to do some months from now than it will be if it is commenced now.

10. Conclusions: Based on the reassessment that has been made and following the above comments, set out below are our conclusions:

a. The current plan does not constitute and does not permit a maximum intelligence and covert action program against Cuba. The plan is not likely to result in the overthrow of the Castro regime unless followed by extensive additional preparation and action based on a firm decision to use U.S. Military Forces at the appropriate point to destroy the regime.

b. If a maximum effort is to be mounted, the decision to use military force must be made now and the planning must go forward in phase to permit a concentrated and planned uprising with the immediate support of military forces to prevent its destruction. In addition, in preparing for the necessary revolt and/or provocation endangering U.S. lives and property, maximum use must be made not only of CIA assets and capabilities, but of the assets and capabilities of the respective military services.

c. To permit requisite flexibility and professionalism for a maximum operational effort against Cuba, the tight controls exercised by the Special Group and the present time-consuming coordination and briefing procedures should, if at all possible, be made less restrictive and less stultifying.

d. The planning for the use of U.S. Military Forces must contemplate minimum reaction time and sufficient pre-positioning to permit the most rapid possible elimination of organized opposition within Cuba. If at all possible, the military intervention should be so planned and prepared that from the time of decision to intervene until the elimination of organized military opposition is only a few days, preferably not more than four or six. It is believed that this is extremely important in order to cut down the time available to the USSR and the Bloc to react and take counteraction elsewhere using Cuba as a pretext, and also to cut down the available time for a coalescing of intense domestic and foreign political press and propaganda opposition to this action. If the U.S. Forces to be committed can be pre-positioned in such a way that a landing in force takes place rapidly, it is believed that a substantial number of Cubans, including those in the militia and the armed forces, will give up quickly. The United States must, however, be prepared to cope with at least some substantial prolonged hard core resistance. In addition, the U.S. Government must be prepared with plans and resources to establish a military government within Cuba and maintain it for an appreciable period, probably at least a year, until the situation can be stabilized, political parties, movements, and leadership developed, and free elections insured.

11. Action:/3/

/3/There is no indication on the source text that McCone or Helms approved these actions.

A. If you concur with the above conclusions, it is recommended that you propose to the Special Group (Augmented) at its meeting on 11 April 1962 that it approve and propose for the approval of higher authority a plan of operations against Cuba requiring decision now to:

(1) Make maximum use of CIA and military resources to create a revolt in Cuba and/or provocation endangering U.S. lives and property, and

(2) Upon the activation of this revolt and/or provocation intervene immediately with sufficient military strength to eliminate organized military opposition within Cuba at the earliest practicable time.

B. If such a plan is not approved, or if the decisions to take the actions necessary to ensure the overthrow of the Castro regime are indefinitely delayed, it is believed that you should give careful consideration as to whether, in the face of other heavy demands and commitments, the Clandestine Service can long continue to afford the present level of effort against Cuba and the heavy expenditure of funds and manpower involved in the operation of Task Force W, which comprises a substantial percentage of the overall assets of the DD/P.

William K. Harvey/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

324. Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McCone

Washington, undated.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 5, DCI (McCone), Caribbean Study Group. Secret; Eyes Only.

MEMORANDUM FOR DISCUSSION AT SPECIAL GROUPMEETING, 2:00 P.M. WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 1962/1/

/1/The meeting was held at the Department of State. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) See Document 325.

1. Program approved. Can be implemented on the approximate timetable, although some slippage exists at the present time, but there is also some prospect to make up the lost time.

2. The program falls short of:

(a) Gathering all possible intelligence, and

(b) Representing maximum effort to create internal dissension within the country.

3. Therefore probable that even though the program as outlined is accomplished, the results attained by July-August will be disappointing.

4. Size of effort has grown substantially--[*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] CIA personnel engaged and probably equal number from other departments. The question is raised whether with this large effort a more aggressive program should not be authorized.

5. A review of U-2 photography indicates military capabilities most recently estimated are the very maximum and probably military force less formidable because of absence of adequate support facilities, logistics, transportation, training facilities, etc., which do not appear in the photography.

6. Monolithic structure at the top seems to be fractionated.

7. We therefore recommend:

(a) More aggressive action.

(b) Large-scale training at U.S. installations.

(c) Preparation for the introduction of guerrilla forces and their subsequent support, in addition to the authorized espionage teams.

(d) Preparation now for necessary military action.

8. Acceptance on the part of the United States of possible attribution for the program.

John A. McCone/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

325. Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McCone

Washington, April 12, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers. Secret; Eyes Only. The memorandum apparently comprises McCone's notes on the April 11 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) at the Department of State; see Document 324.

MEMORANDUM ON OPERATION MONGOOSE

General discussion of Wednesday's/1/ meeting at State. General [Taylor] reviewed the guide lines approved by the President./2/ It was agreed that actions in addition to those now approved could be taken within the guide lines and therefore the group decided not to revise the guide lines but to ask for suggestions as to additional actions. McCone pointed out that original concept was to have a situation within Cuba developed by August, and that present plan of action would not bring this about; therefore it was decided to eliminate the August date but not to eliminate the original intention of the effort.

/1/April 11.

/2/See Document 314.

Questions were asked concerning additional actions. McCone suggested (a) more intense training and proposed that Defense modify regulations under which Cubans could be brought into military for training purposes as part of special forces but not as Cuban units; (b) guerrilla action indicated in addition to espionage teams; (c) probably necessary to supply arms to dissident groups which now have been identified; (d) we must be prepared to take a high level of noise and if we are to continue the present level of activity or increase it the noise level will increase materially. All of this was recognized.

Question of manufacturing MIG-type planes brought up. McCone said he would explore.

JCS paper/3/ on pretext or provocative actions was discussed. We should have and review this paper as it is considered to be a very thoughtful and useful document.

John A. McCone/4/

Director

/3/Not found.

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

326. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil

Washington, April 14, 1962, 6:48 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-1462. Top Secret; Eyes Only; No Distribution. Drafted by Martin and cleared in S/S.

2979. For Ambassador Gordon from Martin. In private conversation Thursday/1/ with Foreign Minister Dantas I told him that the two points which were nonnegotiable in our relations with Castro were his political-military ties to the Soviet bloc and his subversive activities in this Hemisphere.

/1/April 12. On April 10, however, McCone and Rusk discussed this same conversation, which was between Rusk and Dantas. (Memorandum of discussion by McCone, April 11; Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2, DCI (McCone) Memo for the Record, 7 April-21 August 1962) See the Supplement. The conversation between Rusk and Dantas apparently took place on April 10 rather than April 12.

Reporting on his conversations in Mexico City with his Ambassador in Havana he said his Ambassador felt that a serious struggle for power was going on between the Castroites and the old line Communists.

It was agreed that he would ask his Ambassador to seek an appointment to see Castro alone and inquire whether Brazil could be of any assistance in freeing Castro from the pressure of the old line Communists./2/

I told Dantas that you had a special line of communication to me personally and that he should report to you any results of this initiative. Send your messages this subject eyes only for me.

I cannot emphasize too much the importance of limiting this whole matter to your personal knowledge only./3/

Rusk

/2/On April 15 the Department sent another telegram to Ambassador Gordon, drafted in the Secretary's office and cleared by Rusk, to clarify that the conversation referred to in telegram 2979 took place between Rusk and Dantas, not Martin and Dantas. The telegram noted that Dantas informed Rusk that he would ask his Ambassador to seek an appointment with Castro, but there was no agreement between Dantas and Rusk on this point. (Telegram 2987 to Rio de Janeiro; Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-1562)

/3/On April 27 Martin sent an eyes only telegram to Gordon instructing him to inquire of Dantas if there had been any further developments concerning the proposed Brazilian initiative. (Telegram 3113 to Rio de Janeiro; *ibid.*, 737.00/4-2762)

327. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy

Washington, April 18, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-1862. Secret. Drafted by Hurwitch on April 17.

SUBJECT

Cuban Prisoner Exchange

I understand that representatives of the Families Committee for Liberation who recently returned from attempting to negotiate the liberation of the prisoners with Fidel Castro may be calling upon the State Department within the course of the week to secure our further advice. By the end of the week I hope to have suggestions to you on the Government's position.

This memorandum contains the most complete information we now have on the discussions leading up to the recent Cuban prisoner exchange.

Dr. Ernesto Freyre, one of the four members of the Families Committee who went to Habana to negotiate terms

of release of the April 17 prisoners, reported the following results of two interviews with Fidel Castro.

First Interview

1. They offered Castro some \$26 million worth of food in exchange for all of the prisoners; an offer which he rejected on the grounds that it was contrary to the tribunal's decision. The only basis for negotiation he would accept was the sentences passed by the tribunal.
2. Castro offered to release the sick and wounded for the price the tribunal had set, a price which "they could pay whenever they had the money."
3. The Committee members' request to discuss this proposition with the Brigade leaders was granted. The Brigade leaders told the Committee members to accept the offer.

Second Interview

1. The Committee members told Castro they would accept the sick and wounded and would try to raise the approximately \$2.5 million involved.
2. The question of an exchange based on foodstuffs was again broached. Castro replied that he would probably find acceptable a formula for releasing the remaining prisoners based on \$26 million in foodstuffs and medicines and the balance of the \$62 million in cash (he talked about \$10 million in medicines, and the remainder of the \$26 million in cereals, cattle feed, etc.). Castro told the Committee not to be discouraged; that he was confident something could be worked out within ninety days.
3. Castro agreed that the prisoners would not be placed at hard labor as long as the possibility of negotiations remained open.
4. Castro promised that the prisoners' food would be improved. He also agreed to permit them books and other reading matter.
5. Castro suggested that they return to Habana and he would receive them whenever they had something further to discuss regarding the negotiations.

Dr. Carlos Piad, Washington CRC representative, informed the Department that one of the returning prisoners told Dr. Miro that on or about April 11 Castro visited the prisoners and told them that he had nothing against them (they had only been misguided) but that his anger was directed against the President of the United States. Castro allegedly said that the President had called him a "pirate" whereas in reality the President was the "pirate" for having launched the invasion. Castro reportedly told the prisoners that he was confident they would be released within three months, intimating that the United States would pay the \$62 million.

Dean Rusk/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.

328. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)

Washington, April 19, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached distribution list indicates that seven copies of the memorandum were prepared and copies were sent to Robert

Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, and McCone. One copy was kept by Lansdale.

SUBJECT

Operation Mongoose, 13-19 April

The following are the significant highlights of Operation Mongoose for the past week:

Tasks. All tasks agreed to at the 11 April meeting in Secretary Rusk's office and the 12 April Special Group meeting/1/ have been assigned by the Chief of Operations to Departments and Agencies concerned. The State Department, through Assistant Secretary Ed Martin, requested revision of the "total blockade" tasking to be limited to a CIA estimate of the effects on Cuba of a blockade; the tasking was so changed. Status of these tasks will be included in my report to the Special Group next week, when I plan to attend the meeting.

/1/For a record of the April 11 meeting, see Documents 324 and 325. No other record of the April 12 meeting has been found.

Prisoner Ransom. The Chief of Operations met with State and CIA representatives to work on problems arising from Castro's proposed \$62 million ransom deal for prisoners. State agreed to contact James Fusca, the New York public relations advisor to the Cuban Families Committee, so that consideration is afforded the propaganda impact of public appearances for Brigade fund raising, suggesting that the theme be in terms of the fight for recapturing human freedom and national independence rather than in terms of disabled Cubans to whom the U.S. owes a debt of guilt.

A more serious problem is the dissension and splintering of Cuban refugee groups. Attention is called to the 18 April CIA Daily Summary (on Cuba), page 2./2/ It reports the threat of Jose Lasaga, of the MRR, to withdraw from the CRC--unless the CRC publishes that it is against "peaceful co-existence" and that the ransom payment is the first step towards peaceful co-existence. This sentiment and criticism is growing among Cuban refugees in Florida. (USIA reports that local reaction in 11 Latin American countries is strongly negative to a deal with Castro, with the consensus that the U.S. government should ignore Castro's efforts to "sell human beings.")

/2/Not found.

The threat of splintering refugee groups over the purpose of their organization, in turn, raises the problem of what the U.S. desires the CRC to be: a central refugee organization with mainly non-political goals, or a central organization of Cuban political-military actionists for liberating their homeland.

Reports of New "Invaders." *The New York Times* this morning reported a group of Cubans training in the U.S. for guerrilla operations./3/ This is one of several news stories published recently and is an expected outcome of the restlessness of Cuban refugee groups. CIA cited a Chattanooga news item along the same line in its weekly summary. (CIA can report on the facts and meaning of this verbally to the Group.)

/3/*The New York Times* reported on April 19 that: "A compact guerrilla force built around former officers of Premier Fidel Castro's army is being organized in Florida and Puerto Rico for eventual action against the Cuban regime."

Agent Actions. Upon the return of Mr. Harvey from his current field visit, more specific information on the status of agent training and operations should be available. The CIA Progress Report this week/2/ notes that maritime actions to infiltrate two agent teams into Cuba and exfiltrate one team were unsuccessful.

329. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs (Hurwitch) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin)

Washington, April 19, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-2062. Secret. Sent to Martin through John H. Crimmins, Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs.

SUBJECT

The Cuban Exile Community, the Cuban Revolutionary Council, and Dr. Miro Cardona

The Cuban exile community is experiencing a deep sense of frustration and impatience over what it considers "inactivity" regarding the overthrow of the Castro regime. The steps taken at Punta del Este to isolate Cuba and our imposing the trade embargo have stimulated widespread expectations that the "next logical step", i.e., some sort of military action against Cuba, would soon follow. During the intervening weeks the CRC and Dr. Miro Cardona have become the objects of considerable criticism for having failed to convince the United States to embark on a military operations program. Two member organizations have already left the CRC and a third will probably do so within the next few days. The CRC and Dr. Miro are consequently finding themselves in an increasingly precarious position.

Dr. Miro is striving to keep the CRC together. Motivated largely by ambition to be the main instrument of Castro's overthrow (and perhaps his successor), Dr. Miro is also deeply impressed by the President's recent urging that he remain at his post. In a lengthy telephone conversation with him today, however, I gained the impression that he would cease his efforts, resign gracefully and permit the CRC to disintegrate if the Department indicated such a course were desirable. He suggested that he quietly come to Washington in the near future and discuss the matter personally with me.

During a recent meeting, representatives of another Agency indicated that it might be timely to review our relationship with the CRC and Dr. Miro. They are concerned, I believe, that our present relationship presents security and control hazards for their operational requirements.

I view the CRC as of declining usefulness to us as long as the factionalism continues, and see little prospect of the present conflicts abating.

Recommendations:/1/

1. That you authorize me to initiate discussions at the working level with appropriate officers of another Agency with a view toward withdrawing U.S. covert support of the CRC.
2. That you authorize me to discourage Dr. Miro tactfully, on appropriate occasions, from his efforts to hold the CRC together and from continuing as its head.

/1/In an April 20 covering memorandum to Deputy Under Secretary Johnson, Martin indicated that, based on earlier conversations with Johnson and Ralph Dungan, Martin had approved Hurwitch's recommendations. On April 30, however, Hurwitch sent a note to Goodwin in which he observed that the CIA seemed to have had a change of heart concerning Miro Cardona and the CRC. *[text not declassified]* In light of those developments, Hurwitch felt that it would be "prudent to go slow for the time being about discouraging Miro and the CRC" until the CIA attitude on the issue was clearer. (Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Mongoose Operations)

330. Current Intelligence Memorandum

OCI 1265/62

Washington, April 25, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Material, 1/62-9/62. Secret. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence of the CIA. A handwritten note on the source text indicates the memorandum was sent to McGeorge Bundy and President Kennedy on April 26.

SUBJECT

The Economic Situation in Cuba

1. The economic section, (see attached Annex),/1/ of NIE 85-62, "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba," 21 March 1962,/2/ remains valid. In these paragraphs we said that, despite record exports of 6.4 million metric tons of sugar, 1961 was a year of economic decline in Cuba. The reasons for this were complex, but among the most important were the fact that lower prices and the shift of the largest proportion of sales from the US to the Bloc brought no more returns than a normal crop and the lowest amount of convertible exchange in modern Cuban history. Cuba obtained some foodstuffs and other consumers' goods from the Bloc, but not in the quantity or of the quality of those previously imported from the US. During the first half of 1961 there was an acute shortage of industrial raw materials, but much more serious was the accelerated depreciation of the Cuban industrial plant, including transportation facilities, for want of replacement parts. Bloc credits promised--\$357 million for new industrial plants--have thus far had little effect on the economy. The Soviet credits, which make up \$200 million of the total, are mainly for industrial and mineral processing plants which are not expected to become operational until 1964-1965. In addition, of course, there have been dislocations due to the reorganization of the economy and the shortage of managerial talent. None of these adverse factors have been or are likely soon to be corrected.

/1/Not printed.

/2/Document 315.

2. We estimated in NIE 85-62 that the Cuban economy would continue to face problems in 1962 like those which caused the decline in 1961. Evidence continues to come in in support of this judgment. Indications are that the sugar cane harvest--still not completed--will be about 4.5 million metric tons, as compared with 6.6 in 1961 and an annual average of 5.6 million tons in the period 1957-1960. Cuba is curtailing its commitments to export to the Bloc in order to maintain the level of sales to the Free World. We believe it unlikely that Cuba's earnings of convertible exchange from all sources will be sufficient to prevent a net worsening of its convertible exchange position during 1962. This and other restrictions on Cuba's capacity to import will seriously hamper the Cuban economy during 1962, and it is likely that the total output of the Cuban economy in 1962 will be below the 1961 level.

3. Castro's recent offer to release the Bay of Pigs prisoners for ransom was probably motivated by his interest in finding additional foreign exchange, as well as by reasons of propaganda.

4. Beyond 1962, the development of the Cuban economy will depend not only on the rate at which capital goods are made available under Bloc credits, but also on the success of the regime's efforts to expand and diversify agricultural production. We believe that Bloc economic commitments to Cuba were seriously made and that the flow of capital goods from the Bloc is likely to increase substantially by the end of 1962. We think it likely that the industrial area of the Cuban economy will begin to expand in 1963, although these sectors most reliant on US replacement parts may continue to deteriorate. In any event, the rate of expansion is likely to be limited by poor production in agriculture. Such expansion will not, however, affect the welfare of the individual Cuban for some time. At any time, of course, the Bloc could take more extensive action to raise Cuba's levels of consumption, but there is no evidence that this is going to happen.

5. The prospect is for two or three years during which the Cuban people will be on short rations, both as to foodstuffs and other common consumer goods. Acknowledgement by Castro and other regime leaders of the country's economic difficulties and the imposition of stringent food rationing in March are indicators of the seriousness of the problem. We believe that we can expect continued efforts to blame the deprivation which Cubans are subjected to upon the US. Castro's success in dealing with the political implications of the economic situation will be limited. Economic dislocations and deprivations are unlikely to affect the attitudes of pro- and anti-Castro groups, but they will probably make the bulk of the population less well disposed to the regime. Still, we do not foresee an economic situation in Cuba during the next two or three years which will be the critical factor in the ability of the Castro/Communist regime to maintain control of the country.

[end of document]



FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963
Volume X
Cuba, 1961-1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

Cuba, 1961-1962

331. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, April 26, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone. The memorandum apparently records a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented).

SUBJECT

Cuba

1. General Lansdale reported on the activities as per the attached report./1/ McCone expressed dissatisfaction with progress; stated nothing had been accomplished in putting Cubans in the Army for training and that no actions had been taken on matters decided two weeks ago. (In other words, I was very disagreeable.) McCone finally recommended more action; acceptance of attribution if necessary; establishment of training facilities; training of guerrillas and a more dynamic effort in the infiltration of both agents and guerrillas.

/1/Not found attached. An apparent reference to Document 328.

Action: A meeting should be arranged between McCone, Lansdale, and Harvey, immediately upon Harvey's return.

2. The Attorney General requested copies of the Daily Reports on the Opa Laka interrogation. General Taylor instructed Lansdale to prepare a summary of the reports, paying particular attention to specific items of information on complaints which were recurring in successive interviews.

3. General Taylor requested that Mr. Harvey attend the next meeting and report on agent activities.

4. General Taylor suggested that McCone review the memorandum summarizing "Communist Indoctrination of Latin America"/2/ with the President at the earliest opportunity.

/2/Not found.

5. NPIC made a most interesting presentation of the last Corona flight.

Action: McCone agreed to arrange briefing for the President at the earliest convenient time; also briefing for Macmillan when he is here, at a convenient time.

John A. McCone/3/

Director

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

332. Memorandum From the Director of the Joint Staff (Riley) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)

DJSM-572-62

Washington, May 1, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Mongoose Operations. Top Secret; Special Handling; Noform.

SUBJECT

Blockade of Cuba in reprisal for Soviet Actions in Berlin (S)

1. This paper is submitted in response to a request by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to determine the forces that would be required for an effective blockade of Cuba. Such a blockade might be ordered separately or in reprisal for Soviet actions in Berlin.

2. In view of the geographic location and insular nature of Cuba, together with the paucity of pro-Bloc air bases and effective resupply air routes, it is considered that a blockade which would preclude the export and import of the vital commodities necessary to the Cuban economy could be accomplished by maritime forces. Therefore, if directed to institute a blockade of Cuba, CINCLANT would initially put twelve (12) destroyers on perimeter patrol stations or eleven (11) destroyers on blockade stations for the control of specific harbors. These would be augmented by two (2) surveillance aircraft on air patrol stations. Fighter aircraft would be on call at Key West and Guantanamo and available to proceed to the assistance of the surveillance aircraft or destroyers in the event that the blockading forces were attacked by Cuban aircraft.

3. Detailed plans and instructions for the conduct of a blockade of Cuba are in existence. A sketch of the basic concept of the perimeter blockade stations is appended for information./1/ It is considered that an effective blockade can be readily accomplished with existing naval forces. (See Tab A for force totals.)

/1/Not printed.

Herbert D. Riley/2/

Vice Admiral, USN

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Admiral Riley signed the original.

Tab A

Blockade Forces: 12 Destroyers

Station: Perimeter Patrol

Backup for Sustained Effort: 12 Destroyers for rotation

Blockade Forces: 2 Surveillance Aircraft

Station: Air Patrol

Backup for Sustained Effort: 10 Surveillance Aircraft

Blockade Forces: 1 Fighter Squadron

Station: On call at Key West (existing)

Backup for Sustained Effort: None required

Blockade Forces: 1 Fighter Squadron

Station: On call at Guantanamo (existing)

Backup for Sustained Effort: None required

Total forces required: (For sustained effort)

24 Destroyers

12 Surveillance Aircraft

2 Fighter Squadrons

333. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)

Washington, May 3, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached distribution list indicates that seven copies of the memorandum were prepared. Copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, and McCone. One copy was kept by Lansdale.

SUBJECT

Operation Mongoose, 27 April-3 May

The following are the significant highlights of Operation Mongoose for the week:

CIA. Mr. William Harvey has returned from his field trip and is to give his report directly to the Special Group.

In taking measure of where we stand on our tasks, I believe it pertinent to note that CIA now has largely solved its difficult organizational and personnel staffing problems which impeded sound planning and actions as the project was launched. CIA is now moving ahead with the intelligence collection needed to construct appropriate political, psychological and resistance operations to win our goal. In my opinion, CIA deserves to be commended for this difficult regrouping and "re-tooling"; the somewhat disappointing score in attempted operations during this period should consider this.

Now that CIA is ready to move into the fuller operational phase we require, we must recognize that there is

inevitably the risk of visibility and audibility. CIA must undertake practical projects, such as paramilitary training, on a more intensive scale, as basic to fulfilling assignments inside Cuba. Such projects must be backed with firmness from the policy level, in the face of possible adverse events of times, if we are to succeed. Also, such projects are going to require further help from Defense; the Defense staff is awaiting definite requests from CIA.

Brigade Prisoners. State reports that the Families Committee has decided to work for the release of the prisoners as a body instead of in small groups or individuals and has signed a three-months contract with John Price Jones to try to raise the \$62-million ransom. James Fusca remains as a personal advisor to the Committee chairman.

Studies. The series of planning papers noted in my report last week are nearing completion by the several Departments and Agencies; for example, Defense has just completed its part of the Blockade study./1/ I plan to collate these papers and forward to the Special Group (Augmented) as each series is completed.

/1/Document 332.

334. Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McCone

Washington, May 4, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers. Secret; Eyes Only. The meeting was apparently a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented).

MEMORANDUM ON OPERATION MONGOOSE, MEETING HELD

THURSDAY, MAY 3, 1962

General Lansdale reported in writing, as per the attached./1/ Harvey made a long oral report, summarizing all actions taken. No additional actions were authorized at this time.

/1/Not found attached. An apparent reference to Lansdale's May 3 report, Document 333.

Defense was questioned about taking Cubans into the army and advised that efforts to do this should be accelerated. Harvey reported on two television intrusions into Cuba and the purpose of this was questioned by the group.

Action: This should be examined and an explanation made as to (a) exactly how it is done, and (b) the value from the standpoint of our purpose.

Lansdale and Harvey were questioned re possible contact with top people in the Cuban government. There is a growing feeling that we should find a way to make such contacts to determine the possibility of a schism existing between various factions in the Castro regime.

Action: McCone should discuss with Helms and Harvey to see what positive steps can be taken in this direction.

John A. McCone/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

335. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State

Rio de Janeiro, May 3, 1962, noon.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/5-362. Top Secret; Eyes Only; No Distribution.

2577. Eyes only Secretary and Martin. Reference: Deptel 2979./1/ After some delay because his and my travels Brasilia and Rio, finally able discuss reference telegram subject privately with Foreign Minister Dantas May 2. He reports that Ambassador Bastile Pinto saw Fidel privately immediately after Easter. Following Dantas' instructions, he said that GOB had followed closely apparent internal crisis between Barbudos and old line communist party group. Said that GOB had taken well known line at Punta del Este because it envisaged possibility of Cuban evolution direction of nationalist socialism not linked to Soviets, and thought Fidel likely leader that direction. Whole idea GOB proposal statute of limitations was to leave such an alternative open to Cuba instead of Soviet Bloc as only option. GOB therefore wanted to know whether and how Brazil might be useful, since the only significant channel left for Cuba to West.

/1/Document 326.

Fidel's response was a statement of cordial appreciation of the conversation. He admitted increasing difficulties between him and party group. He welcomed opportunity for this discussion with Ambassador and would present concrete suggestions soon.

Above completes report on Havana conversation. Dantas commented that Fidel would have difficulty in formulating precise suggestions, and he could not tell from report whether and when something would be forthcoming. He reemphasized what he had told Secretary concerning impossibility return to pre-revolutionary status quo based on Miami refugees but barely possible evolution toward nationalist type of socialism cut off from Soviet bloc in which some ex-Fidelist refugees might be willing participate.

Gordon

336. Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McCone

Washington, May 7, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 December 1961-30 June 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Filed with materials relating to McCone's meetings with the President, which suggests that he used the memorandum to brief President Kennedy on Operation Mongoose.

SUBJECT

Operation Mongoose

1. Three controlled resistance teams equipped with communications equipment now in Cuba.
2. Five or six additional teams are expected to be infiltrated during May.
3. *[2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]*
4. Extensive penetrations into Cuban-Latin American activities. Legal travelers into Cuba from innumerable Western European and Latin American countries are being used.
5. *[3 lines of source text not declassified]* In addition the Opa Laka interrogation center is producing about 200 intelligence reports each week which are of value and some 300 Cuban agents in Miami are assembling substantial quantities of important intelligence from the refugee colony.

6. Regular U-2 missions are run over Cuba. 90% to 95% of all Cuban territory has been photographed. 14,000 frames have been carefully studied by the interpretation center during the past three weeks to verify Order of Battle information. Every report of construction, armament locations, gossip about missiles, etc., is immediately studied and, if necessary, new photographs taken to verify our dispute.

John A. McCone/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

337. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, May 14, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 11, DCI (Helms) Chrono, Jan-July 1967. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Sheffield Edwards, CIA Director of Security. The memorandum was sent to Attorney General Kennedy on May 15 under cover of a memorandum from Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel of the CIA, in which Houston noted that the memorandum printed here was prepared at Kennedy's request, and set forth the facts on which Edwards and Houston had briefed the Attorney General on May 7. A handwritten note by Richard Helms on the copy of the covering memorandum found in CIA files reads: "Sen. Kennedy read this on 8 March '67." An August 16, 1963, memorandum from Helms, then Deputy Director for Plans, to McCone concerning Sam Giancana concluded that the May 14 memorandum prepared by Edwards was the only written information available on the CIA relationship with Giancana. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT

Arthur James Balletti et al--Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications

1. This memorandum for the record is prepared at the request of the Attorney General of the United States following a complete oral briefing of him relative to a sensitive CIA operation conducted during the period approximately August 1960 to May 1961. /1/ In August 1960 the undersigned was approached by Mr. Richard Bissell then Deputy Director for Plans of CIA to explore the possibility of mounting this sensitive operation against Fidel Castro. It was thought that certain gambling interests which had formerly been active in Cuba might be willing and able to assist and further, might have both intelligence assets in Cuba and communications between Miami, Florida and Cuba. Accordingly, Mr. Robert Maheu, a private investigator of the firm of Maheu and King was approached by the undersigned and asked to establish contact with a member or members of the gambling syndicate to explore their capabilities. Mr. Maheu was known to have accounts with several prominent business men and organizations in the United States. Maheu was to make his approach to the syndicate as appearing to represent big business organizations which wished to protect their interests in Cuba. Mr. Maheu accordingly met and established contact with one John Rosselli of Los Angeles. Mr. Rosselli showed interest in the possibility and indicated he had some contacts in Miami that he might use. Maheu reported that John Rosselli said he was not interested in any remuneration but would seek to establish capabilities in Cuba to perform the desired project. Towards the end of September Mr. Maheu and Mr. Rosselli proceeded to Miami where, as reported, Maheu was introduced to Sam Giancana of Chicago. Sam Giancana arranged for Maheu and Rosselli to meet with a "courier" who was going back and forth to Havana. From information received back by the courier the proposed operation appeared to be feasible and it was decided to obtain an official Agency approval in this regard. A figure of one hundred fifty thousand dollars was set by the Agency as a payment to be made on completion of the operation and to be paid only to the principal or principals who would conduct the operation in Cuba. Maheu reported that Rosselli and Giancana emphatically stated that they wished no part of any payment. The undersigned then briefed the proper senior officials of this Agency on the proposal. Knowledge of this project during its life was kept to a total of six persons and never became a part of the project current at the time for the invasion of Cuba and there were no memoranda on the project nor were there other written documents or agreements. The project was duly orally approved by the said senior officials of the Agency.

/1/The sensitive operation referred to was described more explicitly in a report prepared by the Inspector General of the CIA on April 25, 1967. According to the report, "CIA twice (first in early 1961 and again in early 1962) supplied lethal pills to U.S. gambling syndicate members working on behalf of CIA in a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro." (Ibid., DCI Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 8, HS/CSG2679, Project Amlash) The body of the report, which was based largely upon interviews with CIA officials with knowledge of these abortive attempts to assassinate Castro, indicates in fact that three such attempts were made, the first in late February-early March, a second in late March-early April, and a third attempt in April-June 1962. The Inspector General's report on these attempts to assassinate Castro was supplied in 1975 to the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities and the details are summarized and supplemented by additional testimony taken by the committee in the interim report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, published by the committee in November 1975, pp. 79-85. Documentation generated by the committee in the course of its investigations is in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 233, JFK Collection.

The JFK Collection also contains a record of a conversation on November 9, 1961, between President Kennedy and Tad Szulc of *The New York Times* during which Szulc reported that President Kennedy asked him: "What would you think if I ordered Castro to be assassinated?" Szulc indicated that he felt that would be a terrible idea and Kennedy responded, "I'm glad you feel the same way." (Ibid.; see the Supplement)

2. Rosselli and Maheu spent considerable time in Miami talking with the courier. Sam Giancana was present during parts of these meetings. Several months after this period Maheu told me that Sam Giancana had asked him to put a listening device in the room of one Phyllis McGuire, reported to be the mistress of Giancana. At that time it was reported to me that Maheu passed the matter over to one Edward Du Boise, another private investigator. It appears that Arthur James Balletti was discovered in the act of installing the listening device and was arrested by the Sheriff in Las Vegas, Nevada. Maheu reported to me that he had referred the matter to Edward Du Boise on behalf of Sam Giancana. At the time of the incident neither this Agency nor the undersigned knew of the proposed technical installation. Maheu stated that Sam Giancana thought that Phyllis McGuire might know of the proposed operation and might pass on the information to one Dan Rowan, another friend of McGuire's. At the time that Maheu reported this to the undersigned he reported he was under surveillance by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who, he thought, were exploring his association with John Rosselli and Sam Giancana incident to the project. I told Maheu that if he was formally approached by the FBI, he could refer them to me to be briefed that he was engaged in an intelligence operation directed at Cuba.

3. During the period from September on through April efforts were continued by Rosselli and Maheu to proceed with the operation. The first principal in Cuba withdrew and another principal was selected as has been briefed to The Attorney General. Ten thousand dollars was passed for expenses to the second principal. He was further furnished with approximately one thousand dollars worth of communications equipment to establish communications between his headquarters in Miami and assets in Cuba. No monies were ever paid to Rosselli and Giancana. Maheu was paid part of his expense money during the periods that he was in Miami. After the failure of the invasion of Cuba word was sent through Maheu to Rosselli to call off the operation and Rosselli was told to tell his principal that the proposal to pay one hundred fifty thousand dollars for completion of the operation had been definitely withdrawn.

4. In all this period it has been definitely established from other sources that the Cuban principals involved never discovered or believed that there was other than business and syndicate interest in the project. To the knowledge of the undersigned there were no "leaks" of any information concerning the project in the Cuban community in Miami or in Cuba.

5. I have no proof but it is my conclusion that Rosselli and Giancana guessed or assumed that CIA was behind the project. I never met either of them.

6. Throughout the entire period of the project John Rosselli was the dominant figure in directing action to the

Cuban principals. Reasonable monitoring of his activities indicated that he gave his best efforts to carrying out the project without requiring any commitments for himself, financial or otherwise.

7. In view of the extreme sensitivity of the information set forth above, only one additional copy of this memorandum has been made and will be retained by the Agency.

Sheffield Edwards/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Edwards signed the original.

338. Priority Operations Schedule for Operation Mongoose

Washington, May 17, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Operation Mongoose, Phase I. Top Secret; NoFORN; Special Handling. Prepared by Lansdale. No covering memorandum indicating distribution has been found. The document is stamped to indicate that 12 copies were prepared. A handwritten notation indicates that the source text was Martin's copy. According to a brief memorandum prepared by McCone, the Special Group (Augmented) accepted the schedule on May 17 "for review, study and decision at the meeting on Thursday, May 24." (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers) See the Supplement. No record of the May 24 meeting has been found.

A May 30 memorandum from Martin to Johnson, prepared by Hurwitch, establishes that the schedule of assigned tasks in the schedule printed here was distributed to the concerned agencies, but it was not discussed in advance by the operations group of project officers, such as Hurwitch and Craig. Martin felt that a number of the tasks assigned to the Department were "too vague," and he added that "in the absence of specifics it is not possible to calculate the risk and the cost to the United States of a particular action." He made reference to task #1, calling for action to be stimulated within the OAS. Such action, he noted, "could well place an intolerable strain upon the inter-American machinery, and could thus result in a net advantage for Castro." Martin concluded that assigned tasks should be thoroughly discussed within the operations group before submission for policy consideration to the Special Group (Augmented). (Ibid.)

OPERATION MONGOOSE PRIORITY OPERATIONS SCHEDULE

21 May-30 June 1962

Political Task: 1. Obtain some special and significant action within the OAS organization against the Castro-Communist regime. (State)

Purpose: To produce material for psychological impact on Cuba.

Considerations: Members of OAS need to be inspired to push some special action through. Current events offer a number of opportunities for exploitation through such OAS bodies as the Commission on Human Rights, the Peace Committee, the Council of Jurists, and the Children's Institute, as well as the Special Consultative Committee on Security.

Political Task: 2. Activate key public leaders in Latin America to make timely and strong statements about the Castro-Communist threat to the Hemisphere, the failures of the regime towards Cuban workers, students, farmers, and freedom. (State)

Purpose: To produce material for psychological impact on Cuba.

Considerations: Under the Ambassador's initiative, each Country Team by now has the means to generate more open and active commitment of Latin American political, intellectual, labor, youth, religious, and military leaders. One significant action in each Latin American country, for hard impact on Cuba, is a minimum need.

Political Task: 3. [6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Purpose: To produce material for major psychological impact on Cuba, undermining the power and prestige of the hierarchy of the Castro regime.

Considerations: [1 paragraph (24 lines of source text) not declassified]

Political Task: 4. Develop a suggested platform of Cuban political-economic objectives for possible adoption by Cubans in freeing their country. (State)

Purpose: For the guidance of Operation Mongoose personnel, particularly in the selection and readying of agents to ensure that they are committed to acceptable political beliefs before introduction into Cuba.

Considerations: There are a number of statements of Cuban political objectives, including drafts by State and CIA. What is needed now, and promptly, is a single working document for the guidance of U.S. operational staffs.

Political Task: 5. Assure that optimum values are obtained from the CRC and Cuban refugee groups in the U.S. (CIA)

Purpose: These Cuban external groups have a vital role for propaganda impact inside Cuba. We must have purposeful, singleness of guidance and monitoring of their activities to support the project.

Considerations: CIA and State both have had roles with the CRC and others. Cuban leaders also make contact at a number of high offices of the U.S. government. For the good of the U.S., the Cuban refugees, and our project, there must be coordinated management. The Director, Central Intelligence, should have this responsibility, particularly with leaders of the stature of Dr. Jose Miro Cardona.

Psychological Task: 6. Steer psychological-propaganda Working Group for day-to-day Cuba operations. (State)

Purpose: To assure full consideration of material, as collected, in terms of special psychological-propaganda use against the Cuban regime, and to inform the public.

Considerations: This has been a normal State-chaired working group. It needs to be sharply geared to the project's operations, including consideration of declassifying material for operational use. Defense should be added to the membership. It is possible that USIA should assume leadership.

Psychological Task: 7. Make strong, repetitive theme on radio broadcasts to Cuba of the overwhelming disapproval throughout the Western Hemisphere of the Castro-Communist regime, along with sympathy for the captive Cubans. (USIA)

Purpose: To undermine Castro's psychological basis of control over the Cuban people and the lower echelons of the regime's bureaucracy.

Considerations: This is to make full use of material produced by actions in the Western Hemisphere.

Psychological Task: 8. Give fullest play into Cuba (and the Western Hemisphere) of Cuban refugees and defectors as dramatic witness against the Castro-Communist regime. (USIA)

Purpose: To undermine Castro's psychological basis of control and to build the tone for anti-Castro actions in the Western Hemisphere.

Considerations: Note the inclusion of defectors in this task; it is still a CIA task to produce the defectors. Also, this task includes exploitation of Dr. Miro Cardona's intensely moving statement at the end of the Armstrong Circle Theater drama "Anatomy of Betrayal."

Psychological Task: 9. Ready the "Voice of Cuba" for radio broadcast. (CIA)

Purpose: To provide a ready capability for giving a "voice" to encourage resistance elements inside Cuba and to undermine the morale of the Castro regime.

Considerations: Initially, this would be for brief news broadcasts of local events inside Cuba, simulating a location in Cuba, but actually located off-shore. A plan of how best to do this, with the proposed program format, is needed to obtain policy decision.

Psychological Task: 10. Ready a propaganda action, for balloon delivery. (CIA)

Purpose: To provide a ready capability for low-risk propaganda dissemination inside Cuba.

Considerations: A plan of how to do this, including types of propaganda content (with thought given for delivery of symbolic gifts, such as scarce foods or medicines, as well as leaflets), is required for decision. It is noted that USIA has a brief recording of Castro's broadcasts, sharply contrasting his promises when he took power with what he said when he admitted his Communist affiliation; these could be put on cheap plastic discs and into leaflets.

Psychological Task: 11. Deliver copies of *Time* magazine, with Blas Roca cover story, into Cuba. (CIA)

Purpose: To make the truth available to the Cuban people about the Communist regime.

Considerations: This is seen as smuggling in copies, for passing from hand-to-hand. The smuggling could be done by third-nationals.

Psychological Task: 12. Intensify psychological effort at Guantanamo. (Defense)

Purpose: To make fullest possible use of the existing Cuban labor population on the base.

Considerations: Activities include sports broadcasts, in Spanish, over the base radio station on ball games, news broadcasts using regular wire service news, and making Spanish-language periodicals and literature available for reading on base. USIA has a number of selected titles, published in Mexico and Rio, for stocking base libraries. Also, USIA has a number of VOA "backgrounders" and refugee interviews on tape which could be used for radio broadcasts to Cuban employees on the base.

Psychological Task: 13. Create musical and visual symbols to express anti-regime sentiments. (USIA)

Purpose: To provide catchy expressions of popular resistance against the Communist regime.

Considerations: New words to a favorite song, a new tune, a visual symbol for wall-painting, a hand symbol as easy to do as "V for Victory," are the types of expressions sought. USIA should call on CIA for assistance, since some thought has been given to this already.

Psychological Task: 14. Select a sabotage operation. (CIA)

Purpose: To make a psychological impact upon the regime and public, which symbolizes popular resistance to the regime and which causes talk encouraging to resistance.

Considerations: CIA should select a feasible sabotage operation, a "showy" one against the regime, but not against the people, and present a specific proposal for approval.

Intelligence Task: 15. Make a special effort to step-up the infiltration of teams. (CIA)

Purpose: To exploit recent experience in order to ensure that there is adequate coverage inside Cuba to permit the firm end-of-July intelligence estimate required for further decisions.

Considerations: Feasibility depends on CIA's judgment, both operationally and for depth of intelligence required. The schedule was for 14 teams, 2 singleton agents, 14 third-country residents, and 20 third-country legal travellers by the end of May.

Intelligence Task: 16. Intensify use of third-country collection for specific psychological information which can be exploited in propaganda. (CIA)

Purpose: To provide material for operations putting pressure on the Castro regime inside Cuba, and for use on the OAS-UN opinion stage.

Considerations: Really current "inside" news tips can do most to undermine the regime's morale and interest the Cuban public. Classification may be a problem but this use must be pressed as a priority.

Intelligence Task: 17. Intensify the exploitation of the intelligence potential which exists on the base at Guantanamo. (Defense)

Purpose: To take the fullest possible advantage of this open U.S. "listening post" on Cuban soil.

Considerations: ONI can call upon CIA for assistance. A communication link to Miami would permit use of extensive CIA background information available there and leads for further exploitation, not only for positive intelligence, but also for counter-intelligence. A number of further steps are possible.

Intelligence Task: 18. Get ready for air re-supply missions. (CIA)

Purpose: To have a ready capability for re-supply of agent teams inside Cuba when needed.

Considerations: Since the Air Force has readied a capability for this task and since it is still desired that CIA mount such operations with Cuban or Latin American personnel, an acceptable means must be found promptly. CIA, with Defense assistance, as a priority will review feasible means of mounting these operations, and recommend the most practical method for a policy decision.

Military Task: 19. Develop a real dual-purpose capability of intelligence teams in building up the agent pool for infiltration. (CIA)

Purpose: To assure that skills needed for guerrilla operations are present inside Cuba, so that paramilitary actions can be initiated when the decision is made.

Considerations: While CIA is currently carrying out this task, it is worth CIA taking a further hard look at its training program to anticipate needs. If larger groups of action types are to be trained for possible introduction in

September, it is known that at least 3 months "lead time" is required for minimum selection and training. That means now. It is possible that Defense can be of far more help than called upon at present. Also, it is possible that further policy guidance might be required.

Military Task: 20. Induct Cubans into the U.S. Armed Forces for training. (Defense)

Purpose: To fulfill Cuba exile leadership desires and to build up a potential reserve for possible future military action inside Cuba.

Considerations:

Economic Task: 21. Tighten effect of sanctions by increased effort to enlist further participation by NATO nations, Mexico, Japan, and others. (State)

Purpose: To further restrict Cuba's economy.

Considerations:

Economic Task: 22. Penetrate black market operations in Cuba for economic sabotage. (CIA)

Purpose: To worsen Cuba's economic situation.

Considerations: For instance, gangster elements should offer a possible means to accomplish this task, particularly in Cuban cities. This could be a test mission for alleged resistance cells, without undue risk to "noise level."

Economic Task: 23. [4 lines of source text not declassified]

Purpose: To obtain policy approval for creating economic chaos inside Cuba.

Considerations: Cuba's economy is the Castro-Communist regime's greatest vulnerability and is open to much greater exploitation.

339. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Goodwin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin)

Washington, May 24, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Cuban Project-1962. Top Secret.

SUBJECT

Cuba

The growing evidence of strains within the internal power structure of Cuba seems to me to offer an opportunity for a tentative probe designed to test the possibility of splitting the Castro revolutionaries from the old line communists (those who did not participate in the early stages of the revolution).

I will not bother to summarize the intelligence information which you have seen. My judgment of that information is that there is strain between the revolutionaries and the old-line communists; a strain based much more on rivalry for power than on ideological differences. The key figures in this struggle are probably Raul Castro and possibly Che Guevara, although Che is very much behind the scene. I would guess that these people

fear that the old-line communists, with tacit Moscow-backing, are trying to moderate the power of Fidel and consequently of their group, and that they have transmitted these fears to Fidel.

Although it would be foolish to speculate that these relations are at the breaking point, I have always felt that putting an end to Soviet control in Cuba would more probably come (if it comes at all) from a split in the top leadership than from a popular revolution. Of course, the greatest obstacle to this is the complete dependence of Cuba on the Soviet Union for subsistence and the undoubted feeling that were the Soviet Union to be antagonized Cuba would have no place to go for support.

Therefore, I would suggest an approach to Castro along the following lines: that whatever our past policies we are sympathetic to the original stated aims of the Cuban revolution--social reform and an end to dictatorship--and we are confident that the questions of property which emerged from the revolution can be amicably negotiated; that the reason for our concern is and has been the Soviet control over Cuba which we have always believed is inimical to Castro's own desires and to the aims of the revolution; that were Castro to disengage himself from the communists we would be willing to re-establish normal commercial relations with his revolutionary government and welcome participation in Inter-American efforts including the Alliance for Progress.

This is a brief summary of the sort of approach I believe we should consider. There are two critical items in this proposal:

1. The content of the approach: It must be moderate and face-saving for Castro. It must work to eliminate all fears that we would try to throw out Castro and his revolutionaries or would insist on return of properties, etc. It must offer a way to disengage with dignity and with minimum fear of the consequences. This deserves a great deal of thought including the possibility of some multi-nation guarantee offered to Castro. Once he has broken we would, of course, reconsider this policy.

2. The method of approach: The best method, I believe, would be through a European embassy or through the Cuban Ambassador to the UN, who we have reason to believe is loyal to Fidel and not to communism. Of course, the Cubans should not be able to prove a US initiative but the contact must have credibility. I like the UN idea because of our capacity to monitor communications between New York and Havana.

I strongly believe that our contacts should not be through other Latin American nations. The temptation to play internal politics with such a "mediation" role now or in the future will be enormous. In addition, Latin American sincerity and concepts of security are notoriously poor. I believe we would be really asking for trouble, in the form of future exposure, were we to rely on Latins for this project; especially the Brazilians.

340. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)

Washington, May 31, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Operation Mongoose, Phase I. Top Secret; Sensitive; NoFORN; Special Handling. An attached distribution list indicates that seven copies of the memorandum were prepared. Copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, and McCone, and one copy was kept by Lansdale.

[Here follow operational details relating to intelligence, economic pressure, propaganda, and an incident at Guantanamo.]

Fracturing the Regime has been given priority attention by CIA. A senior case officer has been assigned full-time to this specific action, and has preferential use of CIA assets. Of 24 desirable defection targets, CIA has found several who seem vulnerable [*1 line of source text not declassified*].

Priority Operations Schedule of 21 May,/1/ seeking some positive actions in behalf of our project during the next several weeks, has brought a very healthy response from CIA and USIA. The CIA determination to meet the challenge has surfaced four policy-type questions which I note for you on behalf of CIA:/2/

/1/Document 338.

/2/This copy of the memorandum, which is marked as Johnson's copy, was annotated by Johnson in the margin as follows: after item 1), relating to Task 7: "OK State"; after item 2), relating to Task 10: "No" and an illegible word; after item 3), relating to Task 19: "further planning" and Johnson wrote in "about 10" in place of the word "some" in the first line of the text; and after item 4), relating to Task 23: "submit plan."

1) Task 7, "Voice of Free Cuba," is almost immediately feasible, if the Group will approve CIA arranging with Navy for use of a submarine. CIA has firm plans for worrying the Communist regime through broadcasts which would appear to come from local dissident groups actively planning to harass the regime.

2) Task 10, CIA is prepared to disseminate leaflets on Castro's failure to the Cuban population via balloon with a view of increasing instability of the Communist machine. The technique is tested and CIA has plans to operate from a surface ship in international waters. The Group is asked to approve the idea, including Navy support. This could be operating in time to exploit the 26 July anniversary of Castro's attack upon government forces at Santiago de Cuba in 1953, for "the revolution" he has now betrayed.

3) Task 19, CIA believes it can recruit some 20-man teams for possible use in beefing up resistance groups within Cuba. Group approval is asked for Defense support in training, holding, logistics. The "noise level" hazard is noted, but this special project could be almost unnoticed if timed with proposed U.S. military enlistment of Cubans.

4) [4 lines of source text not declassified]

Other Tasks.

I note here that CIA does not feel it has the operational means to undertake Task No. 22, black-market activities, at this time. Further that Task No. 11, *Time* magazine dissemination, would require operational facilities not now available. I accept indefinite deferral of Task No. 22 and scrubbing of Task No. 11 on this basis.

The Department of State reaction, to my effort to get the U.S. into priority actions towards our project's goals, has been disappointing to me thus far. Apparently, my schedule of targets for special efforts is accepted only as it may fit into long-range, existing programs already under way. If this is the theory of our project, I believe that the project then becomes only a special reporting device and not a special U.S. effort to win the goal of helping the Cubans recapture their country from a gang of Communists.

341. Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented)

Washington, May 31, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Operation Mongoose. Top Secret; Noform; Special Handling. No drafting information appears on the source text, but internal evidence suggests that the memorandum was prepared by Lansdale, as Chief of Operations.

SUBJECT

US Policy in the Event USSR Establishes a Base(s) in Cuba

1. At the 22 March meeting, Mr. Robert Kennedy asked the Special Group (Augmented)--what would be an appropriate course of action for the United States to take in the event that the Soviets establish a military base in Cuba.

2. The Department of Defense is most desirous that a considered response to this question be prepared by each agency concerned, for the establishment of a Soviet military base(s) of any kind in Cuba would increase our national vulnerability and defense costs as forces would have to be developed or shifted to meet this threat from the South./1/ At the same time, it is logical to assume that a Soviet military base in Cuba would result in further economic, managerial and technical assistance for Cuba which would virtually assure, for the foreseeable future, the continuation of the Cuban-Communist base of operations for espionage, sabotage and subversion throughout the entire Western Hemisphere.

/1/CIA Information Report no. K-3,216,423, dated May 31, circulated a report of a possible Soviet submarine base being built on the coast of Cuba in Oriente Province. (Ibid.)

3. Since the Special Group (Augmented) has assumed that overt US military force will have to be used to end Communist control of Cuba, Mr. Kennedy's question is particularly pertinent. For should the Soviets choose to exercise their option of establishing a military base under a Soviet flag in Cuba, it is possible that this would act to prevent any future US decision to intervene with US military force, just as the Soviets have refrained from applying military force against countries on which US bases are established.

4. Furthermore, establishment of a military base(s) in Cuba would cost the Soviets very little in terms of world public opinion. For example, they could explain that they were simply taking a page from our book, and would remove their base(s) from Cuba if we would remove ours from Berlin, Turkey or Formosa.

5. Consequently, I believe national security considerations require that all participating agencies prepare a written response to Mr. Robert Kennedy's question. I recommend that these responses be prepared in time for presentation at our next meeting.

342. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Anderson) to Secretary of Defense McNamara

JCSM-426-62

Washington, June 5, 1962.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Cuba 342.18. Top Secret.

SUBJECT

Cubans in the US Armed Forces (U)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 21 May 1962,/1/ on the above subject, in which it was requested that the necessary detailed plans be developed to implement the President's instructions that selected Cuban refugees be inducted into the US Armed Forces.

/1/Not found.

2. The attached plan,/2/ which follows the basic planning guidance provided, has been developed. The plan requires the lowering of current induction standards to permit induction of those individuals who have dependents and who do not possess the required facility in the English language. These individuals will be

organized into Cuban units through basic and advanced individual training and at the end of that time will either be selected for further special forces type training, integrated into regular units or separated for the convenience of the government./3/

/2/Not printed.

/3/The attached plan envisioned that approximately 3,000 Cuban refugees in the 17-35 age bracket would volunteer for induction and training, and that 1,500 of that total would meet the reduced standards for induction.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the success of the plan is dependent upon overcoming the difficulties previously encountered. Although the lowering of induction standards will permit many to serve who otherwise would be ineligible and the Cuban unit type organization with special forces training may serve to stimulate greater interest, there still remains the problem of motivation for service in the US Armed Forces. Since no definitive objective for utilization of trained Cuban personnel has been established, it is anticipated that there still will be a distinct loss of interest when these personnel come to the full realization that they are not being trained specifically for return to Cuba.

4. Implementation of the attached plan will entail expenditure of funds which have not been budgeted for the coming fiscal year. The training of the Cuban refugees is considered an additional mission and, as such, will not contribute to the accomplishment of prior missions for which Service manpower ceilings have been authorized. It is, therefore, requested that necessary funds and personnel spaces be provided to implement the program, and that those Cubans inducted under this plan not be charged against current Service ceilings. Since the Army is best equipped to provide the type training envisioned, it is anticipated that primary responsibility for implementation of the plan will be placed with that Service./4/

/4/A June 6 covering memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel Sam Wilson (USA) to Brigadier General George S. Brown, Military Assistant to Secretary McNamara, indicates that Lansdale had already discussed the plan with Gilpatric. The status of the project, Wilson noted, would be reported to General Taylor in the Special Group on June 7, and Taylor would then pass the information to the President "in view of latter's strong personal interest in this undertaking." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Cuba 342.18)

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

GW Anderson

343. Notes on an Operations Group Meeting

Washington, June 7, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/6-762. Secret. Prepared by Hurwitch.

1. Lansdale accepted procedure of holding similar meetings for purpose of discussing plans and projects before submission Special Group.
2. Lansdale and to greater extent General Craig harbor notion that we can order other nations do our bidding. When we point out reluctance certain governments follow our lead, they urge a major psychological and political campaign within the country among labor, student and political groups to "force" the government to change its mind.
3. General Craig, particularly, remains convinced that Department is emphasizing "long range goals in the hemisphere" as compared to "priority for Cuba." (Craig has just been promoted to Major General and will probably be transferred next month.)

4. Task 19/1/--guerilla training of intelligence teams--requires careful consideration, with the Secretary, before reaching a decision.

/1/For the tasks cited in the notes, see Document 338.

5. Task 5--U.S. relations with the CRC--remains a State responsibility, reversing Lansdale's original proposal.

6. Unconfirmed rumors brought by four recently-arrived Cuban refugees tell of a mid-June uprising in Cuba. To safe-guard against a premature uprising on the off-chance that there may be some truth in the stories, Dr. Miro plans to make a declaration/2/ characterizing the reports as rumors, urging the Cuban populace to be patient and await the day of liberation resulting from unified action. DOD is reviewing its contingency planning and reaction time in the event an uprising occurred. We have informed Lansdale that on the basis of information to date there appeared little likelihood of an uprising of proportions that might make U.S. military intervention politically feasible; i.e. a nation-wide revolt that seriously threatened the regime, where the opposition held areas and called for assistance.

/2/A handwritten addition by Hurwitch at this point reads: "from Costa Rica".

344. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, June 8, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongose Papers. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Walter Elder, McCone's Executive Assistant. Elder's memorandum apparently records the June 7 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented).

Mongoose

General Lansdale made an oral report on this subject. He also, with certain support from the Attorney General, requested more active participation by the Department of State. The meeting agreed that the Department would furnish real support, appoint a full-time senior officer, and present action proposals.

There was also some discussion of contingency planning against the possibility of widespread revolt in Cuba. General Craig, on behalf of the Department of Defense, said that there were contingency plans for use of US forces.

WElder

345. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)

Washington, June 8, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Mongoose Operations. Top Secret; Sensitive; Noform; Special Handling. An attached distribution list indicates that seven copies of the memorandum were prepared. Copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, and McCone. One copy was kept by Lansdale.

SUBJECT

Status of Requested Studies, Operation Mongoose

At your 26 April meeting, I noted that several studies were in preparation, as had been requested in connection with Operation Mongoose. The following is a report on the status of each study.

Blockade of Cuba.

Defense was asked to determine how a blockade could be imposed on Cuba, if it were decided to do so. CIA was asked to estimate the effects of such a blockade on Cuba.

The Defense and CIA studies have been completed and are attached hereto.^{/1/} The Defense representative notes that the blockade study was submitted in response to a stated problem, and that it is neither a Defense nor JCS recommendation for the United States to undertake this course of action. If such a course of action were decided upon, it would be an act of war.

^{/1/}Not found attached. The CIA study has not been found. For text of the Department of Defense response, see Document 332.

Cubans in the U.S. Armed Forces.

The Defense plan for taking Cubans into the U.S. Armed Forces,^{/2/} on a more liberal basis than in the past, is being submitted separately, through appropriate channels.

^{/2/}See Document 342.

An apparent reference to the memorandum listing principal organizations and personalities within the Cuban exile movement sent on May 3 by McCone to General Taylor. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Exiles 1/62-10/62)/^{3/}

^{/3/}List of Cuban Anti-Castro Organizations.

Task completed. The Director, Central Intelligence, provided copies to members.

Security Committee, OAS.

A continuing task, in which the Department of State has noted that it will keep Operation Mongoose informed of significant developments as they occur. The Special Consultative Committee on Security submitted its initial General Report to the Council of the OAS (COAS), 1 May.^{/4/} The COAS distributed copies to OAS member governments, with a request for observations within forty-five (45) days.

^{/4/}For text of the initial report of the Special Consultative Committee, submitted to the Council of the OAS on April 30, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, pp. 361-366.

Evidence on Supporting Military Facilities in Cuba.

This task arose during a discussion of the reported construction of underground hangars, storage sites, etc., in Cuba. Defense and CIA were tasked with undertaking joint analysis of all such reports. The joint analysis was initiated promptly and continues. Results are reflected in the daily and weekly summaries published by CIA for Operation Mongoose.

Census of Hemisphere Travellers to Cuba.

In progress. Action has been taken to stimulate and systematize reporting; one of CIA's Operation Mongoose

officers made a field trip to all Central American countries, Colombia, and Venezuela for this purpose; remaining Latin American visits are in progress. CIA is collecting and assessing information for a meaningful report.

"Patrol Posts" in Caribbean, with Particular Reference to Haiti and Dominican Republic.

Completed. Based upon Cuban capabilities, the likely nature of the threat, actions taken by the U.S. to offer assistance, and status of U.S. forces in the Caribbean, Defense recommends no further action at this time to establish "Patrol Posts." Defense points out that the requirement for a facility in Haiti, presented to State of 6 March 1962,/5/ would facilitate the establishment of a "patrol post." In an interim reply of 20 March 1962/6/ State indicated the underlying problems with respect to U.S. policy toward the Duvalier regime. Defense reports that State is conducting an analysis of this policy question.

/5/Letter from Gilpatric to Rusk, March 6. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Haiti 370.02)

/6/Letter from Johnson to Gilpatric, March 20. (Ibid.)

U.S. Policy in the Event USSR Establishes a Base in Cuba.

As noted at the 7 June meeting, this is still open. Mr. Gilpatric asked that the Defense paper,/7/ reminding the members of the question raised by Mr. Robert Kennedy 22 March, be distributed. The Defense paper is transmitted herewith.

/7/Document 342.

[end of document]



FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963
Volume X
Cuba, 1961-1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

Cuba, 1961-1962

346. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)

Washington, June 14, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Inter-Agency Staff Study. Top Secret; Noform; Special Handling. A copy was sent to General Taylor.

MEMORANDUM FOR

Edwin Martin, State

General Craig, Defense

William Harvey, CIA

Donald Wilson, USIA

SUBJECT

Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba, Contingency Planning

This confirms the oral assignment of tasks for further contingency planning.

The Defense operational representative is responsible for the preparation of a contingency plan for U.S. actions in a situation of open, wide-spread revolt in Cuba. This contingency is seen as a non-U.S.-initiated situation, similar to that rumored as being activated for mid-June 1962. U.S. actions are seen as including the use of U.S. military force.

The State operational representative is responsible for the preparation of a contingency plan for U.S. actions in a situation of open revolt in one or a few localities in Cuba. This contingency is seen as a non-U.S.-initiated situation where the people in one Cuban locality (or several neighboring localities) openly defy the Communist regime, are being suppressed with force, and U.S. help is requested (by the Cuban revolvers or Latin American opinion).

All U.S. Departments and Agencies participating in Operation Mongoose will assist in the preparation of these plans, as required. Plans should include a description of the assumed contingency situation, specific actions to be taken and by whom, timing required, and an indication of post-action requirements.

Although current operations take priority, it is expected that working drafts of these contingency plans will be ready by 16 July. A working meeting of operational representatives will then ready these plans for submission to the Special Group (Augmented).

EG Lansdale

Brigadier General, USAF

347. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)

Washington, June 14, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Mongoose Operations. Top Secret; Sensitive; NoFORN; Special Handling. An attached distribution list indicates that seven copies of the memorandum were prepared. Copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, and McCone. One copy was kept by Lansdale.

SUBJECT

Progress, Operation Mongoose

Political Actions. At its 7 June meeting,^{/1/} the Group desired that my 17 May list of suggested priority actions^{/2/} be re-issued, to include agreed-upon tasks for State. Completion of this is awaiting the appointment of a representative for the Department of State who can devote full time to Operation Mongoose, as agreed upon. When the appointment is announced to the Special Group, it is my plan to hold a meeting promptly with him and other representatives to work on the schedule of special-effort activities. Meanwhile, we are working on the accepted tasks. State reports that briefing papers have been given to Secretary Rusk on Cuba-European trade, for his forthcoming trip to West Europe and that the Directing Council of the Pan-American Institute of History and Geography has voted to exclude Cuban delegates from meetings.

^{/1/}See Document 343.

^{/2/}Document 338.

Cuban Recruits in U.S. Armed Forces. Concept approved and directive issued by the Secretary of Defense.^{/3/}

^{/3/}Not found.

Outstanding Studies (including Blockade). My 8 June memorandum to the members of the Special Group (Augmented)^{/4/} reported on the current status of all outstanding studies. The desired Defense and CIA papers on the means required for and possible effects of a blockade of Cuba were transmitted with this memorandum.

^{/4/}Document 345.

Also transmitted by my 8 June memorandum was a Defense reminder of the Attorney General's question about U.S. actions in case the Soviets established bases in Cuba. Mongoose representatives were alerted to the last paragraph of the Defense paper, which asked for comments by the 14 June Group meeting.

Possible Contingency. The rumored uprising of the Cuban people in mid-June continues to be watched closely. The CIA coverage inside Cuba has not confirmed this uprising from resistance organizations there, and still concludes that this is an attempt by the Castro regime to get opponents to come out into the open, where they

can be dealt with. It is believed worth some extra intelligence effort to keep a close eye on possible developments in Cuba in this period, and the Group is being asked separately to approve means for doing so. Meanwhile, Dr. Miro Cardona issued a warning (while in Costa Rica) to Cubans not to revolt prematurely; this was picked up by press services and played back into Cuba by VOA and other information means.

In response to the Group's desire for ready plans in case of similar contingencies in the future, Defense has been tasked with developing a plan in case of a surprise wide-spread revolt and State has been tasked with developing a companion plan in case of a localized revolt (in a provincial city, etc.)./5/ The Group will be informed of these plans, when completed.

/5/See Document 346.

"Voice of Cuba." On the planned broadcasts from a submarine, simulating a small radio station for the resistance inside Cuba, details have been firmed to start these by the end of June. CIA and State have been brought together on content themes and programming. Navy has reaffirmed the low risk factor, after working out operational details with CIA. Broadcasts are designed to be brief (the longest, 5 minutes) at the start, and build up credibility slowly. A brief monitor's report will be surfaced, through a U.S. news service, after the broadcasts are established.

Cuban Defector. Pedro Roig Ortega, representative in Mexico of the Cuban Ministry of Commerce, has defected in Mexico City. CIA and State are working on means to exploit this action, especially noting value of impact within both Cuba and Mexico.

Cuban Subversion Through Key Population Groups. CIA has completed a summary analysis of the travel and activities of Cuban student, labor, and cultural organizations, which will be distributed to Group members separately./6/ The analysis reports that this Cuban effort is being pushed aggressively in Latin America, in the pattern of familiar Soviet subversion activities through international organizations.

/6/Not found.

Information. VOA exploited current vulnerabilities: Moscow news of agricultural problems and price rises, the Cuban disastrous season of sugar production, and Castro's discouraging comment that it would be ten to twelve years before living conditions improve in Cuba. Orders from Latin America for the latest comic book on Cuban children have reached 1,235,000.

USIA Participation. Although the Director of USIA is not a member of the Special Group (Augmented), both Ed Murrow and Don Wilson have ensured vigorous USIA participation in Operation Mongoose, and have a definite need to be kept informed on matters which the Mongoose team report to the Special Group (Augmented). The simplest way to do so would be for me to give an information copy to Murrow/Wilson ("eyes only") of such reports to the Special Group (Augmented). Request approval to do so.

348. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)

Washington, June 27, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Secret. Drafted by Hurwitch.

SUBJECT

Priorities Schedule for Cuba

There is attached for your information the list of the Department's courses of action with regard to Cuba which I had shown to you and was subsequently provided General Lansdale.

General Lansdale indicated that he thought this was a good start, although he was, of course, disappointed that the list contained no dramatic event that could be accomplished before the review.

Attachment

LIST PRIORITIES SCHEDULE FOR CUBA

1. Attempt to organize impressive pro-Kennedy and pro-United States manifestations in Mexico in connection with Presidential visit./1/ Feed this back into Cuba to give impression of Mexico-United States solidarity thus undermining one of Cuba's most important sources of hemispheric support--the goodwill of Mexico.

/1/President Kennedy made a State visit to Mexico June 29-30.

2. Make effort to elect pro-United States, anti-Castro candidates in the Brazilian congressional election. At the same time, encourage formation of non-Communist campesino leagues to offset the work of Juliao. Encourage anti-Cuban editorials and stories in Brazilian newspapers.

3. Work toward the election of a moderate democratic government in the Dominican government and the defeat of left extreme forces in the Dominican Republic supporting Castro.

4. Encourage Christian democratic student groups in Venezuela and elsewhere to make anti-Castro statements and resist election of pro-Castro student leaders. In this connection it is important to work with the forthcoming youth festival in Helsinki (where there will be 2000 Latin American students) to take the festival away from the Communists and ensure a good amount of anti-Communist propaganda emanating from this support.

5. Increase support to Cuban exiles for travel throughout Latin America making well publicized anti-Castro speeches.

6. In Chile work to splinter popular front support of Communist candidates.

7. Attempt to secure anti-Castro statements by conservative members of MNR in Bolivia as well as political action designed to lessen strength of extremists in the MNR and in miners' unions.

8. Secure statements of determination to defeat Castro communism by members of Venezuelan government and military. In addition, secure public charges of Cuban involvement in efforts to unseat the liberal democratic government of Betancourt.

9. Encourage Latin American nations to review their passport procedures and take other measures designed to prevent travel to Cuba. Encourage the SCCS to take an active interest in this as well.

10. Pursue vigorously the program of isolating the Castro regime from hemispheric organizations.

349. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, July 3, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Security, 1962. Secret.

CUBAN SITUATION

I. The Castro regime is well along in the process of reorganizing its political, economic, military, and police system in the Soviet pattern.

A. In Communist terminology, Cuba is in the stage of "building socialism," and differences in the developing Cuban institutions from those of the Soviet Bloc are either transitory or relatively minor expressions of national individuality.

B. Cuba's main difference from the Soviet satellites lies in the absence of an explicit Soviet commitment to defend Cuba militarily.

1. Soviet statements in this sense have thus far been vague and general.

II. A single political machine, avowedly based on Marxist-Leninist principles and interlocking in its functions and leadership with the organs of the state, is being formed at local, provincial, and national levels.

A. Called the Integrated Revolutionary Organization (ORI), it is to become the United Party of the Socialist Revolution at such time as the leaders determine that it has become sufficiently well organized and entrenched to perform the role of the single party in a Communist state.

B. It is governed by a 24-man National Directorate. The Directorate in turn is dominated by a six-man secretariat headed by Fidel and Raul Castro as first and second secretaries.

1. Raul Castro is also Deputy Premier, making him second to Fidel in both the party and government hierarchies.

C. Since last August, major government decrees have been issued in the names of both the Council of Ministers (Cabinet) and the national leadership of the ORI.

III. The split in the ORI leadership between Fidel Castro and a group of veteran Communists led by Anibal Escalante, which came into the open with Castro's bitter public blast against Escalante on 26 March, appears to have been not over ideological issues, but over the means and tactics for reaching agreed goals.

A. The Escalante group had been moving rapidly to secure control of the country's political and governmental institutions to the exclusion of Castro followers; Castro's 26 March speech and the maneuvering which preceded it leave no doubt as to his position of primacy in the leadership of the revolution.

1. Escalante was expelled from the ORI National Directorate, the membership of which had been announced less than three weeks earlier, and left for Czechoslovakia.

B. Castro in his 26 March and subsequent speeches on the issue charged Escalante with "sectarianism" and with attempting to build his own power machine "divorced from the masses." These machinations, he charged, had alienated the "masses" and threatened, by undermining public confidence in the revolution, to destroy it.

1. Escalante has subsequently become, along with "imperialism," one of the chief whipping boys for the regime's difficulties.

C. Other veteran Cuban Communists have dutifully followed Castro's lead in condemning Escalante, but try to imply that Escalante's "harmful activities" were the result of personal faults. They are now dutifully praising Castro as "our great Marxist-Leninist leader."

D. Castro himself has left no doubt that his objective is the construction of a Communist society in Cuba and has frequently appealed for an end to any differences between the "old" and the "new" Communists.

E. Veteran Communists hold nine of the 24 seats on the ORI National Directorate, as well as numerous key administrative jobs such as President of the Agrarian Reform Institute and Minister of Domestic Trade.

1. Blas Roca, the ranking Cuban Communist for more than 25 years, is a member of the key six-man Secretariat of the ORI National Directorate, and director of the ORI newspaper Hoy.

F. Blas Roca, in an article in *Pravda* on 13 June, said Escalante's "harmful activities" had done such damage to the construction of a Marxist-Leninist party in Cuba, that "now we have to rebuild . . . and begin again from scratch."

1. Since March, the provincial ORI directorates in at least two provinces--Matanzas and Oriente--have been thoroughly reorganized. Veteran Communists in top provincial party positions have been replaced by "new" Communists associated with the Castro brothers. Similar changes are apparently underway in municipal party units.

G. Whether or not the rivalries between the "old" and the "new" Communists will result in new top-level purges and crises cannot be clearly predicted.

1. Moscow, while probably sympathetic to the veteran Communists and distrustful of Castro's emotionalism and his unpredictability, has publicly supported him and condemned Escalante's tactics. It has also granted Cuba important new economic support since Escalante's ouster.

2. Communist veterans such as Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, President of the Agrarian Reform Institute, probably recognize that they have no substitute for Castro in his unique ability to rouse the people.

IV. A plethora of "mass organizations" have been organized during the past year to foster popular identification with the objectives of the regime, to transmit political indoctrination, and to exercise control and surveillance over the membership.

A. The Union of Young Communists, formed last April from the former Association of Rebel Youth, is described as "the political organization of all Cuban youth."

1. It claims a membership of more than 100,000 and is charged, among other things, with "helping" the Union of Cuban Pioneers, an organization for children between six and 13 years old.

B. The Federation of Cuban Women, headed by Raul Castro's wife, claims a membership of more than 160,000 members.

C. The Central Organization of Workers of Revolutionary Cuba, built on the foundations of the powerful pre-Castro labor confederation, is an instrument of the state for control of organized labor.

D. The militia and the Revolutionary Defense Committees (block warden informant system) are also effective as mass organizations.

E. Other groups, such as the National Institute for Sports and Recreation, the Institute for Friendship with Peoples, and the National Tourist Industry (which arranges vacations for "superior" Cuban workers) also serve the standard purposes of Communist mass organizations.

V. There is widespread discontent in Cuba, particularly over consumer goods shortages, and resentment over the regime's regimentation of the people and its authoritarianism. Active resistance is, however, confined to a few small groups and the most common attitude is hopelessness and apathy. The regime is in no danger of being

toppled at this time.

A. Perhaps only a quarter of the population remains positive in its support for the regime.

1. Many of Castro's original followers have become disillusioned and are now in exile or in prison; some have been executed.

B. The regime's large and pervasive security machinery has intimidated most of the people.

C. Active resistance is confined to small, scattered groups of guerrillas in the mountains and to more important clandestine groups in the cities, where sporadic acts of sabotage have been increasing in recent months.

D. In Matanzas province on 13 June food shortages touched off public demonstrations which led the regime on 16 June to stage an unusual show of military force in the city of Cardenas. Troops, tanks, artillery and MIG jet fighters participated in the show of force, following which President Dorticos addressed a rally.

1. These events were broadcast and televised throughout Cuba and were apparently designed to make an example of Cardenas for the rest of the country.

VI. Cuba now faces an economic crisis attributable to the confusions and dislocations caused by the drastic and rapid changeover of the economy to state control, to poor management in many enterprises, and to the sudden shift in foreign trade, formerly almost exclusively with the West, but now almost exclusively with the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

A. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, writing in a Soviet publication late last year, claimed that 80 percent of agricultural production in Cuba is now accounted for by farms operated by or under the close control of the state and that a similar percentage of industrial production comes from state-owned plants.

B. This year's just completed sugar harvest, the keystone of the Cuban economy, is not quite 5 million tons-- the lowest in many years.

1. An internal Cuban government memo on the prospects for the sugar industry states that Cuba will have only about 1.4 million tons this year to export to "the capitalist market" for convertible currencies; the rest is committed to the bloc and to domestic consumption. This will not only exhaust stocks carried over from last year but there will be no carry-over to next year.

2. The memo, sent by the director of Cuba's Consolidated Sugar Enterprise to Minister of Industries Che Guevara, predicts poor crops for 1963 and 1964.

3. The poor sugar prospects highlight what has been one of the most immediate economic problems--the shortage of foreign exchange to finance needed imports from the Free World of foodstuffs and replacement parts for Western-made machinery. Cuba's main source of foreign exchange is now the 20% of the value of sugar sold to the USSR which is paid for in convertible currency, amounting to about \$50 million per year.

C. The Soviet Bloc has demonstrated its willingness to extend itself considerably to help the Cuban government ease its more pressing problems.

1. On 14 May a supplementary protocol to the Cuban-Soviet trade agreement was signed, increasing total trade between the two countries for this year to \$750 million--about \$50 million above the level called for in the protocol signed in January./1/

/1/On January 9 the Soviet Union and Cuba signed a prococol in Havana relating to reciprocal goods deliveries

that provided for a substantial increase in trade between the two countries as compared to 1961. (*American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, p. 315)

2. Since Cuba has reduced export capabilities, the increase probably involves mainly an increase in Soviet shipments of needed consumer goods to Cuba, probably financed by commodity credits.

D. The Sino-Soviet Bloc is also giving considerable support to Cuba's long-term economic development plans.

1. Sino-Soviet Bloc long-term credits to Cuba for industrial development total at least \$357 million and there are strong indications that the USSR granted Cuba an additional \$100 million credit in May.

2. A \$100 million Soviet credit given Cuba in June of last year was specifically for the development of Cuba's nickel industry. Soviet technicians have been active, though thus far apparently with only partial success, in the two Cuban nickel plants confiscated by the Castro regime in 1960, one of them, at Nicaro, US-government owned.

3. Except for light industrial plants set up by Czechoslovakia, most of the bloc projects in Cuba are not expected to become operational before 1963 or 1964 and have thus far had little impact on the economy.

E. In recent weeks Cuban leaders have repeatedly warned the Cuban people that they face a long period of austerity and hard work in the drive to "build socialism"; they note their gratitude for "the generous assistance" provided by the Soviet Bloc, but emphasize that the future depends on the Cubans themselves.

1. Castro announced on 31 May that it will take ten years to solve Cuba's housing problems.

2. Numerous sessions of "criticism and self-criticism" have resulted in frank admissions by Cuban leaders for past shortcomings in economic management and in assurances to the people that these "errors" are being overcome "on all fronts."

VII. For the past three and a half years, the Castro regime has been engaged in a massive military buildup, supported by more than 30 major shipments of bloc military equipment bringing in some 70,000 tons of material for the ground and air forces.

A. The ground forces now total about 75,000.

1. The regular ground forces are supported by a large ready-reserve force of about 100,000.

B. Bloc military deliveries have included field and anti-aircraft artillery, heavy and medium tanks, rocket launchers, and thousands of modern small arms as well as military vehicles.

C. Aircraft delivered have included at least 40 MIG jet fighters, at least 20 helicopters, 12 prop trainers, and 12 transports.

D. This year the Cuban navy has received its first bloc equipment in the form of six Khronstadt-class submarine chasers and 12 motor torpedo boats.

E. Introduction of bloc equipment has made it necessary to send numerous Cubans to the bloc for training, and to bring Soviet and Czech military personnel to Cuba to supervise assembly and instruction.

F. The capabilities of the Cuban armed forces have increased steadily, and now probably surpass those of any other Latin American country.

1. During 1961, the armed forces were subjected to a thorough reorganization, as units of the former civilian militia merged with regular army units to form a more centralized body.

2. The Cuban armed forces, however, still have little offensive capability outside Cuba, and the equipment sent them by the bloc has not included some items, such as bombers, required for offensive capability.

G. The Soviet Union is not believed to have sent to Cuba any guided missiles or nuclear weapons; it is possible that some surface-to-air missiles are to be delivered to Cuba, but none are believed to have arrived thus far. On 2 July Raul Castro, who is Minister of Armed Forces, arrived in Moscow, probably seeking additional weapons.

VIII. Czech police technicians took part in the reorganization of the Cuban government's police machinery.

A. The Department of State Security within the Ministry of Interior is now the instrument for domestic control.

B. The most pervasive arm of the security apparatus is the network of Revolutionary Defense Committees. According to regime leaders, more than 100,000 of these informant groups have been organized throughout the country.

IX. Cuban foreign policies are dictated by the government's dependence on the Soviet Union.

A. Wherever possible, the Cubans have sought to avoid confronting the issue of Sino-Soviet rivalry; when pressed, however, they have adopted the Soviet position.

B. Cuba's voting record in the UN General Assembly clearly demonstrates its adherence to the Soviet positions.

1. On 37 roll-call votes during the first half of the 16th session of the General Assembly, Cuba voted with the Soviet Bloc 33 times; in the other four cases, one or the other abstained. On five important issues, including the vote appealing to the Soviet Union not to explode a 50-megaton bomb, Cuba was the only country voting with the ten formal members of the Soviet Bloc.

C. Cuba maintains diplomatic relations at the embassy level with all Sino-Soviet Bloc countries except East Germany; it exchanges "missions" not designated as embassies with the latter to avoid a complete rupture with Bonn.

1. The new Soviet ambassador in Havana, Aleksandr Alexseyev, appointed on 11 June, has been in Soviet intelligence work for a number of years.

2. Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki has just concluded a six-day visit to Cuba.

X. Cuba is still attempting to maintain good relations with "non-aligned" governments.

A. Cuba is to attend the Cairo meeting in July of "non-aligned" nations; its conduct at previous meetings of this group in Belgrade and in Cairo was so violently anti-US and so clearly pro-Soviet as to annoy Tito, Nasser, and Nehru.

XI. The Cuban leaders have repeatedly stated that the US holds the naval base at Guantanamo Bay illegally, and that the base will at some time revert to Cuban control.

A. The Cubans maintain that they will never use force against the base but will "at the appropriate time" demand that an "international body" rule that the base be returned to Cuba.

B. The Cuban government still obtains about \$10 million annually in foreign exchange from the wages and

salaries of Cubans working on the base.

C. These workers are systematically harassed by the authorities, and the area around the base has been converted into a military defense zone.

XII. The Castro regime considers that Cuba is setting the "example" which other Latin American peoples will eventually follow in destroying the "imperialist-controlled regimes" which now "oppress" them.

A. The Castro regime has provided covert financial assistance and perhaps other types of material aid to Communist or pro-Communist opposition groups in other Latin American countries.

B. It has also provided hundreds of "scholarships" annually to Latin American students for study in Cuba, and has become a leading transit point for Latin American travel to the Sino-Soviet Bloc. In addition, frequent international gatherings in Havana bring delegates from Latin America and other parts of the world to Cuba.

C. Castro's influence in other Latin American countries has declined steadily since he came to power.

1. The Eighth Meeting of American Foreign Ministers in Punta del Este last January effectively excluded the Castro regime from participating in the Organization of American States and subsidiary organs of the inter-American system.

2. Only five Latin American countries still maintain diplomatic relations with the Castro regime. These are: Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Bolivia. Bolivia does not have any mission in Havana, but there is a Cuban mission in La Paz./2/

/2/On an otherwise blank page attached to a copy of this memorandum in the Kennedy Library, President Kennedy wrote: "Summaries of underdeveloped world. We are getting richer--Commodity prices going down--getting poorer." (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files)

350. Memorandum of Discussion

Washington, July 3, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2, DCI (McCone) Memo for the Record, 7 April-21 August 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone.

MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL,

TUESDAY, JULY 3, 1962

Met with the Attorney General for about an hour this morning; following was covered:

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

3. DCI brought up the question of the Cuba ransom committee, which had been discussed earlier by the AG with Mr. James Donovan./1/ AG indicated sympathetic attitude but did not indicate that we should at this time seek covert means of supporting or contributing to the fund raising effort of the ransom committee. AG raised the question of possibility of negotiating a "lower price", the need for negotiation by an independent negotiator whose relatives were not in prison, the possibility of meeting part of the demand with food and medicine and some money (he mentioned four or five million dollars).

/1/Reference is to James Donovan, an attorney who became involved in renewed negotiations with the Cuban

Government concerning the possible release of the prisoners held in Cuba who were captured during the Bay of Pigs invasion.

DCI stated that on the one hand, from the humanitarian standpoint and the preserving of the goodwill and support of the 1400 prisoners and their several thousand relatives and followers, it appeared important to secure their early release as the group would be a very valuable asset at some future time when the Castro regime collapsed. On the other hand, DCI pointed out that the payment of either money or food would probably prolong the existence of the Castro regime possibly for such an extended period that the regime would become permanent in Cuba. Subject was left for further discussion; however, it was agreed that this question would be compartmented and would not be discussed with others in CIA, DOD, or State who are active in Cuban operations.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

John A. McCone/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

351. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)

Washington, July 5, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Top Secret; Sensitive; NoFORN; Special Handling. An attached distribution list indicates that seven copies of the memorandum were prepared. Copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatrick, Lemnitzer, and McCone. One copy was kept by Lansdale.

SUBJECT

Progress, Operation Mongoose

President in Mexico. State reported that President Kennedy's visit to Mexico greatly enhanced U.S. good-will in Mexico, was marked by the absence of pro-Castro propaganda, and fulfilled U.S. plans to impress upon Castro that Mexico, upon whom the Castro regime counts as an ally, is solidly with the United States and the West. In discussions about Cuba, President Lopez Mateos expressed the Mexican view that Castro was in trouble and that his regime would fall of its own weight. President Kennedy expounded the U.S. view of the Cuban problem; State believes this should ease the way for future discussions about Cuba with the Mexicans.

Joint Communique. The joint communique issued by President Kennedy and President Lopez Mateos,^{1/} included a topic of interest to Operation Mongoose: "Both presidents reaffirmed the dedication of their countries to the ideals of individual liberty and personal dignity which constitute the foundation of a civilization which they share in common. In consonance with their dedication to these ideals and acting always as sovereign and independent countries, which decide their own policies and their own courses of action, they propose to respect and maintain the principles of non-intervention--whether this intervention may come from a continental or extra-continental state--and of self-determination of peoples."

^{1/}For text of the joint communique, issued on June 30, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, pp. 477-479.

The UPI reported that the Mexican press and political observers hailed this joint message as evidence of President Kennedy having "surrendered" to Mexico's policy of "hands off Cuba." In response to my query, the

Department of State said: "There were no developments resulting from the President's trip to Mexico, including the text of the joint United States-Mexico Communiqué, which alter the basic guidelines governing the Cuba project."

Operations. My visit to the Miami area included discussions with the operations staff of the CIA station, which carries the brunt of current work on Operation Mongoose. I was pleased to note that CIA has built a team which has a number of people experienced in operations into Communist-controlled areas (Europe and Asia), whose know-how strengthens the operations of people with Latin American experience. They have some problems, most of which are being resolved on the operating level. Some problems involve policy matters, which are being staffed for presentation to you.

Overall, this is a splendid effort by CIA within present guidelines. On intelligence-collection, the magnitude of the special emphasis given the operation is indicated by the presence of 45 agents now in the Habana area alone (a rather remarkable accomplishment in a Communist capital where there is no official U.S. presence). In addition, there are agents and teams in the provinces; efforts are being made to complete the provincial coverage at an early date, since there are some areas insufficiently covered now.

"Voice of Cuba." The separate CIA weekly report noted the successful initial broadcasts [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] the U.S. publication of the fact that such broadcasts were heard in the U.S., and the replay of this news back into Cuba for the general public. It is noted that UPI carried this news item, but spiced it up with added stories of Castro's use of militia against guerrillas in Matanzas. The two stories put together by UPI have no relationship in reality, and the "Voice of Cuba" broadcasts are being closely directed to fit in with other operations and to keep within Mongoose guidelines.

Diplomatic. State reports that diplomatic efforts are being made to block Cuba's application for accreditation to the European Economic Community. Similarly, efforts are being made to exclude Cuba from the proposed Latin American Free Trade area.

Contingency Planning. Rumors in mid-June of a Cuban uprising led to my tasking Defense for further contingency planning, including an inter-departmental plan. Defense reports this planning is progressing well. As an interim report, Defense notes that while the 18-day reaction time is still basic, a 9-day reaction time is feasible under certain pre-positioning and a 5-day reaction time can be undertaken with certain risks. You will be informed, when this planning is completed.

Defense Intelligence. Defense is reviewing actively its responsibilities for intelligence collection in Cuba, with a view of strengthening the effort considerably, particularly those activities under [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

Voice of America. USIA reported that VOA concentrated mostly on the President's trip to Mexico. Other telling news items were a Costa Rican labor union condemnation of the Castro tyranny, interviews with Cubans who had escaped from a concentration camp and who gave minute details of the terrible conditions, a quote from Castro's own press about chaotic administration (367 days to answer a letter from a Cuban asking permission to acquire industrial equipment), the story of Cuban students disappointed with Russian agricultural schools (VOA pointed out that Russia, with its own agricultural failures, was not in a position to teach others), and an interview with a person from Cardenas where the recent hunger demonstration led to a big Castro military show of force.

352. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, July 14, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Elder.

The following is taken from DCI notes used at the meeting on 12 July of the Special Group (Augmented):

We know a lot about Cuba and the following are the essential elements in our assessment of the present situation:

1. Cuba belongs to Castro.
2. Castro is apparently strengthening his military forces, and photography and other intelligence have added to our knowledge of the size, composition and deployment of his forces.
3. Police security appears to be good.
4. Popular support for Castro has been substantially diminished.
5. Castro has a number of serious problems including, general economic situation, food, spare parts and lack of competent management of industries and agriculture.
6. No splits are apparent in the top leadership.
7. We have no penetration at the top.

WElder

Executive Assistant/DCI

353. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Hurwitch) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin)

Washington, July 18, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7-1962. Top Secret. Also addressed to Goodwin.

SUBJECT

Future Courses of Action with respect to Cuba

The members of the Mongoose Operations Group have been requested to submit by July 20 the factors they think should be considered by the Special Group with respect to each of the following four possible future courses of action regarding Cuba:

- a. Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation; protect Hemisphere from it or
- b. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without overt U.S. military commitment, or
- c. Commit U.S. to help Cubans overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, with a step-by-step phasing to ensure success, including the use of U.S. military force if required at the end, or
- d. Use a provocation and overthrow the Castro-Communist regime by U.S. military force.

General Lansdale plans to submit a composite of these factors (including, I presume, his own views) to the

Special Group. He has informed me that General Taylor intends to invite Secretaries Rusk and McNamara to attend the Special Group meeting when these courses of action are to be discussed. Final recommendations would then, presumably, be submitted to the President.

Preliminary discussion of these courses of action in the Operations Group reveals that the CIA and Defense representatives favor prior commitment to employ U.S. military force; General Lansdale appears to waver, although I believe he feels his task would be greatly simplified if such a commitment could be obtained; the USIA representative thinks it important that a decision be made regarding use of military force, although he has not indicated his preference.

In my opinion, the concentration of attention upon the employment of U.S. military force against Cuba runs counter to the basic concept of Mongoose which is to bring down the Castro regime from within. In the Department, we have recognized the contingency that U.S. military force may be required, and perhaps could be feasibly employed from a political standpoint if a virtual civil war situation existed in Cuba, where anti-Castro forces held substantial territory, appealed for U.S. assistance, and we recognized these forces as the Government of Cuba.

Mr. Harvey (CIA) at the last Operation Group meeting expressed as his considered judgment that a revolt could eventually be mounted in Cuba. By revolt, however, he meant an assault upon a number of Cuban Government installations, including some in the provinces. He did not think that such assaults could be organized in a fashion where anti-Castro forces held territory for any length of time or could overthrow the regime without outside military assistance.

There is clearly a gap between the present CIA estimate of what it can accomplish and what we feel should be the minimum condition in Cuba where we might consider using U.S. military force. Nevertheless, the situation in Cuba is volatile and unpredictable and CIA may be more successful than it presently estimates to be the case. If, or as we proceed with Operation Mongoose, we should recognize that the pressure within the Executive to employ U.S. military force will become increasingly intense.

I could recommend that the course of action we follow for the indefinite future be the following modification of (b) above:

"Exert all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and other pressures to overthrow the Castro regime without prior commitment to employ U.S. military forces overtly, recognizing however that contingencies may arise where employment of U.S. military force might be considered."

There is attached for appropriate approval, the Department's contribution that I would propose be included in the Operation Group's paper regarding the four courses of action.

Attachment

Memorandum

a. Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation; protect Hemisphere from it.

Comment

Cuba will probably be mis-managed for the next year or two, even if we did nothing to exacerbate the situation. The spectacle of a mis-managed Cuba with a discontented population would damage the Soviet, communist, and Castro images in the Hemisphere and elsewhere. Cuba would remain an economic and to some extent political burden for the Bloc. If course (a) were adopted, the U.S. could seek to accommodate itself to the presence in the Hemisphere of a nation closely aligned with the Bloc, at the same time attempt to persuade the regime to adopt a

more neutralist course without necessarily altering its internal structure.

If this course were adopted, it should be recognized that 1) the Castro regime would be enabled to consolidate its internal position at its own pace; eventually to improve its economic situation with Bloc and perhaps other assistance, thereby enhancing its image; and to continue to engage in and eventually increase its subversive activity in the Hemisphere, which we would probably not be able to control effectively; 2) Cuba may become a base of military operations against the U.S.; 3) the morale of anti-Castro Cubans, both in and out of Cuba, would be destroyed; and 4) the possibility of the Castro regime being replaced in the foreseeable future by one less hostile to the U.S. would be very remote.

b. Exert all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without prior U.S. military commitment.

Comment

If this course were adopted, the Castro regime would be kept off balance and forced to employ some of its resources defensively. The economic situation would probably continue to deteriorate and popular discontent would probably mount. Isolated anti-Castro manifestations would occur and be repressed. Cuba under these circumstances would be an unattractive model.

Constant pressure upon the regime might produce sufficiently broad popular disaffection, active resistance and intrigue at top governmental levels to cause a change in the regime or possibly bring about a situation of virtual civil war under circumstances in which it might prove politically feasible for the U.S. to intervene with force.

If this course were adopted, it should be recognized that 1) this could be a long term program in which the overthrow of the Castro regime would not be guaranteed; 2) barring the unforeseen, further overt U.S. diplomatic and economic actions against Cuba are limited in scope; 3) Cuban recruits are reluctant to risk their lives in fomenting disorders without a commitment that U.S. military force will be employed if necessary; and 4) Cuba could still act against the Hemisphere although its effectiveness would be continually reduced.

c. Commit U.S. to help Cubans overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, with a step-by-step phasing to ensure success, including the use of U.S. military force if required at the end.

Comment

If this course were adopted, the overthrow of the Castro regime could probably be brought about.

If this course were adopted, it should be recognized that 1) employment of U.S. military force in Cuba under circumstances that are considered unjustified under international law would constitute intervention, would place us in violation of the UN and OAS charters, would cause grave adverse repercussions in the Hemisphere, would probably jeopardize the Alliance for Progress program and could make us the object of Rio Treaty Article 6 action; 2) the world situation may be such that it would be politically and military unfeasible for us to fulfill a commitment to employ U.S. military force; 3) such a commitment to Cuban exiles would become quickly and widely known and this could seriously complicate our relations with a number of friendly nations; 4) such a commitment could enable the Cuban exiles to "call the tune" and place the U.S. in an untenable position; 5) knowledge of a commitment to employ U.S. military force would solidify internal support for Castro at least in the short term; 6) if U.S. military force is employed, the Bloc would probably exert strong pressure in areas of the world important to the U.S. national interest and where U.S. military force may have to be made available; 7) as the phases progress, the "noise level" would increase substantially and the U.S. must be prepared to defend convincingly in international forums against charges of plotting to overthrow another government.

d. Use a provocation and overthrow the Castro-Communist regime by U.S. military force.

Comment

Without a description of the provocation, it is not possible to comment intelligently. It should be noted that with respect to the employment of U.S. military force many of the considerations described in (c) above are applicable, only more so./1/

/1/On July 19 Martin passed on Hurwitch's memorandum to Johnson, with a covering memorandum indicating that Martin had approved the Hurwitch memorandum as the Department of State contribution to the requested policy review. Martin noted that, in his opinion: "The suggested re-statement of course (b) contained in the attached memorandum is good, I think, and ARA would hope that there might emerge from the Phase I review a policy statement such as that." He asked Johnson to look over the Hurwitch memorandum before it was submitted to General Lansdale. (Ibid.)

354. Memorandum of Discussion

Washington, July 18, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2, DCI (McCone) Memo for the Record, 7 April-21 August 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone on July 19.

MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION AT DINNER ON THE EVENING OF WEDNESDAY, JULY 18, 1962, WITH MR. ROBERT KENNEDY

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

3. The Cuban situation was reviewed in considerable detail, AG expressing the opinion that the last six months' effort had been worthwhile inasmuch as we had gained a very substantial amount of intelligence which was lacking, but that the effort was disappointing inasmuch as the program had not advanced to the point we had hoped. He urged intensified effort but seemed inclined to let the situation "worsen" before recommending drastic action. We discussed several leaders such as *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* however, there was no specific recommendation as to whom we should support or who represented the most dynamic leadership of the Cuban group.

4. Cuban ransoms. The pros and cons of this proposal were discussed in some considerable detail. We both agreed that the sixty two million dollar figure must be negotiated downward and that we should offer our sympathetic interest in the idea of seeking release of the prisoners. I pointed out the injunctions placed upon us by Congress and stated it would be impossible to use CIA funds until these injunctions were removed. The AG brought up the question of Robert Anderson chairing the committee reported on June 27th, and he stated that unless Anderson agreed to chair the committee he thought there would be little interest on the part of the Cubans in pursuing this effort. I pointed out the studies indicated that substantial financial contributions for ransom would perpetuate the Castro regime. Nevertheless we both felt that it was desirable to secure the release of the prisoners if possible. It was decided that I would talk with Anderson and try to get him to accept the chairmanship of the committee, would indicate sympathetic interest in the movement and a desire to help, but would make no commitment of either financial help or help with food. If Anderson accepted then I would discuss the subject with the President and with the appropriate people on the Hill, seek removal of the commitment made last year which enjoins us from financial assistance of such actions to secure prisoner release. In the meantime Anderson (assuming that he assumes the chairmanship) would seek to reduce the figures set by Castro and then we would decide upon a course of action.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

John A. McCone/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

355. Memorandum From the Department of State Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Hurwitch) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)

Washington, July 19, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 7/62. Top Secret. None of the annexes is printed.

I. What we hoped to accomplish in Phase I

A--Increase U.S. intelligence with respect to Cuba and Cuban activities in the Hemisphere.

B--Undertake as many political, economic, psychological and other actions as feasible, designed to weaken the Castro regime and isolate it from the rest of the Hemisphere.

II. What was accomplished in Phase I

A--With reference to A above, the following were accomplished:

1. An increased number of reports from friendly embassies in Habana and improved mechanism for distribution of these reports to agencies concerned.
2. Greater vigilance on the part of our embassies and improved reporting on Cuban activities throughout the world.
3. Regular de-briefing of U.S. and foreign newsmen as well as foreign diplomats who have visited or are posted in Cuba.
4. An improved program of acquisition of Cuban newspapers and other publications.
5. Provision of a list of U.S. citizens now in the U.S. who have lived in Cuba, as possible sources of intelligence information.
6. Publication and dissemination of several intelligence reports covering Cuba (as well as contributions to USIB reports).

B--With respect to B above, the following were accomplished:

1. Political

- a. As a result of the major U.S. effort at the Punta del Este meeting, Cuba was excluded from the OAS, and two Special Committees were established to deal with Cuban-Communist subversion. (For the actions taken to implement the Punta del Este decisions, please see Annex #1.)
- b. Fifteen American republics no longer maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba.
- c. Overwhelming defeat in the UN of Cuban sponsored resolutions charging U.S. with planning an invasion of Cuba.

d. As a result of efforts by the Secretary and Mr. Rostow, NATO has become more aware of U.S. concern over Cuba. No significant actions that might materially affect the situation in Cuba are expected from NATO in the near future, however, since NATO continues generally to regard Cuba as a U.S. problem.

e. A wide variety of conversations held both by Embassy officers throughout the Hemisphere and by Departmental officers in Washington with government officials, politicians, labor, student and other groups have constituted an important factor in their greater awareness of Castro-Communist subversive techniques as well as their increasingly low opinion of Castro and Castroism. These conversations have contributed to influencing the policies of the governments concerned and stimulating a large number of anti-Castro statements throughout the Hemisphere which were then exploited for their propaganda value (for a sampling of such statements, please see Annex #2).

f. The President's trip to Mexico which demonstrated dramatically for the Castro regime the close relationship between the peoples and governments of the two nations.

g. Special reference to the plight of the Cuban people by Latin American clergy during religious services.

h. Examples of labor activity include a symbolic work stoppage in Costa Rica on 7 January 1962 designed to call attention to the plight of Cuban laborers. The Archbishop instructed priests to toll church bells at the beginning and end of the five-minute period. On 3 June 1962 in Venezuela, Jose Gonzalez Navarro, President of the Venezuelan Federation of Labor, decried conditions in Cuba and organized demonstrations in support of President Betancourt. In July 1962 a Chilean labor leader, recently returned from Cuba, spoke of the disillusionment in Cuba. During February 1962, seventeen Secretaries General of Campesino Unions in La Paz approved a resolution against Cuba. In March the La Paz Federation of Teachers chastised the Bolivian National Federation for its pro-Castro attitude. In January 1962 the Venezuelan Labor Confederation adopted a resolution condemning the Communist dictatorship in Cuba and, finding the Cuban CTC not a free labor movement, abrogated its mutual assistance pact of 1960. In April 1962 the National Congress of Bolivian Railroad Workers rejected a resolution supporting the Castro regime. A number of other actions, initiated outside this project, are designed to assist Latin American Unions and will contribute indirectly to this project.

i. Instructions to all posts emphasizing the importance of developing youth assets in the cold war struggle and urging the inclusion of student and other leaders in the exchange of persons program.

j. Instructions to block Cuban accreditation to the ECE.

k. Instructions to deny Cuban participation in the ILO.

l. Instructions to block Cuban entry into the proposed Latin American Free Trade Area.

m. Examples of actions initiated outside of the project which contribute indirectly include arrangements for sending eight U.S. coaches to thirteen Latin American countries for a period of three weeks in each country to assist in training for the Caribbean games and world-wide guidance on the Helsinki Youth Conference, to which the Cubans reportedly plan to send a large delegation.

2. Economic

a. U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba.

b. General decline of trade between the free world and Cuba. (While a variety of factors have contributed to this situation, U.S. Embassy activities in this field have made a substantial contribution to the decline in trade. For a list of specific actions taken, please see Annex #3.)

- c. Tightening of transshipment controls, particularly in Canada and Mexico.
- d. Extension of technical data controls to include Cuba.
- e. Extension of U.S. Customs control procedures to U.S. ports in addition to Miami for the purpose of guarding against transshipment of U.S. goods to Cuba.
- f. Application to Cuban or Cuban-chartered vessels of port security measures in force for Soviet Bloc vessels.
- g. Denial of bunkering facilities at U.S. ports to vessel under Sino-Soviet Bloc charter carrying cargo between Cuba and Bloc ports.
- h. In the early stages of the project an inter-agency committee consisting of representatives of State, Commerce, Treasury and CIA met to explore further possibilities of economic action against Cuba. As a result of following up with the individual members, the above listed actions were accomplished. Mention should be made of the thorough study undertaken to determine the feasibility of entering the tanker charter market. The results of this study indicated that since there was an over-supply of tankers, preclusive action on our part would prove very expensive without compensatory effect. It is difficult to predict when opportunities might arise in the Cuban situation in which economic warfare would be effective. If Cuba's convertible currency position continues to deteriorate (and the poor sugar crop would so augur), we can look for a continued decline in trade between Cuba and the free world, thus reducing the opportunities (and perhaps necessity) for economic warfare. Nonetheless, we should develop this capability in advance, so that opportunities, when and if they arise, can be exploited.

3. Psychological

(The Department chairs a working-level inter-agency psychological warfare committee which supports the Cuba project, although it is not an organic part of the operation. The Committee coordinates the propaganda activities of the agencies involved, determines themes for exploitation and assigns operational responsibility.)

The principal themes that have been emphasized are:

- a. the failures and betrayed promises of the Castro regime;
- b. the suppression of human rights, economic deterioration and social injustice in Cuba;
- c. Cuba's domination by Communism and alignment with the Sino-Soviet Bloc;
- d. Cuban subversive attempts elsewhere in the Hemisphere;
- e. Cuba's isolation from the rest of the Hemisphere;
- f. opposition to Cuba at international conferences;
- g. activities of democratic anti-Castro groups;
- h. the Castro regime is not permanent.

The Committee has had a role in bringing about the following accomplishments:

- a. Indictment of the Prensa Latina representative in New York.

- b. Exposure of author Waldo Frank's acceptance of money from the Cuban Government.
- c. Exploitation of the poor quality of Soviet Bloc medicines in Cuba.
- d. Widely distributed pamphlet on the subversion of the University of Habana.
- e. Effective anti-Castro activity at the UNESCO-ECLA conference on education in Santiago, Chile, March 1962.
- f. Exposure of the Cuban "troika" attempt to appear pro-Western, neutralist and pro-Communist at the same time.
- g. Publicized Cuban charge declared Persona Non Grata by Philippine Government in October 1961.
- h. Dissemination of reports on Cuban attempts to subvert a peaceful solution of the Dominican problem after Trujillo's assassination.
- i. Establishment of a program under which U.S. Embassies in Latin America forward clippings from all available publications, which indicate anti-Castro attitudes.
- j. Compilation of material for magazine length article on Cuba in all languages by Readers Digest.
- k. U.S. television programs on Cuba.

4. Refugee Matters

- a. Cuban Groups--Since the adoption of the policy of open liaison with the CRC and other exile groups, the Department has been the focal point of innumerable visits from Cuban exiles who raise a wide variety of problems. The Department uses these visits to re-assure exiles that Cuba has not been abandoned and to resolve policy problems as they arise. Constant liaison is maintained with HEW. At present, the Department is assisting in the arrangements for the training of a small group of exile military officers at advanced US military schools.
- b. Pan-American Airways is seeking financial assistance through the Department to ameliorate the loss PAA sustains from its Miami-Habana-Miami run. PAA reports it has 2,500,000 pesos in Habana which it is unable to convert and that this sum is increasing at the rate of approximately 900,000 pesos annually. In addition, PAA maintains it loses approximately \$1,000 a day operationally, since their aircraft fly to Habana virtually empty. PAA appears reluctant to continue the service indefinitely without US assistance. The Department believes that since the PAA flights are the main avenue of escape for anti-Castro Cubans, the US has an interest in seeing that the flights are maintained both from the standpoint of our public posture and of intelligence collection. Investigation of the availability of funds for this purpose, including discussions with the CAB, have not proved fruitful to date.
- c. Prisoner Exchange--The Department has assisted the Cuban Families Committee to the extent possible in the Committee's efforts to obtain the release of the Brigade prisoners. Tax deductibility was arranged and official public statements favoring its efforts were stimulated. During the trials public statements from a number of Latin American Presidents and from the Prime Minister of Canada urging humanitarian treatment were arranged and were probably largely responsible for the fact that no death sentences were passed. Indirect efforts to obtain the prisoners' release in exchange for food were attempted through the Cuban UN Ambassador and through the Families Committee.

III. Operational Estimates

Political and Economic

Given the present attitude toward the Cuban problem of friendly nations in the Hemisphere and elsewhere, and barring the unforeseen, the potential for accomplishing significant and effective, new, overt political and economic measures against Cuba (unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally) appears limited. In the economic field, there may arise opportunities when we might covertly engage in economic warfare with good effect. The present unavailability of funds specifically designed for economic warfare purposes would prevent us from taking advantage of such opportunities.

Robert A. Hurwitch/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Hurwitch signed the original.

356. Memorandum From the United States Information Agency Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Wilson) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)

Washington, July 20, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 7/62. Top Secret.

The following information is supplied for inclusion in your report on Phase I, Operation Mongoose.

1. Our objectives during this period were: (1) to utilize all media in mobilizing public opinion in the other countries of Latin America against the Castro/Communist domination of the Cuban people by demonstrating its failure to satisfy the aspirations of the people, by its totalitarian nature and by its subservience to Sino/Soviet policy dictates, and (2) to utilize short wave radio directed at Cuba in order to maintain overt communications with the Cuban people and to assist in undermining their support for and confidence in their Castro/Communist rulers.

Specific tasks assigned to USIA within the general framework of the two principal objectives included those of exploiting Castro defectors and children refugees, examining and reporting on medium wave broadcast and strato-vision possibilities and research on musical and visual symbols.

2. Accomplishments during Phase I.

During this phase reporting from our field posts and limited public opinion surveys indicate a continuing decline of Castro's public prestige among the general public in Latin America. However, this does not mean that we feel there is any general repudiation of Castro and, much less, that there is any strong upsurge in public support for the need for action against Castro. The present general attitude might best be described as "negatively apathetic." (A subsequent memorandum from USIA/1/ indicates that these surveys are based on broad samplings in seven Latin American countries. The usual scientific sampling technique was applied, as in the Dominican Republic where 814 persons were contacted.)

/1/Not found.

We assigned a full-time representative to Opa Locka. His duties have been to identify and develop the most exploitable material from the refugees who go through that center. He has also made a continuing appraisal of VOA programing and reception.

The principal themes upon which we concentrated during this phase were:

A. Economic. Our heaviest continuing output has concentrated on the deteriorating economic situation and the consequent failure of the Castro regime to satisfy the needs of the Cuban people. Media content has relied heavily on our Miami office which has supplied a constant flow of interviews with arriving refugees. Particular emphasis has been placed on the bungling management by the Cuban Communists. Parallels with agricultural failures in the Soviet Union and famine conditions in Red China have also been utilized in order to pin Cuban failures on the Communist system. The power struggle between Castro and the old line Communists has also been treated, not as an ideological struggle, but rather as another cause of economic chaos and inefficiency in running the government.

B. Refugees. The refugee situation received heavy play by our Press Service and the Voice of America. Several interviews per week were used, stressing chaotic economic conditions, rising unemployment and food shortages. Special attention was given to the fact that the refugee groups now include growing numbers of negroes and persons from the lower income groups--people on whom Castro had depended for his initial support.

C. Labor. We have stressed in our general media output the repression of the labor movement under the Castro regime with specific emphasis on lower pay, longer hours and growing unemployment in Cuba. On this theme we have been particularly successful in Venezuela where the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (COV) is distributing our materials on the Cuban situation.

D. Students & Intellectuals. This has been the most difficult target group to work on. Paradoxically, this group appears to be the least susceptible to logical and reasoned appeal. The Castro problem is so highly charged emotionally that no broad avenue of approach has yet been found. The themes which have been helpful in building a negative attitude in the general public--revulsion at mass executions, immediate, concrete economic hardships, attacks on the Church and the social structure, regimentation of labor and other infringements of individual liberties--have not proved particularly effective with this group. Castro's Messianic appeal to this group elicits an emotional response which so far has proven most difficult to overcome. Nevertheless, we are working very hard on developing materials capitalizing on his takeover of the university and attacks on individual liberties.

E. Media products developed in support of the Operation (in addition to the usual daily and weekly output in our normal operations) have included:

(1) Books. (Spanish)

(a) Lequerica Velez--600 dias con Fidel (1,000 copies)

An account of the Castro regime as seen by the author during his two years as Colombian Ambassador in Havana.

(b) Baeza Flores--Las Cadinan vienen de lejos (20,000 copies)

An account of the inner workings of the Castro regime and its takeover by the Communists by a Chilean journalist who worked closely with Castro in the early days of the Revolution and who later escaped to Mexico.

(c) Gilbert--El Infidel Castro (Castro l'Infidele) (6,000 copies)

A French newsman's very unfavorable commentary on Castro's Cuba as he saw it in a 1961 visit.

(d) James--Cuba, 1st Soviet Satellite in America (6,000 copies)--(A Portuguese edition is now under way)

(2) In English we also distributed widely in Latin America both the James book (d above) and Theodore Draper's Castro's Revolution.

Cartoon Books. During the period we have had in production and/or distribution throughout Latin America a total of 5 million copies of the following six cartoon books:

La Estafa--(Castro's takeover of the universities)

La Punalada--(Castro's attack on the Church)

Los Secuestradores-- (Brainwashing of children)

La Mordaza--(Takeover of the press and radio)

El Despertar--(Betrayal of the land reform)

La Traicion--(Takeover of the labor movement)

Films. The Agency produced one film on Cuba during this period:

La Tierra Prometida (10 minute animated on economic failure in Cuba)--Shown in commercial theatres throughout Latin America, also by mobile film units.

Two more similar films are now in production. Exact titles are not yet available but they will cover Castro mistreatment of organized labor and children.

We also supplied newsreel clips on Cuban refugees, Ecuador's break with Cuba, the COSAC Meeting, and the Punta del Este MFM.

Radio.

(a) Broadcasts to Cuba:

Opa Locka reports indicate listenership to be high at least among this group. Short wave is, of course, always somewhat limited as we indicated in our detailed memoranda on this subject. Nevertheless, it does give us a direct channel to certain sectors of Cuban society.

Of 1370 refugees interviewed at Opa Locka in the past two months, 625 said they listened to the Voice of America and were able to identify at least one program on the Voice.

Three of the daily nine hours of Spanish broadcast by the VOA are aimed directly at Cuba. Fourteen different programs make up this package. These include news, commentary, dramatic, sports, Cuban news, agricultural, and historical features, all carrying some freight for our objectives.

(b) Broadcasts to Latin America. For radio coverage of the rest of Latin America, we depend to some extent on local retransmission of VOA shortwave feeds and, principally, on local transmission of VOA taped shows, and shows produced by our field posts. Our placement record is good and we have access to the large majority of radio listeners in the area by these means. News and commentary shows together with serialized anti-Castro and anti-Communist dramatizations are our best outlet in this medium.

Listenership surveys show our soap opera, La Garra Escondida (The Hidden Claw) to have a very high rating throughout the area. Pitched to the urban working class audience, the program is built around family life in a suburban area and the villain of all episodes is the Communist Party or Fidelista front groups.

TV. We have acquired the rights for the Armstrong Circle Theatre show--Anatomy of a Broken Promise--which is now in Spanish and Portuguese production and should be on the air throughout the area in from 30 to 60 days.

We have also acquired the rights to a half-hour West German newsreel on Cuba which is now being put into Spanish and will be circulating in a very short time.

Cuban material has also been included regularly on our fifteen minute show--Panorama Panamericano--shown weekly to 15 million people throughout the area.

Medium Wave Broadcast and Stratovision

Our evaluations of medium wave broadcasting and stratovision wave were presented to the special groups with negative recommendations for strategic, overt U.S. Government utilization. However, tactical utilization was not ruled out.

On visual symbols, in collaboration with CIA we examined a series of possibilities and concluded the worm (gusano) is the best and most widely accepted symbol for an anti-Castro campaign. CIA is now implementing this project. In an effort to develop musical themes identifiable with the resistance, we have been less fortunate. Several possibilities have been researched with all results negative thus far.

3. Potential for psychological operations.

In all psychological planning special attention should be given to avoiding, insofar as is practical, any indications which might be construed as plans to return to the status quo ante. All information output should be pointed toward reassuring the populace that the anti-Castro movement is designed to carry forward programs supporting the social and economic aspirations of the Cuban people.

Particular attention should be given to the tactical utilization of medium wave radio prior to and during any operations. Short wave radio broadcasting would also be stepped up in support of operations. Propaganda leaflets should also receive a high priority.

[4.] Immediate food distribution and medical attention programs should also be given priority because of their psychological value in enlisting local populous support for the liberating forces.

5. We do not consider items a and d feasible at this time and therefore limit our presentation to b and c./2/

/2/See Document 353 for a listing of the four possible future courses of action regarding Cuba upon which the Mongoose Operations Group was requested to comment.

Factors worth consideration in deciding on a future course:

b. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without overt U.S. military commitment.

1. Positive factors supporting this course of action would include:

- i. This would be a Cuban operation directed for and by Cubans, thus making for possibly wider acceptance from the bulk of the Cuban people.
- ii. There would be minimum static at the UN and OAS on "intervention" charges.
- iii. There would be a minimum propaganda base for exploitation of ever-present anti-Yankee sentiment in the rest

of Latin America.

iv. This operation would have a psychological advantage in forcing the various Cuban anti-Castro factions to come to a working agreement with each other rather than separate arrangements with CIA. This should provide a better psychological base for long-range political development in a free Cuba.

v. This option would provide the new GDC with a better psychological base for developing policies more responsive to the demands and aspirations of the Cuban people. (I.e., operations with overt GUS support would probably result in strong pressures from U.S. business firms and Batistianos for significant action pointing towards a return to the status quo ante.)

2. Negative factors include:

i. Failure of this operation due to U.S. nonintervention would have disastrous effects on the morale of all opposition groups in and out of Cuba.

ii. Failure would also have very negative effects on U.S. prestige and stature in the hemisphere and probably damage our position of power in regional and other international organizations.

iii. Less chance of strong moral and material support from U.S. business interests, vital to rebuilding process.

iv. Less chance of effective U.S. guidance of information media during and immediately after landings.

v. Much more difficult to control information media support in time and space after landings.

c. Commit U.S. to help Cubans overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, with a step-by-step phasing to ensure success, including the use of U.S. military force if required at the end.

1. Positive factors.

i. With a better chance of a short struggle and a clean-cut victory, psychological operations would be more easily handled and controlled.

ii. The U.S. power position and prestige in Latin America and probably the rest of the world would be greatly enhanced.

iii. U.S. guidance and direction of media content during and immediately after the operations would be facilitated.

iv. These operations would serve as a strong warning to leftist, non-communist parties in Latin America that the U.S. will not tolerate alliances with Communists. This could be effective in Bolivia, Chile and Colombia.

2. Negative factors.

i. Much more difficult to justify to world opinion in terms of traditional U.S. policy of nonintervention and respect for the rule of law.

ii. There would be a much higher noise level on intervention at the UN and OAS.

iii. It would provide the Sino-Soviets a good propaganda base for possible operations in Berlin, Laos, Quemoy, etc.

iv. It would provide a strong propaganda base for indigenous Communist group actions against pro-U.S., anti-Castro governments in neighboring countries (Colombia, Venezuela, Guatemala, Ecuador).

v. Greater difficulty in evolving a post-overthrow political ideology suitable to all elements involved. (I.e. U.S. leadership during the operation will be strongest factor holding diverse groups together and will thus probably have to combine after overthrow.)

vi. Possibility of remaining guerrilla-type operations acting on the propaganda base of anti-foreign invaders.

Donald M. Wilson/3/

Deputy Director

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Wilson signed the original.

357. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in the American Republics

Washington, July 21, 1962, 1:59 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7-2162. Secret. Drafted by Hurwitch and cleared in ARA by Martin, in CIA by Harvey, in DOD by Gilpatric, and at the White House by Bundy. Approved for transmission by Johnson. Sent to Bogot#, Caracas, Guatemala City, Panama City, San Jose, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, and Tegucigalpa, and repeated to Asuncion, Buenos Aires, La Paz, Lima, Managua, Mexico City, Montevideo, Port-au-Prince, Quito, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, and USUN. On July 20 Lansdale had complained, in a memorandum to U. Alexis Johnson, that the proposed draft of this telegram had not been cleared properly with him, before it was presented by the Department of State representative to the Special Group (Augmented) on July 19 as having been cleared with Lansdale, as well as with the other agencies represented in the group. Lansdale noted: "We want to guide and direct the actions of exile groups, but not 'cut them off at the ankles' as proposed in this message." From the details of the proposed message discussed by Lansdale, which has not been found, it is clear that the circular telegram was revised in the light of his complaints. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose)

109. Increasing number reports reaching Department indicate some Cuban exiles contemplating destruction major Cuban installations, primarily oil refineries, through bombing raids. These exiles apparently convinced Castro regime tottering, internal anti-Castro resistance well organized and time therefore ripe for such bombing raids which in their judgment would, if successful, provide necessary element increase resistance to point of overthrowing Castro regime. One such group headed by ex-Cuban pilot Matias Farias who claims group has access several bombers and he under heavy pressure from exile Cuban pilot friends "do something."

Combination reports of Castro regime difficulties and exile frustration could possibly lead some action such as bombing raids.

Department estimates destruction major Cuban installations at this time, particularly if accomplished by external means, would probably: (1) arouse Cuban nationalism and rally support for regime; (2) result intensified repression internal opposition; (3) gain sympathy for regime in many sectors world opinion on basis such raids arranged by "powerful US against helpless island;" and (4) as premature and uncoordinated effort prove ineffective as means overthrowing Castro regime.

Accordingly, Department has sought discourage Cuban exiles from such actions and taking all feasible actions prevent any bombing raids originating US territory. Since some reports indicate such raids may emanate country bordering Caribbean, action addressee posts should promptly report any developments this subject. If questioned by officials host government or local press re US attitude possible bombing raids Cuba by exiles, you should

adopt line such raids as uncoordinated effort probably premature be effective overthrow Castro regime; US not involved organizing such raids; we remain nevertheless seriously concerned over threat peace and security hemisphere posed by Castro-communist regime.

Ball

358. Memorandum From the Department of Defense Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harris) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)

Washington, July 23, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 7/62. Top Secret.

SUBJECT

End of Phase I

In response to the questions posed in your memorandum of 11 July 1962, subject: End of Phase I, /1/ I have prepared 5 paragraphs each of which is directly responsive to your questions:

/1/Not found.

1. Statement of What DOD Hoped to Accomplish During Phase I.

a. DOD hoped to provide all required support to CIA, State and USIA necessary to the accomplishment of the objectives of Operation Mongoose during Phase I.

b. DOD hoped to accomplish all the planning and essential preliminary actions necessary to establishing a decisive capability for US Military intervention in Cuba.

2. Accomplishments in Phase I.

a. Establishment of a DOD Working Group. A Brigadier General was appointed to full time duty as the DOD/JCS Representative to handle Mongoose affairs. Each of the Services, JCS Directorates and DIA appointed full time representative to serve on the Working Group. Each of these representatives has direct access to his Chief or, in the case of the Services, the Operation Deputies as well. Office space cleared for Top Secret information was established in the Joint Staff area, and secretarial help was assigned.

b. Establishment and Operation of an Interrogation Center at Opa Locka, Florida, on 15 February 1962. DOD assisted CIA in the initial planning for and the establishment of the Interrogation Center. Since the inception of the Center, the DOD has provided personnel support to the Center by furnishing 26 personnel (15 officers and 11 enlisted men) out of a total of 37 personnel manning the Center.

c. PT Boats. DOD reconditioned a PT boat for possible use by CIA. In addition, DOD obtained certain data on characteristics and costs of PT boats manufactured by other countries.

d. Voice Radio Broadcasts from a Submarine. *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* available to CIA for the conduct of voice radio broadcasts near Cuba by the CIA.

e. Overflights of Cuba. DOD has conducted several reconnaissance and photographic missions over Cuba for the CIA.

- f. Utilization of Avon-Park, Florida, by CIA as a Base for the Training of Cuban Refugees. DOD investigated the feasibility of using certain facilities at Avon-Park for the training of Cuban refugees in guerrilla warfare.
- g. *[1 line of source text not declassified]*
- h. Detail of an Officer to CIA. DOD detailed an officer to duty with CIA *[1 line of source text not declassified]*.
- i. Contingency Plan for Overt US Military Intervention in Cuba. In order to insure a decisive US military capability for overt military intervention in Cuba, CINCLANT's regular contingency plan for Cuba has been updated. Attempts are being made to reduce the reaction time required for implementation of this plan, without piecemeal commitment of US forces.
- j. Alternate Contingency Plan for Overt US Military Intervention in Cuba. CINCLANT developed an alternate plan which accomplished a reduction in reaction time but requires piecemeal commitment of forces. In order to reduce the risk inherent in such an operation CINCLANT is seeking means for reduction of the reaction time without piecemeal commitment.
- k. Cover and Deception Plan. This plan has been developed for the purpose of *[3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]*.
- l. Air Strikes Against Cuba. A plan has been developed for the use of airpower only following a national policy decision, to suppress and/or neutralize Cuban forces pending the execution of an assault or to be executed in support of an internal revolt.
- m. Air and Sea Blockade of Cuba. A plan has been developed for the complete air and sea blockade of Cuba within 48 hours after decision.
- n. Civil Affairs and Military Government. An outline plan providing guidance for the conduct of civil affairs and for a provisional military government for Cuba has been prepared.
- o. DOD's Position as to its Stake and Proposed Role in the Removal of the Communist Regime from Cuba. This paper included a statement of conditions under which Defense believes that overt military intervention in Cuba could be accomplished without leading to general war and without serious offense to public opinion.
- p. *[2 lines of source text not declassified]*
- q. Air Re-supply. Four aircraft and crews have been readied for air re-supply missions over Cuba.
- r. Risk Estimate. An estimate was prepared concerning the risk involved in air re-supply missions over Cuba.
- s. *[2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]*
- t. Military Intelligence. A detailed list of Essential Elements of Information was prepared in February 1962 covering the requirements of the Caribbean Survey Group and CINCLANT and was levied on the Intelligence Community for fulfillment. Reconnaissance activities consisting of overhead reconnaissance, air patrols, electronic collection and special operations were implemented. Specific intelligence requirements to be used in the interrogation of knowledgeable refugees covering items of military, political and economic interest were provided to the Caribbean Admission Center, Opa Locka, Florida. All information obtained from these sources was processed through the Intelligence Community's channels. The flow of information concerning Cuba has been greatly improved as a result of these efforts. However, gaps still exist, particularly in details of military order of battle. Increased efforts are being made to fill these gaps.

u. Utilization of US Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for Joint Navy/CIA Intelligence Operations. DOD investigated the possibility of using Guantanamo as a base of operations for the collection of national level intelligence, in light of the present policy limitations and possible policy changes in the future.

v. Establishment of "Patrol Posts" in the Caribbean. In response to a request from the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, DOD examined the possibility of establishing "patrol posts" in the Caribbean.

w. Psychological Operations: A survey was conducted in an attempt to increase Naval Base Guantanamo's role in psychological operations. As a result special OSD funds were made available for special baseball sportscasts over the base radio station.

3. Operational Estimate of the Potential for Intelligence Collection.

a. Reconnaissance--a summary of the Cuban reconnaissance operation is given below:

COMPLETED

Vehicle: WV-2Q

Code Word: Melrose

Frequency: 13

Vehicle: A3D-2P/2Q

Code Word: Fitbolt

Frequency: 4

Vehicle: USS Moale

Code Word: Operation

Frequency: 19 Mar-12 Apr 62

Vehicle: RB 47

Code Word:

Frequency: 1 May 62

Vehicle: Submarine/UDU

Code Word:

Frequency: 5-6 May 62

CONTINUING

Vehicle: F3D-2Q

Code Word: Call Money

Frequency: 6-11 per month

Vehicle: AD-5Q

Code Word: Sleepwalker

Frequency: 2 per month

Vehicle: C-130

Code Word: Quick Fox

Frequency: 10 per month

Vehicle: A3D-2P

Code Word:

Frequency: 6-8 per month

Vehicle: Navy DD

Code Word:

Frequency: daily

Vehicle: Navy P-2V

Code Word:

Frequency: twice daily

In addition to these, there are two special operations per month. The results of all this reconnaissance are satisfactory as far as producing air and navy order of battle information. However, against ground order of battle, they are not able to contribute too much.

b. Refugee Interrogation--Although the quantity of refugees processed at Opa Locka has not diminished, the quality of the information that they have available is not as good as in the past. Particularly in the area of military intelligence, very few refugees can make major contributions. Occasionally, they do fill some gaps in military intelligence and they make considerable contribution in other areas. Therefore, this effort should be continued.

c. Electronic Intelligence--The existing program is producing limited information; however, it is suffering from not only the insufficiency of the effort but also from the recent shift to more sophisticated communication systems by the Cubans. The approved new program should overcome these difficulties and provide increased information in the following areas:

Organization and deployment of Cuban Army, Navy, Air Force and Militia.

Troop, ship and air movements.

Tactics and training Cuban armed forces.

Patrolling and policing information on locations, installation or equipment.

Materiel employed by Armed Forces.

Evidence of Sino-Soviet Bloc technical support, training, volunteers and of the presence of Sino-Soviet military materiel (vessels) or aircraft.

Activities of Department of State security.

Evidences of GOC interception of Cuban resistance forces communications.

Clandestine operations of Cuban government in the United States and other American Republics.

Information on sabotage, dissident activity and defection of Cuban ships and/or personnel.

Restrictive or punitive policies to be applied to Cuban nationals or their property in Cuba.

Strikes, slow-downs and labor problems.

Location and movements of principal Cuban government, military and para-military personalities.

Plots against prominent figures.

Reactions to probes, special activities and reconnaissance flights.

Surveillance of the possible operations against Naval Base at Guantanamo.

Organization, deployment and capability of Cuban communications.

d. Clandestine--The Intelligence Community has put considerable effort into improving their clandestine collection capabilities against the target island. However, these operations suffer from the lack of a definite target date and objective. With an open-end operation, such as Project Mongoose, specific military order of battle information is largely perishable especially when the Armed Forces are in a constant state of reorganization, re-groupment and redeployment. About 25 per cent of all reports on Cuba received from clandestine sources prove to be of definite value.

Collection of information through third-country sources varies widely as to quality. The number and competence of observers and the specific collection requirement levied on the third-country source determine the value of the information obtained. Some very valuable information on specific items has resulted from this effort and this source should continue to be exploited.

e. Summary--Our knowledge of Cuban military order of battle, especially ground order of battle, has dropped off considerably in recent weeks. Changes in unit organization and in the numbering system as well as the militia nature of the organization itself make OB material perishable. Until such time as a definite target date and objective is set making it possible to inject a sufficient quantity of trained observers into the area with specific targets, this situation will probably continue.

4. Estimate of the Potential for Military Operations within Cuba--Should a policy decision be made to militarily intervene in Cuba, the U.S. could:

a. With 18 days of preparation, execute a coordinated airborne-amphibious assault which it is anticipated would gain control of key military installations and the principal centers of population of Cuba within [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] and result in minimum US and Cuban casualties.

b. Should the situation demand, a piecemeal commitment of US forces could be made with reaction times approximately as follows:

2 Airborne Divisions--5 days (para-drop units only)

4 Marine BLTs--7-8 days

Following Forces--15-18 days

(This operation would involve a dangerous element of risk.)

c. [*4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*]

d. Air strikes could be conducted against selected targets in Cuba within 6, 12 or 24 hours; the time dependent upon aircraft availability and desired intensity of attack.

e. Air-sea blockade can be initiated within 24 hours with effectiveness increasing to a complete blockade within approximately 48 hours.

5. Factors Worth Considering in Deciding on One of the Following Four Courses of Action for the United States to Follow in Relation to Cuba:

a. Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation; protect Hemisphere from it.

Advantages

(1) This would be temporarily economical in terms of funds, equipment and allocation of forces.

(2) It would demonstrate the US devotion to the principle of non-intervention.

Disadvantages

(1) This would be an acceptance of a Communist bridgehead in the Western Hemisphere and an admission that there was nothing that the United States could or would do about it.

(2) This would be damaging to the prestige of the United States and would weaken the will to resist or fight against communism in Cuba, Latin America and elsewhere.

(3) It would increase the probability of the establishment of Soviet military base(s) in Cuba which could ultimately prove to be an unacceptable threat to the security of the United States.

(4) It would become increasing difficult to protect the United States or the Western Hemisphere as Cuban military force capabilities increase.

(5) It would prevent the United States from assuming a posture which would permit exploitation of any "breaks" that may develop within Cuba.

(6) It would permit the Castro Communist regime to consolidate its gains and become even more firmly

entrenched.

(7) It might encourage the Communist regime to become even more bold in exporting communism to Latin America.

(8) It would permit the Castro regime to prepare at its own pace the exportation of their revolution of other Latin American countries.

(9) It could eventually cost billions of dollars as US defense forces would have to be developed or shifted to meet the increasing threat from the South.

(10) It would virtually assure the permanent existence of a Communist base for subversion and espionage throughout the Western Hemisphere.

b. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological and other pressures to overthrow the Castro Communist regime without overt US military commitment.

Advantages

(1) Would demonstrate US devotion to the principle of non-intervention.

(2) Would be in accord with the UN charter and stated US policy regarding the non-use of military force in settling disputes.

(3) Depending upon the success of the pressures, in the short term, it would conserve US military forces and resources.

Disadvantages

(1) Except in matter of degree, this has essentially been the US policy since the severance of relations on 3 January 1962, and it has not been successful.

(2) This would give the Soviets time to develop Cuba as a base for operations throughout the Western Hemisphere.

(3) It would give the Communists further time to develop military bases which could cost the United States billions of dollars in developing appropriate defenses.

(4) This would require that US military resources and forces be tied up indefinitely to protect the Hemisphere against the continuing Communist threat.

(5) This would permit the continued indoctrination of Cuban Youth and the progressive strengthening of the internal police state and military forces. These would combine to make the threat to internal revolt more remote and the price of US intervention more costly.

c. Commit the United States to help the Cubans to overthrow the Castro Communist regime, with a step-by-step phasing to ensure success, including the use of US military force if required.

Advantages

(1) Would permit the United States to control the timing of operations against Cuba and permit a progressive build-up which could be modified or terminated as circumstances require.

- (2) It would eventually show that we are willing to back anti-communist efforts and it would reaffirm the Monroe Doctrine.
- (3) US action against Cuba would be more acceptable to world opinion as it would cast the United States in the role of aiding Cuban freedom fighters.
- (4) Widespread revolution would simplify some of the problems of military intervention.
- (5) Revolution could produce leaders from within Cuba who could constitute the new Cuban government.
- (6) It would furnish new hope and incentive to anti-communist elements inside and outside of Cuba.
- (7) It would be economical in terms of military resources and forces by obtaining maximum support from the Cubans.
- (8) It would assure the eventual ousting of the Castro Communist regime.

Disadvantages

- (1) The time involved in this course permits additional Cubans to be indoctrinated thereby creating more problems during the invasion and after.
 - (2) Contains the danger of "telegraphing the punch" and thereby putting Castro and the Soviets on notice, which could result in counter-action and possible escalation if the Sino Soviet Bloc provides open assistance. Furthermore, the longer US intervention is delayed, the higher the cost will be in American lives.
 - (3) This course would further antagonize die-hard non-intervention elements within Latin America.
 - (4) This would require the United States to establish, control, support and manipulate front organizations, develop Cuban leadership and run covert training and operations which carry the risk of extreme national embarrassment.
- d. Use a provocation and overthrow the Castro Communist regime by US military forces.

Advantages

- (1) Would permit the United States to take action against Cuba at a time and place of our own choosing.
- (2) Chances of premature disclosure and compromise, compared with other courses of action, would be reduced.
- (3) It would demonstrate to anti-communists throughout the world the US determination to oppose communism.
- (4) It would reaffirm our adherence to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine.
- (5) It would stop further communist indoctrination of Cubans.
- (6) It would eliminate the possibility of Soviet bases being established in Cuba.
- (7) It would eliminate the utilization of Cuba as a base of subversion throughout the Western Hemisphere.
- (8) It would eliminate the possible requirement for a major outlay of funds in preparing to meet in increasing

threat from Cuba.

Disadvantages

(1) Without a truly plausible provocative act, the United States would pay a very considerable price in terms of world opinion.

(2) It could inspire Soviet counter-action in other areas.

(3) This course of action is contrary to the UN charter and the non-intervention doctrine enunciated at the Bogota Conference.

Benjamin T. Harris/2/

Brig General, USADOD/JCS Representative

Caribbean Survey Group

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates General Harris signed the original.

359. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harvey) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)

Washington, July 24, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 7/62. Top Secret; Noform; Continued Control; Sensitive.

SUBJECT

Operation Mongoose--End of Phase I

REFERENCE

Your Memorandum dated 11 July 1962, Subject as Above/1/

/1/Not found.

1. Pursuant to reference memorandum and in accordance with our previous discussions, set out below are comments for inclusion in your overall report to the Special Group (Augmented) at the conclusion of the first phase of Operation Mongoose, 31 July 1962. In preparing these comments it was found necessary to defer finalizing them until we had an opportunity to review and check them against the 23 July 1962 draft of NIE 85-2-62,/2/ a copy of which is available to you.

/2/This draft has not been found. For text of NIE 85-2-62, see Document 363.

2. Background, Purpose, and Accomplishments--Phase I:

a. On 16 March 1962, the Special Group (Augmented) approved Phase I of Operation Mongoose authorizing and directing that between that date and 31 July 1962, CIA mount a concentrated operational program to collect intelligence concerning Cuba and to develop, insofar as possible, clandestine resistance cadres inside Cuba. This plan authorized intelligence--political, economic, and covert actions, short of those reasonably calculated to

inspire revolt within the target area or otherwise require U.S. armed intervention. The plan required that actions taken during Phase I should be consistent with overt policies of isolating Castro in the Western Hemisphere and be undertaken in such a way as to permit U.S. disengagement with minimum losses of assets and prestige. Major operations going beyond the collection of intelligence have required approval in advance by the Special Group (Augmented).

b. Phase I of Operation Mongoose did not provide for a maximum operational program against Cuba and did not authorize any extensive use of U.S. military personnel, bases, and facilities. No decision was made to undertake a phased operation to provoke a revolt with the commitment that such revolt would be supported by U.S. military forces.

c. Within the policy limitations of Phase I, it was hoped that the following would be accomplished:

(1) The development of an effective functioning operational unit for the conduct of intelligence, psychological warfare and covert actions against Cuba.

(2) The development in depth of hard intelligence coverage of Cuba.

(3) The establishment of limited resistance cadres inside Cuba and an adequate assessment of the resistance potential, as well as operational conditions affecting the possibilities of organizing and inciting a major revolt.

(4) Keep alive, insofar as possible, the spirit of resistance inside Cuba and exploit any possibilities that appeared for the development of future Cuban leadership and revolutionary doctrine.

(5) Determine the possibilities of and, if possible, take action toward splitting the top Cuban leadership.

d. During Phase I the following has been accomplished:

(1) An effective operational unit for the conduct of multi-purpose operations against Cuba has been established and is functioning well. As of 23 July, 477 CIA staff personnel are devoting full time to this effort. In addition, a very large number of additional personnel are devoting part-time efforts to Operation Mongoose.

(2) Point c(2) above has been accomplished. Hard intelligence coverage of Cuba at the present time exists in depth and has increased substantially since the inception of Phase I. Through this coverage we now have an excellent understanding of military, political, economic and resistance conditions and activities inside Cuba as reflected [not] only by numerous individual intelligence disseminations, but by the intelligence reflected in summation in the forthcoming NIE 85-2-62. The plan for Phase I of Operation Mongoose contemplated that we would have established inside Cuba by 31 July 1962, *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* controlled reporting intelligence agents, including legal travelers. In fact, we have at the present time inside Cuba *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* controlled Cuban agents and *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* third country controlled agents, a total of *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* agents inside the target area. *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* third country controlled agents, reporting substantially on Cuba, are located outside Cuba. A substantial number of these will in the near future be dispatched on missions inside Cuba. In addition, *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* independent support agents are producing intermittent intelligence reports with some frequency concerning Cuba. The above figures do not include the extensive reporting from the Opa-Locka Intelligence Center, which is now totaling approximately 800 reports a month.

(3) With regard to Point c(3), we have been less successful. The original maximal planning under Phase I contemplated that we would have infiltrated into Cuba by 31 July 1962 at least 23 illegal intelligence reporting and resistance cadre teams. By the conclusion of this phase, we will have actually infiltrated no more than eleven such teams. In addition, four caching operations and one 1,500 pound re-supply operation will have been

completed. During August 1962, barring presently unforeseen operational failures or aborts, five more teams should have been infiltrated into Cuba, as well as two additional cache operations and one 3,000 pound re-supply operation. Our failure to meet the original schedule of team infiltrations primarily was due to two factors: (a) lack of policy approval by higher authority to make any extensive utilization of Department of Defense personnel and support, and (b) a series of operational failures and aborts due to weather, enemy action, failure of inside agents to keep rendezvous and, in a few instances, missions aborted by the Cuban agents involved for various reasons, including their dissatisfaction with U.S. lack of aggressiveness against Cuba. Since 1 April 1962, in addition to the operations involved above, 19 maritime operations have aborted or failed due to one or more of the factors listed immediately above. Had we been permitted to mount a more intensive and aggressive effort, the original infiltration schedule probably would have been met, possibly exceeded. You will recall that it was pointed out to the Special Group in March 1962 that the full implementation of the operational plan for infiltration would require use of Defense facilities which were not subsequently, as a matter of policy, forthcoming. The speed with which and the extent to which we can in the future infiltrate black teams for resistance purposes into Cuba will of course depend upon policy approvals by higher authority and the amount of support we can count on thereunder. Although we have had losses in connection with the teams infiltrated, Phase I has demonstrated that we can successfully infiltrate such teams and that, given proper policy approval and sufficient support, we can greatly increase the resistance cadres and activities inside Cuba.

(4) With regard to Point c(4) above, our activities, we believe, have had a substantial effect in supporting a spirit of resistance inside Cuba. This effect has not of course been as great as it would have been had we been able to mount a maximum covert action, paramilitary and psychological warfare operation. We have not been successful in developing an effective revolutionary movement or leadership around which a Cuban revolt inside Cuba could be rallied at the present time.

(5) With regard to Point c(5) above, we have developed a number of promising leads to the top Cuban leadership, but no immediate current possibility of splitting it.

3. Operational Estimate:

a. The operational estimate of conditions and possibilities inside Cuba is well reflected in the forthcoming NIE 85-2-62. In summation, based on the intelligence collected and our operational experience during Phase I, it is our conclusion that there is a sufficiently substantial resistance potential inside Cuba which, given a maximum operational effort, could be organized and incited into open revolt provided the Cubans could be assured that if they themselves revolted their revolt would be supported by U.S. intervention and that the U.S. would not permit it to be crushed by Castro's military and police counteraction. It is our opinion that there is an excellent chance such a revolt could be incited by late 1963 if we embark on a maximum operational program now. Possible dissatisfaction with the Cuban regime inside Cuba has materially increased over the past several months and is likely to continue to increase for some time. It is not likely to result in spontaneous revolt or in major widespread resistance without organized assistance and support from the U.S. The Military/Security/Police apparatus of the Castro regime is effective and its effectiveness can be expected to increase. It is and will remain, in our opinion, for the foreseeable future, capable of containing and eventually destroying the bulk of any unorganized, unsupported resistance or revolt which may arise in Cuba. If a revolt in Cuba is organized and incited, it will be destroyed at best within a matter of a few days if it is not supported by substantial military force.

b. With regard to the influence of Castro and Cuba elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere, the appeal of Castroism as such has dimmed appreciably in other Latin American states during the past several months, although there are many indications that Castro's Cuba is still active in subversive activities elsewhere in the Hemisphere, including firm evidence that Cuba provided \$10,000 to the 13th of November Guatemalan revolutionary group in Mexico City. It cannot be overstressed, however, that the Cuban regime has proven that violent social revolution and a break with the U.S. is possible in Latin America and will be supported by the Soviet Bloc without the USSR necessarily insisting on complete traditional communist control. The appeal of the Cuban example will increase in other Latin American states if reform lags and if hopes and promises remain

unfulfilled. Cuba also represents and will continue to represent a danger because its subversive activities might at any time provide the spark that would set off explosions in unsettled countries, for example, Venezuela and Guatemala. In addition, Cuba represents of course the dangerous example of a communist regime within the Western Hemisphere in defiance of the United States and breaching hemispheric solidarity.

4. Future Courses of Action:

Set out below are comments on the four possible future courses of action outlined in Paragraph 5 of reference memorandum:

"a. Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation; protect hemisphere from it:" If this course of action is adopted by higher authority, it will not result in the overthrow or probably in any material change in the Castro regime in the foreseeable future. If this course of action is adopted, the extent of effort currently being devoted by CIA and other agencies to Operation Mongoose should be reviewed and reconsidered and probably seriously curtailed. If this course of action is adopted, the U.S. Government will of course receive increased pressure from the multitudinous Cuban exile groups and will be faced with an increasing level of irresponsible unilateral Cuban actions based in and from the U.S.

"b. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without overt U.S. military commitment:" This course of action, which is very close to that undertaken in Phase I of Operation Mongoose, is not likely to result in the overthrow of the Castro regime in the foreseeable future and unless it is intensified to the point of substantially raising the "noise level" inside and outside the U.S., its effectiveness is likely to be limited to the collection of intelligence and to the containing of Cuba at about the present level. If this course of action is adopted, certain portions of the present CIA effort probably should be terminated, particularly the infiltration of black resistance teams, since without some phased plan for action these teams are being jeopardized to little purpose.

"c. Commit U.S. to help Cubans overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, with a step-by-step phasing to ensure success, including the use of U.S. military force if required at the end:" This is, in effect, the original operational proposal presented to the Special Group (Augmented) and disapproved in favor of Phase I on 16 March 1962. If this course of action is adopted, and if we are permitted thereunder in the immediate future to mount an all-out maximum operational effort to establish and support resistance inside Cuba with full covert use of military facilities and personnel, there is an excellent chance of inciting a revolt inside Cuba by late 1963. This would require maximal effort keyed to a phased plan and would require decision now to commit U.S. Forces to support such a revolt since, even if incited, such a revolt cannot be kept alive more than a few days in the face of Cuban military and security counteraction unless the revolt is supported by substantial military forces. This phasing is necessary too since, unless we can assure the Cubans that if they are able to revolt they will be supported, our chances of inducing them to engage in resistance and revolt to a sufficient extent to constitute more than an irritant to the Castro regime are remote. Details and specifics of the necessary actions to implement this course of action have been discussed with you on a number of occasions. Basic to successful implementation of such a course of action, and particularly the clandestine operational phases thereof, are a series of policy decisions by higher authority at the inception which would permit the operational units sufficient flexibility and freedom of action and decision within clearly understood policy parameters to effectively implement the operations involved on a phased basis.

"d. Use a provocation and overthrow the Castro-Communist regime by U.S. military force:" This course of action involves a policy decision by higher authority beyond the purview of CIA. If higher authority decides on this course of action, CIA is of course prepared to assist in developing the necessary provocation to justify such intervention and to assist in implementing this course of action with full intelligence and covert assets.

5. It is hoped that the above comments will be of some assistance to you in preparing your overall report on Phase I of Operation Mongoose to the Special Group (Augmented). It would be most appreciated if you would

make available to us copies of your report to the Special Group in order that we may comment as appropriate. If any further details or comments from us would be helpful, please let me know.

William K. Harvey/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Harvey signed the original.

360. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)

Washington, July 25, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 7/62. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. An attached distribution list indicates that 11 copies of the memorandum were prepared and copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, McCone, Harvey, Hurwitch, Harris, and Wilson. One copy was kept by Lansdale.

SUBJECT

Review of Operation Mongoose

This is the Operations report at the end of Phase I. It has been compiled to assist you in reviewing Operation Mongoose thus far and in determining the best course of U.S. action for the future.

This Operations report contains the contribution of each major participant, on objectives, on the planning and operational activity to win these objectives, and on future possibilities to be governed by the policy framework. A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 85-2-62)/1/ is being submitted separately for consideration in connection with this report.

/1/Document 363.

As Chief of Operations, I am indicating in this covering memorandum what I consider to be the most significant aspects of our policy and program picture. The full report of each major participant is appended,/2/ to ensure that you have access to the exact reporting as submitted.

/2/The appendices consisted of the reports made to Lansdale by the Operations Officers of the Department of State, USIA, the Department of Defense, and CIA, which are printed as Documents 355, 356, 358, and 359.

Objectives

As desired by higher authority on 30 November 1961, the U.S. undertook a special effort "in order to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime." After a review of operational planning and programming concepts, the Special Group (Augmented) provided guidelines on 14 March 1962 for Phase I, Operation Mongoose (roughly until the end of July 1962)/3/ The main objectives were seen as:

/3/Document 314.

- a. The acquisition of hard intelligence on the target area.
- b. Undertaking all other political, economic, and covert actions, short of inspiring a revolt in Cuba or developing the need for U.S. armed intervention.

c. Be consistent with U.S. overt policy, and remain in position to disengage with minimum loss in assets and U.S. prestige.

d. Continue JCS planning and essential preliminary actions for a decisive U.S. capability for intervention.

Accomplishment

Elements of the U.S. government were organized to reach the goals set for Phase I. My assessment of where we are on each objective is noted under appropriate sub-headings below. In general, this has been a remarkably quiet operation, well within the "noise" and "visibility" limits imposed.

Higher authority has been kept informed of progress through the Special Group (Augmented), by frequent reports. The Special Group has provided policy guidance, as required, in Phase I.

The Chief of Operations has coordinated the efforts of participating departments and agencies, through meetings of the Operational Representatives and by constant review of progress. The Operational Representative of each major U.S. participant in Operation Mongoose are William Harvey (CIA), Robert Hurwitch (State), Brig. Gen. Benjamin Harris (Defense), and Don Wilson (USIA).

My assessment of the organization, planning, and actions to reach the goals in Phase I:

Intelligence. CIA had the main assignment to acquire the "hard-intelligence" desired. The headquarters and field staff of CIA are now well organized for a major effort for this aspect of Operation Mongoose, being strengthened by a number of CIA officers experienced in "denied area" operations elsewhere in the world. Planning and actions rate superior, in a professional sense of intelligence collection.

CIA established the Caribbean Admission Center at Opa-Locka, Florida [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. It undertook a priority plan to collect information on the target from third country areas in Latin America and Europe. Inside Cuba, the recruitment and placement of third country nationals and initiation of Cuban collection nets, particularly in urban centers, has made Operation Mongoose numerically the largest U.S. intelligence agent effort inside a Communist state. However, the effort in more remote provincial areas of Cuba, where guerrilla resistance was expected to be spotted, recruited, and organized, was short of the hoped-for goal; this was due to the regime's security precautions and, to some degree, to policy limitations on the risks to be assumed.

Defense contributed the majority of personnel to staff the Caribbean Admission Center, stepped-up SIGINT collection under NSA despite changes and improved sophistication of Cuban communication procedures, and brought into play the available assets of Service intelligence organizations, in coordination with CIA. State stepped up its information collection from diplomatic and refugee organization sources. Justice (FBI and INS) and USIA provided significant support to the Caribbean Admission Center.

Political. State appointed a representative to devote full-time to Operation Mongoose and to develop the required political actions. During Phase I, the Punta del Este conference was a major U.S. political action to isolate Castro and neutralize his influence in the Hemisphere, but was not developed within the context of Operation Mongoose. The successful visit of President Kennedy to Mexico was another major U.S. political action, with a potential impact upon our special goals, but was not developed within the context of Operation Mongoose. Two Operation Mongoose efforts in political action were attempted in Phase I: to counter Castro-Communist propaganda exploitation of May Day and to arouse strong Hemisphere reaction to Cuban military suppression of the hunger demonstration at Cardenas, in June. Ambassadors in Latin America were asked to undertake a special effort, as possible, with the help of their Country Teams; political action results in both instances were mostly negative, due to lack of capability and the local attitude in Latin American countries.

State is responsible for refugee political policy matters, assisted by CIA in daily liaison. This is an area of major interest to Operation Mongoose, since the Cuban refugees have an open objective of overthrowing the Communist regime in Havana and recapturing their homeland. They are given open U.S. assistance to remain in this country, yet are participating in covert actions in a limited way. Only a fractional opening has been made to release the frustrated energy of these refugees in freeing their homeland and in creating a favorable political climate in Latin America for the liberation of Cuba. Policy limitations of "audibility" and "visibility" apply directly in considering the handling and use of this dynamic refugee potential.

As a working document for U.S. operational guidance, State developed a definition of a political program for a free Cuba, with the understanding that any real political program must be developed by the Cubans themselves.

Psychological. Psychological activities for Operation Mongoose make use of existing assignments of responsibilities within the U.S. government: State, having the policy role, chairs an inter-agency Cuba Psychological Operations Group which meets weekly; USIA disseminates any U.S. government information (VOA and Press Service) and generates "gray" or non-official information (5 million cartoon books and thousands of Spanish books on Cuba disseminated in Latin America); CIA passes information appropriate for "gray" and covert psychological channels (radio, mailings to Cuba, and dissemination inside Cuba).

Conditions and events in Cuba have provided many effective themes, which have been promptly and sharply exploited by available means in the Western Hemisphere. However, the U.S. still lacks the capability of effectively getting information to the majority of the Cuban people. Our short-wave broadcasts are highly regarded by the Cuban people, but short-wave receiver sets are limited inside Cuba. Our medium-wave broadcasts compete against stronger Cuban signals; it was felt that greater U.S. competition in medium-wave broadcasts could lead to Cuban interference of U.S. commercial broadcasts over a fairly wide area of the U.S. Clandestine broadcasts from a submarine (appearing as broadcasts by Cuban guerrillas inside Cuba) have been initiated; they are in their infancy, and have a long way to develop before their messages are believed and get passed among Cubans by word-of-mouth. Dissemination of leaflets and propaganda inside Cuba by balloon or aircraft has not received policy approval.

Economic. State has the main responsibility for developing economic actions. State has chaired an inter-agency working group, which generated the U.S. trade embargo, denial of bunkering facilities, increased port security, and control procedures on transshipment, technical data, and customs inspection. Diplomatic means were used to frustrate Cuban trade negotiations in Israel, Jordan, Iran, Greece, and possibly Japan. Under Resolution VIII adopted at Punta del Este, the OAS has established a special committee to study "the feasibility and desirability of extending the suspension of trade with Cuba to other items (than arms)," State has prepared a program to be submitted to this OAS committee in the future.

The evidence is that Cuba's economy is suffering. Trade with the Communist Bloc and others has kept it limping along, despite scarcity of U.S. goods, the bad drought limiting agrarian crops, increased worker non-cooperation and the regime's bungling of economic control measures. Critical spare parts still arrive in Cuba, including shipments from British and Canadian firms. Chartered shipping from Free World sources still plays a major role in Cuba's trade, and the U.S. has little hope of cutting this life-line to Castro.

Guerrilla. CIA had the main responsibility for assessing resistance potential inside Cuba and to start quietly organizing such resistance as feasible. The CIA plan has been to set about doing this through introducing small teams into the Cuban countryside, "over the beach" from boats. Each team is tasked first to stay alive, while getting established in an area. Once able to live in an area, it then starts a cautious survey of potential recruits for a resistance group. Names of such recruits are sent to CIA for checking. As recruits join, they are trained on the ground by the team, and then continue the survey. This is slow and dangerous work.

CIA reports that 11 teams will have been infiltrated by the end of July and that 19 maritime operations have aborted. Of the teams in, the most successful is the one in Pinar del Rio in western Cuba; its success was helped

greatly by a maritime re-supply of arms and equipment; the fact that it is a "going concern" and receives help from outside has attracted recruits. Its potential has been estimated at about 250, which is a sizable guerrilla force. With equally large guerrilla forces in other Cuban provinces, guerrilla warfare could be activated with a good chance of success, if assisted properly. However, the teams in other provinces have not been so successful; our best hope is that we will have viable teams in all the potential resistance areas by early October. Bad weather, high seas, and increased security patrols will make the infiltration of teams and their re-supply from small boats a hard task.

Sabotage has not taken place, on a U.S.-sponsored basis. Planning for such action by CIA has been thorough, including detailed study of the structures and vulnerabilities of key targets. Sophisticated actions, such as the contamination of POL has been frustrated by lack of cooperation of nations where POL would be vulnerable to action. Commando type raids would take maritime means which now have priority use in support of CIA teams being infiltrated inside to survey and create a guerrilla potential. CIA has reported that there is now some capability inside Cuba for sabotage action, that target selection has been under further careful review, and that a proposal is forthcoming to be submitted for policy approval.

Intervention Planning. The JCS were given the responsibility for planning and undertaking essential preliminary actions for a decisive U.S. capability for intervention in Cuba. This "Guidelines" objective has been met, fully. Also, U.S. military readiness for intervention in Cuba has been under continuing review within Defense, being improved wherever feasible. In addition, rumors during June of a possible uprising inside Cuba led to further planning for a contingency where a non-U.S. inspired revolt might start inside Cuba; inter-agency staffing of U.S. planning for such a Cuban contingency is being completed, under Defense leadership.

Assets. Whatever we decide to do in the future depends, to a large degree, on the assets available to us. Our own U.S. assets in organization, personnel, and equipment are sufficient to liberate Cuba, given the decision to do so. Assets among the Cubans, to liberate themselves, are capable of a greater effectiveness once a firm decision is made by the U.S. to provide maximum support of Cubans to liberate Cuba, and the Cubans start being helped towards that goal by the U.S. There are enough able-bodied and properly motivated Cubans inside Cuba and in exile to do the job. There is wide-spread disaffection in Cuba, with strong indications that economic distress and demoralization of population is causing real concern and strain for the regime's control officials. Firm U.S. intention to help free Cuba is the key factor in assessing the Cubans themselves as an operational asset for Operation Mongoose.

At the close of Phase I, my concern is strong that time is running out for the U.S. to make a free choice on Cuba, based largely on what is happening to the will of the Cuban people. Rightly or wrongly, the Cubans have looked and are looking to the U.S. for guidance on what to aspire to and do next. They wonder if we are not merely watching Cuba closely, as a matter of our own security, undertaking some economic proscription, and isolating the Castro/Communist gang from contaminating the Hemisphere. Along with recognition of our humanitarian sympathies, this seems to be the fear among Cuban refugees, although they are still hopeful.

If Cubans become convinced that the U.S. is not going to do more than watch and talk, I believe they will make other plans for the future. The bulk of Cuban refugees in the U.S. are most likely to start getting serious about settling down for life in the U.S., dulling their desire to return home with personal risk involved. The bulk of disaffected people inside Cuba will lose hope and incentive for futile protests against the regime and start accepting their status as captives of the Communists. Some Cuban activists will not accept the loss of their homeland so easily and may seek release from frustration by liberation operations outside U.S. territory and control. The recent wildcat Cuban scheme to bomb Habana from Central America is an example.

Our probes of the guerrilla potential inside Cuba have been hampered by similar morale factors. Cubans sent to risk their lives on missions inside Cuba feel very much alone, except for their communications link back to the U.S. They are unable to recruit freedom fighters aggressively by the time-proven method of starting an active resistance and thus attracting recruits; U.S. guidelines to keep this short of a revolt have made the intention

behind the operation suspect to local Cubans. The evidence of some intent is seen in the recent maritime re-supply of the team in Pinar del Rio. We brought in extra weapons, for which there were immediate recruits; if we were to exploit the evident guerrilla potential in this province, it appears likely that we would have to furnish supplies by air and probably open the U.S. to strong charges of furnishing such support to Cuban resistance elements.

Therefore, we have been unable to surface the Cuban resistance potential to a point where we can measure it realistically. The only way this can be done, accurately, is when resistance actually has a rallying point of freedom fighters who appear to the Cuban people to have some chance of winning, and that means at least an implication that the U.S. is in support. Word-of-mouth information that such a freedom movement is afoot could cause the majority of the Cuban people to choose sides. It would be the first real opportunity for them to do so since Castro and the Communists came to power. There was little opportunity for the Cuban people to join an active resistance in April 1961; there is less opportunity today. If the Cuban people are to feel they have a real opportunity, they must have something which they can join with some belief in its success.

Projection (Phase II).

As a help towards the making of a U.S. decision on a future course of action, the Operational Representatives developed working statements of four possibilities; at my request they have commented on the positive and negative factors worth considering for each possible course, and it is suggested that these thoughtful statements are worth reading in full. The working statements of the choices open to the U.S. are as follows:

a. Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation; protect Hemisphere from it, or

b./4/ Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without overt employment of U.S. military, or

/4/This copy of this memorandum, which was presumably General Taylor's, was marked by McGeorge Bundy at this point with an arrow pointing to option b.

c. Commit U.S. to help Cubans overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, with a step-by-step phasing to ensure success, including the use of U.S. military force if required at the end, or

d. Use a provocation and overthrow the Castro-Communist regime by U.S. military force.

Recommendation

It is recommended that this review of Phase I be considered by the Special Group as providing the operational basis for guidelines and objectives for Phase II. It is a matter of urgency that these be arrived at by the Special Group, to permit developing specific plans and schedules for Phase II.